Holding

The appeal is dismissed because the claimants failed to establish a causal connection between the death and the employment, and thus no compensation is payable.

Summary

The deceased, Abdulbaksh Rangrej, a boiler attendant, suffered a cardiac arrest and died while on duty at Everchem Dyes Industries. His dependants filed a fatal workmen's compensation claim (WC Fatal Case No.58 of 1998) which was dismissed by the Workman Commissioner. The claimants appealed to the High Court under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, arguing that the death was caused by physical and mental stress from handling hazardous chemicals and heavy boxes. The Court held that the claimants failed to produce any evidence establishing a causal link between the death and the employment, nor any medical report to support an occupational disease claim. Relying on precedents that the burden of proof lies on the claimant to show the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, the Court dismissed the appeal, leaving any existing dependency benefits untouched.

Issues considered

Whether the claimants proved they were dependants of the deceased.
Whether the claimants proved the deceased suffered an employment injury on 31-12-1997.
Whether the claimants proved the deceased was drawing a salary of Rs.2000 per month and was 52 years old at the time of death.
Whether the accident occurred during the course of and out of the employment, making the claimants entitled to compensation.
Whether the respondents proved that no employment injury occurred to the deceased on the date in question.
Whether the respondents proved that the deceased died of a heart attack at his residence, unrelated to employment.
Whether the respondents failed to deposit any compensation amount, and if interest or penalty is payable.
What order should be passed?

Legislation cited

Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923s. 3, s. 30

Subjects

workmen's compensationoccupational diseasecausal connectionburden of proofSection 30heart attackhazardous chemicals

Judgment

C/FA/2052/2009 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/04/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2052 of 2009
==========================================================
SAIDABANU ABDULKARIM RANGREJ & ORS.
Versus
MANAGER EVERCHEM DYES INDUSTRIES & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR DS VASAVADA(973) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2,3
MRS MUMTAZ SAIYED(5187) for the Defendant(s) No. 1
UNSERVED EXPIRED (R) for the Defendant(s) No. 2
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

Date : 10/04/2026

JUDGMENT
1. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated
19.1.2009 passed by the Labour Court, Ahmedabad in
Workman Compensation Case No.58 of 1998, the appellant –
claimants have preferred this first appeal u/s 30 of the
Workman’s Compensation Act, 1923 (in short “the Act”).

2. Brief facts of the case are as under:-

2.1 That on 31-12-1997 the deceased viz. Abdulbaksh
Rangrej went to his job. He was working as Boiler attendant
in the premises of Respondents. The nature of duty of
deceased was such that he had to expose with hazardous
chemicals while manufacturing Tinopol and he also had to lift
the boxes containing such tinopol. That on the said ill-fated
day, all of sudden, while on duty, the deceased received
cardiac arrest and complaining about the Chest Pain to co-
workers. Since, his condition was worsened, he was shifted to
the VS Hospital, where he died at around 2:30.

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2.2 The claimants preferred WC Fatal Case Application
No.58 of 1998 before the learned Workman Commissioner,
Labour Court, Ahmedabad seeking compensation, which was
dismissed.

2.3 Being aggrieved, the claimants have preferred present
appeal.

3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Sachin Vasavada for the
appellant. Though respondent No.2 has expired, but is
survived by respondent No.1.

4. Learned advocate Mr. Vasavada would submit that the
learned Workman Commissioner ought to have called for the
pm report of the doctor and ought to have framed the issue
whether the death of the deceased occurred because of sheer
toil and hard work in lifting the heavy boxes containing
Tinopol and constant exposure with hazardous chemicals
while manufacturing said Tinopol and ought to have held that
the deceased died because of the nature of work and there was
a casual connection between death and nature of work and
ought to have awarded the compensation with interest to the
appellants. He would further submit that the learned
Workman Commissioner without looking into vital evidence,
erroneously held that the deceased passed away only because
of hard work and constant exposure to the hazardous
chemicals in manufacturing tinopol. He would further submit
that the deceased had complained of physical work load and
which may be converted into mental stress and trauma being
root cause of the heart disease. In view of above, he prays to
allow this First Appeal.

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5. In the present matter, the learned Workman
Commissioner has raised following questions of law as
substantial questions of law:-

“1 Whether the applicants prove that they are the
dependants of the deceased Abdul Karimbax Rangrej?

2. Whether the applicants prove that deceased met
with an employment injury on 31.12.97?

3. Whether the applicants prove that on the date of
accident deceased was drawing salary of Rs. 2000/-
p.m. and was 52 years of age?

4. Whether the applicants prove that accident
occurred during the course of and out of the
employment? If yes, Whether the applicants are
entitled for compensation as claimed?

5. Whether the opponents prove that there was no
employment injury occurred to the deceased while on
duty on 31.12.97?

6. Whether the opponents prove that deceased
expired due to heart attack at his residence on
31.12.97?

7. Whether the opponents fails to deposit the amount
of compensation, if any ordered ? If yes, Whether the
opponent is liable to pay the amount of interest or
penalty on the amount as claimed for?

8. What order?”

6. On perusal of the averments made by the claimants, it
appears that the claimants averred nexus of death of the
deceased with employment injury on the ground that
deceased was suffering physical load as well as mental stress
and trauma, which resulted into death of the deceased. To

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prove such averment, claimants as well as co-worker entered
into the witness box and examined themselves as Exhs.9 and
19 respectively. None of them have in unequivocal terms
deposed that the deceased was suffering from physical and
mental stress and trauma, which resulted into cardiac arrest
being root cause of death of the deceased while he was in
employment. Even in the present case, the claimant has not
produced any evidence on record to suggest that the deceased
was suffering from physical stress and trauma and which has
developed heart disease.

7. In furtherance to the aforesaid, the claimants did not
lead any evidence to link the aforesaid nexus of death with the
employment injury or to establish that the aforesaid injury
was an injury arising out of the employment of the deceased
or it is occupational disease arising out of and in the course of
the employment.

8. Heart disease is not unknown in this country, may it
remain undetected, but its development is not unknown in this
country. That the deceased while was in duty, suffered heart
attack and expired and prior to it, at no point of time, he had
any complaint of physical stress and trauma or angina pain
being result of physical and mental stress and trauma being
root cause of heart disease. In absence of specific evidence
thereof, non-granting of compensation in favour of the
claimant by the learned Workman Commissioner is fair,
practicable and right approach.

9. Learned advocate Mr. Vasavada failed to point out that

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the deceased was not suffering from any disease prior to his
death during the employment, which suggests that the death
of the deceased due to heart attack is occupational disease
arising out of and in the course of his employment, as
presumably, he was suffering from physical and mental stress
and trauma.

10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Mackinnon
Mackenzie And Company Private Limited Versus
Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak, 1969 (2) SCC 607, held that it
is a burden upon the claimants to prove that the accident or
occupational disease was arising out of and in the course of
the employment. Though, the claimant is not required to
prove by leading direct evidence, but the onus to prove that
injury by accident or occupational disease arose out of and in
the course of the employment, rest upon the claimants and
essentially, it can be proved by inferring when the facts
proved justify the inference. The findings of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in para 5 and 6 reads as under:-

“5. To come within the Act the injury by accident
must arise both out of and in the course of
employment. The words "in the course of the
employment' mean "in the course of the work which
the workman is employed to do and which is
incidental to it". The words 'arising out of
employment" are understood to mean that "during
the course of the employment, injury has resulted
from some risk incidental to the duties of the service,
which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the
master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would
not otherwise have suffered". In other words, there
must be a causal relationship between the accident
and the employment. The expression "arising out of

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employment" is again not confined to the mere nature
of the employment. The expression applies to
employment as such - to its nature, its conditions, its
obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of
those factors the workman is brought within the zone
of special danger, the injury would be one which
arises 'out of employment'. To put it differently, if the
accident had occurred on account of a risk which is
an incident of the employment, the claim for
compensation must succeed, unless of course the
workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his
own imprudent act. In Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly.
Co. V/s. Highley, 1917 AC 352, Lord Summer laid
down the following test for determining whether an
accident "arose out of the employment":
"There is, however, in my opinion, one test which is
always at any rate applicable, because it arises upon
the very words of the Statute, and it is generally of
some real assistance. It is this: Was it part of the
injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or
to do that which caused his injury- If yea, the
accident arose out of his employment. If nay, it did
not, because, what it was not part of the employment
to hazard, to suffer, or to do, cannot well be the cause
of an accident arising out of the employment. To ask
if the cause of this was within the sphere of the
employment or was one of the ordinary risks of the
employment, or reasonably incidental to the
employment, or reasonably incidental to the
employment, or conversely, was an added peril and
outside the sphere of the employment, are all
different ways of asking whether it was a part of his
employment, that the workman should have acted as
he was acting, or should have been in the position in
which he was, whereby in the course of that
employment he sustained injury."

6. In the case of death caused by accident the burden
of proof rests upon the workman to prove that the
accident arose out of employment as well as in the
course of employment. But this does not mean that a
workman who comes to court for relief must
necessarily prove it by direct evidence. Although the

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onus of proving that the injury by accident arose both
out of and in the course of employment rests upon the
applicant these essentials may be inferred when the
facts proved justify the inference. On the one hand
the Commissioner must not surmise, conjecture or
guess; on the other hand, he may draw an inference
from the proved facts so long as it is a legitimate
inference. It is of course impossible to lay down any
rule as to the degree of proof which is sufficient to
justify an inference being drawn, but the evidence
must be such as would induce a reasonable man to
draw it. Lord Birkenhead L. C. in Lancaster V/s.
Blackwell Colliery Co. Ltd., 1918 WC & IR 345
observed:

"If the facts which are proved give rise to conflicting
inferences of equal degrees or probability so that the
choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture,
then, of course, the applicant fails to prove his case,
because it is plain that the onus in these matters is
upon the applicant. But where the known facts are
not equally consistent, where there is ground for
comparing and balancing probabilities as to their
respective value, and where a reasonable man might
hold that the more probable conclusion is that for
which the applicant contends, then the Arbitrator is
justified in drawing an inference in his favour."

11. A worthy assistance can also be taken from the authority of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shakuntala Chandrakant
Shreshti Vs. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali & Anr., (2007) 11
SCC 668, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while referring to
its earlier judgment and the definition of “accident” was
pleased to dismiss the claim made by the claimants on the
ground that the deceased had not died due to external injury.
The Hon’ble Apex Court examined the issue in detail, including
the meaning and scope of the word “arising out of and in the
course of employment.” In paragraph 20 to 26, the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court has held as under :-

“20.Sufferance of heart disease amongst young
persons is not unknown . A disease of heart may
remain undetected. A person may suffer mild heart
attack but he may not feel any pain. There must, thus,
be some evidence that the employment contributed to
the death of the deceased. It is required to be
established that the death occurred during the course
of employment.

21.This Court in E.S.I. Corporation (supra) referred
to with approval the decision of Lord Wright in Dover
Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Isabella Craig, [1940 AC 190],
wherein it was held :

“Nothing could be simpler than the words `arising
out of and in the course of employment'. It is clear
that there two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises
`in the course of the employment is to be
distinguished from what arises `out of the
employment'. The former words relate to time
conditioned by reference to the man's service, the
latter to casualty. Not every accident which occurs to
a man during the time when he is on his employment
- that is, directly or indirectly engaged on what he is
employed to do - gives a claim to compensation,
unless it also arises out of the employment. Hence the
section imports a distinction which it does not define.
The language is simple and unqualified”.

22. We are not oblivious that an accident may
cause an internal injury as was held in Fenton
(Pauper) v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd., [1903 AC 443], by
the Court of Appeal :

"I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the
expression "accident" is used in the popular
and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an
unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event
which is not expected or designed."
Lord Lindley opined :
"The word "accident" is not a technical legal

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term with a clearly defined meaning. Speaking
generally, but with reference to legal
liabilities, an accident means any unintended
and unexpected occurrence which produces
hurt or loss. But it is often used to denote any
unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart
from its cause; and if the cause is not known
the loss or hurt itself would certainly be called
an accident. The word "accident" is also often
used to denote both the cause and the effect,
no attempt being made to discriminate
between them. The great majority of what are
called accidents are occasioned by
carelessness; but for legal purposes it is often
important to distinguish careless from other
unintended and unexpected events."

23. There are a large number of English and
American decisions, some of which have been taken
note of in ESI Corporation (supra), in regard to
essential ingredients for such finding and the tests
attracting the provisions of Section 3 of the Act.

24. The principles are :
(1) There must be a causal connection
between the injury and the accident and the
accident and the work done in the course of
employment.
(2) The onus is upon the applicant to show that
it was the work and the resulting strain which
contributed to or aggravated the injury.
(3) If the evidence brought on records
establishes a greater probability which
satisfies a reasonable man that the work
contributed to the causing of the personal
injury, it would be enough for the workman to
succeed, but the same would depend upon the
fact of each case.

25. Injury suffered should be a physiological injury.
Accident, ordinarily, would have to be understood as
unforeseen or uncomprehended or could not be
foreseen or comprehended. A finding of fact, thus,

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has to be arrived at, inter alia, having regard to the
nature of the work and the situation in which the
deceased was placed.
26. There is a crucial link between the causal
connections of employment with death. Such a link
with evidence cannot be a matter of surmise or
conjecture. If a finding is arrived at without pleading
or legal evidence the statutory authority will commit
a jurisdictional error while exercising jurisdiction.“

12. In view of above, no substantial question involves in the
matter in absence of any evidence to prove that the deceased
died due to occupational disease arising out of and in the
course of the employment. Furthermore, no pm report, which
is very vital in these type of cases, is produced to support the
case of the claimants.

13. Resultantly, present First Appeal fails and stands
dismissed. Consequently, CA, if any, does not survive and
stands disposed of accordingly.

14. However, it is clarified that the dependency benefit
given to the original claimants uptil now, if any, shall not be
recovered.

15. Registry is directed to return back the R & P, if any, to
the concerned Court forthwith.

(J. C. DOSHI,J)
SHEKHAR P. BARVE

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: SHEKHAR PRAFULBHAI BARVE(HC00200), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 10/04/2026 18:16:48

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