RATNESHWAR KUMARversusThe State of Bihar

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                  CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.53270 of 2023
             Arising out of PS. Case No.-389 Year-2020 Thana- BUXAR District- Buxar
     ======================================================
     Ratneshwar Kumar S/o Late Shiv Janam Ram R/o Village- Baruna, Basuna,
     Basudhar, P.O. And P.S.- Buxar, District- Buxar. Atpresent Dismissed Data
     Entry Operator (GRADE-A, Buxar Treasury, Buxar

                                                                        ... ... Petitioner/s
                                            Versus
1.   The State of Bihar
2.   The District Magistrate, Buxar Bihar
3.   The Additional Collector, Buxar Bihar
4.   The Superintendent Of Police, (VIGILANCE), Bihar, Patna Bihar
5.   The Deputy Superintendent Of Police (VIGILANCE), Bihar, Patna Bihar
6.   The S.H.O. Town Police Station, Buxar Bihar
7.   The Senior Treasury Officer, Buxar Bihar

                                            ... ... Opposite Party/s
     ======================================================
     Appearance :
     For the Petitioner/s     :        Mr. Abhash Ad., Advocate
     For the State            :        Mr. Jai Narain Thakur, SPP (Vigilance)

     ======================================================
     CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANSUL
                           CAV JUDGMENT
      Date : 24-06-2026

                  Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned

     counsel for the State.

                  2. Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks quashing of

     the FIR registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020

     dated 05.09.2020 and the entire proceedings of Special Case No.

     22 of 2020 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance,

     Patna, both arising out of alleged offences under Sections 7, 8 and

     9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
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          3. The petitioner, Ratneshwar Kumar, was a Data Entry

Operator (Grade-A) at the Buxar Treasury and has been dismissed

from service. On 22.07.2020, one Saryu Ojha, a pensioner, visited

the Treasury and was paid his pension on the same day. This

appears to be the event at the heart of this prosecution, though

what is curious is that the FIR was not registered on that date, nor

was any complaint made anywhere near that date. A video

surfaced on social media on 28.08.2020, more than a month later

of the said occurrence, purporting to show the petitioner receiving

money from Saryu Ojha. The District Magistrate, Buxar, upon

noticing the video, directed the Additional Collector to hold an

enquiry. The Additional Collector returned a finding against the

petitioner vide letter No. 10-3228 dated 04.09.2020 and

recommended registration of a case. Accordingly, the Senior

Treasury Officer, Ajmal Ali Ansari, addressed a written complaint

vide letter No. 180438 dated 05.09.2020 to the SHO, Town Police

Station, Buxar, and the present Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of

2020 came to be registered under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Investigation was entrusted to

CI Mukesh Kumar Shree.

          4.    Having considered the FIR, which is on record as

Annexure-1, the Court finds that no specific demand is mentioned
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therein, no occasion of acceptance is identified, no sum is

described as a bribe, and no time or place where illegal

gratification is said to have changed hands finds mention. The date

of occurrence is recorded as 28.08.2020, being the date the video

went viral, and not the date the pension was paid. The

complainant, Ajmal Ali Ansari, was the petitioner’s superior

officer at the Treasury and was plainly not present at the place of

occurrence , where the alleged transaction between Ratneshwar

Kumar and Saryu Ojhais said to have taken place. Sections 7, 8

and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 require, at their

very threshold, proof of acceptance or obtaining of undue

advantage and such undue advantage must pass from an

identifiable person to a public servant. Here, the only person from

whom it is alleged to have passed is Saryu Ojha himself.

           5. It is in the context of that statutory requirement that

the investigative record becomes fatal to the prosecution. Saryu

Ojha’s statement was recorded during investigation. The Court has

considered that statement. Saryu Ojha, the alleged source of the

bribe, the man whose visit to the Treasury on 22.07.2020 gave rise

to this entire case, has stated that he has no recollection of having

paid any illegal gratification to the petitioner. Without his

testimony implicating the petitioner, the essential ingredient of the
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offences alleged simply does not arise. The case against the

petitioner begins and ends with Saryu Ojha. His statement does not

support it.

              6.   Ujjawal Ojha, who is the grandson of Saryu Ojha

and the person who made and spread the video, gave a written

statement before the Police Inspector, Town Anchal, Buxar. In that

statement, as appears from the record, he stated that his

grandfather had given a total of Rs. 8,000/-, out of which Rs. 500/-

was given to the petitioner towards petrol and vehicle hire charges,

and that no illegal gratification was paid to Ratneshwar Kumar. He

further stated that the video was made due to a misunderstanding.

Shrikant Ojha and Ramakant Ojha, both sons of Saryu Ojha, also

stated to the police that their father had given no illegal

gratification and that whatever money passed hands was on

account of transport expenses.

              7. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is not

even one person with direct knowledge of the events of 22.07.2020

who has supported the case that any bribe was paid. The

prosecution rests entirely on a video, and the maker of that video

has retracted.

              8. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan

Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 laid down the categories of cases in
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which the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure may be exercised, and two of those categories

are squarely attracted here. One is where the uncontroverted

allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support thereof

do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make

out a case against the accused. The other is where continuation of

the proceeding would amount to abuse of the process of the Court.

The Supreme Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma v. State of

Chhattisgarh, (2016) 9 SCC 1 held at paragraph 36 that “the

allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the

evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case against the

appellants herein.” Having regard to the state of the evidence, this

Court is of the view that the same position obtains in the present

case.

            9.     Apart from the merits, there is the independent

question of the delay in investigation. The FIR was registered on

05.09.2020. Today is 23.06.2026, which makes it five years and

ten months. The pen drive which carries the viral video, the sole

piece of material evidence in this entire prosecution, has not been

sent for Forensic Science Laboratory examination. No chargesheet

has been filed. No charge has been framed before the learned
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Special Judge till date. The order dated 12.05.2023 passed by the

learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna in Special Case No. 22 of

2020, which is Annexure-2 of the petition, reflects that even nearly

three years after registration of the FIR, the final form had not

been submitted. When the matter was taken up before this Court

on the last date, the SDPO appeared and disclosed that the pen

drive had been acquired, however no explanation was offered for

the delay of five years and ten months of an inactive investigation.

          10. In the opinion of this Court, the right to speedy trial

in a criminal prosecution is not confined to the proceedings in

court. It also encompasses the preceding police investigation as

fully as it does the trial. This Court, in a Full Bench decision in

Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324,

answered this question directly. Having considered the question

whether the right to a speedy public trial is applicable only to the

proceedings in court stricto sensu or includes within its sweep the

preceding police investigations as well, the Full Bench held at

paragraph 27 and paragraph 50, that :-

                            “27. … it is held that the right
           to speedy public trial is applicable not only to the
           actual proceedings in Court but includes within
           its sweep the preceding police investigation in a
           criminal prosecution as well.

                                    Xxx
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                       50. A sharp note of caution must
     be sounded. The aforesaid finding must not be
     misunderstood or misconstrued to mean that a
     delay of less than seven years would not in any
     case amount to prejudice. Indeed, what is sought
     to be laid down is the extreme outer limit
     whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must
     be presumed and the infraction of the
     constitutional right would be plainly established.
     Really, I am somewhat hesitant in spelling out
     even the aforesaid outer time limit which,
     perhaps, errs on the side of strictitude. But since
     we are following binding precedent, the same has
     to be unreservedly accepted. Nor is it sought to
     be laid down that in a lesser period than seven
     years an accused person would not be able to
     establish circumstances pointing to the patent
     prejudice which may entitle him to invoke the
     guarantee of speedy public trial under Art. 21.
     That is a question which can be properly
     considered and adjudicated where it may
     expressly arise. In both the cases before us the
     delay is admittedly even far beyond the outer
     limit of seven years. What indeed is sought to be
     laid down here is that beyond this period of seven
     years the continuation of the investigation and
     trial would bring in the weightiest presumption
     that the enshrined right of speedy public trial is
     violated and the prosecution should be halted in
     its tracks. This would per se be indicative of
     prejudice. Thereafter the burden would
     automatically shift heavily on to the shoulders of
     the State to show that such grave delay was
     either entirely the handiwork of the accused
     himself or was occasioned by such special and
     exceptional circumstances so as to merit
     condonation thereof. A criminal prosecution by
     the State cannot be allowed to become an
     inquisitorial persecution of the accused. Nor cap,
     a fair speedy trial be allowed to become an
     unending travail for him.

                                    Xxx
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                              52. … it is held that an outer
            time limit to concretise the right to speedy public
            trial is envisioned both by principle and
            precedent. It is further held that a callous and
            inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or
            more (which does not arise from the default of the
            accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any
            extraordinary or exceptional reason) in
            investigation and original trial for offences other
            than capital ones plainly violate the
            constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial
            under Art. 21.”

           11.       The constitutional foundation underlying this

position was laid by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v.

Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, which held that the procedure

under Article 21 must be reasonable, fair and just, and that a

procedure which is not so is void. Building on that, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State

of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 held that “no procedure which does not

ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable,

fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21” and that “the State

cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial

to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate

financial resources.” The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman

Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 crystallised this into a

set of propositions at paragraph 86, the governing ones being that

the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 and encompasses all
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stages including investigation, and that ordinarily where this right

is found to have been infringed the charges shall be quashed.

           12.     Applying these principles to a corruption matter

arising from this State, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahendra

Lal Das v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 149 held at paragraphs 7

to 9 that “cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly,

promptly and without delay” and that while interference at the

investigation stage is ordinarily not called for, “it is equally true

that the investigating agency cannot be given the latitude of

protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any limit of

time.” Similary, In Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar,

(2002) 1 SCC 153, the Supreme Court quashed prosecution in a

corruption matter from this State after finding that following an

initial raid no action was taken for six years and that the

prosecution, which had dragged on for thirteen years in all, had

become a travesty of justice. In Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of

Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, which concerned a matter from this

State where investigation had proceeded fitfully over seventeen

years, the Court reiterated at paragraph 25 that where the right to

speedy trial is infringed the charges may be quashed. Most

recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Robert Lalchungnunga

Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339, decided on
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20.11.2025, held that “investigation is covered under the right to

speedy trial and violation of this right can strike at the root of the

investigation itself, leading it to be quashed.”

           13. This Court has not overlooked the position taken in

Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas,

(2008) 8 SCC 580 that mere delay in investigation does not by

itself furnish universal ground for quashing and that each case

must be evaluated on its own facts. That is precisely what has been

done here. The present order does not rest on the ground of delay

alone. It rests with equal force on the merits of the case as

disclosed by the material collected during investigation, which

does not make out any offence under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner.

           14. The delay in this case is entirely attributable to the

investigating agency. The petitioner has not caused it, has not

absconded and has been present. Nothing has been placed before

this Court to show any extraordinary or exceptional reason for five

years and ten months of inaction. The burden which the Full

Bench of this Court laid down in Madheshwardhari Singh(supra)

has not been discharged by the State in any measure.

           15.     In the result, this petition is allowed. The FIR

registered as Buxar (Town) PS Case No. 389 of 2020 dated
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                    05.09.2020 under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of

                    Corruption Act, 1988 at Town Police Station, Buxar, and all

                    proceedings of Special Case No. 22 of 2020 pending before the

                    learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, are hereby quashed.

                              16. Petition disposed of.



                                                     (Ansul, J)
Vikash/-
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE              23.06.2026
Uploading Date
Transmission Date