Holding

The Court held that the properties were self‑acquired, the Will was valid and genuine, and therefore dismissed the second appeal.

Summary

The appellants challenged a judgment that had set aside a trial court decree declaring a 1986 Will executed by their grandfather Reshiabhai void on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The trial court had found the Will fraudulent but dismissed the suit for jurisdictional reasons; the appellate court reversed that finding and dismissed the suit, holding the Will valid and the property self‑acquired. On second appeal, the High Court examined whether the disputed lands were ancestral property, whether Reshiabhai had authority to devise them, and whether the Will was genuine. Relying on revenue records, the Court concluded that the lands were held as self‑acquired co‑ownership, not ancestral, and that the registered Will was duly executed and presumptively genuine. Consequently, the Court found no substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC and dismissed the second appeal, vacating any interim relief.

Issues considered

Whether the Will dated 15‑04‑1986 is genuine and was executed in accordance with law
Whether the suit properties are ancestral in nature and thus subject to Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act
Whether the appellate court erred in law by not holding the properties as self‑acquired and the Will valid
Whether the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish ancestral character was satisfied

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedures. 100, s. Order II Rule 2
Hindu Succession Acts. 30
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 68, s. 69, s. 70
Indian Succession Acts. 63

Subjects

ancestral propertyself‑acquired propertywill validitytestamentary capacitySection 100 CPCHindu Succession Actpartitionundue influenceburden of proof

Judgment

C/SA/67/2005 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 06/02/2026

Reserved On : 21/01/2026
Pronounced On : 06/02/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 67 of 2005

With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 2 of 2005
In R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 67 of 2005

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
==========================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
==========================================================
MAHESH NATUBHAI GAMIT & ORS.
Versus
CHHAGANBHAI RESHIABHAI THROUGH HEIRS AND L.R. & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR NIRAV R MISHRA(6140) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5
MR RK MISHRA(482) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5
MR ZUBIN F BHARDA(159) for the Respondent(s) No. 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5,1.6
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 3.1,3.2
==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

CAV JUDGMENT

1. The present second appeal is filed under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (for short, The code) challenges the
judgment and decree passed by the Principal District Judge, Navsari
in Regular Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1996, by which order dated
21.09.2004, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree
passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 13 of 1988 by the learned Civil
Judge, Junior Division, Vansda dated 29.02.1996, was reversed and
consequently the suit was dismissed.

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BRIEF FACTS:-
2. The subject matter of the present Second Appeal arises from
the judgment and decree dated 21.09.2004 passed by the learned
District Judge, Navsari, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1996,
whereby the learned Appellate Court reversed the findings of the
Trial Court and dismissed the suit of the present appellants. The
litigation concerns the validity of a Will dated 15.04.1986 allegedly
executed by one Reshiabhai, who was the grandfather of appellant
Nos. 1 to 4 and father-in-law of appellant No. 5.

2.1. Shorn of non-essential details, the relevant factual matrix of
the lis in hand is adumbrated thus: The appellants (original
plaintiffs) instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 13 of 1988 before the
learned Civil Judge (J.D.), Vansda, seeking a declaration that the
aforesaid Will was null and void, contending that the properties
bequeathed thereunder were ancestral in nature and that the plaintiffs
possessed an undivided share therein. It was their case that the
testator, being about 90 years of age and in a feeble mental
condition, lacked testamentary capacity, and that the Will had been
procured by respondent No. 1 through fraud and undue influence.
Consequential relief of partition, possession of 1/3rd share, mesne
profits, and permanent injunction were also prayed for.

2.2. The Trial Court, by judgment dated 29.02.1996, partly decreed
the suit, holding that the Will was vitiated by fraud and undue
influence and therefore void, and that the plaintiffs had a 1/3rd share
in the suit properties; however, it further held that the suit was barred
under Order II Rule 2 CPC and that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the same. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No. 1 preferred Regular
Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1996. The learned District Judge allowed the

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appeal on 21.09.2004, setting aside the findings regarding the Will
and dismissing the suit, though holding that the suit was not barred
under Order II Rule 2 CPC and that the Trial Court did possess
jurisdiction. It is this appellate judgment which is assailed in the
present Second Appeal, wherein substantial questions of law are
stated to arise.

3. The parties are relegated to their original status as obtaining
before the learned Trial Court.

4. On 26.04.2025, this Court was pleased to formulate the
following substantial questions of law for consideration:–

“a) Having regard to conflicting finding of courts below on
the truth and genuineness of Will dated 15.4.1986 at Exh.
49, whether Will at Exh. 49 genuine and whether its
execution is in accordance with law?

b) Having regard to Entry No.47 dated 19.6.57 at Exh.42
that properties are ancestral and, along with Ranchhodbhai
name of Reshiabhai has been mutated and even if there is
partition between Ranchhodbhai and Reshiabhai, share
obtained by Reshiabhai on partition is ancestral property as
regards to his male issue and as per Hindu Succession Act
since Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 being male heirs are entitled to
have share by birth in said properties, whether Courts below
have erred in law in not holding that Reshiabhai had no right
to make will (i.e., Exh.49)?

c) Having regard to Exh.42 being Entry No.47 dated
19.6.1957 indicating that properties comprised by said entry
are ancestral properties in respect of which by Exh.45 being
Entry No.533 (dated 17.4.1982) of partition has been
mutated and all the contents of Exh.45 have been admitted
as correct by respondent No.1 in his evidence, whether lower
appellate court has erred in law in not holding that suit

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properties are Ancestral Properties?”

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS:-
5. Learned Advocate Mr. Nirav R. Mishra, adverting to the
substantial questions of law framed by the Coordinate Bench, has
principally contended that the suit properties, particulars whereof are
delineated in para 2 of the plaint, are ancestral in character. The
relief sought by the plaintiff is one for partition by metes and
bounds, coupled with mesne profits, declaration, and permanent
injunction. It is urged that the parties trace their lineage to deceased
Agharabhai, and that the immovable properties in question originally
belonged to him. According to the learned Advocate, the said
properties were not the self-acquired assets of his sons, Reshiabhai
and Ranchhodbhai, but retained their ancestral character. In that
factual milieu, the plaintiff, being a Class-I heir of deceased
Natubhai, who was a predecessor of Reshiabhai, acquired a share by
birth in the suit properties. Ergo, any testamentary disposition sought
to be made by Reshiabhai through a Will would be wholly
impermissible in law. The Will dated 15.04.1986, produced at
Exhibit 46, is therefore assailed as having been executed without
lawful authority and in the teeth of Section 30 of the Hindu
Succession Act. Reliance is further placed on Entry No. 47 dated
19.06.1957 (Exh. 42), which records that the agricultural lands
forming the subject matter of the suit were ancestral and were
merely held by deceased Reshiabhai.

5.1. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court, upon a
comprehensive rumination over the revenue record and documentary
evidence, rightly decreed the suit, the said revenue entries having
remained unchallenged for decades. However, the learned First

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Appellate Court, in reversing the well-reasoned decree, is alleged to
have fallen into a manifest error by misreading and misconstruing
material documentary evidence, particularly Exhs. 42, 45, 49, and 79
to 83. On this score, it is contended that the appellate findings suffer
from perversity, inasmuch as the ancestral nature of the properties
stood established from unimpeached revenue entries which were
never disputed by Reshiabhai or Ranchhodbhai during their lifetime.

5.3. In light of the prevenient ratiocination, learned Advocate for
the appellants has thus entreated that the appeal be allowed, the
impugned judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court be set
aside, and the decree passed by the learned Trial Court be restored.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:-
6. E converso, learned Advocate Mr. Zubin Bharda appearing for
the respondents has supported the impugned judgment and decree,
contending that the learned First Appellate Court has, upon a re-
appreciation and independent reassessment of the entire evidentiary
record, rightly concluded that deceased Reshiabhai possessed full
legal authority and unfettered proprietary rights to dispose of the suit
properties. It is submitted that the properties in question had
assumed the character of self-acquired assets pursuant to a prior
partition between the two brothers, Reshiabhai and Ranchhodbhai,
and thus ceased to retain any ancestral imprimatur.

6.1. Learned Advocate further contended that the plaintiff, who
asserts the properties to be ancestral and claims a share therein by
birth, has failed to discharge the burden of proof cast upon him in
law. No cogent, convincing, or legally admissible documentary
evidence, it is urged, has been adduced to substantiate the plea that

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the suit properties formed part of any coparcenary or joint family
estate. In absence whereof, the very foundation of the plaintiff’s
claim stands eroded.

6.2. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned Advocate
for the respondents has thus entreated that the present Second
Appeal, being devoid of merit and raising no substantial question of
law warranting interference, deserves to be dismissed.

FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF THE
COURT:-
7. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective
sides at length. I have also meticulously perused the judgments and
decrees rendered by the Courts below, in tandem with the entire
record and proceedings of the case.

RELEVANT CASE LAW:-
8. The precedents, apropos, to the matter in issue, are as follows:-

8.1. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, Civil Appeal
Nos. 2843–2844 of 2010, wherein, in Para 37, the Apex Court has
lucidly and categorically enunciated the legal position in the
following terms:-

“37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for
this case may be summarised thus:

(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a
document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the
terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a
document, involving the application of any principle of law,
is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is

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misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a
principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a
question of law.

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves
a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law.
A question of law having a material bearing on the decision
of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the
rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of
law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or
settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents,
and, involves a debatable legal issue.

(iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a
contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on
account of express provisions of law or binding precedents,
but the Court below has decided the mat-ter, either ignoring
or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type
of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because
the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered
on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not
interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts
below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-
recognised exceptions are where i) the courts below have
ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; ii)
the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved
facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts
have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based
on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there
is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case,
where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably
capable of supporting the finding.”

8.2. Reference is also profitably required to be made to the
celebrated decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hero Vinoth v.
Seshammal [(2006) 5 SCC 545], wherein, in Para 21, the Apex
Court has authoritatively delineated and explicated the contours of

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the expression “substantial question of law” in the following terms:-

“21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring
in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code.
The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means
of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth,
important or considerable. It is to be understood as
something in contradistinction with technical, of no
substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it
is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the
scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words
"of general impor-tance" as has been done in many other
provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)
(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on
which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be
a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran
Ditta v. Ram Ditta (1927-28) 55 IA 235, AIR 1928 PC 172
the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed
in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since
omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for
consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a
substantial question of general importance but a substantial
question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir
Chunilal case 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549, AIR 1962 SC 1314
the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the
following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High
Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR
1951 Mad 969, (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB): (Sir Chunilal case
1962 Supp (3) SCR 549, AIR 1962 SC 1314, SCR p. 557)

"[When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is
room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court
thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length
and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a
substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question
was practically covered by the decision of the highest court
or if the general principles to be applied in determining the
question are well settled and the only question was of
applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it
would not be a substantial question of law."

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This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for
determining whether a question of law raised in the case is
substantial: (Sir Chunilal case 1962 Supp (3) SCR 549, AIR
1962 SC 1314, SCR pp. 557-58)

"The proper test for determining whether a question of
law raised in the case is substantial would, in our
opinion. be whether it is of general public importance or
whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of
the paretics and if so whether it is either an open
question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this
Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or
is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of
alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest
court or the general principles to be applied in
determining the question are well settled and there is a
mere question of applying those principles or that the
plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be
a substantial question of law."

8.3. In the case of Jaichand (Dead) through Lrs and Other v.
Sahnulal and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:-
“28. It is thus clear that under Section 100 CPC, the High
Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by
the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts
except in such cases where such findings were erroneous
being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its
settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by
the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or
without evidence.”

9. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed by the
learned Advocates appearing for the respective sides, it would be
apposite to delineate the inter se relationship between the parties,

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which forms the foundational backdrop of the lis in question:-

10. Having thus adverted to the inter se relationship between the
parties, this Court proceeds to examine whether the evidence
adduced during the trial, more particularly the revenue entries,
including Entry No. 47 at Exhibit 42, establishes that the suit
properties were ancestral in character and that deceased Reshiabhai,
upon an alleged partition with Ranchhodbhai, merely received his
share therein. Put differently, the seminal issue is whether the
plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating that the disputed properties
originally belonged to Agharabhai and, by virtue of such lineage,
devolved first upon deceased Natubhai by birth and thereafter upon
plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 as coparceners acquiring an interest by birth.

10.1. The documentary evidence commencing from Exhibit 42
onwards depicts the status of the agricultural lands in the names of
deceased Reshiabhai and Ranchhodbhai. Significantly, Entry No. 47
dated 13.06.1957 reveals that Ranchhodbhai’s name was initially
mutated in the revenue record in the capacity of a tenant.
Subsequently, upon statements of both brothers being recorded by
the revenue authorities, the lands came to be mutated jointly in their
names. Though the entry employs the nomenclature “ancestral

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property,” such description, in the absence of antecedent revenue
records demonstrating title in the name of their father Agharabhai,
cannot ipso facto be treated as conclusive proof of ancestral
character.

10.2. Furthermore, the recitals in the revenue record indicating
Ranchhodbhai’s status as a tenant lend credence to the inference that
the lands were originally held under a tenancy regime, presumably
governed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. It
appears that although both brothers were cultivating the lands,
statutory recognition as a tenant could be accorded to only one
individual, whereafter the mutation came to reflect joint names.
Ergo, the subsequent entry does not, in itself, elevate the character of
the property to that of coparcenary or ancestral property in the strict
legal sense, nor does it conclusively establish inheritance through
Agharabhai.

10.3. The plaintiff remains conspicuously silent on this crucial
aspect. There is no explanation whatsoever as to how the name of
Ranchhodbhai, the brother of Reshiabhai continued to appear in the
revenue record in the capacity of a tenant prior to Entry No. 47. In
the absence of cogent evidence elucidating this circumstance, the
plaintiff cannot successfully contend that the suit properties are
ancestral merely on the strength of the solitary expression
“ancestral” employed in Entry No. 47 at Exh. 42. It is trite, nay
axiomatic, that a revenue entry neither creates nor extinguishes title;
its utility is primarily fiscal and administrative. This well-settled
proposition stands fortified upon a conjoint reading of Revenue
Entry No. 535 (Exh.43) and Entry No. 533 (Exh.45), the latter
unequivocally recording that Reshiabhai and Ranchhodbhai were

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holding the properties as co-owners and that a family arrangement
had been effected whereby their respective shares came to be
demarcated.

10.4. The cumulative effect of these entries indubitably establishes
that the brothers were dealing with the properties in their
independent rights and not as coparceners inheriting from their
predecessor, Agharabhai. The record further reveals that several
registered sale deeds were executed by them from their own funds,
the properties so acquired being subsequently treated as part of a
common pool and thereafter partitioned under Entry No. 533
(Exh.45). Such conduct is wholly inconsistent with the theory of
coparcenary property devolving by birth. At this juncture, it would
be apposite to advert to the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors., 2025
LiveLaw (SC) 494, wherein, upon an illuminating survey of the
earlier decision in Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel & Ors. v. Patel
Ramanbhai Mathurbhai, (2020) 16 SCC 255, the distinction
between ancestral property and self-acquired property has been
pellucidly delineated:-

"18. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to
Shyam Narayan Prasad [Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna
Prasad, (2018) 7 SCC 646 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 702]. That is
a case in which the property in question was held to be
ancestral property by the trial court. The plaintiffs therein
being sons and grandson of one of the sons of Gopal Prasad,
the last male holder was found to have equal share in the
property. The question examined was whether the property
allotted to one of the sons of Gopal Prasad in partition
retains the character of coparcenary property. It was the said
finding which was affirmed by this Court. This Court held as

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under: (SCC P. 651, para 12)

"12. It is settled that the property inherited by a male Hindu
from his father, father's father or father's father's father is an
ancestral property. The essential feature of ancestral
property, according to Mitakshara law, is that the sons,
grandsons, and great grandsons of the person who inherits it,
acquire an interest and the rights attached to such property at
the moment of their birth. The share which a coparcener
obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral
property as regards his male issue. After partition, the
property in the hands of the son will continue to be the
ancestral property and the natural or adopted son of that son
will take interest in it and is entitled to it by survivorship."

…………

20. In view of the undisputed fact, that Ashabhai Patel
purchased the property, therefore, he was competent to
execute the will in favour of any person. Since the
beneficiary of the will was his son and in the absence of any
intention in the will, beneficiary would acquire the property
as self-acquired property in terms of C.N. Arunachala
Mudaliar case [C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar v. C.A.
Muruganatha Mudaliar, (1953) 2 SCC 362: 1954 SCR 243:
AIR 1953 SC 495]. The burden of proof that the property
was ancestral was on the plaintiffs alone. It was for them to
prove that the will of Ashabhai intended to convey the
property for the benefit of the family so as to be treated as
ancestral property. In the absence of any such averment or
proof, the property in the hands of donor has to be treated as
self-acquired property. Once the property in the hands of
donor is held to be self-acquired property, he was competent
to deal with his property in such a manner he considers as
proper including by executing a gift deed in favour of a
stranger to the family.”

11. The second contention canvassed by learned Advocate Mr.
Mishra pertains to the Will dated 15.04.1996, allegedly executed by
deceased Reshiabhai, which is assailed as forged and beyond his

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authority to execute. This Court, for reasons already recorded
hereinabove, has unequivocally held that the properties bequeathed
under the testamentary disposition were the self-acquired properties
of Reshiabhai. Ergo, the embargo contemplated under Section 30 of
the Hindu Succession Act would not operate as a fetter upon his
testamentary competence.

11.1. Turning, therefore, to the issue of genuineness, the Will in
question is produced at Exhibit 49. At the outset, it merits notice that
the instrument is a registered Will, having been duly registered
before the Sub-Registrar, Chikhli on 17.04.1996, who has also
appended his official endorsement and signature thereon. Although
the Will has been propounded by the defendants, its legality and
validity have been put in issue by the plaintiff. In this context, it
would be apposite to advert to the recent pronouncement of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Metpalli Lasum Bai (Since Dead) &
Ors. v. Metapalli Muthiah (D) by Lrs., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 734,
wherein the principles governing proof of a Will and the burden
resting upon the propounder, particularly in the face of allegations of
suspicious circumstances, have been authoritatively expounded:-

“ XXX XXX XXX

The Will, is a registered document and thus there is a
presumption regarding genuineness thereof. The trial Court
accepted the execution of the Will based on the evidence led
before it. As the Will is a registered document, the burden
would lie on the party who disputed its existence thereof,
who would be defendant-Muthaiah in this case, to establish
that it was not executed in the manner as alleged or that there
were suspicious circumstances which made the same
doubtful.

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XXX XXX XXX ”

12. If the oral evidence on this aspect is scrutinized, the plaintiff,
Kantaben Gamit, examined at Exhibit 30, has in her deposition
unequivocally admitted that deceased Reshiabhai executed the Will
dated 15.04.1986 and that the same came to be registered on
17.04.1986. Though she subsequently attempted to dispute the
signature of Reshiabhai on the Will, no cogent material or expert
evidence has been adduced in support of such bald assertion. Her
statement, therefore, remains a mere ipsi dixit devoid of probative
worth.

12.1. One of the attesting witnesses, Ranchhodbhai, was examined
by the plaintiff himself at Exh. 67. The learned Trial Court discarded
his testimony solely on the ground that he was serving as a clerk
with the advocate representing the defendants. The learned Appellate
Court, however, rightly found such reasoning to be wholly
untenable. Merely because a witness is employed as a clerk by an
advocate appearing in the matter cannot, in vacuo, render his
testimony suspect or inadmissible, particularly when he has been
examined by the plaintiff to assail the Will. In his cross-examination,
he categorically admitted that Reshiabhai had executed the Will
while being in a sound and disposing state of mind and that the
execution and registration were carried out in his presence. He
further admitted that, at the time of registration, even the learned
Advocate for the plaintiff was present. These admissions indubitably
lend assurance to the due execution of the testamentary instrument.

12.2. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, read with Section 68
of the Indian Evidence Act (now substantially embodied in the

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Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), mandates examination of at
least one attesting witness to prove a Will. The law is equally
pellucid that, where an attesting witness either denies or fails to
recollect execution, recourse may be had to Sections 69 and 70 of
the Evidence Act to prove handwriting and attestation through other
permissible modes. In this regard, reference may be made to
Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam, AIR 2005 SC
4362, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that an
endorsement by the Sub-Registrar to the effect that the executant
acknowledged execution before him carries significant evidentiary
value and may, in appropriate circumstances, amount to attestation.
On a cumulative appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence,
the execution of the Will at Exh. 49 stands duly proved in
accordance with law.

13. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the prevenient
ratiocination, this Court finds no merit whatsoever in the present
Second Appeal. The appeal is utterly devoid of substance, bereft of
any sustainable ground warranting interference within the limited
scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ergo, the
Second Appeal fails and stands dismissed.

13.1. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. The Record
and Proceedings shall be transmitted back to the Court concerned
without delay.

(J. C. DOSHI,J)

14. After pronouncement of the judgment, learned advocate Mr.
Mishra has sought a stay on the implementation of the present order

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for a period of four weeks so as to enable the plaintiff to avail
appropriate remedies before the higher forum.

14.1. Having regard to the fact that interim relief has been operating
since the admission of the present Second Appeal, the same shall
continue to operate for a further period of four weeks from today,
and shall stand vacated automatically thereafter without further
reference to this Court.

(J. C. DOSHI,J)
MANISH MISHRA

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: MANISH MISHRA(HC01776), STENO GR II, at High Court of Gujarat on 06/02/2026 14:54:38

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