Patna High Court
RAJ NARAYAN SINGHversusTHE STATE OF BIHAR
- Decided
- Disposal
- ALLOWED
- Bench
- SANDEEP KUMAR
Holding
The appeal is allowed; the order dismissing the discharge application is quashed as no offence under the SC/ST Act and insufficient material for IPC offences.
Summary
The appellant Raj Narayan Singh was implicated in a case arising from an old land dispute with the informant Ram Janam Ram. The FIR alleged offences under IPC sections 341, 323, 504, 506 and under Section 3(1)(V) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The appellant contended that the dispute was purely civil, that no intentional insult or intimidation of a Scheduled Caste member occurred, and that the IPC charges were not made out. The High Court examined a series of Supreme Court and High Court precedents on the distinction between civil wrongs and criminal offences, the ingredients of the SC/ST Act, and the requirements of a valid charge‑sheet. It held that the facts showed only a land‑related conflict, not an offence under the SC/ST Act, and that the material was insufficient to sustain the IPC charges. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the order dismissing the discharge application was quashed.
Issues considered
- The occurrence constitutes an offence under Section 3(1)(V) (now 3(1)(r)) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
- Whether the allegations under IPC sections 341, 323, 504 and 506 are made out.
- Whether the High Court may quash the order under its inherent powers when the charge‑sheet lacks sufficient material.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 173(2), 190, 202, 204, 211, 212, 213, 218, 227, 251
- Indian Penal Code — s. 323, 341, 406, 415, 420, 503, 504, 506
- SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — s. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(V)
Subjects
- SC/ST Act
- land dispute
- civil vs criminal
- cheating
- criminal intimidation
- charge‑sheet
- quash
- inherent powers
- IPC sections
- public view
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.3824 of 2021
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-248 Year-2017 Thana- CHAND District- Kaimur (Bhabua)
======================================================
RAJ NARAYAN SINGH S/o Late Bhadra Singh Resident of Village-
Pipariya, P.S.- Chand, District- Kaimur (Bhabua)
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. THE STATE OF BIHAR Bihar
2. RAM JANAM RAM S/o Late Bilgu Ram Resident of Village- Pipariya,
P.S.- Chand, District- Kaimur (Bhabua.)
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Krishna Pd. Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr.Bhaskar Shankar
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Usha Kumari 1
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
8 03-02-2026 Heard the parties.
2. This appeal is preferred for quashing the order
dated 20.03.2021 passed by the learned Court of Additional
District and Sessions Judge-1st-cum-Special Judge, SC/ST Act,
Kaimur at Bhabhua in SC/ST Registration No. 351 of 2017
arising out of Chand P.S. Case No. 248 of 2017 by which the
discharge application of the appellant has been dismissed.
3. The prosecution story is based on the basis of
written application dated 01.11.2017 by informant Ram Janam
Ram. As per informant, there was an old land dispute between
him and co-accused Ram Dulare Ram. After measurement of
land in question by an Amin, accused Ram Dular Ram
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constructed his house but when informant started work for
making his house, Ram Dular Ram illegally encroached his land
as a result of which a heated exchange took place between the
parties which was the cause of present occurrence.
4. On the application of the informant, the present
case was instituted and after investigation charge sheet was
submitted u/s 341, 323, 504, 506/34 1.P.C. and u/s 3 (1) (V) (S)
of SC/ST Act. Thereafter, cognizance was taken under same
sections on 02.08.2018 and because of the same, the appellant
filed an application on 16.10.2018 u/s 227 Cr.P.C. which was
heard and dismissed on 20.03.2021.
5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits
that upon bare perusal of the FIR, it will appear that no offence
is made out against the appellant u/s 3 (1) (V) (S) of SC/ST Act
as the occurrence has taken place because of old land dispute
between the parties.
6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant further
submits that there is case and counter case between the parties
and the offence, as alleged, under the provisions of Indian Penal
Code are triable by Magistrate.
7. He next submits that the appellant has falsely been
implicated in this case by the informant because of village
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politics and therefore the same may be quashed.
8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for
the appellant has relied upon Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court passed in case of Hitesh Verma Versus State of
Uttarakhand reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710.
9. Learned APP for the State has opposed the
application of the appellant and has supported the impugned
order.
10. I have heard and considered the submission of
the parties.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Rikhab Birani v. State of U.P. reported as 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 823 has held as under:-
14. During the last couple of months, a
number of judgments/orders have been
pronounced by this Court, especially in
cases arising from the State of Uttar
Pradesh, deprecating the stance of the
police as well as the courts in failing to
distinguish between a civil wrong in the
form of a breach of contract, non-
payment of money or disregard to and
violation of contractual terms; and a
criminal offence under Sections 420 and
406 of the IPC, the ingredients of which
are quite different and requires mens rea
at the time when the contract is entered
into itself to not abide by the terms
thereof.
15. In Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar
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Pradesh, this Court quoted an earlier
decision in Mohammed Ibrahim v. State
of Bihar, wherein, referring to Section
420 of the IPC, it was observed that the
offence under the said Section requires
the following ingredients to be satisfied:
“18. Let us now examine whether the
ingredients of an offence of cheating
are made out. The essential
ingredients of the offence of
“cheating” are as follows:
(i) deception of a person either by
making a false or misleading
representation or by dishonest
concealment or by any other
act or omission;
(ii) fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of that person to
either deliver any property or
to consent to the retention
thereof by any person or to
intentionally induce that
person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he
were not so deceived; and
(iii) such act or omission causing
or is likely to cause damage
or harm to that person in
body, mind, reputation or
property.”
16. Reference was also made to the decision
in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat and it was
observed:
“7. Similar elucidation by this Court in
“V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat”,
explicitly states that a contractual
dispute or breach of contract per se
should not lead to initiation of a
criminal proceeding. The ingredient
of ‘cheating’, as defined under
Section 415 of the IPC, is existence
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of a fraudulent or dishonest intention
of making initial promise or
representation thereof, from the very
beginning of the formation of
contract. Further, in the absence of
the averments made in the complaint
petition wherefrom the ingredients of
the offence can be found out, the
High Court should not hesitate to
exercise its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C saves the inherent
power of the High Court, as it serves
a salutary purpose viz. a person
should not undergo harassment of
litigation for a number of years,
when no criminal offence is made
out. It is one thing to say that a case
has been made out for trial and
criminal proceedings should not be
quashed, but another thing to say
that a person must undergo a
criminal trial despite the fact that no
offence has been made out in the
complaint. This Court in V.Y. Jose
(supra) placed reliance on several
earlier decisions in “Hira Lal Hari
Lal Bhagwati v. CBI”, “Indian Oil
Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.”,
“Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar
Agarwal” and “All Cargo Movers (I)
(P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal
Jain”.”
17. This Court, in Delhi Race Club (1940)
Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
highlighted the fine distinction between
the offences of criminal breach of trust
and cheating, observing that the two are
antithetical in nature and cannot coexist
simultaneously. Police officers and
courts must carefully apply their minds to
determine whether the allegations
genuinely constitute the specific offence
alleged.
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18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh11, this
Court referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State
of Punjab12 wherein it was observed that
a breach of contract does not give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating unless
fraudulent or dishonest intention is
shown right at the beginning of the
transaction. Merely on the allegation of
failure to keep a promise will not be
enough to initiate criminal proceedings.
Thus, the dishonest intention on the part
of the party who is alleged to have
committed the offence of cheating should
be established at the time of entering into
the transaction with the complainant,
otherwise the offence of cheating is not
established or made out.
19. It is the duty and obligation of the court
to exercise a great deal of caution in
issuing process, particularly when the
matter is essentially of civil
nature.13 The prevalent impression that
civil remedies, being time-consuming, do
not adequately protect the interests of
creditors or lenders should be
discouraged and rejected as criminal
procedure cannot be used to apply
pressure.14 Failure to do so results in the
breakdown of the rule of law and
amounts to misuse and abuse of the legal
process.
20. In yet another case, again arising from
criminal proceedings initiated in the
State of Uttar Pradesh,15 this Court was
constrained to note recurring cases being
encountered wherein parties repeatedly
attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of
criminal courts by filing vexatious
complaints, camouflaging allegations
that are ex facie outrageous or are pure
civil claims. These attempts must not be
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entertained and should be dismissed at
the threshold. Reference was made to a
judgment of this Court in Thermax
Limited v. K.M. Johny16, which held that
courts should be watchful of the
difference between civil and criminal
wrongs, though there can be situations
where the allegation may constitute both
civil and criminal wrongs. Further, there
has to be a conscious application of mind
on these aspects by the Magistrate, as a
summoning order has grave
consequences of setting criminal
proceedings in motion. Though the
Magistrate is not required to record
detailed reasons, there should be
adequate evidence on record to set
criminal proceedings into motion. The
Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the
evidence on record and may even put
questions to the
complainant/investigating officer etc. to
elicit answers to find out the truth about
the allegations. The summoning order
has to be passed when the complaint or
chargesheet discloses an offence and
when there is material that supports and
constitutes essential ingredients of the
offence. The summoning order should not
be passed lightly or as a matter of
course.
21. Lastly, we would refer to another detailed
judgment of this Court in Sharif
Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh17,
which draws out the ingredients required
to establish an offence under
Sections 406, 415, 420, 503 and 506 of
the IPC in the following terms:
“36. An offence under Section 406 of
the IPC requires entrustment, which
carries the implication that a person
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handing over any property or on
whose behalf the property is handed
over, continues to be the owner of the
said property. Further, the person
handing over the property must have
confidence in the person taking the
property to create a fiduciary
relationship between them. A normal
transaction of sale or exchange of
money/consideration does not
amount to entrustment. Clearly, the
charge/offence of Section 406 IPC is
not even remotely made out.
37. The chargesheet states that the
offence under Section 420 is not
made out. The offence of cheating
under Section 415 of
the IPC requires dishonest
inducement, delivering of a property
as a result of the inducement, and
damage or harm to the person so
induced. The offence of cheating is
established when the dishonest
intention exists at the time when the
contract or agreement is entered, for
the essential ingredient of the offence
of cheating consists of fraudulent or
dishonest inducement of a person by
deceiving him to deliver any
property, to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he
had not been deceived. As per the
investigating officer, no fraudulent
and dishonest inducement is made
out or established at the time when
the agreement was entered.
38. An offence of criminal intimidation
arises when the accused intendeds to
cause alarm to the victim, though it
does not matter whether the victim is
alarmed or not. The intention of the
accused to cause alarm must be
established by bringing evidence on
record. The word ‘intimidate’ means
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to make timid or fearful, especially :
to compel or deter by or as if by
threats. The threat communicated or
uttered by the person named in the
chargesheet as an accused, should be
uttered and communicated by the
said person to threaten the victim for
the purpose of influencing her mind.
The word ‘threat’ refers to the intent
to inflict punishment, loss or pain on
the other. Injury involves doing an
illegal act.
39. This Court in Manik Taneja v. State of
Karnataka, had referred to Section
506 which prescribes punishment for
the offence of ‘criminal intimidation’
as defined in Section 503 of the IPC,
to observe that the offence under
Section 503 requires that there must
be an act of threating another person
with causing an injury to his person,
reputation or property, or to the
person or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested. This
threat must be with the intent to
cause alarm to the person threatened
or to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do, or omit to do an
act which he is entitled to do. Mere
expression of any words without any
intent to cause alarm would not be
sufficient to bring home an offence
under Section 506 of the IPC. The
material and evidence must be
placed on record to show that the
threat was made with an intent to
cause alarm to the complainant, or to
cause them to do, or omit to do an
act. Considering the statutory
mandate, offence under Section 506
is not shown even if we accept the
allegation as correct.”
22. Significantly, this Court in Sharif
Ahmed (supra) cautioned courts to check
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such attempts of making out a criminal
case on the basis of vague and ex
facie false assertions.
23. Further, Sharif Ahmed (supra) exposits
the legal position relating to the
ingredients and contents of a
chargesheet, drawing upon several
earlier judgments of this Court which
elucidate the contents of a police report
under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It
also clarifies the course of action to be
adopted by the Magistrate when the
chargesheet is found to be incomplete or
vague in content. In this context,
reference may be made to
Sections 190 and 204 of the Cr.P.C., as
well as Sections 211 to 213 and 218 of
the Cr.P.C., which collectively govern the
framing and contents of a charge. Some
of the portions of this judgment are
reproduced below:
“13. The question of the required details
being complete must be understood
in a way which gives effect to the true
intent of the chargesheet under
Section 173(2) of the Code. The
requirement of “further evidence” or
a “supplementary chargesheet” as
referred to under Section 173(8) of
the Code, is to make additions to a
complete chargesheet8, and not to
make up or reparate for a
chargesheet which does not fulfil
requirements of Section 173(2) of the
Code. The chargesheet is complete
when it refers to material and
evidence sufficient to take cognizance
and for the trial. The nature and
standard of evidence to be elucidated
in a chargesheet should prima facie
show that an offence is established if
the material and evidence is proven.
The chargesheet is complete where a
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case is not exclusively dependent on
further evidence. The trial can
proceed on the basis of evidence and
material placed on record with the
chargesheet. This standard is not
overly technical or fool-proof, but a
pragmatic balance to protect the
innocent from harassment due to
delay as well as prolonged
incarceration, and yet not curtail the
right of the prosecution to forward
further evidence in support of the
charges.
XXXXXX
16. This Court in Bhushan Kumar v. State
(NCT of Delhi) while referring to
Sections 190 and 204 of the Code has
observed that the expression
“cognisance” in Section 190 merely
means “becoming aware of”, and
when used with reference to a court
or a judge it connotes “to take notice
of judicially”. It indicates the
juncture at which the court or
Magistrate takes judicial notice of
the offence with a view to initiate
proceedings in respect of such an
offence. This is different from
initiation of proceedings. Rather, it is
a condition precedent to the initiation
of proceedings by a Magistrate or
judge. At this stage, the Magistrate
has to keep in mind the averments in
the complaint or the police report,
and has to evaluate whether there is
sufficient ground for initiation of
proceedings. This is not the same as
the consideration of sufficient
grounds for conviction, as whether
evidence is sufficient for supporting
the conviction or not, can be
determined only at the stage of trial,
and not at the stage of cognisance.
This aspect is important and will be
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subsequently referred to when we
examine the decision of this Court
in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India,
and the observations therein which
have been referred to on several
occasions in other judgments.
17. Section 204 of the Code does not
mandate the Magistrate to explicitly
state the reasons for issue of
summons and this is not a
prerequisite for deciding the validity
of the summons. Nevertheless, the
requirement of the Code is that the
summons is issued when it appears to
the Magistrate that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the
accused. Summons is issued to the
person against whom the legal
proceedings have commenced. Wilful
disobedience is liable to be punished
under Section 174 of the Penal Code,
1860. As a sequitur, keeping in mind
both the language of Section 204 of
the Code and the penal
consequences, the Magistrate is
mandated to form an opinion as to
whether there exists sufficient ground
for summons to be issued. While
deciding whether summons is to be
issued to a person, the Magistrate
can take into consideration
any prima facie improbabilities
arising in the case. The parameters
on which a summoning order can be
interfered with are well settled by the
decision of this court in Bhushan
Kumar (supra). The Magistrate in
terms of Section 204 of the Code is
required to exercise his judicial
discretion with a degree of caution,
even when he is not required to
record reasons, on whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding.
Proceedings initiated by a criminal
court are generally not interfered
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with by High Courts, unless
necessary to secure the ends of
justice.
XXXXXX
19. Sections 211 to 213 and Section 218
of the Code deal with the contents of
the charge. The object and purpose
of these provisions is to bring the
nature of allegations against the
accused to his notice. These
allegations have to be proved and
established by leading evidence. The
accused should not be taken by
surprise or be unbeknownst so as to
cause prejudice to him. The
provisions of the Code also prescribe
how to interpret the words used in the
charge in terms of Section 214 of the
Code, the effect of defects in the
charge in terms of Section 215 of the
Code, the power of the court to alter
the charge and recall of the witnesses
when a charge is altered in terms of
Sections 216 and 217 of the Code.
20. There is an inherent connect between
the chargesheet submitted under
Section 173(2) of the Code,
cognisance which is taken under
Section 190 of the Code, issue of
process and summoning of the
accused under Section 204 of the
Code, and thereupon issue of notice
under Section 251 of the Code, or the
charge in terms of Chapter XVII of
the Code. The details set out in the
chargesheet have a substantial
impact on the efficacy of procedure
at the subsequent stages. The
chargesheet is integral to the process
of taking cognisance, the issue of
notice and framing of charge, being
the only investigative document and
evidence available to the court till
that stage. Substantiated reasons and
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grounds for an offence being made in
the chargesheet are a key resource
for a Magistrate to evaluate whether
there are sufficient grounds for
taking cognisance, initiating
proceedings, and then issuing notice,
framing charges etc.
XXXXXX
26. The object and purpose of the police
investigation is manyfold. It includes
the need to ensure transparent and
free investigation to ascertain the
facts, examine whether or not an
offence is committed, identify the
offender if an offence is committed,
and to lay before the court the
evidence which has been collected,
the truth and correctness of which is
thereupon decided by the court.
27. In H.N. Rishbud and Inder
Singh v. State of Delhi21, this Court
notes that the process of investigation
generally consists of : 1) proceeding
to the concerned spot, 2)
ascertainment of facts and
circumstances, 3) discovery and
arrest, 4) collection of evidence
which includes examination of
various persons, search of places and
seizure of things, and 5) formation of
an opinion on whether an offence is
made out, and filing the chargesheet
accordingly. The formation of
opinion is therefore the culmination
of several stages that an
investigation goes through. This
Court in its decision in Abhinandan
Jha v. Dinesh Mishra22 states that
the submission of the chargesheet or
the final report is dependent on the
nature of opinion formed, which is
the final step in the investigation.
28. The final report has to be prepared
with these aspects in mind and
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should show with sufficient
particularity and clarity, the
contravention of the law which is
alleged. When the report complies
with the said requirements, the court
concerned should apply its mind
whether or not to take cognisance
and also proceed by issuing summons
to the accused. While doing so, the
court will take into account the
statement of witnesses recorded
under Section 161 of the Code and
the documents placed on record by
the investigating officer.
29. In case of any doubts or ambiguity
arising in ascertaining the facts and
evidence, the Magistrate can, before
taking cognisance, call upon the
investigating officer to clarify and
give better particulars, order further
investigation, or even record
statements in terms of Section 202 of
the Code.
XX XX XX”
12. Further, in the case of Hitesh Verma (Supra)
the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held as under:
11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet
filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)
(x) of the Act. The said section stands
substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26-1-
2016. The substituted corresponding
provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads
as under:
“3. (1)(r) intentionally insults
or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view;”
12. The basic ingredients of the offence
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under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be
classified as
“(1) intentionally insults or
intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe and (2) in
any place within public
view”.
13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the
Act would indicate the ingredient of
intentional insult and intimidation with
an intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
All insults or intimidations to a person
will not be an offence under the Act
unless such insult or intimidation is on
account of victim belonging to Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of
the Act is to improve the socio-economic
conditions of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied
number of civil rights. Thus, an offence
under the Act would be made out when a
member of the vulnerable section of the
society is subjected to indignities,
humiliations and harassment. The
assertion of title over the land by either
of the parties is not due to either the
indignities, humiliations or harassment.
Every citizen has a right to avail their
remedies in accordance with law.
Therefore, if the appellant or his family
members have invoked jurisdiction of the
civil court, or that Respondent 2 has
invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court,
then the parties are availing their
remedies in accordance with the
procedure established by law. Such
action is not for the reason that
Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled
Caste.
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14. Another key ingredient of the provision is
insult or intimidation in “any place
within public view”. What is to be
regarded as “place in public view” had
come up for consideration before this
Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v.
State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC
(Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn
distinction between the expression
“public place” and “in any place within
public view”. It was held that if an
offence is committed outside the building
e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the
lawn can be seen by someone from the
road or lane outside the boundary wall,
then the lawn would certainly be a place
within the public view. On the contrary, if
the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there
(not merely relatives or friends) then it
would not be an offence since it is not in
the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence
appears to be contrary to what is stated
below in the extract from Swaran Singh,
(2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in
the application of this principle in para
15, below:“Also, even if the remark is
made inside a building, but some
members of the public are there (not
merely relatives or friends) then also it
would be an offence since it is in the
public view.”] . The Court held as
under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)
“28. It has been alleged in the FIR
that Vinod Nagar, the first informant,
was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3
(by calling him a “chamar”) when he
stood near the car which was parked
at the gate of the premises. In our
opinion, this was certainly a place
within public view, since the gate of a
house is certainly a place within
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public view. It could have been a
different matter had the alleged
offence been committed inside a
building, and also was not in the
public view. However, if the offence is
committed outside the building e.g. in
a lawn outside a house, and the lawn
can be seen by someone from the
road or lane outside the boundary
wall, the lawn would certainly be a
place within the public view. Also,
even if the remark is made inside a
building, but some members of the
public are there (not merely relatives
or friends) then also it would be an
offence since it is in the public view.
We must, therefore, not confuse the
expression “place within public
view” with the expression “public
place”. A place can be a private
place but yet within the public view.
On the other hand, a public place
would ordinarily mean a place which
is owned or leased by the
Government or the municipality (or
other local body) or gaon sabha or
an instrumentality of the State, and
not by private persons or private
bodies.” (emphasis in original)
13. In view of the afore-quoted Judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court and upon reading of the FIR, it is clear
that the abuses has taken place for occurrence relating to land
and therefore, the provisions of SC/ST Act will not be
applicable.
14. From the reading of the FIR and from the
discussions made herein above, it appears that there is no
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.3824 of 2021(8) dt.03-02-2026
19/19
sufficient material against the appellant for which he shall be
prosecuted under the provisions of IPC.
15. Considering the aforesaid, this appeal is allowed.
16. Accordingly, the order dated 20.03.2021 passed by
the learned Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge-1st-
cum-Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Kaimur at Bhabhua in SC/ST
Registration No. 351 of 2017 arising out of Chand P.S. Case No.
248 of 2017, is hereby quashed.
(Sandeep Kumar, J)
Vikas/-
U
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