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Patna High Court

Nagendra Prasad SinghversusThe State Of Bihar and Ors

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Decided
Disposal
DISPOSED

Holding

The Court dismissed the petition to quash the 2005 increment‑withholding order due to delay and acquiescence, but set aside the 2011 salary‑withholding order for violation of Rule 97, remitting the matter for fresh consideration with due notice.

Summary

The petitioner, a former Assistant in the Revenue Department, challenged two departmental orders: one (Memo 2414, 2005) withholding three increments and another (Memo 2325, 2011) withholding salary and allowances during a suspension period. He claimed the proceedings were initiated after a long delay, lacked proper notice, and violated natural justice. The Court examined whether the writ petition was maintainable given the eight‑year delay and acquiescence, and whether the 2011 order breached Rule 97(3) of the Bihar Service Code. It held that the petition to quash the 2005 increment‑withholding order must be dismissed due to delay and waiver, but the 2011 salary‑withholding order was set aside for procedural defect. The matter was remitted to the respondents to re‑issue the order after giving proper notice, and the writ petition was disposed.

Issues considered

  • Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the delay and laches alleged by the State.
  • Whether the disciplinary order of Memo No. 2414 dated 17.11.2005 withholding three increments is liable to be quashed.
  • Whether the order of Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011 withholding salary and allowances without notice violates Rule 97(3) of the Bihar Service Code.
  • Whether the departmental proceedings complied with principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
  • Whether the punishment imposed constitutes a major penalty requiring a full inquiry under service rules.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • departmental enquiry
  • suspension
  • withholding increments
  • delay and laches
  • natural justice
  • service law
  • Bihar Service Code
  • Rule 97
  • waiver
  • acquiescence

Judgment

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                   Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.20448 of 2013
     ======================================================
     Nagendra Prasad Singh Son Of Late Mundrika Prasad Singh Resident Of
     Lane No.- 4A, Vijay Nagar, Police Station- Rupaspur, District- Patna

                                                                   ... ... Petitioner/s
                                        Versus
1.   The State Of Bihar
2.   The Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Secretariat
     Building, Bihar, Patna
3.   The Principal Secretary, Department Of Revenue And Land Reforms,
     Secretariat Building, Bihar, Patna

                                               ... ... Respondent/s
     ======================================================
     Appearance :
     For the Petitioner/s   :      Mr. Manoj Priyadarshi, Sr. Advocate
                            :      Mr. Ram Kishor Singh, Advocate
     For the Respondent/s   :      Mr. Arvind Kumar, AC to Ex GA-9
     ======================================================
     CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
     CAV JUDGMENT
      Date :      11-05-2026


                   Heard the parties.

                  2. The present writ petition has been filed for the

     following reliefs:-

                            “I. To quash the letter contained in memo no. 2414
                                dated 16.11.2005 of the General Administration
                                Department whereby and where under the
                                petitioner has been inflicted punishment of
                                withholding of three increments with cumulative
                                effect in a departmental proceeding.
                            II. To quash the letter contained in memo no. 2325
                                dated 21.07.2011 passed by the General
                                Administration Department by which at the
                                conclusion       of   the   same      departmental
                                proceeding against petitioner the department
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                                     has decided to impose and withhold the salary
                                     and allowances of the petitioner for the
                                     suspension period, running between 5.10.2000
                                     to 27.05.2005, other than the subsistence
                                     allowance already paid, in transaction under
                                     which three increments have been withheld by
                                     the letter dated 17.11.2005 against him.
                               III. To hold and declare entire departmental
                                     proceeding against petitioner vitiated and
                                     suspension unjustified in law, including the
                                     punishments of withholding of three increments
                                     by   letter   dated     17.11.2005     and   further
                                     disallowing petitioner to get full salary and
                                     allowances for suspension period through letter
                                     dated 21.07.2011 under the same departmental
                                     proceeding illegal, void and inoperative in the
                                     eye of law.
                               IV. To command the respondents and order them to
                                     restore the increments already withheld in
                                     pursuance of letter dated 17.11.2005 and to
                                     further direct them to pay full salary and
                                     allowances to the petitioner, other than the
                                     subsistence    allowance     already     paid,    for
                                     suspension     period     that   continued       from
                                     5.10.2000 to 27.05.2005 after the punishments
                                     of the petitioner being declared illegal and
                                     unsustainable in law.”
                               FACTS OF THE CASE
                    3. The brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition

       are that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant in the

       Revenue and Land Reforms Department. Subsequently, in the year

       1988, on account of formation of a joint cadre of assistants of the
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       secretariat and assistants of the attached offices to the secretariat,

       the General Administration Department became the parent

       department of the assistants of the Secretariat. While the petitioner

       was posted as an Assistant in the year 2000, he was put under

       suspension vide order contained in Memo No. 1050 dated

       05.10.2000 issued under the signature of Under Secretary,

       Personal and Administrative Reforms Department, Government of

       Bihar, Patna with respect to alleged irregularities committed by

       him in passing forged travelling allowances bills and getting

       financial benefits, in making payment of honorarium to the

       beneficiaries, without approval of the Finance Department. The

       departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner vide

       letter contained in Memo No. 39 dated 12.01.2001 issued under

       the signature of the Deputy Secretary, Personal and Administrative

       Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, Patna and the enquiry

       officer was appointed. The petitioner was directed to submit his

       explanation before the enquiring authority. Memo of charge was

       also given to the petitioner wherein altogether 9 charges were

       levelled against him, which appears to have been prepared on the

       basis of preliminary enquiry conducted by the then Additional

       Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department. The petitioner

       appeared before the enquiry officer and submitted his reply on
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       12.04.2001, wherein he raised the objection with regard to clarity

       of the charges, since the petitioner was of the view that the charges

       should have been more clear, so that the petitioner could have

       submitted an effective reply. The petitioner further requested the

       enquiry officer to make available the relevant documents for

       examination and the list of witnesses, who according to the

       petitioner were necessary witnesses in the enquiry proceeding for

       their examination and cross-examination. Pursuant thereto, the

       enquiry officer wrote a letter to the department and asked for

       clarification with respect to the charges to be proceeded with,

       against the petitioner. Thereafter, fresh charge-sheet was issued

       vide memo No. 1072 dated 16.11.2001, which contained

       altogether 5 charges against the petitioner. It is the case of the

       petitioner that the departmental proceeding was initiated on the

       basis of the complaint submitted by two persons and the then

       Additional Secretary, Revenue Department, who had conducted

       preliminary enquiry and prepared a report, should have taken

       statement of those two persons, but neither the statement of the

       two persons nor the report of the Additional Secretary was

       supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation

       before the enquiry officer, wherein he refuted all the charges

       levelled against him. The petitioner was directed to clarify more
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       with respect to charge no.1, which the petitioner duly complied by

       submitting a detailed reply on 27.12.2001. After conducting the

       departmental enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report on

       31.01.2002, wherein he came to the conclusion that the charges

       levelled against the petitioner are not proved and the department

       failed to prove its case against any of the charges on the basis of

       preponderance of probabilities. The department/disciplinary

       authority sat on the report of the enquiry officer and proceeded

       with further enquiry with regard to charge nos.1 and 4

       respectively, for which memo no. 417 dated 20.04.2002 was

       issued, whereby another enquiry officer was appointed and the

       petitioner was directed to submit his explanation before the

       enquiry officer. Being aggrieved with the action of the

       departmental authorities, initiating fresh enquiry, the petitioner

       preferred C.W.J.C. No. 8766 of 2002. However during pendency

       of the writ petition, the enquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry

       and the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation vide letter

       contained in Memo No. 1348 dated 14.12.2002. By letter dated

       14.12.2002, another enquiry officer was appointed. The petitioner

       filed his show cause reply on 17.02.2003, reiterating his earlier

       explanations submitted on 06.12.2001 and 27.12.2001, whereby he

       denied all the allegations levelled against him and requested the
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       enquiry officer to exonerate him from the charges levelled against

       him. In the fresh enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report

       on 19.05.2003, wherein he did not find anything against the

       petitioner with respect to charge no.1, however for charge no.4, the

       enquiry officer could not give any conclusive finding, that the

       petitioner was associated in any way in making irregular payment

       to any firm or was benefitted in any manner through transactions

       in question. Second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner

       vide letter dated 13.08.2003. The petitioner challenged all the

       actions of the respondent authorities by way of filing Interlocutory

       Application in C.W.J.C. No. 8766 of 2002. The writ petition filed

       by the petitioner was allowed vide order dated 08.11.2004,

       whereby the second enquiry initiated on 20.04.2002 was found to

       be unlawful and accordingly was set aside. The petitioner had also

       preferred a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 1141 of 2001,

       whereby he challenged the suspension order dated 05.10.2000. The

       said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 11.04.2005

       with a direction to the authorities concerned to consider revocation

       of the suspension of the petitioner, if the same was not already

       revoked. The suspension of the petitioner was revoked vide letter

       dated 28.05.2005 and the department again issued a show cause

       notice vide letter contained in Memo No. 920 dated 21.06.2005,
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       showing disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer

       dated 31.01.2002, with respect to charge no.1 and 4. The petitioner

       submitted his explanation on 23.09.2005, wherein he refuted all

       the allegations levelled against him. Finally, the disciplinary

       authority vide memo no. 2414 dated 17.11.2005 found the

       petitioner guilty for charge no.1, on the ground that he could not

       satisfy the disciplinary authority with regard to submitting and

       receiving fake TA bills. The petitioner was inflicted with the

       punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative

       effect. The petitioner was exonerated of the charge no.4. The

       decision with respect to payment of salary and allowances, apart

       from the subsistence allowance, during the period of suspension,

       was not taken by the disciplinary authority while passing the order

       dated 17.11.2005, therefore vide another order contained in Memo

       No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011, a decision was taken to withhold

       salary and allowances of the petitioner from 05.10.2000 to

       27.05.2005, except the subsistence allowance, which was paid to

       the petitioner, during the said period of suspension. No notice

       whatsoever was issued to the petitioner, before passing the order

       dated 21.07.2011, in terms of Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code,

       thereby depriving the petitioner from getting full salary and

       allowance for the suspension period, which is of grave civil
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       consequences. The petitioner superannuated from service on

       completion of the age of superannuation w.e.f. 30.04.2013, while

       working as Section Officer, in the Revenue Department. It is

       further case of the petitioner that the departmental proceeding in

       question was initiated for stale charges that allegedly were part of

       actions occurring 12-15 years back and the proceeding was

       initiated without giving any opportunity to the petitioner.

             SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

                    4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

       preliminary enquiry was conducted behind the back of the

       petitioner and the said enquiry was conducted on the basis of the

       complaint filed by two persons, who were employees of the

       Revenue Department and the proceeding was initiated after 12-15

       years of the alleged misconduct. He further submits that the

       identity of the complainant was never verified and they were never

       produced as a witness for cross examination, thereby denying the

       opportunity to the petitioner to rebut the charges, which were

       levelled against him on the basis of the complaint submitted by

       two individuals. He further submits that the order of withholding

       salary and allowances for the period of suspension, except the

       subsistence allowance, which was already paid to the petitioner, is

       a civil consequence and could not have been passed without
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       following the procedure prescribed under Rule 97 of the Bihar

       Service Code.

                    5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

       enquiry against the petitioner was completed on 31.01.2002 and

       the department in most cavalier manner kept the matter with

       regard to the petitioner pending till 2005, despite having no proof

       against the petitioner. The enquiry officer submitted his enquiry

       report wherein he did not find the charges to be proved against the

       petitioner, however the disciplinary authority was adamant on

       inflicting punishment against the petitioner.

                    6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a

       judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in

       (2006) 5 SCC 88 (M. V. Bijlani versus Union of India and

       Others), wherein in paragraph nos. 16, 17 and 19 it has been held

       as follows:-

                                “16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has
                                     not been shown as to what were the duties of
                                     the appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or
                                     otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown
                                     either by the disciplinary authority or the
                                     Appellate Authority as to how and in what
                                     manner the maintenance of ACE-8 Register by
                                     way of sheets which were found attached to the
                                     estimate file were not appropriate so as to
                                     arrive at the culpability or otherwise of the
                                     appellant. The Appellate Authority in its order
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                                     stated that the appellant was not required to
                                     prepare ACE-8 Register twice. The appellant
                                     might have prepared another set of register
                                     presumably keeping in view the fact that he was
                                     asked to account for the same on the basis of
                                     the materials placed on records. The Tribunal
                                     as also the High Court failed to take into
                                     consideration that the disciplinary proceedings
                                     were initiated after six years and they
                                     continued for a period of seven years and, thus,
                                     initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as
                                     also continuance thereof after such a long time
                                     evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer.

                                17. In State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC
                                     738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC
                                     514] this Court has clearly held: (SCC p. 740,
                                     para 4)

                                        “The irregularities which were the subject-
                                     matter of the enquiry are said to have taken
                                     place between the years 1975-77. It is not the
                                     case of the department that they were not
                                     aware of the said irregularities, if any, and
                                     came to know it only in 1987. According to
                                     them even in April 1977 there was doubt about
                                     the involvement of the officer in the said
                                     irregularities and the investigations were going
                                     on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to
                                     think that they would have taken more than 12
                                     years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as
                                     stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory
                                     explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing
                                     the charge memo and we are also of the view
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                                     that it will be unfair to permit the departmental
                                     enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage.”
                                19. It is really a matter of great surprise that a
                                     disciplinary proceeding was initiated five years
                                     after the appellant handed over charge. At that
                                     time he was admittedly not having possession
                                     of   any     documents.      The     enquiry   officer
                                     furthermore took a period of seven years to
                                     complete the enquiry. The Appellate Authority
                                     also took seven years in disposing of the
                                     appeal. Even then, the Appellate Authority did
                                     not go into the question as to whether the
                                     procedures         laid   down     for   holding   the
                                     disciplinary proceedings had been followed or
                                     not. He did not go into the contentions of the
                                     appellant herein minutely. The memo of appeal
                                     filed by the appellant was very elaborate. He
                                     raised a number of contentions therein. The
                                     enquiry officer was charged with bias. He was
                                     also charged with unfair conduct. He was said
                                     to have committed a large number of
                                     irregularities in the departmental proceeding.
                                     The memo of appeal of the appellant was in
                                     about 65 typed pages. It was subdivided into
                                     five parts. He made all endeavours to deal with
                                     each and every finding of the enquiry officer
                                     and dealt with almost all the documents relied
                                     upon by the department. He also dealt with the
                                     deposition of the witnesses examined on behalf
                                     of the parties.”
                    7. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a

       judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in
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       (1997) 11 SCC 374 (Manzoor Ahmed Mazumdar versus State of

       Maghlaya and Others), wherein in paragraph no. 4 it has been

       held as follows:-

                         “4. In view of the decision in M. Gopalkrishna Naidu
                               [AIR 1968 SC 240 : (1968) 1 SCR 355 : (1968) 2 LLJ
                               125] it must be held that even though there is no
                               express requirement in Fundamental Rule 54(3) for
                               giving an opportunity to the employee before passing
                               an order, giving of such an opportunity is implicit in
                               the exercise of the power which has been conferred
                               by the said provision. It was, therefore, necessary for
                               the competent authority to afford an opportunity to
                               the appellant before passing the order regarding pay
                               and allowances payable to the appellant in respect of
                               the period of suspension (sic absence). Since this was
                               not done in the present case, the order dated 12-8-
                               1982 cannot be upheld and has to be set aside. For
                               the same reason the impugned judgment of the High
                               Court has also to be set aside. It will be open to the
                               respondents to pass a fresh order in accordance with
                               law after affording an opportunity to the appellant.”
                    8. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a

       judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 1991

       Supp. (1) SCC 504 ( Kulwant Singh Gill versus State of Punjab),

       wherein in paragraph no.4 it has been held as follows:-

                               “4. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter
                                  undoubtedly is a minor penalty within the
                                  meaning of Rule 5(iv). But sub-rule (v) postulates
                                  reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay
                                  for a specified period with further directions as to
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                                  whether or not the government employee shall
                                  earn increments of pay during the period of such
                                  reductions and whether on the expiry of such
                                  period the reduction will or will not have the effect
                                  of postponing the future increments of his pay. It is
                                  an independent head of penalty and it could be
                                  imposed as punishment in an appropriate case. It
                                  is one of the major penalties. The impugned order
                                  of stoppage of two increments with cumulative
                                  effect whether would fall within the meaning of
                                  Rule 5(v)? If it so falls Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules
                                  require conducting of regular enquiry. The
                                  contention of Shri Nayar, learned counsel for the
                                  State is that withholding two increments with
                                  cumulative effect is only a minor penalty as it does
                                  not amount to reduction to a lower stage in the
                                  time scale of pay. We find it extremely difficult to
                                  countenance the contention. Withholding of
                                  increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge
                                  over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule
                                  5(iv) of the Rules. But when penalty was imposed
                                  withholding two increments i.e. for two years with
                                  cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that
                                  the two increments earned by the employee was
                                  cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his
                                  upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In
                                  other words the clock is put back to a lower stage
                                  in the time scale of pay and on expiry of two years
                                  the clock starts working from that stage afresh.
                                  The insidious effect of the impugned order, by
                                  necessary implication, is that the appellant
                                  employee is reduced in his time scale by two
                                  places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the
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                                  tenure of his service with a direction that two
                                  years' increments would not be counted in his time
                                  scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words
                                  are the skin to the language which if peeled off its
                                  true colour or its resultant effects would become
                                  apparent. When we broach the problem from this
                                  perspective the effect is as envisaged under Rule
                                  5(v) of the Rules. It is undoubted that the Division
                                  Bench in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [ILR
                                  (1985) 2 P&H 193 : (1985) 1 SLJ 513 (P&H)] ,
                                  P.C. Jain, A.C.J. speaking for the Division Bench,
                                  while considering similar question, in paragraph
                                  8 held that the stoppage of increments with
                                  cumulative effect, by no stretch of imagination
                                  falls within clause (v) of Rule 5 or in Rule 4.12 of
                                  Punjab Civil Services Rules. It was further held
                                  that under clause (v) of Rule 5 there has to be a
                                  reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay
                                  by the competent authority as a measure of
                                  penalty and the period for which such a reduction
                                  is to be effective has to be stated and on
                                  restoration it has further to be specified whether
                                  the reduction shall operate to postpone the future
                                  increments of his pay. In such cases withholding
                                  of the increments without cumulative effect does
                                  not at all arise. In case where the increments are
                                  withheld with or without cumulative effect the
                                  government employee is never reduced to a lower
                                  stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held
                                  that clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts
                                  of that case. With respect we are unable to agree
                                  with the High Court. If the literal interpretation is
                                  adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive
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                                  at that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the
                                  back of the mind, it would always be so, the result
                                  will be the conclusion as we have arrived at. If the
                                  reasoning of the High Court is given acceptance,
                                  it would empower the disciplinary authority to
                                  impose, under the garb of stoppage of increments,
                                  (sic stoppage) of earning future increments in the
                                  time scale of pay even permanently without
                                  expressly       stating   so.   This   preposterous
                                  consequence cannot be permitted to be permeated.
                                  Rule 5(iv) does not empower the disciplinary
                                  authority to impose penalty of withholding
                                  increments of pay with cumulative effect except
                                  after holding inquiry and following the prescribed
                                  procedure. Then the order would be without
                                  jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be
                                  per se void. Considering from this angle we have
                                  no hesitation to hold that the impugned order
                                  would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the
                                  Rules; it is a major penalty and imposition of the
                                  impugned penalty without enquiry is per se
                                  illegal.”
                SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

                    9. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of

       the respondent-State submits that the petitioner was found prima

       facie guilty of the misappropriation of public money by adopting

       unfair means, since the petitioner availed travelling allowances for

       journeys, which he said to have travelled through scooter and

       availed it on the basis of fake T.A. Bill, for which he was not

       entitled and he was not authorised by any superior authority. When
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       the matter came to the notice of the authorities concerned, an

       explanation was sought for from the petitioner and proceeding was

       initiated against him. The enquiry officer was appointed and after

       considering the enquiry report, the authorities came to the

       conclusion that the report of the enquiry officer was not up to

       mark, since the charge no.4, which was related to fake bills and

       fake firm was not enquired by the conducting/enquiry officer,

       which was essential to be enquired into. It was not taken into

       account that without approval or permission of the competent

       authority, the petitioner had undertaken the journey by scooter to

       distant places. Finally, the disciplinary authority awarded

       punishment of withholding of three annual increment to the

       petitioner with cumulative effect.

                    10. The learned counsel for the State further submits that

       all the TA bills were fake, since it is not possible to travel 250-300

       kilometers by scooter in a day and to come back. Further, the

       petitioner was absent from his duty in the name of travelling from

       one place to another for 15-20 days in a month. The petitioner

       committed financial blunder/irregularity by submitting fake T.A.

       Bills, which is misconduct on the part of the petitioner, therefore,

       he was rightly given the punishment. He further submits that the

       petitioner approached this Hon’ble Court after a much delay in as
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       much as that the order of punishment was passed on 16.11.2005

       and the petitioner has filed the present writ petition on 03.10.2013,

       which is after more than 8 years and that too, after his retirement

       on 30.04.2013. Therefore, he submits that on the ground of delay

       and laches, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed at the stage of

       admission itself.

                    11. The learned counsel for the State finally submits that

       under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court has to see

       that whether any procedural lapses are there or not, whether there

       is violation of principles of natural justice, whether there is any

       allegation of bias and the perversity of the judgment or not. In the

       present case, no such plea has been taken by the petitioner and no

       perversity has been shown. All the defence taken by the petitioner

       has been considered by the disciplinary authority, while awarding

       punishment to him.

                    12. The learned counsel for the state refers to and relies

       upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported

       in (2024) 15 SCC 215 (Mrinmoy Maity versus Chhanda Koley &

       Ors.), wherein in paragraph nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 it has been

       held as follows:-

                            9.    Having heard rival contentions raised and on
                                  perusal of the facts obtained in the present case,
                                  we are of the considered view that the writ
                                  petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in
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                                  other words the writ petition ought to have been
                                  dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself.
                                  An applicant who approaches the court belatedly
                                  or in other words sleeps over his rights for a
                                  considerable period of time, wakes up from his
                                  deep slumber ought not to be granted the
                                  extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court
                                  time and again has held that delay defeats equity.
                                  Delay or laches is one of the factors which should
                                  be borne in mind by the High Court while
                                  exercising discretionary powers under Article 226
                                  of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the
                                  High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
                                  powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to
                                  assert his right has allowed the cause of action to
                                  drift away and attempts are made subsequently to
                                  rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
                            10.   The discretion to be exercised would be with care
                                  and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in
                                  approaching the writ court is explained which
                                  would appeal to the conscience of the court, in
                                  such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the
                                  contesting party that for all times to come the
                                  delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad
                                  circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of
                                  the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends
                                  on facts and circumstances of each case, same
                                  cannot be described in a straitjacket formula with
                                  mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to
                                  be exercised by the writ court depends upon the
                                  facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which
                                  the facts have travelled.
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                            11.   For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that
                                  no fixed period of limitation is prescribed.
                                  However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of
                                  the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to
                                  whether within a reasonable time same has been
                                  invoked and even submitting of memorials would
                                  not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect
                                  the cause of action which has had a natural death.
                                  In such circumstances on the ground of delay and
                                  laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or
                                  the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found
                                  that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and
                                  laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the
                                  petition on that sole ground itself, inasmuch as the
                                  writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such
                                  indolent litigant to take advantage of his own
                                  wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver
                                  of   fundamental      right   but   while   exercising
                                  discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the
                                  High Court will have to necessarily take into
                                  consideration the delay and laches on the part of
                                  the applicant in approaching a writ court.
                            12.   This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of
                                  W.B. [Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.,
                                  (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] has
                                  held to the following effect: (SCC p. 784, paras
                                  56-58)
                                  “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is
                                        no doubt true that there can be no waiver of
                                        fundamental right. But while exercising
                                        discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,
                                        226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this
                                        Court takes into account certain factors and
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                                        one of such considerations is delay and
                                        laches on the part of the applicant in
                                        approaching a writ court. It is well settled
                                        that power to issue a writ is discretionary.
                                        One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under
                                        Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that
                                        the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
                                  57.   If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction
                                        of a writ court, he should come to the Court
                                        at    the       earliest     reasonably     possible
                                        opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the
                                        motion for a writ will indeed be a good
                                        ground for refusing to exercise such
                                        discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying
                                        object of this principle is not to encourage
                                        agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
                                        which have already been disposed of or
                                        settled or where the rights of third parties
                                        have accrued in the meantime (vide State of
                                        M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [State of M.P. v. Bhailal
                                        Bhai, (1964) 15 STC 450 : 1964 SCC
                                        OnLine SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR
                                        1964 SC 1006] , Moon Mills Ltd. v.
                                        Industrial Court [Moon Mills Ltd. v.
                                        Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 :
                                        AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v.
                                        Union of India [Bhoop Singh v. Union of
                                        India, (1992) 3 SCC 136] ). This principle
                                        applies even in case of an infringement of
                                        fundamental          right     (vide      Tilokchand
                                        Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [Tilokchand
                                        Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC
                                        110 : (1970) 25 STC 289] , Durga Prashad
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                                        v. Controller of Imports and Exports [Durga
                                        Prashad v. Controller of Imports and
                                        Exports,        (1969)   1   SCC   185]    and
                                        Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India
                                        [Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
                                        (1970) 1 SCC 84] ).
                                  58.   There is no upper limit and there is no lower
                                        limit as to when a person can approach a
                                        court. The question is one of discretion and
                                        has to be decided on the basis of facts before
                                        the court depending on and varying from
                                        case to case. It will depend upon what the
                                        breach of fundamental right and the remedy
                                        claimed are and when and how the delay
                                        arose.”
                            13.   It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by
                                  this Court in Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K.
                                  Thangappan [Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K.
                                  Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC
                                  (L&S) 791] whereunder it has been held that the
                                  High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary
                                  jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on
                                  the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has
                                  been further held thereunder: (SCC pp. 325-26,
                                  paras 6-9)
                                  “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is
                                        to be borne in mind by the High Court when
                                        they exercise their discretionary powers
                                        under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an
                                        appropriate case the High Court may refuse
                                        to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is
                                        such negligence or omission on the part of
                                        the applicant to assert his right as taken in
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                                        conjunction with the lapse of time and other
                                        circumstances, causes prejudice to the
                                        opposite party. Even where fundamental
                                        right is involved the matter is still within the
                                        discretion of the Court as pointed out in
                                        Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and
                                        Exports [Durga Prashad v. Controller of
                                        Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] .
                                        Of course, the discretion has to be exercised
                                        judicially and reasonably.
                                  7.    What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
                                        Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
                                        Prosper         Armstrong    Hurd     [Lindsay
                                        Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd,
                                        (1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (LR PC
                                        at p. 239) was approved by this Court in
                                        Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [Moon
                                        Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC
                                        OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
                                        Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular
                                        Motor      Service   [Maharashtra    SRTC v.
                                        Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1968 SCC
                                        OnLine SC 54 : (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR
                                        1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
                                        (Lindsay        Petroleum    case     [Lindsay
                                        Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd,
                                        (1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , LR pp.
                                        239-40)
                                        ‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
                                        equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
                                        doctrine. Where it would be practically
                                        unjust to give a remedy either because the
                                        party has, by his conduct done that which
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                                        might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
                                        waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
                                        neglect he has though perhaps not waiving
                                        that remedy, yet put the other party in a
                                        situation in which it would not be reasonable
                                        to place him if the remedy were afterwards
                                        to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
                                        of time and delay are most material. But in
                                        every case, if an argument against relief,
                                        which otherwise would be just, is founded
                                        upon mere delay, that delay of course not
                                        amounting to a bar by any statute of
                                        limitation, the validity of that defence must
                                        be    tried     upon   principles   substantially
                                        equitable.      Two    circumstances     always
                                        important in such cases are, the length of the
                                        delay and the nature of the acts done during
                                        the interval which might affect either party
                                        and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
                                        taking the one course or the other, so far as
                                        it relates to the remedy.’
                                  8.    It would be appropriate to note certain
                                        decisions of this Court in which this aspect
                                        has been dealt with in relation to Article 32
                                        of the Constitution. It is apparent that what
                                        has been stated as regards that article would
                                        apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was
                                        observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
                                        India [Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
                                        (1970) 1 SCC 84] that no relief can be given
                                        to the petitioner who without any reasonable
                                        explanation approaches this Court under
                                        Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was
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                                        stated that though Article 32 is itself a
                                        guaranteed right, it does not follow from this
                                        that it was the intention of the Constitution-
                                        makers that this Court should disregard all
                                        principles and grant relief in petitions filed
                                        after inordinate delay.
                                  9.    It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal
                                        Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal,
                                        (1986) 4 SCC 566] that the High Court in
                                        exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
                                        assist the tardy and the indolent or the
                                        acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
                                        inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner
                                        and    such      delay   is   not   satisfactorily
                                        explained, the High Court may decline to
                                        intervene and grant relief in exercise of its
                                        writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule
                                        is premised on a number of factors. The
                                        High Court does not ordinarily permit a
                                        belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
                                        because it is likely to cause confusion and
                                        public inconvenience and bring, in its train
                                        new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
                                        exercised after unreasonable delay, it may
                                        have the effect of inflicting not only hardship
                                        and inconvenience but also injustice on third
                                        parties. It was pointed out that when writ
                                        jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
                                        coupled with the creation of third-party
                                        rights in the meantime is an important factor
                                        which also weighs with the High Court in
                                        deciding whether or not to exercise such
                                        jurisdiction.”
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                    13. The learned counsel for the State further refers to

       and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

       reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 (Chennai Metropolitan Water

       Supply and Sewerage Board and Others versus T.T. Murali

       Babu), wherein in paragraph no. 16 it has been held as follows:-

                            “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not
                                  be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required
                                  to weigh the explanation offered and the
                                  acceptability of the same. The court should bear
                                  in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
                                  equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it
                                  has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
                                  simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the
                                  primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
                                  without adequate reason, approaches the court at
                                  his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
                                  under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis
                                  at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
                                  it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
                                  certain circumstances delay and laches may not
                                  be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
                                  delay would only invite disaster for the litigant
                                  who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
                                  reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a
                                  litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic
                                  norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest
                                  thief of time” and second, law does not permit one
                                  to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring
                                  in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”
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                    14. The learned counsel for the State further refers to

       and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

       reported in 2009 1 SCC 768 (Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others

       versus State of West Bengal and Others and its analogues cases)

       wherein in paragraph nos. 56 to 58 it has been held as follows:-

                            “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no
                                  doubt true that there can be no waiver of
                                  fundamental       right.   But    while    exercising
                                  discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226,
                                  227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes
                                  into account certain factors and one of such
                                  considerations is delay and laches on the part of
                                  the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is
                                  well settled that power to issue a writ is
                                  discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing
                                  reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution
                                  is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

                            57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
                                  writ court, he should come to the Court at the
                                  earliest     reasonably     possible      opportunity.
                                  Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ
                                  will indeed be a good ground for refusing to
                                  exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The
                                  underlying object of this principle is not to
                                  encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume
                                  matters which have already been disposed of or
                                  settled or where the rights of third parties have
                                  accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v.
                                  Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR
                                  261] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR
                                  1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India
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                                  [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992)
                                  2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case
                                  of an infringement of fundamental right (vide
                                  Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1
                                  SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
                                  Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and
                                  Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1
                                  SCC 84] ).
                            58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit
                                  as to when a person can approach a court. The
                                  question is one of discretion and has to be decided
                                  on the basis of facts before the court depending on
                                  and varying from case to case. It will depend upon
                                  what the breach of fundamental right and the
                                  remedy claimed are and when and how the delay
                                  arose.”
                    CONSIDERATION

                    15. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and

       after going through the records, it appears that the punishment

       order against the petitioner was passed vide Memo No. 2414 dated

       17.11.2005, whereby the petitioner was found guilty for charge

       no.1. He was inflicted with the punishment of withholding of three

       increments with cumulative effect. The petitioner never challenged

       the said order and sat over the matter, meaning thereby that he had

       accepted the punishment and he was satisfied with the impugned

       order of punishment dated 23.09.2005. Subsequently, vide another

       order contained in Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011, a decision

       was taken to withhold his salary and allowances from 05.10.2000
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       to 27.05.2005, except the subsistence allowance which was paid to

       the petitioner during the said period of suspension. The petitioner

       preferred the present writ petition against both the impugned

       orders i.e. order contained in Memo No. 2414 dated 17.11.2005

       and Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011. The learned counsel

       appearing on behalf of the State has taken a preliminary objection

       with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the

       ground of delay and laches and relied on different judgments of the

       Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case of Mrinmoy Maity

       (supra), Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board

       and Others (supra), Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others (supra)

       wherein a consistent view has been taken that delay defeats all the

       cause. Further the petitioner did not challenge the order dated

       16.11.2005 for almost 8 years, therefore he waived his rights and

       accepted the same. As per the principal of waiver and

       acquiescence, the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the

       same after 8 years of passing of the proceeding and no plausible

       reason, whatsoever has been furnished with regard to delay in

       approaching this Court. It is well settled proposition of law that

       stale claims should not be adjudged by the writ Courts. In this

       connection reference has to be made of a judgment of the Hon’ble

       Supreme Court of India reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 (State of
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       Uttar Pradesh and Others versus Arvind Kumar Srivastava and

       Others), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph

       no. 20, 21 and 22.2 has held as follows:-

                                “20. The Court also quoted the following passage
                                     from Halsbury's Laws of England (para 911, p.
                                     395) : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v.
                                     Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1
                                     SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, para 12)

                                “12. … ‘In determining whether there has been such
                                     delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to
                                     be considered are:

                                (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and

                                (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
                                     defendant's part.

                                     Acquiescence in this sense does not mean
                                     standing by while the violation of a right is in
                                     progress, but assent after the violation has been
                                     completed and the claimant has become aware
                                     of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy
                                     where, by his conduct, he has done that which
                                     might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
                                     waiver of it; or where by his conduct and
                                     neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has
                                     put the other party in a position in which it
                                     would not be reasonable to place him if the
                                     remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such
                                     cases lapse of time and delay are most
                                     material. Upon these considerations rests the
                                     doctrine of laches.’”
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                                21. Holding that the respondents had also
                                     acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the
                                     appeal of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with the
                                     following reasons : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P.
                                     Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC
                                     464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC p. 471,
                                     para 13)

                                “13. In view of the statement of law as summarised
                                     above, the respondents are guilty since the
                                     respondents have acquiesced in accepting the
                                     retirement and did not challenge the same in
                                     time. If they would have been vigilant enough,
                                     they could have filed writ petitions as others
                                     did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it
                                     appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it
                                     away and did not rise to the occasion in time
                                     for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases,
                                     the court should be very slow in granting the
                                     relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to
                                     be taken into consideration the question of
                                     acquiescence or waiver on the part of the
                                     incumbent whether other parties are going to
                                     be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the
                                     present case, if the respondents would have
                                     challenged their retirement being violative of
                                     the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam
                                     could have taken appropriate steps to raise
                                     funds so as to meet the liability but by not
                                     asserting their rights the respondents have
                                     allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple
                                     of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming
                                     the benefit for two years. That will definitely
                                     require the Nigam to raise funds which is going
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                                     to have serious financial repercussions on the
                                     financial management of the Nigam. Why
                                     should the court come to the rescue of such
                                     persons when they themselves are guilty of
                                     waiver and acquiescence?”

                                22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-
                                     recognised exceptions in the form of laches and
                                     delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons
                                     who did not challenge the wrongful action in
                                     their cases and acquiesced into the same and
                                     woke up after long delay only because of the
                                     reason that their counterparts who had
                                     approached the court earlier in time succeeded
                                     in their efforts, then such employees cannot
                                     claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered
                                     in the case of similarly situated persons be
                                     extended to them. They would be treated as
                                     fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the
                                     acquiescence, would be a valid ground to
                                     dismiss their claim.”

                    16. Similar view has been taken by a learned Co-

       ordinate Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 25.02.2020

       passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2276 of 2020 (Arun Kumar Mehta versus

       the State of Bihar & Ors.), wherein in paragraph nos.4 and 8, it

       has been held as follows:-

                            “4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties
                                  and gone through the materials on record.
                                  Apparently, there is a delay of about 07 years in
                                  filing the present writ petition, even if the
                                  appellate order dated 15.12.2012 is taken into
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                                   account, for which no plausible explanation
                                   whatsoever has been furnished, hence the writ
                                   petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of
                                   principles of delay and laches, alone.
                            5.     Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
                                   the case, considering the submissions made by the
                                   learned counsel for the parties as also taking into
                                   account the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
                                   Court in the cases referred to hereinabove,
                                   regarding the principles of delay and laches, this
                                   Court finds that as far as the present case is
                                   concerned, no plausible explanation has been
                                   furnished by the petitioner so as to convincingly
                                   explain the delay in question of about 07 years in
                                   approaching this Court, hence the present writ
                                   petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of
                                   delay and laches. Accordingly, the writ petition
                                   stands dismissed.”
                    17. Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court in a

       judgment dated 24.03.2026 passed in L.P.A. No. 891 of 2025 (The

       Patna High Court through its Registrar General, Patna High

       Court & Ors. versus Chandan Kumar & Ors.), in paragraph nos.

       55 & 60, has held as follows:-

                                 “55. Thirdly, the issue of delay and laches, though
                                     noticed, has not been adequately appreciated in
                                     its proper legal perspective. The appellants had
                                     specifically contended that the writ petitioner
                                     approached the Court after a considerable
                                     lapse of time and, therefore, could not claim
                                     parity with those who had been vigilant in
                                     asserting their rights. The Hon’ble Supreme
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                                     Court in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar
                                     Srivastava (Supra) has clearly held that though
                                     similarly    situated   persons    are   ordinarily
                                     entitled to equal treatment, this principle is
                                     subject to exceptions, particularly in cases
                                     involving delay, laches and acquiescence.
                                     Persons who wake up after long delay cannot
                                     claim the same relief as those who approached
                                     the Court in time.
                                60. In view of the discussions and conclusions
                                     arrived at on the issues framed hereinabove,
                                     this Court is of the considered opinion that the
                                     impugned       judgment    and      order      dated
                                     09.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge
                                     cannot be sustained in the eyes of law,
                                     inasmuch as the same proceeds on an
                                     erroneous application of legal principles,
                                     extends the benefit of earlier judgments beyond
                                     their intended scope, and overlooks material
                                     aspects relating to delay, laches and the
                                     statutory framework governing the field. The
                                     reasoning so adopted does not stand to judicial
                                     scrutiny and has resulted in an unwarranted
                                     direction    for   consideration    of   the    writ
                                     petitioner’s case.”
                    18. Similar view has been taken by an Hon’ble Division

       Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 10.04.2026 passed in

       L.P.A. No. 762 of 2025 (Raj Kumar Jha versus the State of Bihar

       & Ors.), wherein in paragraph no.8 it has been held as follows:-

                            “8. Law is well settled that mere representation does
                                  not extend the period of limitation and the
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                                  aggrieved person has to approach the Court
                                  expeditiously and within a reasonable time. If it is
                                  found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and
                                  laches, the High Court would be fully justified to
                                  dismiss the writ petition at the threshold. Equity
                                  aids the vigilant, not the indolent. Courts of equity
                                  grant relief to only those who actively protect their
                                  rights, not those who sleep on them. It demands
                                  prompt action to prevent injustice.
                                  In the case of P.S. Sadashivaswamy -Vrs.- State
                                  of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1 Supreme
                                  Court Cases 152, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
                                  been pleased to observe that in a service matter,
                                  an aggrieved party should approach the Court at
                                  least within six months or at the most a year of the
                                  arising of the cause of action, and it would be
                                  sound and wise exercise of discretion for the
                                  Court to refuse the exercise the extraordinary
                                  power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
                                  India and in case the petitioner does not approach
                                  it expeditiously for relief, such petition should be
                                  dismissed in limine as entertaining such petition is
                                  a wastage of time of the Court and it would
                                  impede the work of the Court in considering the
                                  legitimate grievances. It is the settled law that
                                  when an aggrieved person, without adequate
                                  reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or
                                  pleasure, the Court would be under legal
                                  obligation to scrutinize whether the belated
                                  approach should be entertained or not. Inordinate
                                  delay would invite disaster for the litigant who
                                  knocks at the doors of the Court.
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                                  Remaining innocuously oblivious to the delay
                                  does not foster the cause of justice, on the
                                  contrary it brings injustice and it is likely to affect
                                  others. A Court is not expected to give indulgence
                                  to the indolent persons who compete with
                                  Kumbhkarana and the delay does not deserve any
                                  indulgence and on that ground alone, the writ
                                  Court can throw the petition overboard at the very
                                  threshold.”
                    19. On the basis of the consideration made above, this

       Court is of the considered opinion that so far the prayer of the

       petitioner for quashing of Memo No. 2414 dated 16.11.2005 is

       concerned, the same is fit to be rejected in view of the settled legal

       proposition of law and taking into account the judgment passed by

       the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and this Hon’ble Court in the

       cases referred hereinabove, since no plausible reason has been

       furnished by the petitioner to explain the delay of about 8 years in

       approaching this Court.

                    20. So far the quashing of the letter contained in Memo

       No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011 is concerned, the impugned order has

       been passed on 21.07.2011, without giving any notice to the

       petitioner, before passing the impugned order, by which the

       petitioner has been held to be not entitled for grant of full salary

       and allowances for the suspension period, which is of grave civil

       consequences and is in violation of Rule 97(3) of the Bihar Service
             Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
                                                       36/36




                    Code. This Court is of the opinion that the impugned order

                    contained in Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011 is fit to be set aside

                    and is accordingly set aside.

                                 21. The matter is remitted back to the respondent

                    authorities to take a decision afresh from the defective stage i.e.

                    after issuance of notice upon the petitioner and then to proceed in

                    accordance with law within a period of six months form the date of

                    receipt/production of a copy of this order.

                                 22. With the aforesaid observation and directions, the

                    writ petition is disposed of.

                                 23. Pending application, if any, shall also disposed of.




                                                  (Ritesh Kumar, J)
AjayMishra/-
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE                21.04.2026
Uploading Date          11.05.2026
Transmission Date         NA


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