Patna High Court
Rajan JhaversusThe State of Bihar
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
Holding
The petition lacks merit and is dismissed.
Summary
Rajan Jha filed a public interest litigation seeking a court order to halt the construction of a weir on the link stream of the Kamla River in Darbhanga, alleging severe environmental and health impacts. The respondents, the State of Bihar and officials of the Water Resources Department, defended the project as a policy decision based on expert technical reports. The Patna High Court examined whether the judiciary could intervene in such a technical, expert‑driven governmental action. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that unless the decision is arbitrary, illegal, or unconstitutional, courts must give due credence to expert‑based policy decisions. Finding no merit in the petition and noting that interference would adversely affect public interest, the Court disposed of the writ petition.
Issues considered
- Whether the court can intervene to stop a government‑sanctioned weir construction on environmental grounds when the decision is based on expert technical reports.
- Whether the decision to construct the weir is arbitrary, illegal, or violative of constitutional provisions.
Subjects
- public interest litigation
- environmental law
- judicial review
- policy decision
- technical expertise
- separation of powers
- water resources
- Bihar
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.4127 of 2026
======================================================
Rajan Jha S/o Devendra Jha, R/o Village and P.O.- Kasrour, Kasraund,
Kasraur P.S.- Ghanshyampur, District- Darbhanga.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar Patna through the Principal Secretary, Water Resources
Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
2. Principal Secretary, Water Resources Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
3. Superintending Engineer, Western Koshi Canal Division, Darbhanga,Water
Resources Department
4. Executive Engineer, Western Koshi Canal Division, Darbhanga.
5. District Forest Officer, Darbhanga.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Kaushik Deo, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. P K Shahi, Advocate General
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
(Per: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE)
3 24-04-2026 This writ petition has been filed by way of Public
Interest Litigation by Rajan Jha seeking following relief:-
“(i) For direction to the
Principal Secretary, Department of Water
Resources, Govt. of Bihar, Patna not to
construct a weir on the link stream of
Kamla river in Mouza korthu within
kasrour Basauli Panchayat, PS-Gaura
Bouram, Dist.- Darbhanga as it will
severely cause environmental and
ecological problems causing serious
health issues also to the local people.”
Patna High Court CWJC No.4127 of 2026(3) dt.24-04-2026
2/8
2. Prima facie, after going through the averments
made in the writ petition, we do find that the matter pertains to
technical aspects regarding construction of “weir” on the link
stream of Kamla River, under the notification issued by Water
Resources Department, Government of Bihar.
3. The Court has time and again cautioned that if the
decision of the State Government is based on the opinion of the
Experts, reflected from the project report prepared by
technocrats, duly accepted and acknowledged by the State, it
will have to be given due credence, unless it is inconsistent with
the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or highly irrational.
The aforesaid settled legal principle has been reiterated time and
again. It would be worth benefiting to quote some relevant
paragraphs of decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation -Vrs.-
Union of India, reported in (2016) 6 Supreme Court Cases 408
(Paragraphs- 21, 22, 23 and 24).
“21. Such a policy decision, when not
found to be arbitrary or based on irrelevant
considerations or mala fide or against any
statutory provisions, does not call for any
interference by the courts in exercise of power
of judicial review. This principle of law is
ingrained in stone which is stated and restated
time and again by this Court on numerous
occasions. In Jal Mahal Resorts (P) Ltd. v. K.P.
Patna High Court CWJC No.4127 of 2026(3) dt.24-04-2026
3/8
Sharma [Jal Mahal Resorts (P) Ltd. v. K.P.
Sharma, (2014) 8 SCC 804], the Court
underlined the principle in the following
manner : (SCC pp. 861-62, paras 137-38)
“137. From this, it is clear that
although the courts are expected very often
to enter into the technical and
administrative aspects of the matter, it has
its own limitations and in consonance with
the theory and principle of separation of
powers, reliance at least to some extent to
the decisions of the State authorities,
specially if it is based on the opinion of the
experts reflected from the project report
prepared by the technocrats, accepted by
the entire hierarchy of the State
administration, acknowledged, accepted
and approved by one Government after the
other, will have to be given due credence
and weightage. In spite of this if the court
chooses to overrule the correctness of such
administrative decision and merits of the
view of the entire body including the
administrative, technical and financial
experts by taking note of hair splitting
submissions at the instance of a PIL
petitioner without any evidence in support
thereof, the PIL petitioners shall have to be
put to strict proof and cannot be allowed to
function as an extraordinary and extra-
judicial ombudsman questioning the entire
exercise undertaken by an extensive body
which includes administrators, technocrats
and financial experts. In our considered
view, this might lead to a friction if not
collision among the three organs of the
State and would affect the principle of
governance ingrained in the theory of
separation of powers. In fact, this Court in
Patna High Court CWJC No.4127 of 2026(3) dt.24-04-2026
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M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P. [M.P.
Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., (1997) 7
SCC 592], at p. 611 has unequivocally
observed that : (SCC para 41)
‘41. … The power of judicial
review of the executive and
legislative action must be kept within
the bounds of constitutional scheme
so that there may not be any occasion
to entertain misgivings about the role
of judiciary in outstepping its limit by
unwarranted judicial activism being
very often talked of in these days. The
democratic set-up to which the polity
is so deeply committed cannot
function properly unless each of the
three organs appreciate the need for
mutual respect and supremacy in their
respective fields.’
138. However, we hasten to add and
do not wish to be misunderstood so as to
infer that howsoever gross or abusive may
be an administrative action or a decision
which is writ large on a particular activity
at the instance of the State or any other
authority connected with it, the Court
should remain a passive, inactive and a
silent spectator. What is sought to be
emphasised is that there has to be a
boundary line or the proverbial “Laxman
rekha” while examining the correctness of
an administrative decision taken by the
State or a Central authority after due
deliberation and diligence which do not
reflect arbitrariness or illegality in its
decision and execution. If such equilibrium
in the matter of governance gets disturbed,
development is bound to be slowed down
Patna High Court CWJC No.4127 of 2026(3) dt.24-04-2026
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and disturbed specially in an age of
economic liberalisation wherein global
players are also involved as per policy
decision.”
22. Minimal interference is called for by
the courts, in exercise of judicial review of a
government policy when the said policy is the
outcome of deliberations of the technical
experts in the fields inasmuch as courts are not
well equipped to fathom into such domain
which is left to the discretion of the execution.
It was beautifully explained by the Court in
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India
[Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India,
(2000) 10 SCC 664] and reiterated in
Federation of Railway Officers Assn. v. Union
of India [Federation of Railway Officers Assn.
v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 289] in the
following words : (SCC p. 289, para 12)
“12. In examining a question of this
nature where a policy is evolved by the
Government judicial review thereof is
limited. When policy according to which
or the purpose for which discretion is to be
exercised is clearly expressed in the
statute, it cannot be said to be an
unrestricted discretion. On matters
affecting policy and requiring technical
expertise the court would leave the matter
for decision of those who are qualified to
address the issues. Unless the policy or
action is inconsistent with the Constitution
and the laws or arbitrary or irrational or
abuse of power, the court will not interfere
with such matters.”
23. Limits of the judicial review were
again reiterated, pointing out the same position
by the courts in England, in G. Sundarrajan v.
Patna High Court CWJC No.4127 of 2026(3) dt.24-04-2026
6/8
Union of India [G. Sundarrajan v. Union of
India, (2013) 6 SCC 620] in the following
manner : (SCC p. 646, para 15)
“15.1. Lord MacNaughten in Vacher
& Sons Ltd. v. London Society of
Compositors [Vacher & Sons Ltd. v.
London Society of Compositors, 1913 AC
107 : (1911-13) All ER Rep 241 (HL)] has
stated : (AC p. 118)
‘… Some people may think the
policy of the Act unwise and even
dangerous to the community. … But a
judicial tribunal has nothing to do
with the policy of any Act which it
may be called upon to interpret. That
may be a matter for private judgment.
The duty of the court, and its only
duty, is to expound the language of
the Act in accordance with the settled
rules of construction.’
15.2. In Council of Civil Service
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service
[Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC
374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All
ER 935 (HL)] (AC p. 414 : All ER p. 954),
it was held that it is not for the courts to
determine whether a particular policy or
particular decision taken in fulfilment of
that policy is fair. They are concerned only
with the manner in which those decisions
have been taken, if that manner is unfair,
the decision will be tainted with what Lord
Diplock labels as “procedural
impropriety”.
15.3. This Court in M.P. Oil
Extraction v. State of M.P. [M.P. Oil
Patna High Court CWJC No.4127 of 2026(3) dt.24-04-2026
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Extraction v. State of M.P., (1997) 7 SCC
592] held that unless the policy framed is
absolutely capricious, unreasonable and
arbitrary and based on mere ipse dixit of
the executive authority or is invalid in
constitutional or statutory mandate, court's
interference is not called for.
15.4. Reference may also be made of
the judgments of this Court in Ugar Sugar
Works Ltd. v. Delhi Admn. [Ugar Sugar
Works Ltd. v. Delhi Admn., (2001) 3 SCC
635] , Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v.
State of Uttaranchal [Dhampur Sugar
(Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal,
(2007) 8 SCC 418] and Delhi Bar Assn. v.
Union of India [Delhi Bar Assn. v. Union
of India, (2008) 13 SCC 628].
15.5. We are, therefore, firmly of the
opinion that we cannot sit in judgment
over the decision taken by the Government
of India, NPCIL, etc. for setting up of
KKNPP at Kudankulam in view of the Indo-
Russian Agreement.”
(emphasis in original)
24. When it comes to the judicial review of
economic policy, the courts are more
conservative as such economic policies are
generally formulated by experts. Way back in
the year 1978, a Bench of seven Judges of this
Court in Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India
[Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1978)
3 SCC 459 : AIR 1978 SC 1296 : 1978 Cri LJ
1281] carved out this principle in the following
terms : (SCC p. 478, para 24)
“24. We have listened to long
arguments directed at showing us that
producers and sellers of oil in various
Patna High Court CWJC No.4127 of 2026(3) dt.24-04-2026
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parts of the country will suffer so that they
would give up producing or dealing in
mustard oil. It was urged that this would,
quite naturally, have its repercussions on
consumers for whom mustard oil will
become even more scarce than ever
ultimately. We do not think that it is the
function of this Court or of any court to sit
in judgment over such matters of economic
policy as must necessarily be left to the
government of the day to decide. Many of
them, as a measure of price fixation must
necessarily be, are matters of prediction of
ultimate results on which even experts can
seriously err and doubtlessly differ. Courts
can certainly not be expected to decide
them without even the aid of experts.”
4. Having carefully gone through the above referred
decision and considering the nature of relief sought for, we are
of the view that the writ petition lacks any merit and any
interference would have an adverse effect on public interest.
5. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed off.
(Sangam Kumar Sahoo, CJ)
(Harish Kumar, J)
shivank/-
U
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