Holding

The High Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, confirming the acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove a legally enforceable debt and the elements of Section 138 NI Act were not satisfied, and no error or perversity was found in the appellate court's reasoning.

Summary

The complainant, a plastic packaging manufacturer, claimed that the respondent failed to pay a cheque of Rs.63,91,878 issued to discharge a debt of Rs.76,77,846.37, which was dishonoured and returned with a stop‑payment endorsement. A statutory demand under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act was served, but the respondent only paid Rs.35,00,000 and did not settle the full amount within the 15‑day period, leading to a criminal case. The trial court convicted the respondent and sentenced him to one year’s simple imprisonment, but the appellate court reversed this judgment and acquitted him. The complainant sought leave to appeal the acquittal, arguing that the appellate court ignored material evidence and that a single reliable witness suffices for conviction. The High Court examined the evidence, noted that the complainant had already received a substantial part of the debt and that the remaining amount claimed was not a legally enforceable liability, concluding that the ingredients of Section 138 were not satisfied. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the appellate court was justified in acquitting the accused on the basis that the complainant failed to establish a legally enforceable debt corresponding to the cheque amount.
Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was properly appreciated and whether any material was ignored or mis‑appreciated.
Whether there was any illegality, irregularity or perversity in the appellate court's judgment of acquittal.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. 419
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 374(3), s. 378
Negotiable Instruments Acts. 138

Subjects

Cheque dishonourSection 138 NI ActAcquittalLeave to appealPresumption of innocenceEvidence appraisalCommercial disputeStatutory demand

Judgment

R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL) NO. 18251
of 2026
In F/CRIMINAL APPEAL/34358/2026
With
F/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 34358 of 2026
==========================================================
ALPS POLYTEX THROUGH MAHENDRAKUMAR PRABHUDAS PATEL
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR RUDRAM T TRIVEDI(12973) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK

Date : 07/08/2026

ORDER

ORDER IN CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION No.18251 OF 2026

1. The applicant – original complainant has preferred this
application under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BNSS’
for short) seeking leave to prefer an appeal against the
judgment and order dated 10.06.2026 passed by the learned
6th Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana (hereinafter be
referred to as “the Appellate Court”) in Criminal Appeal
No.228 of 2025 whereby the Appellate Court has acquitted
the original accused- respondent No.2 herein from the charge
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act
(hereinafter be referred to as “NI Act”) by quashing and
setting aside the judgment and order dated 13.03.2025 passed

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by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kadi
(hereinafter be referred to as the “Trial Court”) in Criminal
Case No.228 of 2025.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and wholesale
trading of plastic packaging materials. Respondent No.2, in
the ordinary course of its business, used to purchase plastic
packaging materials from the applicant from time to time.
Thus, the applicant and Respondent No.2 had longstanding
commercial and business dealings, pursuant to which the
applicant regularly supplied goods to Respondent No.2
against invoices raised from time to time.

2.1 As on 23.03.2023, a sum of Rs.76,77,846.37/- remained
due and payable by Respondent No.2 to the applicant towards
the price of the goods supplied under the aforesaid business
transactions. Consequently, a legally enforceable debt and
liability arose and became due and payable by Respondent
No.2 to the applicant.

2.3 After repeated reminders and towards discharge of the
aforesaid outstanding liability, Respondent No.2 issued
cheque bearing No.000046 for a sum of Rs.63,91,878/-
towards substantial discharge of its legally enforceable debt
and liability, while assuring the applicant that the balance
outstanding amount of Rs.12,85,968.37/- would be paid within
a short period. Relying upon the said assurance, the applicant
accepted the said cheque and presented it for encashment
through its banker on 20.04.2023, within its validity period.
However, the cheque was dishonoured and returned unpaid

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vide Return Memo dated 20.04.2023 with the endorsement
“Stop Payment.”

2.4 Upon receipt of the Return Memo, the applicant, through
its advocate, issued a statutory demand notice dated
02.05.2023 under Section 138(b) of the NI Act, calling upon
Respondent No.2 to pay the cheque amount within the
statutory period. The said notice was duly served upon
Respondent No.2 on 04.05.2023. Despite receipt of the
statutory notice, Respondent No.2 failed to make payment of
the entire cheque amount within the statutory period
prescribed under Section 138(c) of the NI Act. Respondent
No.2 made only partial payments aggregating to
Rs.35,00,000/- into the applicant’s account on different dates,
namely Rs.10,00,000/- on 04.05.2023, Rs.10,00,000/- on
26.05.2023, Rs.10,00,000/- on 02.06.2023, and Rs.5,00,000/-
on 05.06.2023.

2.5 Despite service of the statutory demand notice on
04.05.2023, Respondent No.2 failed to pay the entire cheque
amount of Rs.63,91,878/- within the statutory period
prescribed under Section 138(c)of the NI Act. The payment of
Rs.10,00,000/- made on 04.05.2023 was only a part-payment
of the amount demanded under the statutory notice, while the
remaining payments were made subsequently. Thus, upon
expiry of the statutory period, Respondent No.2 had failed to
comply with the statutory demand for payment of the cheque
amount, thereby giving rise to the cause of action under
Section 138 of the NI Act. The applicant thereafter instituted
Criminal Case No.2087 of 2023 before the Trial Court.

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2.6 After hearing both sides and appreciating the evidence on
record, the Trial Court vide Judgment and Order dated
13.03.2025, ordered the respondent No.2 to undergo one year
simple imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section
138 of the NI Act.

2.7 Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Order of conviction
dated 13.03.2025, Respondent No.2 preferred Criminal
Appeal No.228 of 2025 before the Appellate Court.

3. It appears from the records that to prove the case, the
complainant has examined the following witness before the
Appellate Court:-

P.W. No. Name of Witnesses Exhibit
1 Deposition of complainant Mahendrakumar 04
Prabhudas Patel

3.1 In addition to this, the complainant has also produced
the following documentary evidence:-

Sr. No. Details of documents Exhibit
1 Authorization Letter / Power of Attorney 11

2 Disputed Cheque 12

3 Cheque Return Memo 13

4 Registered Post A.D. Slip 14

5 Office Copy of Notice 15

6 Acknowledgment Slip 16,17

7 GST Registration Certificate 18

8 Partnership Change Document / Deed 19

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9 GSTR-1 20

10 Complainant’s Bank Account Statement 21,22

11 Extract of E-Way Bill 23

12 Extract of Accused’s Account 24

13 GST Challan 31

14 Ledger Account of Maruti Company 32

15 Extract of E-Way Bill 33

16 Audit Report 34

17 Income Tax Return 35

18 Interest Calculation Ledger 36

3.2 The evidence Produced on Behalf of the accused:

Oral Evidence

PW. No. Particulars Exhibit

1. Deposition of witness Rakha K. Vijiyan 40

Documentary Evidence

Sr. No. Description Exhibit

1 Email Copy 41

2 Certificate of 65(b) 42

3.3 After closure of the evidence, the statements of the
accused under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 has been recorded wherein he denied of having
committed any offence and has stated that he is innocent.

3.4 After hearing both the sides and after evaluating the

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evidence placed on record, by the impugned Judgment and
Order dated 10.06.2026, the Appellate Court, reversed the
findings of the Trial Court and acquitted Respondent No.2.

3.5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
Judgment and Order of Acquittal dated 10.06.2026 passed by
the Appellate Court, the Applicant intends to prefer an appeal
against the said Judgment and Order. Accordingly, by way of
the present application, the Applicant seeks leave to prefer an
appeal against the impugned Judgment and Order of
Acquittal.

4. Heard Mr.Rudram Trivedi, learned counsel for the
applicant – original complainant and Ms.Jirga Jhaveri, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent – State of
Gujarat at length.

5. Mr.Trivedi, learned counsel appearing for the applicant –
original complainant has submitted the same facts which are
narrated in the memo of application and has also submitted
that the prosecution has examined witnesses and produced
documentary evidence, despite this fact, the Appellate Court
has not considered the same in its true and proper
perspective in passing the judgment and order of acquittal.
Mr. Trivedi, learned counsel, while referring to the entire oral
as well as documentary evidence, has assailed the impugned
judgment and order and submitted that the Appellate Court
has not taken into consideration the evidence connecting the
accused to the alleged offence in its proper perspective and
even the prosecution has been able to prove the charges
levelled against the accused. While referring to the evidence

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of the witnesses and the material collected against the
accused, Mr. Trivedi, learned counsel has submitted that the
prosecution has established the case against the accused by
examining the witnesses, who have supported the case of the
prosecution, however, the Appellate Court has discarded and
disbelieved the evidence of these witnesses. He has submitted
that the witnesses have fully supported the case of the
prosecution, however, the Appellate Court has not
appreciated the same and passed the judgment and order of
acquittal which is illegal and unjust. He has submitted that it
is settled legal position that the evidence of a single witness is
sufficient for conviction if the same is reliable and trustworthy
and in the present case, though the evidence of all the
witnesses are reliable and trustworthy, without any cogent
reason, the Appellate Court has disbelieved and discarded the
evidence of the witnesses.

5.1 According to Mr. Trivedi, learned Counsel appearing for
the Applicant, the Appellate Court has erred in law and on
facts in interfering with the well-reasoned judgment and order
of conviction passed by the Trial Court. It is submitted that
the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court were based
on proper appreciation and evaluation of the oral as well as
documentary evidence on record, and there was no justifiable
ground for the Appellate Court to reverse the said findings
and record an order of acquittal in favour of the
Respondent/Accused. He has prayed to allow the present
application seeking leave to prefer an appeal against the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

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6. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the Appellate Court, the questions arise
for determination are as under:-

(1) whether the Appellate Court is justified in passing the
judgment and order of acquittal.

(2) whether the Appellate Court has rightly appreciated the
evidence led by the prosecution in recording the
reasons.

(3) whether there is any illegality, irregularity or any
perversity in the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal.

7. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon
perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as
well as the evidence recorded by the Appellate Court, it is
appropriate to first examine the facts of the case. The
Applicant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
wholesale trading of plastic packaging materials. Respondent
No.2 had longstanding business dealings with the Applicant
and regularly purchased goods against invoices raised from
time to time. As on 23.03.2023, an amount of
Rs.76,77,846.37/- was due and payable by Respondent No.2
towards the goods supplied by the Applicant, thereby giving
rise to a legally enforceable debt and liability. Towards part
discharge of the said liability, Respondent No.2 issued Cheque
No.000046 for Rs.63,91,878/-, assuring the Applicant that the
balance amount would be paid shortly. The Applicant
presented the cheque through its banker; however, the same
was dishonoured and returned unpaid vide Return Memo
dated 20.04.2023 with the endorsement “Stop Payment”.

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Thereafter, the Applicant issued a statutory demand notice
dated 02.05.2023 under Section 138(b) of the NI Act, which
was duly served upon Respondent No.2 on 04.05.2023.
Despite receipt thereof, Respondent No.2 failed to pay the
entire cheque amount within the statutory period and made
only partial payments aggregating to Rs.35,00,000/- on
different dates. As the entire cheque amount remained unpaid
upon expiry of the statutory period prescribed under Section
138(c) of the NI Act, the cause of action arose in favour of the
Applicant, pursuant to which the Applicant instituted Criminal
Case No.2087 of 2023 before the Trial Court. Upon
appreciation of the evidence on record, the Trial Court, vide
Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2025, convicted Respondent
No.2 for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI
Act and sentenced him to undergo one year’s simple
imprisonment.

8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said Judgment and
Order of conviction, Respondent No.2 preferred Criminal
Appeal No.228 of 2025 before the learned Appellate Court.

9. After hearing both the sides and after evaluating the
evidence placed on record, by the impugned Judgment and
Order dated 10.06.2026, the Appellate Court, reversed the
findings of the Trial Court and acquitted Respondent No.2.

10. Now, it appears from the record that, prior to the
institution of the complaint, the Respondent-Accused had
already paid a total amount of Rs.35,00,000/- towards the
outstanding dues of Rs.76,77,846.37/-. Thus, the amount of

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Rs.41,77,846.37/- remained outstanding. However, the cheque
in question for Rs.63,91,878/- was issued towards the
outstanding liability and was subsequently dishonoured with
the endorsement “Stop Payment”.

11. Though the aforesaid fact was within the knowledge of the
Applicant–Original Complainant, the Trial Court, without
properly appreciating or considering the said material fact,
passed the impugned Judgment and Order, whereby the
Respondent was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of one year. The Trial Court further
directed the Respondent to pay the remaining amount of the
cheque along with interest thereon.

12. It appears from the record that the Appellate Court
while recording the reasons in paragraph Nos. 10.2 to 10.3,
observed that from the cheque amount of Rs.63,91,878/- the
amount of Rs.35,00,000/- is already received by the
complainant and the complainant has also admitted in his
cross examination that this amount was received by the
complainant.

13. It further appears from the record that the amount
mentioned in the cheque at Exhibit-12 was Rs.63,91,878/-.
After receipt of the statutory demand notice, the accused paid
Rs.35,00,000/- to the complainant. Therefore, after deducting
the said amount from the cheque amount of Rs.63,91,878/-,
the outstanding legally recoverable amount would be
Rs.28,91,878/-, and the complaint ought to have been filed
only for the said amount of Rs.28,91,878/-.

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14. Despite the aforesaid position, the complainant, contrary
to the contents of the statutory notice, stated that an amount
of Rs.41,77,846/- was outstanding and instituted the
complaint for recovery of the said amount. Such amount
cannot be said to be a legally enforceable debt or liability.
Therefore, the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act are not satisfied.

15. It is an admitted fact that, against the total dues of
Rs. 76,77,846.37/-, the Applicant had already received an
amount of Rs. 35,00,000/-, which was also specifically
mentioned in his legal notice as well as in the complaint.
Despite having received the said amount, the Applicant
presented the cheque for an amount of Rs. 63,91,878/-. This
clearly suggests that the Applicant intended to misuse the
cheque, which was in his custody. It is, therefore, clearly
established that the complainant failed to establish the basic
ingredients necessary to constitute an offence under Section
138 of the NI Act. Furthermore, the Applicant was required to
establish that the Respondent/Accused was legally liable to
pay the amount for which the cheque was issued. However,
the Applicant failed to prove that the Respondent was liable to
discharge any legally enforceable debt or liability
corresponding to the amount mentioned in the cheque.

16. At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the provision of
Sections 138 of the NI Act, which read as under:-

“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in
the account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an
account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any

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amount of money to another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is
returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be
paid from
that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person
shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without
prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two years’], or
with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or
with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

(a) thecheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six
months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of
its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case
may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of
money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,
[within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the
bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said
amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder
in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the
said notice.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt of other
liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”

17. It is worthwhile to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in case of Kamala S. vs. Vidhyadharan M.J. and Anr.
Reported in 2008(1) GLR 423 more particularly head note
and paragraph Nos. 4, 17 and 18.
“Heard note:-
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (XXVI of 1881) Sec. 118(a),Secs.
138 & 139- Presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge
of "any debt or other liability" -Burden of proof in the matter on the
accused to rebut the presumption is of "preponderance of
probability" - Inference therefor can be drawn from the
circumstances -On facts found that defence of accused was
probable -Held, High Court had wrongly reversed the acquittal.

4. According to the appellant, Smt. Sathyabhama owned a property

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bearing old Survey No. 1363/3-1-1 measuring an area of 47 cents.
She had executed two Sale Deeds, one in favour of Mr.
Ramchandran Nair and another in favour of Thankamony
conveying to them 20 cents and 27 cents respectively. The Sale
Deeds were allegedly executed in favour of the aforementioned
persons as a security in lieu of some amount paid in her favour.
However, when the Thankamony and Ramchandran Nair demanded
the money back from the wife of the respondent, the appellant was
approached for purchase of the said property for a consideration of
Rs. 5 lakhs. On 05.09.1997, the said Thankmony executed a Deed
for Sale in favour of the appellant wherefor she had withdrawn a
sum of Rs. 4 lakhs from bank. The said amount was paid to
Sathyabhama which in turn was paid to Thankamony and
Ramchandran Nair. However, as there was a dispute in regard to
the exact area of the property and measurement therefor had not
been taken, she had given a cheque to Sathyabhama in the name of
her husband as demanded by Sathyabhama on an understanding
that the consideration shall be reduced if the area found in the Sale
Deed is found short. As upon measurement, the area of the
property conveyed in his favour was found to be short by 4 cents,
the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the respondent on
27.11.1997. Allegedly, however the respondent had asked for a
sum of Rs. 10,000/- more from the appellant, but a sum of Rs.
5,000/- was only given to him on 18.12.1997 towards full and final
settlement thereof and in that view of the matter no further amount
was due from her.

8. On the said finding, the learned Trial Judge recorded a judgment
of acquittal. On an appeal preferred by the respondent herein
thereagainst, the High Court, however, reversed the said finding,
opining that the appellant had not been able to discharge the
burden of proof laid down under Sections 138 and 139 of the Act,
which read as under :
"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
funds in the account.Where any cheque drawn by a
person on an account maintained by him with a banker
for payment of any amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or
in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the
bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement
made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to
have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice
to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine which may extend to twice the
amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply

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unless

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn
or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,
as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of
the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing,
to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank regarding
the return of the cheque as unpaid, and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment
of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case
may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque,
within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "debt or other
liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability."
"139. Presumption in favour of holder.It shall be presumed, unless
the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the
cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge,
in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability."

17. This Court clearly laid down the law that standard of proof in
discharge of the burden in terms of Section 139 of the Act being of
preponderance of a probability, the inference therefor can be
drawn not only from the materials brought on record but also from
the reference to the circumstances upon which the accused relies
upon. Categorically stating that the burden of proof on accused is
not as high as that of the prosecution, it was held;

"33. Presumption drawn under a statute has only an
evidentiary value. Presumptions are raised in terms of the
Evidence Act. Presumption drawn in respect of one fact may
be an evidence even for the purpose of drawing presumption
under another."
18. It was further observed that ;
" 38. If for the purpose of a civil litigation, the defendant
may not adduce any evidence to discharge the initial burden
placed on him, a "fortiori" even an accused need not enter
into the witness box and examine other witnesses in support
of his defence. He, it will bear repetition to state, need not
disprove the prosecution case in its entirety as has been held
by the High Court.
39. A presumption is a legal or factual assumption drawn

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from the existence of certain facts."

18. It is also appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Sureshchandra Chandrashankar
Joshi vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. reported in 2010(1)
GLR 271 more particularly paragraph Nos. 11 and 12 and the
decision in case of Shanku Concretes Pvt. Ltd. and Others
vs. State of Gujarat and Another reported in 2000(3)
Crimes 602.

19. Even as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the case of Babubhai (supra), the accused has been successful
in bringing on record a probable defence, which has
ultimately resulted in the shifting of the burden upon the
complainant by putting questions regarding legal dues in the
cross-examination.

20. On perusal of the record of the appeal, it transpires that
the respondent-accused has established his innocence before
the Appellate Court and that, after due appreciation of the
oral as well as documentary evidence and other material
placed on record, the Appellate Court has rightly passed the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings
recorded by the Appellate Court are just, proper and in
accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore,
no interference is warranted by this Court.

21. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the First
Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is

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founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the Appellate Court.

22. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find

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out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.

23. At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dattatraya vs.
Sharanappa reported in (2024) 8 SCC 573, wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:-

“33.1 Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the fundamental
essence of liberty and presumption of innocence unless proven
guilty. This presumption gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent
findings of acquittal. Therefore, this court must be extra-cautious
while dealing with a challenge against acquittal as the said
presumption gets reinforced by virtue of a well-reasoned
favourable outcome. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution
side becomes more burdensome pursuant to the said double
presumption.

33.3 Where two views are possible, then this Court would not
ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent findings of
acquittal. However, where the situation is such that the only
conclusion which could be arrived at from a comprehensive
appraisal of evidence, shows that there has been a grave
miscarriage of justice, then, notwithstanding such concurrent view,
this Court would not restrict itself to adopt an oppugnant view.

33.4 To adjudge whether the concurrent findings of acquittal are
‘perverse’ it is to be seen whether there has been failure of justice.
This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala clarified the ambit of the term
‘perversity’ as:

“20…...if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/admissible material. The finding may also be said
to be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if
the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the
vice of irrationality.”

33.6 Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to safeguard
interests of justice when the acquittal is based on some irrelevant
grounds or fallacies in re- appreciation of any fundamental
evidentiary material or a manifest error of law or in cases of non-
adherence to the principles of natural justice or the decision is
manifestly unjust or where an acquittal which is fundamentally
based on an exaggerated adherence to the principle of granting
benefit of doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside. Say in

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cases where the court severed the connection 12 (2023) 10 SCC
148. between accused and criminality committed by him upon a
cursory examination of evidences. [Vide State of Punjab v.
Gurpreet Singh and Others and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar]

34. Upon perusal of the aforementioned principles and applying
them to the facts and circumstances of the present matter, it is
evident that there is no perversity and lack of evidence in the case
of the respondent- accused. The concurrent findings have backing
of detailed appraisal of evidences and facts, therefore, do not
warrant interference in light of above enlisted principles. In a
similar set of facts as in the present case, involving criminal
liability arising out of dishonour of cheque, this Court in M/s Rajco
Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff dejected from reversing the
concurrent findings of acquittal of the accused therein and
underscored the principle of non-interference, unless such findings
are perverse or bereft of evidentiary corroboration or lacks
question of law.”

24. It is appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Rajco Steel Enterprises vs. Kavita
Saraff and another reported in (2024) 9 SCC 390,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:-
“12. We are dealing with a case where the First Appellate Court
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 374(3) of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, ongoing through the analysis of evidence,
acquitted the accused/respondent no.1. The acquittal was further
upheld by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under
Section 378 of the 1973 Code. The whole question involved in this
proceeding is as to whether the cheques were issued in discharge
of a debt and if it was so, then whether the accused/respondent
no.1 was able to rebut the presumption in terms of Section 118
read with Section 139 of the 1881 Act. In the light of the judgment
of this Court in the case of Narendra Pratap Narain Singh -vs-
State of U.P. the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India to interfere with concurrent findings of fact is
not in question, when such findings are based on no evidence or
are perverse. The question, we have to address thus, is as to
whether the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High
Court are on no evidence or perverse. Both these Courts have
examined the evidence threadbare and in the opinion of these two
fora, go against the complainant/petitioner.”

25. It is also appropriate to have a glance of the decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basalingappa vs.

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Mudibasappa reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418, Rangappa
vs. Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441.

26. Further, in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the Appellate Court.

27. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:-

“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the
general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa
and others vs. State of Karnataka , regarding the power
of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal
against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:

“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on the evidence before it
may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,
“very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with

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acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review
the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that
in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour
of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court.

21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential
for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to
clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the
record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in
order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of
the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the
High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility
of witnesses and it is absolutely imperative that the High
Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the
Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified
as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of
criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the brusque
approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2,
reversing the cogent and well-considered judgment of
acquittal by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of
doubt, cannot be sustained.”

28. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused have committed the alleged crime.
Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence
on record.

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29. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the Appellate Court has not committed
any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on
record and in acquitting the accused from the charges
levelled against him. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence,
it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed
to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the Appellate Court is sustainable and the present
application for leave to appeal is liable to be dismissed.

30. In view of the above, the present application seeking
leave to prefer an appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to
be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed and leave is refused.
The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the
Appellate Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands
cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the
concerned Court forthwith.

ORDER IN F/CRIMINAL APPEAL N0.34358 OF 2026.

Since the application seeking leave to appeal has been
dismissed/refused, the present Criminal Appeal, which is at
the filing stage, does not survive and is accordingly dismissed.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: SURESHKUMAR MOTIBHAI SOLANKI(HC00208), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 12/08/2026 17:45:46

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