MR. ATUL HIRALAL SHAHversusM/S UNISPACE LANDMARK PRIVATE LIMITED

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                                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                          SECOND APPEAL NO.307 OF 2026
                                                      WITH
                                       INTERIM APPLICATION NO.6661 OF 2026

                      Atul Hiralal Shah and Anr.                        ...   Appellants
                            versus
                      M/s. Unispace Landmark Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.         …     Respondents

                      Mr. Naushad Engineer, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Sudarshan, Ms. Nidhi Singh, Mr.
                      IshanGambhir, Ms. Aletea Fernandes, for Appellants.
                      Mr. Rubin Vakil with Mr. saurabh Nikalje, Ms. Nipa Ghosh, for Respondents.

                                        CORAM:       N.J.JAMADAR, J.

                                        DATE :       16 SEPTEMBER 2026

                      JUDGMENT :

                      1.    Heard Mr. Naushad Engineer, learned Senior Advocate for the

                      Appellants, and Mr. Rubin Vakil, learned Counsel for the Respondents.

                      2.    The following substantial question of law arises for consideration :

                                  Whether the Appellate Tribunal did not apply correct principles in

                      deciding the application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal, and,

                      thereby misdirected itself in rejecting the application for condonation of
SWAROOP
SHARAD
PHADKE                delay ?
Digitally signed by
SWAROOP SHARAD
PHADKE
Date: 2026.09.24
15:05:43 +0530
                      3.    In the light of the nature of controversy and the aforesaid substantial

                      question of law that arises for consideration, with the consent of the learned

                      Counsel for the parties, this Second Appeal is taken up for hearing and final

                      disposal.


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4.    This Second Appeal is directed against the order dated 6 April 2026

passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, in Misc.

Application No.117 of 2026 in Appeal No.AT06//00076/2026, whereby the said

application preferred by the Appellants for the condonation of delay of 143

days in filing the appeal against the judgment and order dated 30 June 2025

passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (the Authority) in

Complaint No.CC006000000354475 came to be dismissed.

5.    The Respondents are the promoters of a project ‘Sodah Sadan’. On 4

October 2016, the Appellants entered into two registered agreements for

purchase of two flats in the said project. The possession of the flats was

agreed to be delivered on 31 December 2018.          Despite obtaining repeated

extensions, the Respondents committed default in performance of their part of

the contract.   The Appellants, thus, filed a complaint before the Authority

seeking possession, interest, compensation and other reliefs.

6.    By an order dated 30 June 2025, the Authority was persuaded to partly

allow the complaint. The claim for possession was rejected. However, the

promoters were directed to pay interest for the delayed delivery of possession

of the subject flats from 1 January 2019 till the date of offer of possession with

OC, on the actual amount paid by the complainants towards the consideration

of the said flats at the rate of Marginal Cost Lending Rate (MCLR) of SBI plus

2% as prescribed under the provisions of Section 18 of the RERA and the


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rules made thereunder.      The Authority further directed that the amount

towards interest shall be paid by the Promoters to the complainants after

obtaining full occupancy certificate. The Promoters were granted liberty to

adjust the said amount of interest against the outstanding consideration

towards the balance consideration along with interest thereon, if any.

7.    The Appellants claimed that the Appellants bonafide pursued the

Respondents to obtain full occupancy certificate under a genuine belief that

no sooner the Respondents obtain OC, they would comply with their statutory

obligations in the matter of payment of interest for the delayed delivery of

possession of the subject flats.   Despite repeated efforts by the Appellants,

the Respondents failed and neglected to favourably respond to the request of

the Appellants. Eventually, it transpired that there was no progress at the

project site and possibility of obtaining the OC. Thus, there was delay in

preferring the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the said order

passed by the Authority. Hence, the Appellants preferred Misc. Application

No.117 of 2026 seeking condonation of delay of 143 days in preferring the

appeal.

8.    The application was resisted by the Respondents.

9.    By the impugned order dated 6 April 2026, the Appellate Tribunal was

persuaded to reject the application observing that, though a liberal justice

oriented approach was required to be adopted, yet, the said principle cannot


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be used to defeat the substantive provisions of law contained in Section 3 of

the Limitation Act, 1963. The Appellate Tribunal was of the view that the

reasons ascribed in the application for condonation of delay did not constitute

a sufficient cause and the Appellants failed to account for each and every

day’s delay. The Appellants appeared to be negligent in not exhausting the

appellate remedy within the stipulated period.

10.   Mr. Engineer, learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants, submitted

that, though the Authority, on the one hand, granted the relief of interest for

the delayed delivery of possession, yet, on the other hand, deprived the

Appellants of the benefits thereof, by deferring the payout of interest to the

date of obtaining the occupancy certificate. The Appellants / allottees were,

thus, made to pursue the Respondents for the expeditious occupancy

certificate so that the order passed by the Authority could become

enforceable.   The Appellate Tribunal, Mr. Engineer would submit, did not

properly appreciate the predicament to which the allottees were put by the

order passed by the Authority. The Appellate Tribunal, thus, could not have

non-suited the Appellants by holding that the Appellants were negligent in

pursuing their remedies.

11.   In any event, the delay of 143 days in preferring the appeal cannot be

said to be inordinate. The Appellate Tribunal adopted a very rigid standard

and did not keep in view the principles which govern an application for


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condonation of delay. Moreover, since the condonation of delay was sought

by the allottees, having regard to the object of RERA 2016, the Appellate

Tribunal ought to have considered the reasons ascribed by the Appellants

liberally.   An endeavour was made by Mr. Engineer to place on record the

copies of the documents which indicate that the Appellants were bonafide

pursuing the Respondents to obtain the occupancy certificate.

12.    In opposition to this, Mr. Rubin Vakil, learned Counsel for the

Respondents, would submit that the Appellate Tribunal was wholly justified in

rejecting the application for condonation of delay as the reasons ascribed for

delay can in no circumstance be said to be an explanation which accounts for

the delay in preferring the appeal. At best, the said reason of non-compliance

with the order passed by the Authority, can be a ground for delay in seeking

enforcement of the order passed by the Authority. Non-compliance of the

impugned order can never be a ground for approaching the Appellate Court

belatedly.    If there is no cause ascribed for the delay, the Court or Tribunal

cannot record satisfaction that there was a sufficient cause for not preferring

the appeal within the stipulated period and in the absence thereof, the Court /

Tribunal has no authority to condone the delay.

13.    Mr. Vakil further submitted that the documents now sought to be relied

upon by the Appellants in support of the application for condonation of delay

cannot be looked into at this stage, as those documents were not tendered


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before the Appellate Tribunal.

14.   I have given careful consideration to the submissions canvassed across

the bar.   In the application for condonation of delay, the Appellants have

indeed ascribed the only reason that, after the order was passed by the

Authority, in good faith, they were pursuing the Respondents to obtain the OC

and discharge their contractual and statutory obligations.        The Appellants

claimed to have repeatedly requested the Respondents, approached them

personally and sought compliance of their obligations. Having realized that

there was no possibility of the compliance of the directions of the Authority

and the delivery of possession of the subject flats along with the occupation

certificate, the Appellants decided to approach the Appellate Tribunal.

15.   In a very strict sense, it could be urged that the non-compliance of the

impugned order, does not constitute a satisfactory explanation for the delay in

preferring the appeal. However, in the considered view of this Court, the said

aspect was required to be appreciated in the light of the attendant facts of the

case and the situation in life of the parties.

16.   Statutes of limitation are termed as, “statutes of peace”.             Law of

limitation is based upon the public policy that there should be an end to

litigation by interdicting the right to remedy rather than the extinguishment of

the right itself. The principle is based on the maxim, “interest reipublicae ut sit



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finis litium, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be an

end to litigation.

17.    If a party does not exercise the right to remedy without any justifiable

cause, such party forfeits the right to seek the remedy. If there is no period of

limitation for exercising the right to remedy, it would result in a perpetual threat

of action and the consequent unsettling of settled claims after a long lapse of

time, causing a grave prejudice to the adversary.

18.    The object of the Statute of Limitation was expounded by the Supreme

Court in the case of Pundlik Jalan Patil vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon

Medium Project1 in the following terms :-

                     “29.   It needs no restatement at our hands that the object
                     for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy
                     fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general
                     welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not
                     resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies
                     promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the
                     laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the
                     sleepy.”             (emphasis supplied)


19.    The term, 'sufficient cause' which is the linchpin of the provisions which

empower the Courts/Tribunals to condone the delay often receives a liberal

construction so as to advance the cause of substantial justice when no

negligence, inaction, or want of bona fide is imputable to a party.

1   (2008) 17 SCC 448.

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Undoubtedly, whether the cause ascribed would constitute a “sufficient cause”

is rooted in the facts of the given case. The expression 'sufficient cause'

cannot be confined in a straitjacket. Nor can a rule of universal application to

judge the contours of sufficient cause for either condoning or declining to

condone the delay can be devised. It is well settled by a long line of decisions

that the term 'sufficient cause' is elastic in nature and does not admit of a

definition in cast iron.

20.     In the case of Shivamma (dead) by LRs. vs. Karnataka Housing

Board and others2, the Supreme Court expounded the import of the term

‘sufficient cause’ in the following Liberation Sansterms.

                “122. The exceptional provision of condonation of delay on grounds
                of “sufficient cause” is couched as a manifestation of substantive
                justice. This Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. v.
                Special Deputy Collector (LA), reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC
                513, summarized the principles governing the exceptions imagined
                under “sufficient cause” vis-à-vis substantive justice as under: -
                “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
                aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
                (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be
                an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the
                right itself;
                (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of
                for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
                period of time;
                (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
                differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense
                whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
                (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
                justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be


2     2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969.

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      kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial
      law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
      (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
      delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of
      power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if
      sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where
      there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
      (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does
      not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the
      court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the
      appeal;
      (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
      condoning the delay; and
      (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
      parameters laid down for conLiberation Sansdoning the delay and
      condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been
      imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”
      (Emphasis supplied)
      123. From above, it is manifest that that the phrase “sufficient
      cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an expression of elastic
      import, incapable of precise definition, yet not without boundaries.
      Its purpose is to empower courts to advance the cause of justice by
      preventing genuine litigants from being shut out on account of
      unavoidable delays. At the same time, it is equally clear that the
      phrase is not a charter for indolence or a device to revive stale
      claims that the law of limitation otherwise extinguishes.
      124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party
      seeking condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the
      cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of
      cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of
      circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of the applicant and
      the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The inquiry is not
      mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides
      and diligence.
      125. The expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea
      for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is
      to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish
      innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control.
      126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate
      inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the
      maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the
      certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.




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              127. The expression “sufficient cause” must be construed in a
              manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the
              discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by
              sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of
              whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing
              the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and
              consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned
              towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a
              casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused.”

                                                             (emphasis supplied)


21.   Where the Court/Tribunal of the first instance has refused to condone

the delay, the Appellate Court is required to delve into the matter in a little

detail and examine for itself whether the delay deserves to be condoned, in

the light of the reasons ascribed by the party. In such a case, the entire matter

ordinarily remains open before the Appellate/Revisional Authority.

22.   It appears that the Appellate Tribunal has adopted a slightly rigid

approach in the matter of condonation of delay and did not keep in view the

aforesaid principles, which ordinarily govern the application for condonation of

delay. The justifiability of the cause ascribed for the delay was required to be

judged on the touchstone of the reasonableness, bonafide and diligence. The

element of justice oriented flexibility in appraising the sufficiency of cause is

required to be kept in view. If it is a case of gross negligence, deliberate

inaction or blatant indifference to the statutory mandate, the delay cannot be

condoned as it would amount to showing undeserved generosity and

misplaced sympathy. That is not the case at hand.



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23.    As noted above, the possession of the subject flats was to be delivered

on 31 December 2018. Till passing of the impugned order, the Respondents

had not offered possession of the subject flats, nor obtained full occupation

certificate.   The Appellants were the allottees.     The expectation that the

promoter would comply with its statutory and contractual obligations and the

order passed by the Authority, cannot be said to be wholly unreasonable.

24.    The nature of the order passed by the Authority, in the circumstances of

the case, assumes importance. The direction to pay interest for the delayed

delivery of possession was deferred till the Promoter obtained the occupancy

certificate. The enforcement of the order passed by the Authority was, thus,

made contingent upon the grant of the occupancy certificate.                 The

compliance of the said condition was beyond the control of the allottees and

hinged upon the volition and acts of the promoters.

25.    From this standpoint, the action of the allottees in pursuing the

promoters bonafide in the hope that the occupancy certificate would soon be

obtained and the order passed by the Authority would then become

enforceable, could not have been construed as negligence on the part of the

allottees.

26.    The length of delay is also a relevant consideration. Delay of 143 days

cannot be said to be huge and inordinate. The principle that the party who

seeks condonation of delay shall account for each and every days delay,


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cannot be stretched to the point of the mathematical precision and exactitude

in offering explanation for each day’s delay.

27.   The Appellants were pursuing the Respondents – Promoters to obtain

the occupancy certificate and discharge their obligations. It is trite law that,

on balance, the Court may also take into account the merits of the matter

while considering an application for condonation of delay.

28.   Mr. Vakil, learned Counsel for the Respondents, fairly submitted that,

according to his instructions, the occupation certificate has yet not been

obtained. In such a situation, if the Appellants seek enforcement of the order

passed by the Authority, the said action would be termed pre-mature as the

enforceability of the liability to pay interest is deferred to an uncertain event of

obtaining the occupancy certificate. The legality and justifiability of such order

passed by the Authority would be required to be examined by the Appellate

Tribunal in the event the delay is condoned.

29.   For the foregoing reasons, this Court is impelled to answer the question

of law in the affirmative, and allow the appeal.

30.   Hence, the following order :

                                         ORDER

             (i)    The impugned order stands quashed and set aside.

             (ii)   Misc. Application for condonation of delay stands allowed.




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            (iii)   The delay of 143 days in preferring the appeal before the

      Appellate Tribunal stands condoned, subject to the payment of costs of

      Rs.20,000/- by the Appellants to the Respondents, within a period of

      four weeks from the date of uploading of this order.

            (iv)    The Appellate Tribunal is requested to decide the Appeal in

      accordance with law.



                                                  ( N.J.JAMADAR, J. )




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