High Court of Gujarat

NIRUPKUMAR RAMESHBHAI GAMITversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

Decided: 17 March 2026
Disposal: 26-DISMISSED @ ADM.STAGE
Bench: NIRZAR S DESAI

Holding

The Court held that a charge‑sheet or show‑cause notice does not amount to an adverse order, and in the absence of procedural illegality the petition is premature and must be dismissed.

Summary

The petitioner, a Multipurpose Health Worker appointed in 2014, challenged a charge‑sheet dated 24‑01‑2024 and a final show‑cause notice dated 28‑01‑2026 issued by the State of Gujarat, seeking their quash and a stay on any disciplinary action. The petitioner argued that his qualifications were valid and that the departmental proceedings were premature, requesting a limited stay on any future punishment. The State contended that the petition was premature as no penalty had yet been imposed and relied on precedents that a charge‑sheet or show‑cause notice does not amount to an adverse order. The Court examined the legal position that a writ cannot ordinarily be entertained against a mere charge‑sheet or show‑cause notice unless there is a clear jurisdictional defect, and noted that the petitioner had participated in the inquiry without objection. Finding no procedural illegality and deeming the petition premature, the Court dismissed the petition without addressing the merits.

Issues considered

Whether a charge‑sheet and final show‑cause notice constitute an adverse order that can be challenged by a writ petition
Whether the petitioner is entitled to a stay on any future disciplinary action pending the outcome of the departmental inquiry
Whether the petition is premature and therefore liable to be dismissed

Subjects

departmental inquiry
charge sheet
show-cause notice
writ petition
premature petition
administrative law
public servant disciplinary proceedings
Article 226
recruitment rules

Judgment

C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.3782 of 2026

=========================================
NIRUPKUMAR RAMESHBHAI GAMIT
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
=========================================
Appearance :
MR VAIBHAV A VYAS for the Petitioner.
MS PRACHI UPADHYAY for the Petitioner.
MR AAKASH GUPTA, AGP for the Respondent No.1.
=========================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRZAR S. DESAI

Date : 17/03/2026
ORAL ORDER

1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for the
following reliefs :-

“(A) Quash and set aside the charge sheet dated

24.1.2024, Annexure-A to this petition, and

(B) Quash and set aside the final show-cause

notice dated 28.1.2026, Annexure-B to this

petition, and

petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to

stay the departmental proceedings initiated

against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned

charge sheet dated 24.1.2024, Annexure-A, and /

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(D) Pending admission and final disposal of this

petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to

stay the operation and implementation of charge

sheet dated 24.1.2024, Annexure-A to this

petition, and/or

(E) Pending admission and final disposal of this

petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to

stay the operation and implementation of show

cause Annexure-B to this application, and notice

dated 28.1.2026,

(F) Award the cost of this petition, and

(G) Grant any other relief or pass any other

order which the Honourable Court may consider

as just and proper in the facts and circumstances

of the case.”

2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was selected and
appointed to the post of Multipurpose Health Worker, Class-III,
after completing the regular selection process initiated by the
Gujarat Panchayat Service Selection Board. The petitioner had
appeared in the competitive examination and, after successfully
clearing the same, was appointed to the said post. The petitioner
was appointed in the year 2014 and, after completing satisfactory
service for a period of five years, he was placed in regular service
and was granted regular pay scale in the year 2020 with effect
from 2019.

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3. According to the petitioner, the appointment to the post
of Multipurpose Health Worker (Male), Class-III is governed by the
Multipurpose Health Worker (Male), Class-III (Panchayat Service)
Recruitment Rules, 2011. As per the said Rules, in order to be
eligible for appointment to the post of Multipurpose Health Worker
(Male) by way of direct selection, a candidate is required, inter alia,
to possess the qualification of completion of one year training in
the Multipurpose Health Worker Basic Course from an institution
recognized by the Government, or must have passed the Sanitary
Inspector Examination from an institution recognized by the
Government.

4. The present petitioner has passed the Diploma Course
in Health and Sanitary Inspector (BHSI) Examination from
Vinayaka Missions University, which is a Deemed University duly
recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC). After the
appointment of the petitioner in the year 2014, for the purpose of
verification of the genuineness of their educational qualifications,
the petitioner was issued a communication dated 15.09.2018. In
response to the said communication, the petitioner submitted the
necessary information and relevant documents to the respondent
authorities.

5. Since the services of similarly situated employee from
another district were terminated, the petitioner, along with other
similarly situated persons, approached this Court by filing Special
Civil Application No.11430 of 2019. The said petition came to be
disposed of by order dated 03.10.2022, in terms of Clause 6 of the
operative portion of the judgment and order dated 08.07.2022
passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.1411 of 2018. By the said

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order, the order passed by the learned Single Judge setting aside
the order of termination was upheld, and the respondents were
directed to pay back wages from the date of the order of the
learned Single Judge, with a modification in the order passed by
the learned Single Judge. The respective District Panchayats were
granted liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, if deemed fit, by
treating the order of termination as a show-cause notice, and upon
consideration of the reply submitted by the concerned employees,
to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. It was further
clarified by the Court that it had not expressed any opinion with
regard to the correctness, authenticity, or validity of the diploma
certificates produced in the petition. The District Panchayats were
directed to issue show-cause notices and were also directed to
furnish copies of the internal inquiry report to the concerned
employees.

6. Pursuant to the aforesaid orders, the petitioner was
issued fresh show-cause notice, followed by charge sheet and fresh
departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner herein.
The show-cause notice was issued on 29.11.2022, thereafter, the
charge sheet was issued on 24.01.2024, and subsequently a final
show-cause notice came to be issued on 28.01.2026.

7. In view of the above, the present petition has been
preferred by the petitioner seeking the reliefs as incorporated in
the foregoing paragraphs.

8. Learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas submitted that
though the petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
extensive reliefs, the limited relief now pressed for by the

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petitioner is that in the event the respondents ultimately pass any
order imposing penalty upon the petitioner, the implementation of
such order may be stayed for a specific period, as may be deemed
appropriate by this Court.

8.1. Learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas submitted that so
far as the legal position is concerned, the petitioner is not disputing
the same. However, considering the fact that the petitioner has
been in employment for almost 12 years, his appointment relating
back to the year 2014, it is submitted that his services may not be
abruptly terminated. Therefore, it is prayed that in the event any
order of punishment is imposed upon the petitioner in future, the
implementation of such order may be kept in abeyance for a
specific period, as may be deemed appropriate by this Court.

8.2. Learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas relied upon two
decisions of this Court. In the case of Gopalbhai Veneeshankar
Ladhwa vs. State of Gujarat, in Letters Patent Appeal No.651
of 2024, by order dated 20.03.2025, the Division Bench of this
Court issued direction of not to implement the final order of
punishment for a period of two weeks. Learned advocate Mr. Vyas
also relied upon the decision dated 25.09.2025 passed in
Special Civil Application No. 13539 of 2025, in the case of
Vaibhavkumar Prabhatsangh Palania vs. State of Gujarat,
wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court directed the
respondents to keep the order of punishment in abeyance for a
period of two weeks. Learned advocate Mr. Vyas, therefore,
submitted that with this limited prayer, the present petition has
been preferred.

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8.3 Learned advocate Mr. Vyas did not make any other
submissions nor did he rely upon any other judgments except the
orders and judgments already annexed with the petition.

9. Learned AGP Mr. Aakash Gupta vehemently opposed
the petition and submitted that it is a settled legal position that the
present petition is premature, inasmuch as the departmental
inquiry has already been concluded and only a final show-cause
notice has been issued to the petitioners. It is submitted that no
order of punishment has been passed as of now, and therefore, as
on date, there is no adverse order passed against the present
petitioner.

9.1. Learned AGP further relied upon a recent decision of
the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ashishkumar
Vithaldas Gohil vs. State of Gujarat and Others, decided on
24.12.2025 in Special Civil Application No. 17857 of 2025.
Relying upon the observations made in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the
said judgment, it was submitted that the present petition is not only
premature but is also liable to be dismissed without grant of any
relief in favour of the petitioner.

9.2. Learned AGP drew the attention of this Court to the
observations made by the Coordinate Bench, which relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Odisha and Others vs. Satishkumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye and
Others, reported in (2021) 7 SCC 90. By placing reliance upon
the said decision, as well as the observations made by the
Coordinate Bench in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment dated
24.12.2025 in the case of Ashishkumar Vithaldas Gohil (supra),

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learned AGP prayed for dismissal of the petition.

10. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and
perused the record. It cannot be disputed by learned advocate Mr.
Vaibhav Vyas that the legal proposition, in respect of the facts of
the case, is settled and that to the extent that though the petition is
premature, the petition is preferred with a limited prayer to keep
the proposed order of punishment in abeyance for a specific period,
and therefore, I do not wish to elaborately state as to how the
petition is premature, as the same could not be disputed by learned
advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas.

11. In view of the above factual background, the only
question that remains to be considered is whether, when the
petitioner has participated in the ongoing inquiry and considering
the fact that this is the second round of litigation, the prayer made
by the petitioner to keep the proposed order of punishment in
abeyance for a specific period deserves to be granted or not.
Therefore, the submission made by learned AGP is required to be
considered, particularly when, according to him, the issue is
covered by the latest decision of the Coordinate Bench.
Accordingly, the observations made by the Coordinate Bench in
paragraphs 9 and 10 are required to be considered.

12. I have also considered the fact that what is under
challenge by way of the present petition is the charge sheet as well
as the show-cause notice, and therefore the observations made by
the Coordinate Bench in paragraphs 9 and 10 are required to be
taken into consideration. . In paragraphs 9 and 10, the Coordinate
Bench, in the case of Ashishkumar Vithaldas Gohil (supra),

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made the following observations :-

“[9] It is more or less settled legal position of law that mere
issuance of a charge-sheet and or show cause notice would not
amount to any penalty or consider to be an adverse order passed
against delinquent. Since both the sides, in support their
respective submissions, have relied upon the same decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court; it would be apt to refer few observations from
the said decision in the case of Kunisetty Satyanarayana
(Supra), which reads as under:

“11. Instead of replying to the aforesaid Charge Memo, the
respondent filed an OA before the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Hyderabad which was disposed of vide order
15.3.2004 with the direction to the applicant to submit his
reply to the Charge Memo dated 23.12.2003 and on
submission of the said reply the Disciplinary Authority
should consider the same. Instead of filing any reply the
respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court which has
been allowed, and hence this appeal.

12. In our advice, the High Court was not justified in
allowing the Writ Petition.

13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this
Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge
sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer,
Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and
others JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another vs.
Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467,
Ulagappa and others vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore
and others 2001(10) SCC 639, State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt
Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943 etc.

14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should
not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice
or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition
may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or
show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of
action, because it does not amount to an adverse order
which affects the rights of any party unless the same
has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to
do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to
the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the
authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold

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that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a
writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere
show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the
right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some
punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is
passed, that the said party can be said to have any
grievance.

15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and
hence such discretion under Article 226 should not
ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or
charge sheet.

16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases
the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause
notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for
some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily
the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.”
(emphasis supplied)

[9.1] Thus, in view of the aforesaid position of law, mere issuance
of a charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any
cause of action. At the same time, as a word of caution, the Court
has also said that in very rare and exceptional circumstances, the
High Court can exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India and may quash a charge-sheet or show-
cause notice, as the case may be, but when it is found that it is
wholly without jurisdiction or it’s illegal.

[9.2] In view of above, the petitioner must make out a rare and
exceptional case to entertain this Writ Petition.

[10] The entire emphasis in challenging the impugned charge-
sheet is based upon premise that no preliminary inquiry should
have been undertaken by respondent No.1, and that upon receipt
of the preliminary inquiry, the impugned charge-sheet could not
have been served upon the petitioner.

[10.1] The heavy reliance is placed upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satish Kumar Ishwardas
Gajbhiye & Ors (supra). The facts of aforesaid decision are
entirely distinct from the present one, as set out below:

“(i) In the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the
preliminary inquiry was conducted covertly as the

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delinquent was not made aware of it; Whereas, the
petitioner herein was called upon during course of the
preliminary inquiry, then had its knowledge.

(ii) When the delinquent was served with the charge-sheet,
he immediately approached the Central Administrative
Tribunal (CAT), challenging the charge-sheet; Whereas, the
petitioner herein has not only participated in the
departmental inquiry without any demur but not questioned
the chargesheet till its end.

(iii) The phrasing of the article of charges clearly revealed
formation of advice of the authorities in finding of guilt of
the delinquent; Nothing sort of this pointed out by the
petitioner in this regard.”

[10.2] It would also be apt to refer the observations of Satish
Kumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye & Ors (supra), which read thus:

“13. We do not think the position of law has changed
since then. In the case of Champaklal Chimanlal
Shah v. The Union of India, 1964 AIR(SC) 1854,
some form of preliminary enquiry was found to be
justifiable under certain circumstances. It was
observed in this judgment:

"12. Before however we consider the facts of this case,
we should like to make certain general observations in
connection with disciplinary proceedings taken against
public servants. It is well known that government does
not terminate the services of a public servant, be he
even a temporary servant, without reason; nor is it
usual for government to reduce a public servant in
rank without reason even though he may be holding
the higher rank only temporarily. One reason for
terminating the services of a temporary servant may be
that the post that he is holding comes to an end. In that
case there is nothing further to be said and his services
terminate when the post comes to an end. Similarly a
government servant temporarily officiating in a higher
rank may have to be reverted to his substantive post
where the incumbent of the higher post comes back to
duty or where the higher post created for a temporary
period comes to an end. But besides the above, the
government may find it necessary to terminate the
services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with
his conduct or his suitability for the job and or his
work. The same may apply to the reversion of a public
servant from a higher post to a lower post where the

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post is held as a temporary measure. This
dissatisfaction with the work and/or conduct of a
temporary servant may arise on complaint against him.
In such cases two courses are open to government. It
may decide to dispense with the services of the servant
or revert him to substantive post without any action
being taken to punish him for his bad work and/or
conduct. Or the Government may decide to punish such
a servant for his bad work or misconduct, in which
case even though the servant may be temporary he will
have the protection of Article 311(2). But even where
it is intended to take action by way of punishment
what usually happens is that something in the
nature of what may be called a preliminary
enquiry is first held in connection with the
alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work . In this
preliminary enquiry the explanation of the government
servant may be taken and documentary and even oral
evidence may be considered. It is usual when such a
preliminary enquiry makes out a prima facie case
against the servant concerned that charges are then
framed against him and he is asked to show cause why
disciplinary action be not taken against him. An
enquiry officer (who may be himself in the case where
the appointing authority is other than the Govern-
ment) is appointed who holds enquiry into the charges
communicated to the servant concerned after taking
his explanation and this enquiry is held in accordance
with the principles of natural justice. This is what is
known as a formal departmental enquiry into the
conduct of a public servant. In this enquiry evidence
both documentary and oral may be led against the
public servant concerned and he has a right to cross-
examine the witnesses tendered against him. He has
also the right to give documentary and oral evidence in
his defence, if he thinks necessary to do so. After the
enquiry is over, the enquiry officer makes a report to
the Government or the authority having power to take
action against the servant concerned. The government
or the authority makes up its mind on the enquiry
report as to whether the charges have been proved or
not and if it holds that some or all the charges have
been proved, it determines tentatively the punishment,
to be, inflicted on the public servant concerned. It then
communicates a copy of the enquiry officer's report
and its own conclusion thereon and asks him to show
cause why the tentative punishment decided upon be,
not inflicted upon him. This procedure is required by
Article 311(2) of the Constitution in the case of the
three major punishments i.e. dismissal, or removal or
reduction in rank. The servant, concerned has then an

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opportunity of showing case by making a
representation that the conclusions arrived at the
departmental enquiry are incorrect and in any case the
punishment proposed to be inflicted is too harsh."

18. We have quoted the judgment of the Calcutta High
Court (supra), with which we concur. The principle of
law that emerges from that judgment is that though a
private citizen is permitted to do what is not prohibited
in law, a statutory authority can do only what is
permissible in law. As such in our considered view,
the order directing the preliminary inquiry in the
present case, in the form it was undertaken, was
not justified in law. In situations where Rules do not
provide for holding preliminary enquiry before
initiating disciplinary action, the principle laid down in
the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah (supra) would
prevail. But the nature of enquiry in such a situation
would be in the nature of information gathering
exercise, on the basis of which the authorities would
decide whether to proceed in the matter or not. In this
case, as we have already observed, the preliminary
enquiry resulted in issue of Article of Charges, the
phrasing of which clearly revealed formation of advice
of the authorities in finding of guilt of the respondent
no. 1.”

(emphasis supplied)

[10.3] So, in the peculiar background of the facts, the Hon’ble
Apex Court in aforesaid decision held that the issuance of charge-
sheet against the delinquent on the basis of the preliminary inquiry
is bad in law. Nonetheless, it is not an absolute proposition of law
that no preliminary inquiry can be initiated by the State prior to
issuance of a charge-sheet.

[10.4] It is remained undisputed in the case on hand that during
the course of preliminary inquiry, petitioner was called upon by the
authority concerned and after recording his statement, report was
prepared. The petitioner has all thorough out without raising any
objection participated in the departmental inquiry, rather on its
conclusion when called upon, replied to the show cause notice as
well. Nothing is made out on the record to show that authority in
present case has formed any advice of guilt against the petitioner
when issued the impugned charge-sheet, rather as can be seen, the
principles of natural justice has been observed at all stages. In
view of the aforesaid, the said decision would not help the case of
the petitioner.

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[10.5] Even, the bare perusal of the impugned charge-sheet,
produced on record, would indicate that issuance of charge-sheet
was not solely on the basis of the preliminary report. Even
otherwise, at the relevant point of time, when the petitioner has
not questioned the impugned charge-sheet, rather, participated in
the inquiry, then as per the doctrine of estoppel and waiver, at this
belatedly stage, petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge the
impugned charge-sheet, on any counts.”

13. Apart from and in addition to the above observations,
what is considered by this Court is the fact that on an earlier
occasion also, in the year 2019, the petitioner had preferred a
petition challenging the action of the respondents, apprehending
termination. At that time, the petitioner’s case was considered and
whatever procedural lacuna was alleged was subsequently
corrected by the respondent authority.

14. Today, when the inquiry has already concluded and a
subsequent show-cause notice has been issued to the petitioner,
learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas could not point out any
procedural lacuna in respect of the subsequent show-cause notice
issued pursuant to the order passed by the Coordinate Bench in the
first round of litigation.

15. Therefore, when no procedural illegality has been
pointed out by learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas, I do not see any
reason to keep the proposed order of punishment in abeyance for a
specific period, simply for the reason that the show-cause notice
issued by the respondents, though answered by the petitioner, is
yet to be considered by the respondents. If any relief is granted in
favour of the petitioner at this stage, the same may influence the
ongoing departmental proceedings and the issue relating to the

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imposition of punishment, if at all the respondents decide to impose
any major penalty upon the present petitioner.

16. Therefore, at this juncture, when learned advocate Mr.
Vaibhav Vyas could not point out any procedural illegality in the
ongoing departmental inquiry, including the show-cause notice, I
do not deem it appropriate to pass any order directing the
respondent authorities to keep the proposed order of punishment
in abeyance for a specific period.

17. However, it is clarified that this Court has not
considered the matters on merits, and as and when, and if at all,
orders of punishment are imposed upon the petitioners, it will
always be open for the petitioners to raise all the contentions which
they may wish to raise, even on merits, in accordance with law.

18. Accordingly, without entering into the merits of the
matter, and considering the fact that the petitioner could not point
out any procedural irregularity, as well as considering that the
present petition is premature in nature, the present petition stands
dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed.

(NIRZAR S. DESAI,J)

SAVARIYA

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: RAJNISH NARENDRA SAVARIYA(HC00179), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 17/03/2026 17:35:10

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