Bombay High Court
SHRI VIJAY S/O. AMRIT PATILversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Disposal
- DISMISSED
Holding
The appellant’s act of pouring kerosene on his wife and urging her to die amounted to instigation with the necessary mens rea, satisfying Section 306 IPC, and the conviction was upheld.
Summary
The appellant, a husband, was convicted under Section 306 IPC for abetting the suicide of his wife, who suffered severe burns after he allegedly beat her, poured kerosene on her and urged her to die, after which she set herself on fire. The prosecution's case rested on the parents' testimony and a dying declaration recorded by a Special Executive Magistrate, which the defence challenged as unreliable and lacking attestation. The trial court dismissed the dying declaration as inadmissible and acquitted the appellant of other charges, but upheld the conviction for abetment. On appeal, the appellant argued there was no mens rea or instigation, contending the wife ignited herself voluntarily. The appellate court found the dying declaration credible, noted the appellant’s positive act of pouring kerosene and urging death, and held that these constituted clear instigation and mens rea under Section 306 IPC, citing relevant Supreme Court precedents. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed.
Issues considered
- The admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate.
- Whether the appellant possessed the requisite mens rea and performed an act of instigation sufficient for conviction under Section 306 IPC.
- Whether the evidence supports sustaining the conviction for abetment of suicide.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 107, 306, 323, 498-A, 504, 506
Subjects
- abetment of suicide
- dying declaration
- mens rea
- Section 306 IPC
- instigation
- evidence reliability
- criminal law
Judgment
2026:BHC-AUG:46579
CriAppeal-163-2016
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 163 OF 2016
Shri Vijay s/o Amrit Patil
Age : 35 years, Occupation : Nil,
R/o : Eklahare, Taluka Amalner,
District Jalgaon. … Appellant.
Versus
The State of Maharashtra
Through the PSO, Marwad Police Station,
Marwad, Taluka Amalner, District Jalgaon. … Respondent
…..
Mr. Paresh B. Patil, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr. V. V. Jahagirdar, APP for the Respondent/State.
.....
CORAM : ABHAY S. WAGHWASE, J.
Reserved on : 05.10.2026
Pronounced on : 06.10.2026
JUDGMENT :
1. Appellant, a convict, hereby challenges the judgment and order
of conviction dated 28.01.2016 passed by learned Ad-hoc Additional
Sessions Judge, Amalner in Sessions Case No. 44 of 2013 convicting
appellant for charge under Section 306 of IPC.
2. Informant PW2 Prakash, father of deceased Surekha, set law
into motion alleging that his daughter was married to accused 15
years prior to the incident and out of said wedlock, she had a son as
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well as a daughter. Accused husband was addicted to liquor and he,
under its influence, used to beat Surekha and forcibly take away her
earnings from labour work. That, on 25.07.2013, husband came home
drunk, picked up quarrel with her and then poured kerosene over her
and suggested her to die. Surekha, in the rage of anger, incinerated
herself and suffered 98% burns and her dying declaration was
recorded both, by Police Head Constable as well as by Magistrate.
While undergoing treatment, she succumbed to the burns. On report
of father, crime was registered bearing No. 25 of 2013 for offence
under Section 498-A, 306, 323, 504 and 506 of IPC. Investigation was
carried out by PW7 and he duly chargesheeted accused, who was
tried by above referred court and the trial ended up in conviction but
only for offence under Section 306 of IPC. Accused has been acquitted
from charge under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of IPC. Hence,
instant appeal by convict.
BRIEF ACCOUNT OF EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
3. PW1 mother, in her evidence at Exhibit 32, deposed about
marriage of her daughter with accused. That, accused used to
consume liquor, beat Surekha and demand amount earned by her
from labour work. That, for some period, they both shifted to Surat
but there also he used to quarrel with her. He also beat her in the
CriAppeal-163-2016
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marriage of a relative. After they had returned at Eklahare, accused
had beaten her daughter, poured kerosene on her and set her on fire.
While under cross, she admitted that her daughter used to
come for festivals. She denied that when she and her husband went to
meet her in Civil Hospital, she was unconscious and was unable to
speak. Omission is brought only to the extent that after birth of
children, accused and Surekha had been to Surat for job. Rest is all
denial.
4. PW2 informant father also deposed as like his wife about
accused husband consuming liquor, quarreling with deceased, in a
marriage he beating Surekha on the head and demanding cash from
her and on such count, beating her. He deposed about message being
received regarding her burns on 25.07.2013. He claims that in the
hospital, there was dying declaration by Surekha. That, accused
poured kerosene on her. However, he deposed that he does not
remember what she stated thereafter and that he passed information
to police and lodged report.
While under cross, he admitted that her daughter and accused
stayed at Surat for five to seven years and that, he and his wife used
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to visit her on festivals and she also came for festivals to their place.
He denied that, he falsely stated that accused demanded money
earned by Surekha and that he beat her under influence of liquor.
Rest is all denial. He identified khabar Exhibit 34 and report Exhibit
35.
5. PW3 and PW4 have acted as pancha to spot and seizure
respectively, but they did not support prosecution.
6. PW5 is the autopsy surgeon who conducted postmortem and
issued cause of death as “shock due to burns”.
7. PW6 is the Executive Magistrate, who on receipt of
communication from police, claims to have visited Civil Hospital,
approached Medical Officer and requested him to examine fitness to
give dying declaration and obtained necessary endorsement. He
identified dying declaration noted by him at Exhibits 53 and 54.
While under cross, he admitted not mentioning timing of
receipt of Exhibit 51 i.e. requisition. He answered that burns ward
and office of Civil Surgeon are at distinct places. He admitted noting
dying declaration on a printed form. He admitted that when he
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inquired with the patient as to who was present at the time of
incident, she did not reply said question. He admitted there to be no
noting on the dying declaration about statement being read over and
he admitted not obtaining signature of a person for attestation over
toe impression.
8. PW7 is the Investigating Officer who carried out investigation
and chargesheeted accused.
9. PW8 is the Medical Officer who, on request of Special Executive
Magistrate, examined patient and finding her conscious and oriented,
gave certification of her fitness over Exhibit 54 after which, she claims
that, in her presence dying declaration was recorded and she was
present there till its end. She deposed that after some time, Police
Constable Khairnar also came there for recording dying declaration
and he also gave remark of fitness.
While under cross, she answered that patient suffered deep
burns. She denied that, pulse rate of the patient was feeble. She
admitted that, in cases of burns blood pressure reduces and patient
may go in coma, but she denied that in such case, patient is not in
position to make statement. She volunteered that in this case, the
patient was conscious and oriented.
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SUBMISSIONS
On behalf of the Appellant-Accused :
10. Pointing to the above evidence, learned counsel for appellant,
at the outset, would submit that learned trial court has acquitted
accused husband from charges under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and
506 of IPC. According to him, evidence before learned trial court on
behalf of prosecution was, statements of parents and dying
declaration. According to him, parents have hearsay information and
dying declaration is not free from doubt as there was no attestation to
the toe impression and he doubts capacity of deceased to give dying
declaration.
11. Learned counsel pointed out that, oral dying declaration is
rightly discarded by learned trial court and according to him, dying
declaration by Police Constable cannot be gone into because the
author Constable is not examined before learned trial court. He would
point out that here, the incident apparently seems to have happened
in a rage of anger resulting from quarrel. He further pointed out that,
there are mere allegations that husband poured kerosene, but ignition
is by deceased herself and that too in annoyance. According to him,
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accused was not responsible for burning as he had no intention or
mens rea that deceased should ignite herself. That, it was act
attributable to deceased herself and accused cannot be held
responsible by imputing instigation or abetment. According to him,
husband did not abet, induce or instigate so as to attract offence of
Section 306 IPC. According to him, learned trial court has failed to
consider and appreciate the settled law, and he seeks reliance on the
judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of
Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618; Prakash and others v. State of
Maharashtra and another (2026) 6 SCC 251 and the judgment of
Telangana High Court in Cherukupally v. The State of Andhra
Pradesh MANU/TL/2651/2022 [Criminal Appeal No. 447 of 2009
decided on 02.08.2022], and ultimately prays to apply the same and
set aside the impugned judgment by allowing the appeal.
On behalf of the Respondent-State :
12. Per contra, learned APP would support the judgment and order
of conviction by pointing out that, accused allegedly beat deceased on
the relevant day and thereafter he poured kerosene on her after
which, he also suggested her to die and consequent to such
instigation only, deceased ignited herself. According to him, there is
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voluntary and trustworthy dying declaration and the same has rightly
been considered and appreciated by learned trial court. For above
reasons, he prays to dismiss the appeal by maintaining the judgment
of conviction.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
13. On re-appreciating the entire evidence, it is emerging that,
here, though prosecution has adduced evidence of 8 witnesses, crucial
evidence is of parents and the dying declaration recorded by the
Special Executive Magistrate.
14. Admittedly, there is no dispute that accused and deceased are
husband and wife. There is also no dispute that deceased suffered
98% burns and succumbed to the same. Charge of prosecution is that,
accused abetted the suicide.
15. Here, both parents PW1 and PW2, who are examined at
Exhibits 32 and 33 respectively, are consistent about accused husband
addicted to liquor, he picking up quarrel and beating Surekha. They
are also found to be consistent about he forcibly taking away her
earnings. To this extent, both witnesses are lending support to each
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other. Both of them have indeed received message about their
daughter suffering burns and they visited her at Civil Hospital.
However, PW1 mother has not stated about any oral dying
declaration given by their daughter which PW2 has deposed.
However, his testimony is ambiguous as he merely stated that his
daughter informed him that there was quarrel between his daughter
and accused and that accused poured kerosene on her daughter.
Stating so much, he deposed that he does not remember what else she
disclosed. He is silent about the part of his daughter igniting herself.
16. Another piece of evidence here is the dying declaration Exhibit
54 recorded by PW6 Special Executive Magistrate. This witness at
Exhibit 51 deposed about receiving requisition from police Exhibit 52,
carrying the same to Dhule Civil Hospital, approaching Medical
Officer on duty, requesting him to examine the patient and to
ascertain whether she was in a position to give statement, and after
examination and endorsement, he recording dying declaration Exhibit
54. Though cross examined and though this witness has admitted that
he did not mention the timing of receiving Exhibit 51, the patient to
be wrapped in bandage and undergoing treatment, and though he
admitted that dying declaration was recorded on a printed form,
except stating that patient did not reply to his question as to who was
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present at the time of incident, there is nothing to doubt the exercise
taken by him i.e. visiting Civil Hospital for recording dying
declaration and after meeting doctor, on his examination, receiving
certification of fitness, he recorded dying declaration.
17. In the dying declaration at Exhibit 54 deceased reported that on
25.07.2013 at around 11.30 a.m., her husband came home under
influence of liquor and without reason, abused her and on being
questioned to that extent, he allegedly poured kerosene from the
drum available in the house and suggested her to die. She deposed
that, out of annoyance and anger, she ignited herself.
18. In the above dying declaration, there is certification of doctor at
the beginning as well as at the end, and the same has been identified
by Medical Officer PW8. Therefore, mere failure to take attestation
over the toe impression will not render the entire dying declaration,
which is otherwise convincing and voluntary, doubtful or unworthy of
credence. The same is recorded on the same day and is thus a prompt
dying declaration.
19. Learned counsel for the appellant would strenuously submit
that accused husband did not ignite her, but deceased ignited herself.
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Therefore, according to him, appellant cannot be said to be having
mens rea or that he abetted or instigated the suicide and thereby
learned counsel finds fault in the conclusion drawn by learned trial
court and guilt recorded for offence under Section 306 of IPC. He
would add that, deceased had incinerated herself in the rage of anger
and accused never desired the suicide by burning.
20. However, here, it is to be noted that on the relevant day, after
coming home in aberrated condition, he allegedly abused her and on
being questioned, he allegedly beat her and thereafter he went to the
extent of pouring kerosene on her and he did not stop there, but also
suggested her to die, and it is thereafter that deceased ignited herself,
though in anger. Here, there is active participation by accused in
pouring kerosene.
21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra
v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605, dealt
with the aspect of abetment, the meaning of words ‘instigation’ and
‘goading’ and opined that, “there should be an intention to provoke,
incite or encourage the doing of an act by the later. Each person’s
suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his
own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to
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lay down any straitjacket forumla in dealing with such cases. Each
case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and
circumstances”.
22. Similarly in the case of S. S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan
and another (2010) 12 SCC 190, in para 25, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has observed as under :
“25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding (emphasis laid) a person in
doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the
accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction
cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and
the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in
order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has
to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also
requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased
to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have
been intended to push the deceased into such a position
that he committed suicide.”
23. Applying the above settled legal position and reverting to the
facts of the case in hand, here, as stated above, after beating
deceased, appellant had done a positive act first by pouring kerosene
on his wife, and he further went to the extent of suggesting her to die.
This, in the considered opinion of this Court, is clear instigation and
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provocation. Even his mens rea is explicit as his intentions are clear,
for he himself had poured kerosene on her and suggested her to die.
Therefore, even though deceased completed the rest of the part in
anger, accused had landed deceased in such situation wherein she
had taken the extreme step of igniting herself. Applying the
Explanation 2 of Section 107, responsibility can be fixed on accused
husband. Hence, in the considered opinion of this Court, in the light
of peculiar facts of this case, the same is a fit case for attracting
charge of abetment to commit suicide. Facts in the case in hand and
the cases relied by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinct
and the same does not come to the rescue of the appellant.
24. Perused the judgment impugned herein. Learned trial court has
thereby committed no error in returning guilt of the appellant for
offence under Section 306 of IPC. There being no perversity or
illegality in the impugned judgment and order of conviction, the
following order is passed :
ORDER
The Criminal Appeal is dismissed.
[ABHAY S. WAGHWASE, J.]
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