Patna High Court
Vijay RamversusThe State Of Bihar and Ors
- Decided
- Disposal
- ALLOWED
- Bench
- RITESH KUMAR
Holding
The Court held that the petitioner’s uninterrupted service as a daily‑wage employee obliges the State to regularise him with full service benefits from the date of his appointment, notwithstanding his minority at the time of engagement.
Summary
The petitioner, Vijay Ram, was engaged as a daily‑wage chaukidar in 1983 at the age of 15 and served continuously for 26 years in the East Sone Canal Division. He sought regularisation in a Class IV post, arguing that his long, uninterrupted service and the State’s policy entitled him to the same treatment as similarly situated employees who were regularised. The respondents contended that his appointment as a minor rendered the contract void under Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act and that a medical board certificate of age was pending. The Court examined precedents on regularisation of ad‑hoc workers, the doctrine of legitimate expectation, and the constitutional guarantee of equality (Arts 14, 16, 21). Relying on Supreme Court judgments (Dharam Singh, Bhola Nath, Jaggo, etc.) and a Full‑Bench decision (Ragjawa Narayan Mishra), the Court held that the petitioner’s continuous service created a right to regularisation despite his minority at entry. Consequently, the petition was allowed, directing the State to regularise the petitioner from the date of appointment, grant all accrued benefits, and pay arrears for the three years preceding the petition.
Issues considered
- Whether a person engaged as a daily‑wage employee while a minor can be regularised under the State’s policy.
- Whether the State’s refusal to regularise the petitioner violates Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution.
- Whether the absence of a medical board certificate of age bars regularisation.
Legislation cited
- Bihar Service Code — s. 73
- Indian Contract Act, 1872 — s. 11
Subjects
- regularisation
- daily wage employee
- minority employment
- constitutional equality
- Article 14
- Article 16
- Article 21
- legitimate expectation
- state as employer
- pension benefits
- service tenure
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.25749 of 2013
======================================================
Vijay Ram S/O Sri Sadhu Ram R/O Mohallah Barah Patthar Dehri-On-Sone,
P.O. and P.S. Dehri-On-Sone, District Rohtas.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Of Bihar
2. The Secretary, Water Resources Development Department, Govt. Of Bihar,
Patna.
3. The Chief Engineer East Sone Canal Division, Aurangabad.
4. The Superintending Engineer, East Sone Canal Circle, Aurangabad,
Aurangabad.
5. The Executive Engineer, East Sone Canal Division, Aurangabad.
6. The District Magistrate, Aurangabad.
7. The District Magistrate, Aurangabad-Cum-The Chairman, Appointment
Committee For Appointment On The
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Ashutosh Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. K.P. Gupta, GP-10
: Mr. Virendra Kumar, AC to GP-10
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 16-06-2026
Heard the parties.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following reliefs:-
“a. For directing the respondent authorities to
regularize the service of the petitioner on the
basis of the period i.e. 26 years rendered in
service as a daily wage on a Class IV post.
b. For directing the respondent authorities to
take a decision with respect to the
regularization of the service of the petitioner
on Class IV (Group GHA) post in the light of
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the Govt. policy issued with respect the daily
wages employees.
c. For directing the respondent authorities to
absorb the petitioner on any Class IV post in
any organization of the state govt.”
BRIEF FACTS
3. The brief facts, which are essential for adjudication
of the present writ petition are that the petitioner was engaged to
work on daily wage basis by the Chief Engineer, East Sone Canal
Division, Aurangabad vide letter No. 23 dated 15.09.1983 in the
Office of East Sone Upper Layer Division, Barun, Aurangabad. As
per the school leaving certificate given by the petitioner, his date
of birth has been mentioned as 15.08.1968. The petitioner was
placed to work as Chaukidar at Main Canal Point vide Letter No.
272 dated 19.05.1986, issued under the signature of the Sub-
Divisional Officer, Barun, Aurangabad for the purposes of
controlling the canal’s water and also to maintain the law and
order during the time of kharif irrigation. From time to time, letter
of appreciation was issued in favour of the petitioner with regard
to his satisfactory work and he was also granted bonus, along with
others to the tune of Rs. 150/- for the year 1987-88. Subsequently,
the petitioner and two others were directed to work as night
chaukidar in Barun colony vide memo No. 994 dated 27.04.1989,
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issued under the signature of the Executive Engineer, East Sone
Upper Canal Division, Aurangabad. The name of the petitioner and
18 others was recommended for absorption by the Chief Engineer,
Water Resource Department, Aurangabad as per the list submitted
by the Superintending Engineer, Sone Upper Level Canal
Division, Aurangabad vide letter No. 1563 dated 28.11.1991, to
the Joint Secretary, Water Resource Department. Vide resolution
dated 16.03.2006, the State Government in consultation with
different employees unions, extended the cutoff date for
regularization of the work charge employees from 01.08.1985 to
11.12.1990, for giving priorities in appointment in Class-IV posts.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that despite rendering
uninterrupted and unblemished service, which is perennial in
nature, the petitioner rendered 26 years of the prime of his life
without being regularized by the respondent authorities. When the
case of the petitioner was not considered for regularization, in
terms of the resolution of the State Government dated 16.03.2006
and letter dated 01.04.2006, vide letter No. 1219 dated 07.05.2006,
issued under the signature of the Chief Engineer, Water Resource
Department, Aurangabad, a request was made to the
Superintending Engineer, Aurangabad to send the relevant
information with respect to petitioner and others for absorption of
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their services. Subsequently, a meeting was held on 16.06.2008,
under the Chairmanship of the Collector, Aurangabad by the
Committee, which was constituted for absorption through
appointment with regard to daily wage employees of Group-IV
(Gha) and have taken decision with respect the available 18
persons. The name of the petitioner was placed at serial no. 18 in
the said list, however in column no. 6, a remark was made that the
petitioner has been engaged at the time, when his age was 15 years
and only after getting clarification, his case will be considered.
Subsequently, in view of letter No. 96 dated 23.06.2008, issued
under the signature of the Collector, Aurangabad, the Executive
Engineer, Sone High Level Canal Division, Aurangabad vide his
letter No. 1029 dated 23.07.2008, recommended the name of the
petitioner for regularization of his services. Vide letter No. 914
dated 28.08.2009, issued under the signature of the Executive
Engineer, Sone High Level Canal Division, Aurangabad,
addressed to the Chief Engineer, Water Resources Department,
Aurangabad it was informed that the petitioner is continuously
performing his duties and he was found on duty at the time of
inspection by the higher authorities. The Executive Engineer
recommended the case of the petitioner for his regularization. The
petitioner kept on filing representation before the respondent
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authorities for consideration of his case, but no action has been
taken. It is further case of the petitioner that similarly situated 18
persons have already been regularized by the authorities, however
the petitioner has been left out, on the ground that on the date his
engagement, he was a minor aged about 15 years.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner was engaged to work as a daily wage employee in 1983
and as per his date of birth, which is 15.08.1968, he was 15 years
at the time of his engagement. Despite recommendation made by
the concerned authorities, his case has not been considered for
regularization only on the ground, since at the time of his
engagement, he was a minor. He further submits that several
similarly situated persons, namely, Narayan Yadav, Bindeshwari
Singh, Nand Kumar, Madan Yadav and Panchan Yadav were also
minor at the time of their engagement, however they have been
regularized in service by the respondent authorities and the
petitioner has been left out, on the ground that on the date of his
engagement, he was a minor. He submits that when the case of the
petitioner for his regularisation was not considered, despite the fact
that he was working since 1983 and similarly situated persons
have been regularised, he has filed a present writ petition.
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SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State submits that the petitioner fulfills all the conditions
mentioned in the direction for appointment. His appointment was
recommended by the department, but at the time of meeting, it was
not considered, since according to the official records, he was
engaged to work as a daily wage employee, when he was 15 years
of age. Later on, an affidavit was filed by his father to the effect
that he was not underage at the time of appointment and due to
conflict of his age, he was not appointed. He further submits that
according to the directions of the Government, his age was to be
confirmed by the Medical Board, which has not been received,
therefore, no decision has been taken by the respondent-State on
the case of the petitioner for his regularization. The learned
counsel for the State further submits that the decision with regard
to appointment/regularization of the petitioner was postponed for
want of his certificate of age by the Medical Board and the same is
still lacking. He further submits that despite the petitioner
fulfilling all the eligibility criteria, his case has not been
considered, since at the time of initial engagement, he was found
to be under age i.e. he was aged about 15 years.
CASE LAW RELIED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
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7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner in support of his contention refers to and relies upon a
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1735 (Dharam Singh & Ors. Versus State of
U.P. & Anr.), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, while
considering the case of regularization of daily wagers/Ad-hoc
employees, in paragraph nos. 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18 and 19 has held
as follows:-
“9. Moreover, it is undisputed that the nature of
work performed by the appellants, i.e.
sorting and scrutiny of applications, dispatch
and office support, and driving, has been
continuous and integral to the Commission's
functioning since their engagement between
1989 and 1992. The Commission itself moved
for sanction of fourteen posts and furnished a
list of fourteen daily wagers including the
appellants. That consistent internal demand,
coupled with uninterrupted utilisation of the
appellants' labour on regular office hours,
fortifies the conclusion that the duties are
perennial. To continue extracting such work
for decades while pleading want of
sanctioned strength is a position that cannot
be sustained.
11. Furthermore, it must be clarified that the
reliance placed by the High Court on
Umadevi (Supra) to non-suit the appellants is
misplaced. Unlike Umadevi (Supra), the
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challenge before us is not an invitation to
bypass the constitutional scheme of public
employment. It is a challenge to the State's
arbitrary refusals to sanction posts despite
the employer's own acknowledgement of
need and decades of continuous reliance on
the very workforce. On the other hand,
Umadevi (Supra) draws a distinction
between illegal appointments and irregular
engagements and does not endorse the
perpetuation of precarious employment
where the work itself is permanent and the
State has failed, for years, to put its house in
order. Recent decisions of this Court in
Jaggo v. Union of India4 and in Shripal v.
Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad5 have
emphatically cautioned that Umadevi
(Supra) cannot be deployed as a shield to
justify exploitation through long-term “ad
hocism”, the use of outsourcing as a proxy,
or the denial of basic parity where identical
duties are exacted over extended periods.
The principles articulated therein apply with
full force to the present case. The relevant
paras from Shripal (supra) have been
reproduced hereunder:
“14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on
Umadevi (supra)2 to contend that daily-wage
or temporary employees cannot claim
permanent absorption in the absence of
statutory rules providing such absorption.
However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi
itself distinguishes between appointments
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that are “illegal” and those that are
“irregular,” the latter being eligible for
regularization if they meet certain
conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi
cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative
engagements persisting for years without the
Employer undertaking legitimate
recruitment. Given the record which shows
no true contractor-based arrangement and a
consistent need for permanent horticultural
staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh
recruitment, though real, cannot justify
indefinite daily-wage status or continued
unfair practices.
15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen
continuously rendered their services over
several years, sometimes spanning more than
a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were
not produced in full, the Employer's failure to
furnish such records-despite directions to do
so-allows an adverse inference under well-
established labour jurisprudence. Indian
labour law strongly disfavors perpetual
daily-wage or contractual engagements in
circumstances where the work is permanent
in nature. Morally and legally, workers who
fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year
after year cannot be dismissed summarily as
dispensable, particularly in the absence of a
genuine contractor agreement. At this
juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the
broader critique of indefinite “temporary”
employment practices as done by a recent
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judgment of this court in Jaggo v. Union of
India3 in the following paragraphs:
“22. The pervasive misuse of temporary
employment contracts, as exemplified in this
case, reflects a broader systemic issue that
adversely affects workers' rights and job
security. In the private sector, the rise of the
gig economy has led to an increase in
precarious employment arrangements, often
characterized by lack of benefits, job
security, and fair treatment. Such practices
have been criticized for exploiting workers
and undermining labour standards.
Government institutions, entrusted with
upholding the principles of fairness and
justice, bear an even greater responsibility to
avoid such exploitative employment
practices. When public sector entities engage
in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only
mirrors the detrimental trends observed in
the gig economy but also sets a concerning
precedent that can erode public trust in
governmental operations.
………
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary
employees, particularly in government
institutions, often face multifaceted forms of
exploitation. While the foundational purpose
of temporary contracts may have been to
address short-term or seasonal needs, they
have increasingly become a mechanism to
evade long-term obligations owed to
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employees. These practices manifest in
several ways:
• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees
engaged for work that is essential, recurring,
and integral to the functioning of an
institution are often labelled as “temporary”
or “contractual,” even when their roles
mirror those of regular employees. Such
misclassification deprives workers of the
dignity, security, and benefits that regular
employees are entitled to, despite performing
identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees
are frequently dismissed without cause or
notice, as seen in the present case. This
practice undermines the principles of natural
justice and subjects workers to a state of
constant insecurity, regardless of the quality
or duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary
employees often find themselves excluded
from opportunities for skill development,
promotions, or incremental pay raises. They
remain stagnant in their roles, creating a
systemic disparity between them and their
regular counterparts, despite their
contributions being equally significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions
increasingly resort to outsourcing roles
performed by temporary employees,
effectively replacing one set of exploited
workers with another. This practice not only
perpetuates exploitation but also
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demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the
obligation to offer regular employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits:
Temporary employees are often denied
fundamental benefits such as pension,
provident fund, health insurance, and paid
leave, even when their tenure spans decades.
This lack of social security subjects them and
their families to undue hardship, especially
in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen
circumstances.””
13. As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra)
and Shripal (Supra), outsourcing cannot
become a convenient shield to perpetuate
precariousness and to sidestep fair
engagement practices where the work is
inherently perennial. The Commission's
further contention that the appellants are not
“full-time” employees but continue only by
virtue of interim orders also does not
advance their case. That interim protection
was granted precisely because of the long
history of engagement and the pendency of
the challenge to the State's refusals. It
neither creates rights that did not exist nor
erases entitlements that may arise upon a
proper adjudication of the legality of those
refusals.
15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing
observations, the impugned order of the High
Court cannot be sustained. The State's
refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003, in
so far as they concern the Commission's
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proposals for sanction/creation of Class-
III/Class-IV posts to address perennial
ministerial/attendant work, are held
unsustainable and stand quashed.
17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to
recall that the State (here referring to both
the Union and the State governments) is not
a mere market participant but a
constitutional employer. It cannot balance
budgets on the backs of those who perform
the most basic and recurring public
functions. Where work recurs day after day
and year after year, the establishment must
reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength
and engagement practices. The long-term
extraction of regular labour under temporary
labels corrodes confidence in public
administration and offends the promise of
equal protection. Financial stringency
certainly has a place in public policy, but it is
not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason
and the duty to organise work on lawful
lines.
18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that
“ad-hocism” thrives where administration is
opaque. The State Departments must keep
and produce accurate establishment
registers, muster rolls and outsourcing
arrangements, and they must explain, with
evidence, why they prefer precarious
engagement over sanctioned posts where the
work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked,
the record should show what alternatives
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were considered, why similarly placed
workers were treated differently, and how the
chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and
21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to
the human consequences of prolonged
insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a
constitutional discipline that should inform
every decision affecting those who keep
public offices running.
19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service
of the appellants, the admitted perennial
nature of their duties, and the material
indicating vacancies and comparator
regularisations, we issue the following
directions:
i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary
posts: All appellants shall stand regularized
with effect from 24.04.2002, the date on
which the High Court directed a fresh
recommendation by the Commission and a
fresh decision by the State on sanctioning
posts for the appellants. For this purpose, the
State and the successor establishment (U.P.
Education Services Selection Commission)
shall create supernumerary posts in the
corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or
equivalent) and Class-IV
(Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent)
without any caveats or preconditions. On
regularization, each appellant shall be
placed at not less than the minimum of the
regular pay-scale for the post, with
protection of last-drawn wages if higher and
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the appellants shall be entitled to the
subsequent increments in the pay scale as per
the pay grade. For seniority and promotion,
service shall count from the date of
regularization as given above.
ii. Financial consequences and arrears: Each
appellant shall be paid as arrears the full
difference between (a) the pay and
admissible allowances at the minimum of the
regular pay-level for the post from time to
time, and (b) the amounts actually paid, for
the period from 24.04.2002 until the date of
regularization/retirement/death, as the case
may be. Amounts already paid under
previous interim directions shall be so
adjusted. The net arrears shall be released
within three months and if in default, the
unpaid amount shall carry compound interest
at 6% per annum from the date of default
until payment.
iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has
already retired shall be granted
regularization with effect from 24.04.2002
until the date of superannuation for pay
fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and
recalculation of pension, gratuity and other
terminal dues. The revised pension and
terminal dues shall be paid within three
months of this Judgment.
iv. Deceased appellants: In the case of Appellant
No. 5 and any other appellant who has died
during pendency, his/her legal
representatives on record shall be paid the
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arrears under clause (ii) up to the date of
death, together with all terminal/retiral dues
recalculated consistently with clause (i),
within three months of this Judgment.
v. Compliance affidavit: The Principal Secretary,
Higher Education Department, Government
of Uttar Pradesh, or the Secretary of the U.P.
Education Services Selection Commission or
the prevalent competent authority, shall file
an affidavit of compliance before this Court
within four months of this Judgment.”
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner further refers to
and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
reported in 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 passed in SLP(CIVIL) No.
30762 of 2024 (Bhola Nath versus The State of Jharkhand &
Ors.), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph
nos. 9.3, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 has held as follows:-
“9.3. In the present case, the respondent-State has
engaged the services of the appellants for a
period exceeding 10 years. Upon completion
of this long tenure, the respondents, as
apprehended by the appellants, declined to
grant any further extension on the ground
that the engagement was contractual in
nature. Such a decision necessarily warrants
examination on the touchstone of the equality
principles enshrined in the Constitution,
which obligate the State to act as a model
employer and to take decisions free from
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arbitrariness. In our consideration of the
second issue, we shall examine whether non-
interference with the impugned judgments
would result in substantial and grave
injustice to the appellants.
ISSUE II. Whether the action/inaction of the
respondent-State in not recognizing the
appellants’ continuous service for the
purpose of regularization is arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India?
10. The learned Single Judge, vide common order,
dismissed the writ petitions filed by the
appellants seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the respondentState to regularize
their services. In doing so, the writ Court
placed reliance on the terms and conditions
of the employment agreement entered into
between the appellants and the respondents.
The learned Single Judge, in this regard,
recorded the following findings: -
i. The appellants were appointed on a purely
contractual basis pursuant to a decision of
the Finance Department to fill 22 sanctioned
posts through contractual engagement, the
expenditure being met from non-plan funds.
Following issuance of an advertisement and
completion of the selection process, the
appellants were appointed by entering into
contracts of employment for an initial period
of one year, extendable from time to time for
fixed durations.
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ii. The appellants were granted extensions
periodically, with the last extensions having
been issued in the year 2023 as a one-time
measure. The respondent-State treated the
said decision as a conscious policy
determination, which, according to the
learned Single Judge, did not warrant
interference by the Court.
iii. The appellants were held not entitled to
regularization under the regularization
scheme framed by the respondent-State in the
year 2015, as modified in 2019, which
prescribed completion of ten years of
continuous service as on the cut-off year
2019. It was further noted that the appellants
had not laid any challenge to the validity of
the said regularization scheme.
iv. Since the appellants were appointed on a
contractual basis and continued only through
periodic extensions, it was held that they did
not possess any statutory or legal right to
continue in service once the contractual
period, including its extensions, came to an
end.
v. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the
appellants were fully aware, and were put to
notice on each occasion of renewal, that
their engagement was contractual and
limited to a specified tenure. In view thereof,
the learned Single Judge held that no
question of legitimate expectation or
enforceable right to renewal or
regularization could arise, nor could any
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right be said to have crystallised in their
favour. vi. It was further noted that the
appellants had not been replaced by another
set of contractual employees. On the
contrary, the material on record indicated
that the respondent-State had undertaken
regular recruitment and appointed nine
persons as regular employees through a fresh
advertisement.
11. At the outset, we find it necessary to express
our disapproval of the manner in which the
High Court has approached the present lis.
The controversy before the Court was not
one of mere acquiescence or implied waiver
of rights. The High Court, in our view, has
proceeded on a mechanical application of
precedents without engaging with the core
constitutional issues involved, thereby
reducing the dispute to one of acceptance of
contractual terms, divorced from its larger
constitutional context.
12. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v.
Brojo Nath Ganguly,6 this Court
acknowledged the increasing imbalance in
the bargaining power of contracting parties.
The Court held thus: -
“89. . . . We have a Constitution for our country.
Our judges are bound by their oath to
“uphold the Constitution and the laws”. The
Constitution was enacted to secure to all the
citizens of this country social and economic
justice. Article 14 of the Constitution
guarantees to all persons equality before the
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law and the equal protection of the laws.
The principle deducible from the above
discussions on this part of the case is in
consonance with right and reason, intended
to secure social and economic justice and
conforms to the mandate of the great
equality clause in Article 14. This principle
is that the courts will not enforce and will,
when called upon to do so, strike down an
unfair and unreasonable contract, or an
unfair and unreasonable clause in a
contract, entered into between parties who
are not equal in bargaining power. It is
difficult to give an exhaustive list of all
bargains of this type. No court can visualize
the different situations which can arise in
the affairs of men. One can only attempt to
give some illustrations. For instance, the
above principle will apply where the
inequality of bargaining power is the result
of the great disparity in the economic
strength of the contracting parties. It will
apply where the inequality is the result of
circumstances, whether of the creation of
the parties or not. It will apply to situations
in which the weaker party is in a position in
which he can obtain goods or services or
means of livelihood only upon the terms
imposed by the stronger party or go without
them. It will also apply where a man has no
choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but
to give his assent to a contract or to sign on
the dotted line in a prescribed or standard
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form or to accept a set of rules as part of the
contract, however unfair, unreasonable and
unconscionable a clause in that contract or
form or rules may be. This principle,
however, will not apply where the bargaining
power of the contracting parties is equal or
almost equal. This principle may not apply
where both parties are businessmen and the
contract is a commercial transaction. In
today's complex world of giant corporations
with their vast infrastructural organizations
and with the State through its
instrumentalities and agencies entering into
almost every branch of industry and
commerce, there can be myriad situations
which result in unfair and unreasonable
bargains between parties possessing wholly
disproportionate and unequal bargaining
power. These cases can neither be
enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court
must judge each case on its own facts and
circumstances.”
(emphasis laid)
Therefore, the Court has held that the
Constitution obliges courts to advance social
and economic justice and to give effect to the
equality mandate under Article 14.
Consequently, courts will neither enforce nor
hesitate to invalidate contracts, or
contractual clauses, that are unfair or
unreasonable when entered into between
parties with unequal bargaining power.
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13. Another facet requiring consideration in the
case of contractual employees, such as the
present appellants, is the doctrine of
legitimate expectation. Where employees
have continued to discharge their duties on
contractual posts for a considerable length of
time, as in the present case, it is but natural
that a legitimate expectation arises that the
State would, at some stage, recognize their
long and continuous service. It is in this
belief, bolstered by repeated extensions
granted by the Executive, that such
employees continue in service and refrain
from seeking alternative employment,
notwithstanding the contractual nature of
their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus
apposite to advert to the principles governing
the doctrine of legitimate expectation as
enunciated by this Court in Army Welfare
Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 8
wherein it was held as follows: -
“63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings
forth the following features regarding the
doctrine of legitimate expectation:
63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based
on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish
or anticipation;
63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise
either from an express or implied promise;
or a consistent past practice or custom
followed by an authority in its dealings;
...
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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63.5. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in
the realm of public law, that is, a plea of
legitimate action can be taken only when a
public authority breaches a promise or
deviates from a consistent past practice,
without any reasonable basis.. . .
64. The aforesaid features, although not
exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help
us in deciding the applicability of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation to the
facts of the case at hand. It is clear that
legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially,
was a device created in order to maintain a
check on arbitrariness in State action. It
does not extend to and cannot govern the
operation of contracts between private
parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory
estoppel holds the field.”
(emphasis laid)
It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend
the expectation with which such contractual
employees continue in the service of the
State. The repeated conduct of the employer-
State in expressing confidence in their
performance and consistently granting
monetary upgrades & tenure extensions
reasonably nurtures an expectation that their
long and continuous service would receive
further recognition.
14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing
paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions
as follows:
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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I. The respondent-State was not justified in
continuing the appellants on sanctioned
vacant posts for over a decade under the
nomenclature of contractual engagement and
thereafter denying them consideration for
regularization.
II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing
engagement solely on the basis of
contractual nomenclature, without either
recording cogent reasons or passing a
speaking order, is manifestly arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar
claims for regularization cannot override
constitutional guarantees. Acceptance of
contractual terms does not amount to waiver
of fundamental rights, and contractual
stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State
action from constitutional scrutiny.
IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on
contractual labels or mechanical application
of Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-
hocism or to discard long-serving employees
in a manner inconsistent with fairness,
dignity and constitutional governance.
V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct
the respondent-State to forthwith regularize
the services of all the appellants against the
sanctioned posts to which they were initially
appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to
all consequential service benefits accruing
from the date of this judgment.”
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9. The learned counsel for the petitioner further refers to
and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
passed in Civil Appeal No. 8354-8356 of 2026 arising out of
SLP(C) Nos. 28802-28804 of 2019 (Bhikhani Devi & Etc. versus
Union of India & Ors.), wherein in paragraph no. 76 the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India has held that “a temporary status casual
labourer would be entitled to pensionary benefits on
superannuation even in the absence of regularization.”
CONSIDERATION AND ANALYSIS
10. Having heard the rival submission and after going
through the records, it is apparent that the petitioner was appointed
as a daily wager in 1983 and he continued to work on the said post
till filing of the writ petition. Further, it has been informed at the
bar that the petitioner is still working and performing his duties to
the satisfaction of the respondent authorities. It is not in dispute
that the petitioner fulfills all the requisite qualifications for being
regularized in services of the respondent authorities and the
respondent authorities in their counter affidavit have made a
categorical statement to that effect. The only ground, on which the
case of the petitioner has not been considered, is that on the date of
his engagement as a daily wager, he was 15 years of age. It has
already been settled by the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in a
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
26/32
case reported in 2006 (1) PLJR 410 (Ragjawa Narayan Mishra
versus the Chief Executive Officer, Bihar Rajya Khadi
Gramoudyog Board & Ors.), wherein in paragraph nos. 13, 15,
16, 17 and 18, it has been held as follows:-
“13. The plain perusal of the aforesaid statutory
provision would, undoubtedly, go to suggest
that the Government by virtue of an
amendment by addition Rule 5 in Appendix-
5 in the Bihar Pension Rules which came
into effect, on 23.8.1950, long before the
petitioners came to be admitted in the
service of the Board and it is very clear
there from that the qualifying age of the
Government servants for consideration of
the pensionary benefits came to be raised
from 16 years to 18 in the Government
service. Otherwise, also, the aforesaid
circular of 1998 has a purpose and policy
behind it. It is clarificatory. There is no
dispute about the fact that the service
between the employer and the employees is a
matter of contract. Once, a person is validly
entered into the service of the Government
he is offered the contractual and statutory
protection and the initial entry in the service
always is the outcome of the contractual
relationship. Who would be competent to
contract? It has been provided in Section 11
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as to who
is the competent to contract. Section 11 of
the said Act reads herein as under:
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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Who are competent to contract.— Every
person is competent to contract who is of the
age of majority according to the law to
which he is subject, and who is of sound
mind and is not disqualified from
contracting by any law to which he is
subject.”
15. It leaves no any manner of doubt that in this
country the age of majority of a person,
domiciled in India, has been on his attaining
the age of eighteen years and not before. Of
course, it would be not very material at this
stage to consider that in computing the age
of a person, the day on which he borns is to
be included as a whole day.
16. Be that as it may, one thing is certain that
admittedly both the petitioners when they
entered into the contract with the respondent
Board they had not attained the age of
majority. Apart from its legal impact and
effect, the ramifications and end result on
the status of a contract in terms of the
service relationship, a person could be said
to have entered into a valid service, only,
when he has attained the age of majority. So
the minimum age prescribed at the entry
point in the Government service has been 18
years. The maximum age prescribed for the
exit point is 58 years. In other words, the
total length of period of Government service
in any case for pensionary benefits would
not exceed 40 years. It is in this context, the
Government Circular mentioned herein
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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above needs to be considered. When there is
a clear Rule provision anything contrary to
or inconsistent with or incompatible to it,
any circular or resolution or order, will not
have any legal and valid effect to abridge
the right enshrined in the Rule Provision.
Even if the said circular of 1998 as relied
upon by the petitioners is considered to be
beneficial to them then, also, it cannot be
read at this juncture with the existing
statutory provision incorporated in the Bihar
Pension Rules, as well as, the Bihar Service
Code. Therefore, from that point of view also
the petitioners cannot be allowed to contend
that they have right to continue even beyond
the age of 58 years though provided in Rule
73 of the Bihar Service Code which
prescribes the superannuation age of 58
years.
17. Thirdly, it is settled and established
proposition of law and principles of
jurisprudence that a person who takes undue
advantage by one or other reasons at the
entry point in the service cannot be allowed
to urge that he be given higher benefit and if
it is urged then, clearly, it goes to show that
something wrong or irregular has been
done, at the entry point, in service. So the
settled principle, also, creates a very strong
impediment in getting the relief from this
Court which is exercising extraordinary,
prerogative, equitable and discretionary writ
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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jurisdiction by invocation of the provision of
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. In our opinion, therefore, the impugned
orders questioned in both the writ petitions,
obviously, cannot be interfered with from
any point of view as discussed hereinabove.
The proposition of law, therefore, is made
evident and unambiguous that the
superannuation age prescribed in Rule 73 of
the Bihar Service Code will apply for
retirement purpose and a person cannot be
continued beyond the age of completion of
40 years in service. It is, therefore, evidently,
clear that a Government servant who has
completed 40 years of service or has
attained the age of 58 years has to be
superannuated in terms of the existing Rule
provision. Our answer, therefore, is very
clear and we answer this reference
accordingly. The contradictory view in the
aforesaid decisions referred to hereinbefore,
shall not be a good law.”
11. From the Hon’ble Full Bench decision of this Court
in the case of Ragjawa Narayan Mishra (supra), it would
transpire that if a person is appointed, while he was a minor, his
services shall be counted till he attains the age of 60/62 years or
maximum 42/44 years, in case of Class-III/ Class-IV employees.
In the present case, since the petitioner has been appointed in 1983
and as per the date of birth, which has been mentioned by the
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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petitioner in the writ petition i.e., 15.08.1968, he was 15 years of
age at the time of his appointment. Therefore at best, the
respondent authorities could have done, to have directed the
petitioner to superannuate from service on completion of 42 years
of service i.e. the maximum period which an employee can serve,
assuming the date of employment as 18 years of age. In case of the
petitioner, since he was appointed on 15.09.1983, the respondent
authorities could have retired him from service on completion of
42 years of age i.e. 15.09.2025. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of Bhola Nath (supra) and Dharam
Singh (supra) has categorically held that if the person is engaged
after following all the due process of law and is performing the
work/duties, which are perennial in nature and which is same, as
being performed by a regular employee, then in that case,
considering the long tenure of engagement, he is liable to be
regularized in service. In the present case, the respondent
authorities have not contradicted the fact that the petitioner is not
eligible to be appointed/regularized in service. The only ground,
which has been taken to deny the regularization to the petitioner, is
that at the time of his engagement as a daily wage employee, he
was 15 years of age and was treated to be a minor. Further, in a
recent judgment in the case of Bhikhani Devi & Etc. (supra), the
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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Hon’ble Supreme Court of India allowed the writ petition by
holding that a temporary status casual labourer would be entitled
to pensionary benefits on superannuation, even in the absence of
regularization.
12. Considering the facts stated above and on the basis
of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Dharam Singh (Supra) & Bhola Nath (Supra), this Court
is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to be
regularized in service w.e.f 15.09.1983 i.e. the date on which the
order of appointment was issued. The petitioner is entitled for all
the service related benefits, since it is not in dispute that he has not
worked for the said period. However, the arrears payable to the
petitioner shall remain continued to the period of three years,
preceeding the date of filing of the present writ petition before this
Court, in view of paragraph no.82 of the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Bhikhani Devi & Etc.
(supra). He would be entitled for all the service related benefits
treating his date of regularization as 15.09.1983 and the entire
period from 15.09.1983 till the date of his retirement will be
counter for the purposes of granting pension and pensionary
benefits. Since, the petitioner has completed 42 years of service on
15.09.2025, which an employee can maximum serve, in view of
Patna High Court CWJC No.25749 of 2013 dt.16-06-2026
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the decision of the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of
Ragjawa Narayan Mishra (supra), he will be entitled for pension
and pensionary benefits w.e.f the date of his superannuation.
13. The respondent authorities are directed to take steps
for regularization of the services of the petitioner in terms of the
directions given hereinabove and in terms of the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Dharam Singh
(Supra) & Bhola Nath (Supra) and to take steps for making
payment of arrears of salary, as indicated above and the pension
and pensionary benefits.
14. The entire exercise in this regard must be completed
within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production
of a copy of the order.
15. The writ petition is allowed.
16. Pending applications, if any, shall also stands
disposed of.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
AjayMishra/-
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 18.06.2026
Transmission Date NA
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