Holding

The High Court held that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act does not require a written notice to revoke permission, and therefore the Small Cause Court was correct in issuing the possession warrant under Section 43; the revision is dismissed.

Summary

The plaintiff, Chandrakant J. Patel, sought a possession warrant against his relative Pradipkumar G. Patel under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, 1882, claiming that the permission to occupy the disputed premises had been withdrawn. The Small Cause Court issued the warrant under Section 43, which the defendant challenged by filing a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendant argued that a written notice revoking permission was required, while the plaintiff contended that the statute does not mandate such notice. The High Court examined the language of Sections 41 and 43, held that the Act does not require a written revocation notice, and that the request for possession can be implied. Relying on statutory interpretation principles and prior case law, the Court found no error in the Small Cause Court’s decision. Consequently, the revision was dismissed and the order of the Small Cause Court upheld.

Issues considered

The requirement of a written notice to revoke permission under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, 1882
Whether the Small Cause Court erred in issuing a possession warrant under Section 43 without a written revocation notice
Whether the revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is maintainable
Interpretation of the statutory provisions in light of the doctrine of casus omissus

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115

Subjects

possession warrantSmall Cause CourtSection 41Section 43written notice requirementstatutory interpretationrevision under CPCcasus omissus

Judgment

C/CRA/40/2020 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 21/01/2026

Reserved On : 22/12/2025
Pronounced On : 21/01/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 40 of 2020

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI Sd/-

=====================================================

Approved for ReportingYes No
Yes
=====================================================
PRADIPKUMAR GORDHANDAS PATEL
Versus
CHANDRAKANT JIVANLAL PATEL
=====================================================
Appearance:
MR.MRUDUL M BAROT(3750) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR HARDIK D MUCHHALA(5634) for the Opponent(s) No. 1
=====================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

CAV JUDGMENT

1. By way of this revision under Section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’),
revisionist prayed for following relief:-

“16. A) Allow this Application;

B) Be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated
04.12.2019 passed in P.S.R.P. No.22 of 2011 passed by the
Small Cause Court No.10, Ahmedabad;

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C) Pending admission, hearing and till the final disposal
of the present application, this Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to stay the said order dated 04.12.2019 passed in
P.S.R.P. No.22 of 2011 passed by the Small Casue Court
No.10, Ahmedabad;

D) Pass such orders as thought fit in favour of the
applicant in the interest of justice.”

2. The case backgrounds as under:-

2.1 Mr. Chandrakant Jivanlal Patel filed the application
under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, 1882
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to issue possession warrant
against the opponent – Pradipkumar Gordhandas Patel for
getting possession of the disputed premises bearing House No.86
situated at Uttar Gujarat Patel Society, Part-I, near Haripur,
Asarva, Ahmedabad (‘Disputed premises’) on the pleading that
the disputed premises was handed over to the opponents for the
use and enjoyment for the limited time period without charging
any rent, as the opponent was the relative of the applicant. The
permission is revoked and the plaintiff has demanded the
peaceful and vacant possession of the premises from the
opponent, but no possession has been handed over. Instead, the
opponent has filed the Civil Suit No. 2069 of 2003 for the relief of
injunction to protect his possession and Civil Suit No.2929 of
2010 for the relief of specific performance in the City Civil Court
against the plaintiff and other.

2.2 Some incidental pleading made to the effect that the
opponent has acquired alternative accommodation situated at

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Mandirvas Navi Parabadi, Haripura Gaam, Asarwa being House
No. 300/1 in Ahmedabad City.

2.3 The relief of issuance of possession warrant,
therefore, was sought under Section 41 read with Section 43 of
‘the Act’. On service of notice, the opponent has appeared before
the Court and has filed his written statement at Exhibit-40,
wherein defendant admitted that they are close relatives. It is
further averred that the petitioner is the son of defendant’s aunt
(Foi) and since defendant’s mother was expired, he was not kept
by the father of the plaintiff and later on, since defendant was
earning independently, he has purchased the disputed property
on the sale consideration of Rs. 45,50,000/- by paying Rs.
1.50,000/- being part payment thereof on 29.04.1994 and
Bharatbhai Patel, the brother of the plaintiff obtained the
possession of the disputed property thereof.

2.4 On the aforesaid conspectus, it was prayed that the
application under Section 41 and 43 of ‘the Act’ is not
maintainable.

2.5 Learned Small Cause Court permitted both the
parties to lead the evidence and allowed the petition and passed
the order of issuing the possession warrant under Section 43 of
‘the Act’ and the Bailiff of the Court was directed to execute the
possession warrant and to take the possession of the disputed
premises and handover it to the applicant.

2.6 Being aggrieved, the defendant is before this Court by
filing this revision.

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3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot for the
revisionist – defendant and learned advocate Mr. Hardik D.
Muchhala for the original plaintiff.

3.1 Learned advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot raised the
argument that plaintiff has not given any notice in writing to the
revisionist, terminating the permission or revoking the
revisionist's right to remain in the possession of the demised
premises. Thus, order of isuance of posession warrant is bad in
law.

3.2 He would further submit that the plaintiff is totally
silent on the aspect that, on which date the plaintiff has left the
premises of the defendant to live in other premises, no specific
date was mentioned to claim that on particular date, the notice
was issued to the defendant and permission to live in the
disputed property was discontinued or revoked.

3.3 Learned advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot takes this
Court to the order dated 31.01.2020 passed by the coordinate
Bench and submitted that the revision was admitted on the
ground that, although the request for revocation of the
permission may not be in writing, but must be proved with
specific effective date of revocation, date of revocation to declare
the defendant as a permissive user or tresspasser. He would
submit that since the oral notice request was not proved in
absence of plea as to specific date on which the revisionist
becomes permissive user or was rendered tresspasser, inasmuch
as it is only after the said date that the petitioner could be
termed as a ‘tresspasser’. Therefore, in absence of compliance

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with the written notice request, the petition under Section 41 of
‘the Act’ was not maintainable.

3.4 He would further submit that the learned Small
Cause Court erroneously referred to provision of some other Act
and drew the analogy from there that if a notice in writing is to
be served to the defendant, the lawmakers must have stated so
in the provision of the law.

3.5 He would further submit that the predominant aspect
in Section 41 is to revoke the permission and the person
claiming to be the owner is to request the person in occupation
and such request must reckon from any particular date to
render the permissive possession as a possession of the
trespasser. In absence thereof, he would submit that the
application filed by the petitioner under Section 41 of ‘the Act’
was not maintainable, but the learned Small Cause Court has
committed serious error in overlooking the specific provision.

3.6 Mainly upon the aforesaid submission, learned
advocate Mr. Mrudul M. Barot submitted to allow this revision
and to interfere with the impugned judgment and order, and
consequently, to quash the same.

4. As against the aforesaid submission, learned
advocate Mr. Hardik D. Muchhala appearing for the original
plaintiff would submit that Section 41 of ‘the Act’ does not
contemplate to written request/notice to revoke the permission.

4.1 He would further submit that the defendant since
has apprehended the threat to his possession, has filed Civil Suit

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in the City Civil Court to protect from being dspossessed is
suffice to say that the plaintiff being a landlord has made the
request and revoked the permission of the revisionist to remain
in the possession of the disputed property. Therefore, he
submitted that the learned Small Cause Court has not
committed any error in reaching to conclusion of issuance of the
warrant for possession of the petitioner. Thus, he submitted to
dismiss this revision.

5. I have heard learned advocates for both the sides,
also perused the paper-book and applied anxious consideration
to the rival submission as well as the facts of the case.

5.1 Some admitted facts of the case are that the
defendant - Pradipkumar Gordhandas Patel is living in the
disputed property. Defendant’s possession has not been given
any statutory enactment like tenant, lessee, mortgagee, etc. It is
a case of the landlord that he is the owner of the disputed
property, it is not much disputed by the defendant. Rather,
during the course of leading of evidence, it is admitted that the
plaintiff is the owner of the property.

5.2 In para 1.2 of application, plaintiff came out with the
case that he has withdrawn the permission and has demanded
the possession of the disputed premises from the defendant. No
specific date is stated that on which date the permission was
withdrawn or revoked. Apt to note that the defendant has no
other statutory right to remain in possession of the disputed
property, except under the permission of the plaintiff.

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5.3 The plaintiff filed the PSRP Application under Section
41 of ‘the Act’ on 01.07.2011. The defendant filed two Civil Suits
being Civil Suit No.2069 of 2003 and secondly, Civil Suit
No.2929 of 2010. The former suit was filed for the injunction, as
the defendant was apprehending that his possession could have
been snatched away by the plaintiff without following due
process of law and second suit was filed for the specific
performance of the agreement, by which the defendant claims
that it was purchased by him from the brother of the plaintiff.

5.4 In juxtaposition of the aforesaid undisputed facts of
the case, the question arise that, whether landlord is required to
issue any written notice to revoke the permission given to the
defendant by specifying the particular date reckoned as a date
for revocation of the permission to file the petition under Section
41 of ‘the Act’ and to claim the possession of the disputed
property thereof.

6. The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 has
been enacted in 1882 with the specific object to consolidate and
streamline the law for small civil cases in the presidency towns
establishing the territorial Court with simpler procedure to
provide speedy, efficient justice for trivial disputes, reducing the
burden of regular Courts and ensuring quicker resolution for
small monetary issues and property possession issues. ‘The Act’
has been amended from time to time.

6.1 Section 4 of 'the Act' regulates the operation of the
“Small Cause Court” within the territorial jurisdiction of the
towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.

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6.2 Section 5 to extends 'the Act' to the city of
Ahmedabad and the Court to be called the Court of Small
Causes of Ahmedabad

6.3 Section 6 to put the Court of Small Causes of
Ahmedabad and to be a Court subject to the superintendence of
the High Court of Gujarat and to be a Court subordinate to the
High Court within the meaning of Section 6 of the Legal
Practitioners Act, 1879 and further gives the High Court the
same powers in respect of the Small Cause Court of Ahmedabad
as it has in respect of the Courts subject to its appellate
jurisdiction.

6.4 Section 17 and 18 in Chapter IV of 'the Act' are in
regards to the Jurisdiction in respect of Suits. It defines the local
limit and jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes. Section 18
also defines the territorial jurisdiction with the exceptions stated
in Section 19.

6.5 Chapter VII of 'the Act' is dealing with the litigation in
regards to recovery of possession of immovable property. Section
41 permits a person to file the PSRP Application for recovery of
the immovable property.

6.6 Section 43 permits the Small Cause Court to issue
possession warrant in case if the occupant does not appear at
the time appointed and show cause to the contrary.

6.7 Section 44 is in regards to execution of the
possession warrant. Section 45 is related to the granting the
right to sue to the occupant for compensation, and applicant, if

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entitled to possession, not to be deemed trespasser for any error
in proceedings.

6.8 Section 46 thereof deals with the situation where
applicant obtaining the possession of any property under the
Chapter of 'the Act' from any occupant, the occupant deeming
himself aggrieved thereby, may file a suit against the applicant
and the applicant’s possession would not be protected.

6.9 Section 47 of 'the Act' deals with the legal situation,
whereby the occupant, if intends to file a civil suit protecting his
possession and claiming of non-application of Section 41 of 'the
Act', was required to give two sureties, in a bond for such
amount as the Small Cause Court thinks reasonable, and if
occupant obtains a decree in any such suit against the
applicant, such decree shall supersede the order of the
possession warrant made under Section 43.

6.10 The Sections 41, 43, 45, 46 and 47 of 'the Act' being
important provision to decide this revision, are reproduced as
under:-

“41. Summons against person occupying property
without leave.—When any person has had possession of
any immovable property situate within the local limits, of the
Small Cause Court’s jurisdiction and of which the annual
value at a rack-rent does not exceed [two] thousand rupees,
as the tenant, or by permission, of another person, or of
some person through whom such other person claims,

and such tenancy or permission has determined or
been withdrawn,

and such tenant or occupier or any person holding

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under or by assignment from him (hereinafter called the
occupant) refuses to deliver up such property in compliance
with a request made to him in this behalf by such other
person,

such other person (hereinafter called the applicant)
may apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons against
the occupant, calling upon him to show cause, on a day
therein appointed, why he should not be compelled to deliver
up the property.

xxx xxx xxx

43. Order for possession.—If the occupant does not
appear at the time appointed and show cause to the
contrary, the applicant shall, if the Small Cause Court is
satisfied that he is entitled to apply under section 41, be
entitled to an order addressed to a bailiff of the Court
directing him to give possession of the property to the
applicant on such day as the Court thinks fit to name in
such order.

Explanation.—If the occupant proves that the tenancy
was created or permission granted by virtue of a title which
determined previous to the date of the application, he shall
be deemed to have shown cause within the meaning of this
section.

xxx xxx xxx

45. Applicant, if entitled to possession, not to be
deemed trespasser for any error in proceedings.
Occupant may sue for compensation. —When the
applicant, at the time of applying for any such order as
aforesaid, was entitled to the possession of such property,
neither he nor any person acting in his behalf shall be
deemed, on account of any error, defect or irregularity in the
mode of proceeding to obtain possession thereunder, to be a
trespasser; but any person aggrieved may bring a suit for
the recovery of compensation for any damage which he has
sustained by reason of such error, defect or irregularity:

when no such damage is proved, the suit shall be

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dismissed; and when such damage is proved but the
amount of the compensation assessed by the Court does not
exceed ten rupees, the Court shall award to the plaintiff no
more costs than compensation, unless the Judge who tries
the case certifies that in his opinion full costs should be
awarded to the plaintiff.

46. Liability of applicant obtaining order when not
entitled. —Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to
protect any applicant obtaining possession of any property
under this Chapter from a suit by any person deeming
himself aggrieved thereby, when such applicant was not at
the time of applying for such order as aforesaid entitled to
the possession of such property.

Application for order in such case an act of
trespass. —And when the applicant was not, at the time of
applying for any such order as aforesaid, entitled to the
possession of such property, the application for such order,
though no possession is taken thereunder, shall be deemed
to be an act of trespass committed by the applicant against
the occupant.

47. Stay of proceedings on occupant giving security
to bring suit against applicant.—Whenever on an
application being made under section 41 the occupant binds
himself, with two sureties, in a bond for such amount as the
Small Cause Court thinks reasonable, having regard to the
value of the property and the probable costs of the suit next
hereinafter mentioned, to institute without delay a suit in the
High Court against the applicant for compensation for
trespass and to pay all the costs of such suit in case he does
not prosecute the same or in case judgment therein is given
for the applicant, the Small Cause Court shall stay the
proceedings on such application until such suit is disposed
of.

If the occupant obtains a decree in any such suit
against the applicant, such decree shall supersede the order
(if any) made under section 43.

Nothing contained in section 22 shall apply to suits
under this section.”

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6.11 Thus, the entire scheme under Chapter-VII in regards
to possession of the immovable property, if streamlined, it can be
this wise that, ‘if the person being occupant continues his
occupation after losing the right to remain in possession and
delivered such property in compliance with the request made to
him in this behalf by such other person, i.e. applicant, the later
one has been given a right to file PSRP Application under Section
41 of 'the Act'.

6.12 Section 43 streamlines the proceedings of the Small
Cause Court. It gives the jurisdiction to the Small Cause Court
that if the occupant fails to show cause to the contrary and the
Small Cause Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to
apply under Section 41 of 'the Act', the Small Cause Court
should pass order addressed to the Bailiff of the Court directing
him to give possession of the property to the applicant on such
day as the Court may deem fit. Conjoint reading of Section 41
and 43 of 'the Act' demarks the proceeding under Chapter VII
from ordinary civil proceedings. It gives the summary power to
the Small Cause Court to recover possession from the occupant
without following the rigors of the ordinary civil suit proceedings
or following the rigors of the Evidence Act.

6.13 Section 45 of 'the Act' saves the action of the
applicant, he cannot deemed to be a trespasser in a case where,
at the time of applying for issuance of the possession warrant
and was entitled to the possession of such property, committed
any error, defect or irregularity in the mode of proceedings by

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himself or someone on his behalf. However, it gives the right to
the occupant or the person aggrieved to bring a suit for recovery
of compensation for any damage, which he has sustained by
reason of such error, defect or irregularity.

6.14 Section 46 of 'the Act' is a liability upon the applicant
and right given to the occupant and it permits the occupant to
file suit against the applicant to claim, if he is entitled to the
possession of such property, which is taken pursuant to the
warrant issued under Section 43 of 'the Act' establishing his
right to remain in occupation.

6.15 Section 47 of 'the Act' is in regards to giving
breathing time to the occupant to tender sureties and bonds for
any amount the Small Cause Court thinks reasonable, having
regard to the value of the property and the probable costs of the
suit and to institute the suit in the City Civil Court against the
applicant for compensation for trespass and to pay all the costs
of such suit, in case he does not prosecute the same or in case
judgment therein is given for the applicant, the Small Cause
Court shall stay the proceedings on such application until such
suit is disposed of and if the occupant obtains a decree, it would
supersede the judgment (if any) passed under Section 43 of 'the
Act'.

7. The coordinate Bench of this Court in Saiyad
Jabbarhusain and Ors. v. Hasan Abubakar Malbari
(deceased by Lrs.) and Ors., reported in AIR 1998 Gujrat 130,
referred to the provision under Chapter-VII of 'the Act'. Para 7, 8
and 12 observed and held as under:-

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“7. Section 41 of the said Act, which is to be found in
Chapter VII, which is captioned as “Recovery of Possession
of Immovable Property”, inter alia, provides that when any
person has had possession of any immovable property
situate within the local limits of the Small Cause Court’s
jurisdiction and of which the annual value at a rack-rent
does not exceed two thousand rupees, as the tenant, or by
permission, or another person, or of some person through
whom such other person claims, and such tenancy or
permission has determined or been withdrawn, and such
tenant or occupier or any person holding under or by
assignment from him (hereinafter called the occupant)
refuses to deliver up such property in compliance with a
request made to him in this behalf by such other person,
such other person (hereinafter called the applicant) may
apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons against the
occupant, calling upon him to show cause, on a day therein
appointed, why he should not be compelled to deliver up the
property.

In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Section 41,
for the words “two thousand” the words “three thousand”
were substituted by Guj. Act 5 of 1969, Section 5 and
Bombay Act 17 of 1952, Section 5 (4-11-1952). Now, in
Gujarat the words “three thousand rupees” are substituted
by the words “five thousand rupees” — Guj. Act 20 of 1979,
Section 9 (1-1-1980).
8. Under the scheme of the said Act, a person who is
alleged to be a licensee or a person who is put in possession
has the remedy under Section 46 to file an application, inter
alia, seeking declaration that the application of the applicant
under Section 41 is, in fact, an act of trespass and, on
making such application, he is required to apply under
Section 47 for stay of proceedings on the occupant giving
security to bring suit against the applicant. Section 47 of the
said Act, as amended by the State of Gujarat, in its
application to the city of Ahmedabad, reads as under :–
‘47. State of proceedings on occupant giving security to
bring suit against applicant : Whenever on an application
being made under Section 41 the occupant bind himself,
with two sureties, in a bond for such amount as the Small
Cause Court thinks reasonable, having regard to the value

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of the property and the probable costs of the suit next
hereinafter mentioned, to institute without delay a suit in the
High Court against the applicant for compensation for
trespass and to pay all the costs of such suit in case he does
not prosecute the same or in case judgment therein is given
for the applicant, the Small Cause Court shall stay the
proceedings on such application until such suit is disposed
of.
If the occupant obtains a decree in any such suit
against the applicant, such decree shall supersede the order
(if any) made under Section 43.
Nothing contained in Section 22 shall apply to suits
under this Section.
In its application to the city of Ahmedabad, Section
47 :– (i) for the words ‘occupant binds himself, substitute the
words ‘the occupant, at the earliest opportunity, and in any
event before filing any statement of defence, binds himself ;
and (ii) for the words ‘High Court’, substitute the words
‘Ahmedabad City Civil Court’ — Guj. Act 19 of 1961,
Sections 18 and 21 and Schedule (4-11-1961).’
xxx xxx xxx
12. Being fully conscious of the fact that the Court was a
Court of very limited jurisdiction, supposed to make inquiry
under Section 41 of the said Act only, he unfortunately
permitted himself to be carried away by a fact which was
not even the defence of deceased Hasan Abubakar, Having
totally forgotten the scope, nature and ambit of Section 41 of
the said Act, he proceeded to record a finding that the
deceased Hasan Abubakar who was inducted as a licensee
by the Wakf Committee, was in exclusive possession of the
room in question and that would create a tenancy in his
favour; and that such a right cannot be said to be a right of
licensee. The learned Small Causes Court Judge was not
deciding a dispute between the landlord and the tenant in
which case the matter would have been covered by the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act,
1947. He was very much conscious of the fact that he was
deciding an application under Section 41 of the said Act
where the licensee or person who was inducted as a
licensee by the Wakf Committee was required to institute an
application under Sections 46 and 47 for the purpose of

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declaration that the action of bringing an application under
Section 41 was an act of trespass on the part of the Wakf
Committee and he was required to apply for stay of such
proceeding in the City Civil Court within the stipulated time.
For the reasons best known to Shri A. S. Sanghvi, the then
Small Causes Court Judge, blatantly misdirected himself in
law and dragged himself into the controversy which was not
even raised by the deceased Hasan Abubakar. On such
reasoning, he rejected the application of the Wakf Committee
under Section 41 by the impugned order, least realising
thereby that the remedy which was available to the licensee
or person who is inducted in the premises under Section 41
of the said Act by resorting to Sections 46 and 47 of the said
Act was not availed of and he being a Court of very limited
jurisdiction cannot open up Pandora’s box and cannot create
a case which was not even pleaded by the deceased Hasan
Abubakar.”

8. The base contention of learned advocate Mr. Mrudul
M. Barot that the permission was not revoked by a written notice
or communication, the revocation was not reckoning from any
particular date, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to file
the application under Section 41 of 'the Act' and consequently,
the Small Cause Court was not entitled to issue possession
warrant under Section 43 of 'the Act' thereof.

9. The plain reading of statute does not call for
revocation of the permission by a written communication or to
discontinue the permission by issuance of any statutory notice.
Section 41 of 'the Act' rather starts with the facts that, ‘if a
person i.e. occupant, had been in possession of any immovable
property either as the tenant, or by permission of another
person, or of some person through whom such other person
claims, and such tenancy or permission has determined or been
withdrawn, and such tenant or occupier still holds the

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possession, refuses to deliver up such property in compliance
with a request made to him, such other person, i.e. applicant,
would be entitled to prefer the application under Section 41 of
'the Act'.

10. The scheme of the statute, thus, clearly reflects that,
the person being an occupant has to establish by raising a
defence that his permission or tenancy has not been determined
or not been withdrawn to classify the application under Section
41 of 'the Act' as premature. It is not a duty upon the applicant
to establish that, by a particular date, the permission or tenancy
was determined or has been withdrawn and possession become
illegal. The phrase ‘refuses to deliver up such property in
compliance with a request made to him’, is indicative of the fact
that the request of the applicant may be implied. It is not
necessary to be explicit and by written communication. Any act
or gesture may be treated as a request made by the applicant to
deliver the peaceful and vacant possession of the immovable
property. The legislature being conscious enough has not
legislated that the request must be written and explicit and does
not make it statutory as it is made in some other statute, like the
Rent Act, Negotiable Instruments Act or Section 80 of “the Code”
or in some other Act, like the Panchayat Act or the GPMC Act,
etc.

11. In the rule of interpretation of the statute, applying
the Doctrine of Cassus Omissus, it is made explicitly clear that
when statute does not call for any supplant in reading of it, the
Court cannot supply it. It is further to be noted that provision of
the law has to be read as a whole in its context. When language

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of the provision is plain and unambiguous, question of supplying
Cassus Omissus does not arise. It is well settled principle of law
that, Court can interpret the provision of law, but cannot
legislate.

12. In Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of
T.N. and Ors., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533, the Supreme
Court while observing that the Court cannot read anything into
statutory provision, which is plain and unambiguous, in para 12
to 14 held as under:-

“12. The rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and
casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well settled
principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a
statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A
statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed
in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.
The first and primary rule of construction is that the
intention of the Legislation must be found in the words used
by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be
supposed and has been intended but what has been said.

'Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid".
Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed
with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind
them’. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR
547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v.
Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC
981).

13. In Dr. R Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. vs. Dy. Transport
Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842) it was
observed that Courts must avoid the danger of apriori
determination of the meaning of a provision based on their
own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme
into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted.
They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the
disguise of interpretation.

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14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is
misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is
for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed
necessary. [See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. vs. P.N.B.
Capital Services Ltd. (2000 (5) SCC 515)]. `The legislative
casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative
process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous.
There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done
in Narasimhaiah's case (supra). In Nanjudaiah's case
(supra), the period was further stretched to have the time
period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a
view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1).
If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be
covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to
Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can
never be the legislative intent.”

13. Yet in another judgment in the case of State of
Jharkhand and Anr. v. Govind Singh, reported in (2005) 10
SCC 437, similarly the interpretation has been made by
observing that when the words of statute are clear, plain or
unambiguous, they are reasonably susceptible of only one
meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning,
regardless of consequences. The relevant are para 12, 15, 20 and
22, which reads as under:-

“12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature.
The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a
statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the
legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no
obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court
to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or
altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges

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should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-
maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have
to remember that there is a line, though thin, which
separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not
be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by ‘an alert
recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as
well as trained reluctance to do so’. (See: Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in "Essays on
Jurisprudence", Columbia Law Review, P.51.)
xxx xxx xxx
20. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is
misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is
for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed
necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular
Trading Company, Ujjain (AIR 2000 SC 1578). The
legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial
interpretative process.
xxx xxx xxx
22. It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend
not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those
which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words
further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and
that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on
the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do
enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that
they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more
frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Fenton v.
Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345). A casus omissus ought not to
be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong
necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really
occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or
on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt
legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left
unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as
it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni
datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus
omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52),
‘can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would
be to make laws.’ ”

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14. Lastly, I may refer to the judgment in the case of
Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar
and Company and Ors., reported in (2018) 9 SCC, whereby the
Supreme Court involving the basic principles involving the
interpretation of the statutes, explained the purpose of
interpretation and explained the difference between the Literal
Construction, Principle of Strict Construction and plain meaning
of Rule. Para 20, 21, 23 and 25 are as under:-

“20. It is well accepted that a statute must be construed
according to the intention of the Legislature and the Courts
should act upon the true intention of the legislation while
applying law and while interpreting law. If a statutory
provision is open to more than one meaning, the Court has to
choose the interpretation which represents the intention of
the Legislature. In this connection, the following
observations made by this Court in District Mining Officer vs.
Tata Iron and Steel Co., (2001) 7 SCC 358, may be noticed:

‘… A statute is an edict of the Legislature and in
construing a statute, it is necessary, to seek the intention
of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to
the intent of them that make it and the duty of the Court
is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature. If a
statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation
the Court has to choose that interpretation which
represents the true intention of the Legislature. This task
very often raises the difficulties because of various
reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be
scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning
and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey
one’s thought or that the assembly of Legislatures
consisting of persons of various shades of opinion purport
to convey a meaning which may be obscure. It is
impossible even for the most imaginative Legislature to
forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that
may emerge after enacting a statute where its application

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may be called for. Nonetheless, the function of the Courts
is only to expound and not to legislate. Legislation in a
modern State is actuated with some policy to curb some
public evil or to effectuate some public benefit. The
legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the
Legislature based on information derived from past and
present experience. It may also be designed by use of
general words to cover similar problems arising in future.
But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to
anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future in
which the application of the legislation in hand may be
called for, and, words chosen to communicate such
indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases
lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise to
controversial questions of construction. The process of
construction combines both literal and purposive
approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e.,
the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by
considering the meaning of the words used in the
enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object
which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which
the enactment is directed…’

21. The well settled principle is that when the words in a
statute are clear, plain and unambiguous and only one
meaning can be inferred, the Courts are bound to give effect
to the said meaning irrespective of consequences. If the
words in the statute are plain and unambiguous, it becomes
necessary to expound those words in their natural and
ordinary sense. The words used declare the intention of the
Legislature.

xxx xxx xxx
23. In applying rule of plain meaning any hardship and
inconvenience cannot be the basis to alter the meaning to
the language employed by the legislation. This is especially
so in fiscal statutes and penal statutes. Nevertheless, if the
plain language results in absurdity, the Court is entitled to
determine the meaning of the word in the context in which it
is used keeping in view the legislative purpose. Not only
that, if the plain construction leads to anomaly and
absurdity, the court having regard to the hardship and
consequences that flow from such a provision can even

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explain the true intention of the legislation. Having observed
general principles applicable to statutory interpretation, it is
now time to consider rules of interpretation with respect to
taxation.

xxx xxx xxx
25. At the outset, we must clarify the position of ‘plain
meaning rule or clear and unambiguous rule’ with respect of
tax law. ‘The plain meaning rule’ suggests that when the
language in the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court
has to read and understand the plain language as such,
and there is no scope for any interpretation. This salutary
maxim flows from the phrase “cum inverbis nulla ambiguitas
est, non debet admitti voluntatis quaestio”. Following such
maxim, the courts sometimes have made strict interpretation
subordinate to the plain meaning rule4, though strict
interpretation is used in the precise sense. To say that strict
interpretation involves plain reading of the statute and to
say that one has to utilize strict interpretation in the event of
ambiguity is selfcontradictory.”

15. After referring to the aforesaid principle of law,
coming to the facts of the present case, the occupant -
defendants failed to show any statutory discipline to remain in
the possession of the disputed property.

16. It is discernible that the revisionist has filed the
application under Sections 46 and 47 of 'the Act' in the
proceedings of PSRP Application No.22 of 2011. The order dated
28.02.2013 disfavors the case of the revisionist. It was assailed
before this Court by way of filing a SCA No.10271 of 2013. The
revisionist remained unsuccessful in getting any favorable order.
The coordinate Bench in the proceedings of the SCA, in addition
to dismissing the SCA, directed the revisionist to vacate the
premises forthwith.

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17. The order was challenged before the Supreme Court
in Civil Appeal No. 3591 of 2019. The Supreme Court did not
incline to grant the application under Section 46 and 47 of ‘the
Act’, but found that the order passed by the coordinate Bench in
the SCA to vacate the premises is in excess of jurisdiction, and
therefore, a limited interference was made to that extent. What
could be noticeable from these proceedings that, at no point of
time, the occupant’s possession was conceded under any
statutory discipline, permitting the occupant to file the Civil Suit
under Section 46 or his request to grant the time to file the Civil
Suit under Section 47 of ‘the Act’. The obvious consequence was
to face the possession warrant under Section 43 of ‘the Act’.

18. It is noticeable aspect on the factual milieu is that,
prior to filing of the PSRP Application No.22 of 2011, since the
revisionist apprehended that his possession would have been
taken away by the petitioner and thus, had filed a Civil Suit
being a Civil Suit No.2069 of 2003 unsuccessfully, which itself
determined that the permission to remain in the possession of
the disputed property was revoked or withdrawn explicitly
known to the revisionist and it abundantly made clear to be a
deemed request of the applicant - landlord to handover the
peaceful and vacant possession of the disputed property.

19. According to this Court, under the limited
jurisdiction of revision, this Court finds no error, much less error
of interpreting the provision of law by the learned Small Cause
Court. This Court finds the argument that no written request
has been made as an attempt to open up the Pandora’s Box.
Such kind of argument is found to be breathless and in the teeth

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of the spirit of provision contained in Chapter VII of 'the Act'. It is
pitiable that the applicant, who is claiming the possession of the
disputed property since 2003 and subsequently filed the PSRP
Application under Section 41 of ‘the Act’ on 01.07.2011 is yet to
ripe the fruit of the provision, which is essentially a summary
proceedings.

20 In the aforesaid premises, reasoning stated
hereinabove are suffice to reject the revision. Accordingly, it is
rejected.

i) Interim-relief, if any, stands vacated.

ii) Registry is directed to return back the Record and
Proceedings to the concerned Court forthwith.

Sd/-
(J.C. DOSHI, J.)
Raj

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: RAJ SUBHASH DHOBI(HC01779), Private Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 21/01/2026 16:26:10

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