Patna High Court
Nagendra Prasad SinghversusThe State Of Bihar and Ors
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- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
- Bench
- RITESH KUMAR
Holding
The Court dismissed the petition to quash the 2005 increment‑withholding order due to delay and acquiescence, but set aside the 2011 salary‑withholding order for violation of Rule 97, remitting the matter for fresh consideration with due notice.
Summary
The petitioner, a former Assistant in the Revenue Department, challenged two departmental orders: one (Memo 2414, 2005) withholding three increments and another (Memo 2325, 2011) withholding salary and allowances during a suspension period. He claimed the proceedings were initiated after a long delay, lacked proper notice, and violated natural justice. The Court examined whether the writ petition was maintainable given the eight‑year delay and acquiescence, and whether the 2011 order breached Rule 97(3) of the Bihar Service Code. It held that the petition to quash the 2005 increment‑withholding order must be dismissed due to delay and waiver, but the 2011 salary‑withholding order was set aside for procedural defect. The matter was remitted to the respondents to re‑issue the order after giving proper notice, and the writ petition was disposed.
Issues considered
- Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the delay and laches alleged by the State.
- Whether the disciplinary order of Memo No. 2414 dated 17.11.2005 withholding three increments is liable to be quashed.
- Whether the order of Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011 withholding salary and allowances without notice violates Rule 97(3) of the Bihar Service Code.
- Whether the departmental proceedings complied with principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
- Whether the punishment imposed constitutes a major penalty requiring a full inquiry under service rules.
Legislation cited
- Bihar Service Code — s. Rule 97(3)
Subjects
- departmental enquiry
- suspension
- withholding increments
- delay and laches
- natural justice
- service law
- Bihar Service Code
- Rule 97
- waiver
- acquiescence
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.20448 of 2013
======================================================
Nagendra Prasad Singh Son Of Late Mundrika Prasad Singh Resident Of
Lane No.- 4A, Vijay Nagar, Police Station- Rupaspur, District- Patna
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Of Bihar
2. The Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Secretariat
Building, Bihar, Patna
3. The Principal Secretary, Department Of Revenue And Land Reforms,
Secretariat Building, Bihar, Patna
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Manoj Priyadarshi, Sr. Advocate
: Mr. Ram Kishor Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Arvind Kumar, AC to Ex GA-9
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 11-05-2026
Heard the parties.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following reliefs:-
“I. To quash the letter contained in memo no. 2414
dated 16.11.2005 of the General Administration
Department whereby and where under the
petitioner has been inflicted punishment of
withholding of three increments with cumulative
effect in a departmental proceeding.
II. To quash the letter contained in memo no. 2325
dated 21.07.2011 passed by the General
Administration Department by which at the
conclusion of the same departmental
proceeding against petitioner the department
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has decided to impose and withhold the salary
and allowances of the petitioner for the
suspension period, running between 5.10.2000
to 27.05.2005, other than the subsistence
allowance already paid, in transaction under
which three increments have been withheld by
the letter dated 17.11.2005 against him.
III. To hold and declare entire departmental
proceeding against petitioner vitiated and
suspension unjustified in law, including the
punishments of withholding of three increments
by letter dated 17.11.2005 and further
disallowing petitioner to get full salary and
allowances for suspension period through letter
dated 21.07.2011 under the same departmental
proceeding illegal, void and inoperative in the
eye of law.
IV. To command the respondents and order them to
restore the increments already withheld in
pursuance of letter dated 17.11.2005 and to
further direct them to pay full salary and
allowances to the petitioner, other than the
subsistence allowance already paid, for
suspension period that continued from
5.10.2000 to 27.05.2005 after the punishments
of the petitioner being declared illegal and
unsustainable in law.”
FACTS OF THE CASE
3. The brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition
are that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant in the
Revenue and Land Reforms Department. Subsequently, in the year
1988, on account of formation of a joint cadre of assistants of the
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secretariat and assistants of the attached offices to the secretariat,
the General Administration Department became the parent
department of the assistants of the Secretariat. While the petitioner
was posted as an Assistant in the year 2000, he was put under
suspension vide order contained in Memo No. 1050 dated
05.10.2000 issued under the signature of Under Secretary,
Personal and Administrative Reforms Department, Government of
Bihar, Patna with respect to alleged irregularities committed by
him in passing forged travelling allowances bills and getting
financial benefits, in making payment of honorarium to the
beneficiaries, without approval of the Finance Department. The
departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner vide
letter contained in Memo No. 39 dated 12.01.2001 issued under
the signature of the Deputy Secretary, Personal and Administrative
Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, Patna and the enquiry
officer was appointed. The petitioner was directed to submit his
explanation before the enquiring authority. Memo of charge was
also given to the petitioner wherein altogether 9 charges were
levelled against him, which appears to have been prepared on the
basis of preliminary enquiry conducted by the then Additional
Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department. The petitioner
appeared before the enquiry officer and submitted his reply on
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12.04.2001, wherein he raised the objection with regard to clarity
of the charges, since the petitioner was of the view that the charges
should have been more clear, so that the petitioner could have
submitted an effective reply. The petitioner further requested the
enquiry officer to make available the relevant documents for
examination and the list of witnesses, who according to the
petitioner were necessary witnesses in the enquiry proceeding for
their examination and cross-examination. Pursuant thereto, the
enquiry officer wrote a letter to the department and asked for
clarification with respect to the charges to be proceeded with,
against the petitioner. Thereafter, fresh charge-sheet was issued
vide memo No. 1072 dated 16.11.2001, which contained
altogether 5 charges against the petitioner. It is the case of the
petitioner that the departmental proceeding was initiated on the
basis of the complaint submitted by two persons and the then
Additional Secretary, Revenue Department, who had conducted
preliminary enquiry and prepared a report, should have taken
statement of those two persons, but neither the statement of the
two persons nor the report of the Additional Secretary was
supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his explanation
before the enquiry officer, wherein he refuted all the charges
levelled against him. The petitioner was directed to clarify more
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with respect to charge no.1, which the petitioner duly complied by
submitting a detailed reply on 27.12.2001. After conducting the
departmental enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report on
31.01.2002, wherein he came to the conclusion that the charges
levelled against the petitioner are not proved and the department
failed to prove its case against any of the charges on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities. The department/disciplinary
authority sat on the report of the enquiry officer and proceeded
with further enquiry with regard to charge nos.1 and 4
respectively, for which memo no. 417 dated 20.04.2002 was
issued, whereby another enquiry officer was appointed and the
petitioner was directed to submit his explanation before the
enquiry officer. Being aggrieved with the action of the
departmental authorities, initiating fresh enquiry, the petitioner
preferred C.W.J.C. No. 8766 of 2002. However during pendency
of the writ petition, the enquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry
and the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation vide letter
contained in Memo No. 1348 dated 14.12.2002. By letter dated
14.12.2002, another enquiry officer was appointed. The petitioner
filed his show cause reply on 17.02.2003, reiterating his earlier
explanations submitted on 06.12.2001 and 27.12.2001, whereby he
denied all the allegations levelled against him and requested the
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enquiry officer to exonerate him from the charges levelled against
him. In the fresh enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report
on 19.05.2003, wherein he did not find anything against the
petitioner with respect to charge no.1, however for charge no.4, the
enquiry officer could not give any conclusive finding, that the
petitioner was associated in any way in making irregular payment
to any firm or was benefitted in any manner through transactions
in question. Second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner
vide letter dated 13.08.2003. The petitioner challenged all the
actions of the respondent authorities by way of filing Interlocutory
Application in C.W.J.C. No. 8766 of 2002. The writ petition filed
by the petitioner was allowed vide order dated 08.11.2004,
whereby the second enquiry initiated on 20.04.2002 was found to
be unlawful and accordingly was set aside. The petitioner had also
preferred a writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 1141 of 2001,
whereby he challenged the suspension order dated 05.10.2000. The
said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 11.04.2005
with a direction to the authorities concerned to consider revocation
of the suspension of the petitioner, if the same was not already
revoked. The suspension of the petitioner was revoked vide letter
dated 28.05.2005 and the department again issued a show cause
notice vide letter contained in Memo No. 920 dated 21.06.2005,
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showing disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer
dated 31.01.2002, with respect to charge no.1 and 4. The petitioner
submitted his explanation on 23.09.2005, wherein he refuted all
the allegations levelled against him. Finally, the disciplinary
authority vide memo no. 2414 dated 17.11.2005 found the
petitioner guilty for charge no.1, on the ground that he could not
satisfy the disciplinary authority with regard to submitting and
receiving fake TA bills. The petitioner was inflicted with the
punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative
effect. The petitioner was exonerated of the charge no.4. The
decision with respect to payment of salary and allowances, apart
from the subsistence allowance, during the period of suspension,
was not taken by the disciplinary authority while passing the order
dated 17.11.2005, therefore vide another order contained in Memo
No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011, a decision was taken to withhold
salary and allowances of the petitioner from 05.10.2000 to
27.05.2005, except the subsistence allowance, which was paid to
the petitioner, during the said period of suspension. No notice
whatsoever was issued to the petitioner, before passing the order
dated 21.07.2011, in terms of Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code,
thereby depriving the petitioner from getting full salary and
allowance for the suspension period, which is of grave civil
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consequences. The petitioner superannuated from service on
completion of the age of superannuation w.e.f. 30.04.2013, while
working as Section Officer, in the Revenue Department. It is
further case of the petitioner that the departmental proceeding in
question was initiated for stale charges that allegedly were part of
actions occurring 12-15 years back and the proceeding was
initiated without giving any opportunity to the petitioner.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
preliminary enquiry was conducted behind the back of the
petitioner and the said enquiry was conducted on the basis of the
complaint filed by two persons, who were employees of the
Revenue Department and the proceeding was initiated after 12-15
years of the alleged misconduct. He further submits that the
identity of the complainant was never verified and they were never
produced as a witness for cross examination, thereby denying the
opportunity to the petitioner to rebut the charges, which were
levelled against him on the basis of the complaint submitted by
two individuals. He further submits that the order of withholding
salary and allowances for the period of suspension, except the
subsistence allowance, which was already paid to the petitioner, is
a civil consequence and could not have been passed without
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following the procedure prescribed under Rule 97 of the Bihar
Service Code.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
enquiry against the petitioner was completed on 31.01.2002 and
the department in most cavalier manner kept the matter with
regard to the petitioner pending till 2005, despite having no proof
against the petitioner. The enquiry officer submitted his enquiry
report wherein he did not find the charges to be proved against the
petitioner, however the disciplinary authority was adamant on
inflicting punishment against the petitioner.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in
(2006) 5 SCC 88 (M. V. Bijlani versus Union of India and
Others), wherein in paragraph nos. 16, 17 and 19 it has been held
as follows:-
“16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has
not been shown as to what were the duties of
the appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or
otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown
either by the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority as to how and in what
manner the maintenance of ACE-8 Register by
way of sheets which were found attached to the
estimate file were not appropriate so as to
arrive at the culpability or otherwise of the
appellant. The Appellate Authority in its order
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stated that the appellant was not required to
prepare ACE-8 Register twice. The appellant
might have prepared another set of register
presumably keeping in view the fact that he was
asked to account for the same on the basis of
the materials placed on records. The Tribunal
as also the High Court failed to take into
consideration that the disciplinary proceedings
were initiated after six years and they
continued for a period of seven years and, thus,
initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as
also continuance thereof after such a long time
evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer.
17. In State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC
738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC
514] this Court has clearly held: (SCC p. 740,
para 4)
“The irregularities which were the subject-
matter of the enquiry are said to have taken
place between the years 1975-77. It is not the
case of the department that they were not
aware of the said irregularities, if any, and
came to know it only in 1987. According to
them even in April 1977 there was doubt about
the involvement of the officer in the said
irregularities and the investigations were going
on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to
think that they would have taken more than 12
years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as
stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory
explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing
the charge memo and we are also of the view
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that it will be unfair to permit the departmental
enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage.”
19. It is really a matter of great surprise that a
disciplinary proceeding was initiated five years
after the appellant handed over charge. At that
time he was admittedly not having possession
of any documents. The enquiry officer
furthermore took a period of seven years to
complete the enquiry. The Appellate Authority
also took seven years in disposing of the
appeal. Even then, the Appellate Authority did
not go into the question as to whether the
procedures laid down for holding the
disciplinary proceedings had been followed or
not. He did not go into the contentions of the
appellant herein minutely. The memo of appeal
filed by the appellant was very elaborate. He
raised a number of contentions therein. The
enquiry officer was charged with bias. He was
also charged with unfair conduct. He was said
to have committed a large number of
irregularities in the departmental proceeding.
The memo of appeal of the appellant was in
about 65 typed pages. It was subdivided into
five parts. He made all endeavours to deal with
each and every finding of the enquiry officer
and dealt with almost all the documents relied
upon by the department. He also dealt with the
deposition of the witnesses examined on behalf
of the parties.”
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in
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(1997) 11 SCC 374 (Manzoor Ahmed Mazumdar versus State of
Maghlaya and Others), wherein in paragraph no. 4 it has been
held as follows:-
“4. In view of the decision in M. Gopalkrishna Naidu
[AIR 1968 SC 240 : (1968) 1 SCR 355 : (1968) 2 LLJ
125] it must be held that even though there is no
express requirement in Fundamental Rule 54(3) for
giving an opportunity to the employee before passing
an order, giving of such an opportunity is implicit in
the exercise of the power which has been conferred
by the said provision. It was, therefore, necessary for
the competent authority to afford an opportunity to
the appellant before passing the order regarding pay
and allowances payable to the appellant in respect of
the period of suspension (sic absence). Since this was
not done in the present case, the order dated 12-8-
1982 cannot be upheld and has to be set aside. For
the same reason the impugned judgment of the High
Court has also to be set aside. It will be open to the
respondents to pass a fresh order in accordance with
law after affording an opportunity to the appellant.”
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 1991
Supp. (1) SCC 504 ( Kulwant Singh Gill versus State of Punjab),
wherein in paragraph no.4 it has been held as follows:-
“4. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter
undoubtedly is a minor penalty within the
meaning of Rule 5(iv). But sub-rule (v) postulates
reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay
for a specified period with further directions as to
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whether or not the government employee shall
earn increments of pay during the period of such
reductions and whether on the expiry of such
period the reduction will or will not have the effect
of postponing the future increments of his pay. It is
an independent head of penalty and it could be
imposed as punishment in an appropriate case. It
is one of the major penalties. The impugned order
of stoppage of two increments with cumulative
effect whether would fall within the meaning of
Rule 5(v)? If it so falls Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules
require conducting of regular enquiry. The
contention of Shri Nayar, learned counsel for the
State is that withholding two increments with
cumulative effect is only a minor penalty as it does
not amount to reduction to a lower stage in the
time scale of pay. We find it extremely difficult to
countenance the contention. Withholding of
increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge
over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule
5(iv) of the Rules. But when penalty was imposed
withholding two increments i.e. for two years with
cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that
the two increments earned by the employee was
cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his
upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In
other words the clock is put back to a lower stage
in the time scale of pay and on expiry of two years
the clock starts working from that stage afresh.
The insidious effect of the impugned order, by
necessary implication, is that the appellant
employee is reduced in his time scale by two
places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the
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tenure of his service with a direction that two
years' increments would not be counted in his time
scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words
are the skin to the language which if peeled off its
true colour or its resultant effects would become
apparent. When we broach the problem from this
perspective the effect is as envisaged under Rule
5(v) of the Rules. It is undoubted that the Division
Bench in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [ILR
(1985) 2 P&H 193 : (1985) 1 SLJ 513 (P&H)] ,
P.C. Jain, A.C.J. speaking for the Division Bench,
while considering similar question, in paragraph
8 held that the stoppage of increments with
cumulative effect, by no stretch of imagination
falls within clause (v) of Rule 5 or in Rule 4.12 of
Punjab Civil Services Rules. It was further held
that under clause (v) of Rule 5 there has to be a
reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay
by the competent authority as a measure of
penalty and the period for which such a reduction
is to be effective has to be stated and on
restoration it has further to be specified whether
the reduction shall operate to postpone the future
increments of his pay. In such cases withholding
of the increments without cumulative effect does
not at all arise. In case where the increments are
withheld with or without cumulative effect the
government employee is never reduced to a lower
stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held
that clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts
of that case. With respect we are unable to agree
with the High Court. If the literal interpretation is
adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive
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at that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the
back of the mind, it would always be so, the result
will be the conclusion as we have arrived at. If the
reasoning of the High Court is given acceptance,
it would empower the disciplinary authority to
impose, under the garb of stoppage of increments,
(sic stoppage) of earning future increments in the
time scale of pay even permanently without
expressly stating so. This preposterous
consequence cannot be permitted to be permeated.
Rule 5(iv) does not empower the disciplinary
authority to impose penalty of withholding
increments of pay with cumulative effect except
after holding inquiry and following the prescribed
procedure. Then the order would be without
jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be
per se void. Considering from this angle we have
no hesitation to hold that the impugned order
would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the
Rules; it is a major penalty and imposition of the
impugned penalty without enquiry is per se
illegal.”
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
9. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent-State submits that the petitioner was found prima
facie guilty of the misappropriation of public money by adopting
unfair means, since the petitioner availed travelling allowances for
journeys, which he said to have travelled through scooter and
availed it on the basis of fake T.A. Bill, for which he was not
entitled and he was not authorised by any superior authority. When
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the matter came to the notice of the authorities concerned, an
explanation was sought for from the petitioner and proceeding was
initiated against him. The enquiry officer was appointed and after
considering the enquiry report, the authorities came to the
conclusion that the report of the enquiry officer was not up to
mark, since the charge no.4, which was related to fake bills and
fake firm was not enquired by the conducting/enquiry officer,
which was essential to be enquired into. It was not taken into
account that without approval or permission of the competent
authority, the petitioner had undertaken the journey by scooter to
distant places. Finally, the disciplinary authority awarded
punishment of withholding of three annual increment to the
petitioner with cumulative effect.
10. The learned counsel for the State further submits that
all the TA bills were fake, since it is not possible to travel 250-300
kilometers by scooter in a day and to come back. Further, the
petitioner was absent from his duty in the name of travelling from
one place to another for 15-20 days in a month. The petitioner
committed financial blunder/irregularity by submitting fake T.A.
Bills, which is misconduct on the part of the petitioner, therefore,
he was rightly given the punishment. He further submits that the
petitioner approached this Hon’ble Court after a much delay in as
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much as that the order of punishment was passed on 16.11.2005
and the petitioner has filed the present writ petition on 03.10.2013,
which is after more than 8 years and that too, after his retirement
on 30.04.2013. Therefore, he submits that on the ground of delay
and laches, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed at the stage of
admission itself.
11. The learned counsel for the State finally submits that
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court has to see
that whether any procedural lapses are there or not, whether there
is violation of principles of natural justice, whether there is any
allegation of bias and the perversity of the judgment or not. In the
present case, no such plea has been taken by the petitioner and no
perversity has been shown. All the defence taken by the petitioner
has been considered by the disciplinary authority, while awarding
punishment to him.
12. The learned counsel for the state refers to and relies
upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported
in (2024) 15 SCC 215 (Mrinmoy Maity versus Chhanda Koley &
Ors.), wherein in paragraph nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 it has been
held as follows:-
9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on
perusal of the facts obtained in the present case,
we are of the considered view that the writ
petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in
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other words the writ petition ought to have been
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself.
An applicant who approaches the court belatedly
or in other words sleeps over his rights for a
considerable period of time, wakes up from his
deep slumber ought not to be granted the
extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court
time and again has held that delay defeats equity.
Delay or laches is one of the factors which should
be borne in mind by the High Court while
exercising discretionary powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the
High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to
assert his right has allowed the cause of action to
drift away and attempts are made subsequently to
rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care
and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in
approaching the writ court is explained which
would appeal to the conscience of the court, in
such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the
contesting party that for all times to come the
delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad
circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of
the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends
on facts and circumstances of each case, same
cannot be described in a straitjacket formula with
mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to
be exercised by the writ court depends upon the
facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which
the facts have travelled.
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11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that
no fixed period of limitation is prescribed.
However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of
the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to
whether within a reasonable time same has been
invoked and even submitting of memorials would
not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect
the cause of action which has had a natural death.
In such circumstances on the ground of delay and
laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or
the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found
that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the
petition on that sole ground itself, inasmuch as the
writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such
indolent litigant to take advantage of his own
wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver
of fundamental right but while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the
High Court will have to necessarily take into
consideration the delay and laches on the part of
the applicant in approaching a writ court.
12. This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of
W.B. [Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.,
(2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] has
held to the following effect: (SCC p. 784, paras
56-58)
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is
no doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,
226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this
Court takes into account certain factors and
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one of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant in
approaching a writ court. It is well settled
that power to issue a writ is discretionary.
One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that
the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction
of a writ court, he should come to the Court
at the earliest reasonably possible
opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the
motion for a writ will indeed be a good
ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying
object of this principle is not to encourage
agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
which have already been disposed of or
settled or where the rights of third parties
have accrued in the meantime (vide State of
M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [State of M.P. v. Bhailal
Bhai, (1964) 15 STC 450 : 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR
1964 SC 1006] , Moon Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Court [Moon Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 :
AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v.
Union of India [Bhoop Singh v. Union of
India, (1992) 3 SCC 136] ). This principle
applies even in case of an infringement of
fundamental right (vide Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC
110 : (1970) 25 STC 289] , Durga Prashad
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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v. Controller of Imports and Exports [Durga
Prashad v. Controller of Imports and
Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] and
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India
[Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower
limit as to when a person can approach a
court. The question is one of discretion and
has to be decided on the basis of facts before
the court depending on and varying from
case to case. It will depend upon what the
breach of fundamental right and the remedy
claimed are and when and how the delay
arose.”
13. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by
this Court in Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K.
Thangappan [Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K.
Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 791] whereunder it has been held that the
High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary
jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on
the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has
been further held thereunder: (SCC pp. 325-26,
paras 6-9)
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is
to be borne in mind by the High Court when
they exercise their discretionary powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an
appropriate case the High Court may refuse
to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is
such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental
right is involved the matter is still within the
discretion of the Court as pointed out in
Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and
Exports [Durga Prashad v. Controller of
Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185] .
Of course, the discretion has to be exercised
judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong Hurd [Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd,
(1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (LR PC
at p. 239) was approved by this Court in
Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [Moon
Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC
OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v.
Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1968 SCC
OnLine SC 54 : (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR
1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
(Lindsay Petroleum case [Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd,
(1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , LR pp.
239-40)
‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards
to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the
delay and the nature of the acts done during
the interval which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as
it relates to the remedy.’
8. It would be appropriate to note certain
decisions of this Court in which this aspect
has been dealt with in relation to Article 32
of the Constitution. It is apparent that what
has been stated as regards that article would
apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was
observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
India [Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
(1970) 1 SCC 84] that no relief can be given
to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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stated that though Article 32 is itself a
guaranteed right, it does not follow from this
that it was the intention of the Constitution-
makers that this Court should disregard all
principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal,
(1986) 4 SCC 566] that the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner
and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule
is premised on a number of factors. The
High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring, in its train
new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may
have the effect of inflicting not only hardship
and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay
coupled with the creation of third-party
rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in
deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction.”
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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13. The learned counsel for the State further refers to
and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 (Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board and Others versus T.T. Murali
Babu), wherein in paragraph no. 16 it has been held as follows:-
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not
be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required
to weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same. The court should bear
in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it
has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the
primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
without adequate reason, approaches the court at
his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis
at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may not
be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
delay would only invite disaster for the litigant
who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a
litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic
norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest
thief of time” and second, law does not permit one
to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring
in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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14. The learned counsel for the State further refers to
and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
reported in 2009 1 SCC 768 (Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others
versus State of West Bengal and Others and its analogues cases)
wherein in paragraph nos. 56 to 58 it has been held as follows:-
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no
doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226,
227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes
into account certain factors and one of such
considerations is delay and laches on the part of
the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is
well settled that power to issue a writ is
discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing
reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution
is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
writ court, he should come to the Court at the
earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ
will indeed be a good ground for refusing to
exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not to
encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume
matters which have already been disposed of or
settled or where the rights of third parties have
accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v.
Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR
261] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR
1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
27/36
[(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992)
2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case
of an infringement of fundamental right (vide
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1
SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and
Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1
SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit
as to when a person can approach a court. The
question is one of discretion and has to be decided
on the basis of facts before the court depending on
and varying from case to case. It will depend upon
what the breach of fundamental right and the
remedy claimed are and when and how the delay
arose.”
CONSIDERATION
15. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
after going through the records, it appears that the punishment
order against the petitioner was passed vide Memo No. 2414 dated
17.11.2005, whereby the petitioner was found guilty for charge
no.1. He was inflicted with the punishment of withholding of three
increments with cumulative effect. The petitioner never challenged
the said order and sat over the matter, meaning thereby that he had
accepted the punishment and he was satisfied with the impugned
order of punishment dated 23.09.2005. Subsequently, vide another
order contained in Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011, a decision
was taken to withhold his salary and allowances from 05.10.2000
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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to 27.05.2005, except the subsistence allowance which was paid to
the petitioner during the said period of suspension. The petitioner
preferred the present writ petition against both the impugned
orders i.e. order contained in Memo No. 2414 dated 17.11.2005
and Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011. The learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State has taken a preliminary objection
with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the
ground of delay and laches and relied on different judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case of Mrinmoy Maity
(supra), Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board
and Others (supra), Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others (supra)
wherein a consistent view has been taken that delay defeats all the
cause. Further the petitioner did not challenge the order dated
16.11.2005 for almost 8 years, therefore he waived his rights and
accepted the same. As per the principal of waiver and
acquiescence, the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the
same after 8 years of passing of the proceeding and no plausible
reason, whatsoever has been furnished with regard to delay in
approaching this Court. It is well settled proposition of law that
stale claims should not be adjudged by the writ Courts. In this
connection reference has to be made of a judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 (State of
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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Uttar Pradesh and Others versus Arvind Kumar Srivastava and
Others), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph
no. 20, 21 and 22.2 has held as follows:-
“20. The Court also quoted the following passage
from Halsbury's Laws of England (para 911, p.
395) : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1
SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, para 12)
“12. … ‘In determining whether there has been such
delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to
be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean
standing by while the violation of a right is in
progress, but assent after the violation has been
completed and the claimant has become aware
of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy
where, by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it; or where by his conduct and
neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has
put the other party in a position in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such
cases lapse of time and delay are most
material. Upon these considerations rests the
doctrine of laches.’”
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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21. Holding that the respondents had also
acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the
appeal of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with the
following reasons : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P.
Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC
464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC p. 471,
para 13)
“13. In view of the statement of law as summarised
above, the respondents are guilty since the
respondents have acquiesced in accepting the
retirement and did not challenge the same in
time. If they would have been vigilant enough,
they could have filed writ petitions as others
did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it
appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it
away and did not rise to the occasion in time
for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases,
the court should be very slow in granting the
relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to
be taken into consideration the question of
acquiescence or waiver on the part of the
incumbent whether other parties are going to
be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the
present case, if the respondents would have
challenged their retirement being violative of
the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam
could have taken appropriate steps to raise
funds so as to meet the liability but by not
asserting their rights the respondents have
allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple
of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming
the benefit for two years. That will definitely
require the Nigam to raise funds which is going
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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to have serious financial repercussions on the
financial management of the Nigam. Why
should the court come to the rescue of such
persons when they themselves are guilty of
waiver and acquiescence?”
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-
recognised exceptions in the form of laches and
delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons
who did not challenge the wrongful action in
their cases and acquiesced into the same and
woke up after long delay only because of the
reason that their counterparts who had
approached the court earlier in time succeeded
in their efforts, then such employees cannot
claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered
in the case of similarly situated persons be
extended to them. They would be treated as
fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the
acquiescence, would be a valid ground to
dismiss their claim.”
16. Similar view has been taken by a learned Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 25.02.2020
passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2276 of 2020 (Arun Kumar Mehta versus
the State of Bihar & Ors.), wherein in paragraph nos.4 and 8, it
has been held as follows:-
“4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and gone through the materials on record.
Apparently, there is a delay of about 07 years in
filing the present writ petition, even if the
appellate order dated 15.12.2012 is taken into
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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account, for which no plausible explanation
whatsoever has been furnished, hence the writ
petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of
principles of delay and laches, alone.
5. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the case, considering the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties as also taking into
account the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the cases referred to hereinabove,
regarding the principles of delay and laches, this
Court finds that as far as the present case is
concerned, no plausible explanation has been
furnished by the petitioner so as to convincingly
explain the delay in question of about 07 years in
approaching this Court, hence the present writ
petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches. Accordingly, the writ petition
stands dismissed.”
17. Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court in a
judgment dated 24.03.2026 passed in L.P.A. No. 891 of 2025 (The
Patna High Court through its Registrar General, Patna High
Court & Ors. versus Chandan Kumar & Ors.), in paragraph nos.
55 & 60, has held as follows:-
“55. Thirdly, the issue of delay and laches, though
noticed, has not been adequately appreciated in
its proper legal perspective. The appellants had
specifically contended that the writ petitioner
approached the Court after a considerable
lapse of time and, therefore, could not claim
parity with those who had been vigilant in
asserting their rights. The Hon’ble Supreme
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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Court in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava (Supra) has clearly held that though
similarly situated persons are ordinarily
entitled to equal treatment, this principle is
subject to exceptions, particularly in cases
involving delay, laches and acquiescence.
Persons who wake up after long delay cannot
claim the same relief as those who approached
the Court in time.
60. In view of the discussions and conclusions
arrived at on the issues framed hereinabove,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned judgment and order dated
09.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law,
inasmuch as the same proceeds on an
erroneous application of legal principles,
extends the benefit of earlier judgments beyond
their intended scope, and overlooks material
aspects relating to delay, laches and the
statutory framework governing the field. The
reasoning so adopted does not stand to judicial
scrutiny and has resulted in an unwarranted
direction for consideration of the writ
petitioner’s case.”
18. Similar view has been taken by an Hon’ble Division
Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 10.04.2026 passed in
L.P.A. No. 762 of 2025 (Raj Kumar Jha versus the State of Bihar
& Ors.), wherein in paragraph no.8 it has been held as follows:-
“8. Law is well settled that mere representation does
not extend the period of limitation and the
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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aggrieved person has to approach the Court
expeditiously and within a reasonable time. If it is
found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches, the High Court would be fully justified to
dismiss the writ petition at the threshold. Equity
aids the vigilant, not the indolent. Courts of equity
grant relief to only those who actively protect their
rights, not those who sleep on them. It demands
prompt action to prevent injustice.
In the case of P.S. Sadashivaswamy -Vrs.- State
of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1 Supreme
Court Cases 152, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
been pleased to observe that in a service matter,
an aggrieved party should approach the Court at
least within six months or at the most a year of the
arising of the cause of action, and it would be
sound and wise exercise of discretion for the
Court to refuse the exercise the extraordinary
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India and in case the petitioner does not approach
it expeditiously for relief, such petition should be
dismissed in limine as entertaining such petition is
a wastage of time of the Court and it would
impede the work of the Court in considering the
legitimate grievances. It is the settled law that
when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the Court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinize whether the belated
approach should be entertained or not. Inordinate
delay would invite disaster for the litigant who
knocks at the doors of the Court.
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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Remaining innocuously oblivious to the delay
does not foster the cause of justice, on the
contrary it brings injustice and it is likely to affect
others. A Court is not expected to give indulgence
to the indolent persons who compete with
Kumbhkarana and the delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on that ground alone, the writ
Court can throw the petition overboard at the very
threshold.”
19. On the basis of the consideration made above, this
Court is of the considered opinion that so far the prayer of the
petitioner for quashing of Memo No. 2414 dated 16.11.2005 is
concerned, the same is fit to be rejected in view of the settled legal
proposition of law and taking into account the judgment passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and this Hon’ble Court in the
cases referred hereinabove, since no plausible reason has been
furnished by the petitioner to explain the delay of about 8 years in
approaching this Court.
20. So far the quashing of the letter contained in Memo
No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011 is concerned, the impugned order has
been passed on 21.07.2011, without giving any notice to the
petitioner, before passing the impugned order, by which the
petitioner has been held to be not entitled for grant of full salary
and allowances for the suspension period, which is of grave civil
consequences and is in violation of Rule 97(3) of the Bihar Service
Patna High Court CWJC No.20448 of 2013 dt. 11-05-2026
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Code. This Court is of the opinion that the impugned order
contained in Memo No. 2325 dated 21.07.2011 is fit to be set aside
and is accordingly set aside.
21. The matter is remitted back to the respondent
authorities to take a decision afresh from the defective stage i.e.
after issuance of notice upon the petitioner and then to proceed in
accordance with law within a period of six months form the date of
receipt/production of a copy of this order.
22. With the aforesaid observation and directions, the
writ petition is disposed of.
23. Pending application, if any, shall also disposed of.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
AjayMishra/-
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE 21.04.2026
Uploading Date 11.05.2026
Transmission Date NA
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