Bombay High Court

NILESH VITHOBA GADADEversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Disposal: Disposed Off

Holding

The extension of investigation was invalid because the report did not constitute an independent report of the Special Public Prosecutor as mandated by Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA, and the appeal is allowed.

Summary

The appellant, Nilesh Vithoba Gadade, was charged under MCOCA and several other statutes for a violent incident that resulted in the death of a minor. The Special Judge, Sangli, extended the investigation period by 90 days based on a report filed by the investigating officer, which was merely signed by the Special Public Prosecutor. The appellant challenged the extension, arguing that the report did not satisfy the statutory requirement of an independent report by the Special Public Prosecutor under Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA. The Court examined precedents establishing that the prosecutor must apply his mind and expressly endorse the request for extension, which was absent here. Consequently, the Court held that the extension order was legally untenable, quashed it, and allowed the appeal, thereby restoring the appellant's right to seek default bail.

Issues considered

The report/application for extension of investigation complied with the requirements of Section 21(2)(b) of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999?
Whether the Special Judge was justified in granting a 90‑day extension on the basis of a report prepared by the investigating officer?
Does the failure to obtain an independent prosecutor's report entitle the accused to default bail?
Whether the appeal under Section 12 of MCOCA is maintainable and should be allowed?

Legislation cited

Arms Act — s. 25, 27, 3, 5
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — s. 103(1), 13, 189(4), 332(a)(c), 49
Code of Criminal Procedure — s. 167
Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) — s. 21(2)(b), 25, 27, 3, 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4), 4, 5
Maharashtra Police Act — s. 142, 37(1)(3)/135
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 — s. 49(2)(b)
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — s. 43D

Subjects

MCOCA
extension of investigation time
public prosecutor report
procedural compliance
default bail
criminal procedure
investigation detention

Judgment

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Digitally signed
by HARISH
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
HARISH VITHAL
VITHAL CHAUDHARI CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CHAUDHARI Date:
2026.10.08
19:26:53 +0530 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CR. APPEAL NO. 218 OF 2026

Nilesh Vithoba Gadade ...Appellant
Versus
The State Of Maharashtra ...Respondent

——————
Mr. Abad Ponda, Senior Counsel i/b Mr. Pritesh A. Kharade, Mr. Sajid A. Bagwan,
Sumit Tiwari , Samyak Bhatkar for the Appellant.
Mr. Shishir. S. Hiray, Chief PP a/w Mahalaxmi Ganpathy Addl. PP & Smt. S. N.
Deshmukh, APP for the Respondent-State.
——————
Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh &
Neeraj P. Dhote, JJ.
Date : October 08, 2026.

FINAL ORDER : (Per Neeraj P. Dhote J.)

1. Considering the issue involved and by consent of both sides, the

appeal is heard inally at the admission stage.

2. This is an Appeal under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Control of

Organized Crime Act, 1999 ( for short “MCOCA”) against the order dated

8th September, 2026 granting 90 days extension to complete the

investigation, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and

Special Judge, (MCOCA Court), Sangli below Remand Application dated

07th September, 2026 in respect of accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 in

C.R. No. 235 of 2026 registered with Sanjaynagar Police Station, District

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Sangli for the ofences punishable under Sections 103(1), 189(4), 332(a)

(c), 49 and 13 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Sections 3, 5, 25,

and 27 of the Arms Act; Sections 37(1)(3)/135 and 142 of the

Maharashtra Police Act; and Sections 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4), and 4 of

the MCOCA.

3. The prosecution's case, as stated in paragraph No. 4 of the appeal

memo, is reproduced below:

“(a) It is the prosecution case that the First Informant, Sandeep
Balu Bandgar, is the son of Vithal @ Balu Bandgar, a former
labour (hamali) union representative at the Sangli Market
Yard, and the nephew of Maruti Bandgar, a Director of the
Sangli Krishi Utpanna Bazar Samiti. The prosecution alleges
that the First Informant has known the Appellant for about
10-12 years, from the period when the Appellant was
working at the said Market Yard, and was acquainted with
Accused Nos. 02 to 05.

(b) It is further the prosecution's case that on 10/06/2026, in
the evening, the Appellant went to the residence of one
Laxman Kharat, a labour mukadam at Aurangabad Railway
Station, Taluka Jat, and allegedly ired gunshots near his
residence and demanded that Kharat either vacate the
railway-station labour contract or pay an amount of
Rs.10,00,000/-, failing which he would be killed. It is alleged
that on 11/06/2026 at about 08.00 hours, Balu Bandgar
and Maruti Bandgar accompanied Kharat to Jat Police
Station to lodge a complaint in that regard and that, at
about 16.30 hours on the same day, the Appellant came to
the police station and allegedly confronted them and
warned them to stay out of the matter.

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2 to 5, allegedly went to the residence of the complainant
in a black Thar-type SUV. It is alleged that the Appellant
entered the compound, inquired about Balu Bandgar,
caught hold of his minor son, Vedant Maruti Bandgar, aged
about 14 years, and allegedly ired a pistol shot at his head
from close range, resulting in his death. Accused Nos. 02
and 03 are alleged to have provided cover with weapons,
while Accused Nos. 04 and 05 are alleged to have
threatened the persons present at the spot. Thereafter, all
the accused are alleged to have led from the spot in the
said vehicle.”

4. The Appellant is arraigned as accused No. 1 in the aforesaid crime.

He was arrested on 14th June 2026 and produced before the learned

Judicial Magistrate, Sangli on 15th June, 2026 and remanded to police

custody till 18th June, 2026. Thereafter, by an order dated 18th June,

2026, the Appellant's police custody was further extended till 20th June,

2026. Thereafter, by an order dated 20th June, 2026, the Appellant came

to be remanded to judicial custody.

5. On 08th July, 2026, pursuant to the approval accorded by the

Special Inspector General of Police, Kolhapur Range, the aforesaid

sections under MCOCA came to be added in the aforesaid C.R. and the

matter came to be transferred to the ile of the Special Judge, MCOCA,

Sangli. On 18th August, 2026, the Appellant was produced before the

Special Judge, MCOCA, and was remanded to police custody till 24 th

August, 2026. Thereafter, by an order dated 24th August, 2024, the

Appellant was remanded to judicial custody till 07 th September, 2026.

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On 07th September, 2026, the Investigating Oicer submitted a report

before the learned Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli seeking extension of

the period for completion of investigation and iling of the charge-sheet

by a further period of 90 days from 10 th September, 2026 under Section

21(2)(b) of the MCOCA. The Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli issued notice

to the accused persons, which came to be served on 08 th September,

2026. The Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli passed the impugned order

allowing the report submitted by the prosecution and extended the

period for completion of investigation and iling of the charge-sheet for

a further period of 90 days from 10th September, 2026

6. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant

that, the application submitted for extension of time was prepared and

presented by the Investigating Oicer, which merely records that it was

presented through the Special Public Prosecutor (SPP), who signed the

same and stated that he has iled the same. There was no endorsement

of whatsoever nature on the application or on any other

contemporaneous document demonstrating that the Special Public

Prosecutor had perused the application, examined the papers and

material collected during the investigation, had independently applied

his mind to the question whether further detention of the accused was

necessary for completion of investigation, had himself arrived at the

satisfaction contemplated by Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA, had

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instructed the Investigating Oicer to ile the application, had settled,

vetted, or approved the contents of the application, or had otherwise

independently considered and endorsed the request for extension. The

said omission assumes considerable signiicance, as the application

under Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA requires the Public Prosecutor to

apply his mind independently to the material and to the necessity for

further detention and continuation of investigation. The said

requirement was not satisied in the case at hand. The satisfaction and

the application of mind by the Public Prosecutor must be relected from

the record and cannot be supplied subsequently by oral assertions. The

defect cannot be cured by a subsequent oral assertions that the Special

Public Prosecutor had perused the papers, discussed with the

Investigating Oicer, suggested alterations or modiications, and

thereafter directed the Investigating Oicer to ile the application. The

learned Special Court ought to have examined the application as it

stood when it was presented, and not by reference to subsequent

explanations or oral submissions seeking to establish that, certain steps

were taken by the learned Special Public Prosecutor but were not

recorded anywhere on the contemporaneous record. The omission was

signiicant. Mere presence of the Special Public Prosecutor in the court

was not suicient. The extension granted by the learned Special Court

was mechanical and against the settled position under the law. In

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support of his submissions, he relied on the decisions in:

i. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur And Another v. State of Maharashtra
And Others, [(1994) 4 SCC 602];

ii. Darshan Subhash Nandagawali v. State of Maharashtra,
Through Police Station Oicer, [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1162];

iii. Shaikh Moin Shaikh Mehmood v. State of Maharashtra,
Through Ramtirth Police Station, [2020 SCC OnLine Bom 968];

iv. Akshay Mahadeo Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, Through
Secretary and Others, [2026 SCC OnLine Bom 158];

v. State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundalik Gadling and Others,
[(2019) 5 SCC 178].

7. It is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that, the aidavit

of the Sub-Divisional Police Oicer, Miraj Division, District Sangli, was

submitted in the Appeal. He submitted that there is no speciic format

under the law for an application seeking extension of time to complete

the investigation and ile the charge-sheet. The report submitted by the

Investigating Oicer was scrutinized by the Special Public Prosecutor

before submitting to the learned Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli. During

submissions, the learned Public Prosecutor though tendered across the

Bar a copy of the same aidavit along with a copy of the report dated

05th September, 2026 under the signature of the Sub-Divisional Police

Oicer, Miraj Division, addressed to the Special Public Prosecutor

before the learned Special Court, he fairly admitted that the said report

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was not placed before the learned Special Judge. He submitted that in

the judgment of Surendra Gadling (supra), the Apex Court carved out an

exception and the ratio will not apply to the case at hand as there are

two reports in this case. He further fairly admitted that the impugned

order was passed on the report dated 07 th September, 2026, which was

at page Nos. 125 to 142.

8. The only aspect to be considered and decided in the present

appeal is whether the report submitted before the learned Special

Judge, Sangli for extension of time to complete the investigation was as

per the requirement of Section 21 of the MCOCA. The said provision is

quoted below:

“21. Modiied application of certain provisions of the Code
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any
other law, every ofence punishable under this Act, shall be deemed to
be a cognizable ofence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2
of the Code and "cognizable case" as deined in that clause shall be
construed accordingly.
(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case
involving an ofence punishable under this Act subject to the
modiications that, in sub-section (2),-
(a) the references to "ifteen days," and "sixty days,"
wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "thirty
days" and "ninety days", respectively;
(b) after the proviso, the following proviso shall be
inserted, namely:-
Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Special
Court shall extend the said period upto one hundred and eighty
days, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the
progress of the investigation and the speciic reasons for the
detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days.

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(3) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to
any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having
committed an ofence punishable under this Act.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an ofence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody, be
released on bail or on his own bond, unless-
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to
oppose the application of such release; and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,
the Court is satisied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that he is not guilty of such ofence and that he is not
likely to commit any ofence while on bail.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the accused
shall not be granted bail if it is noticed by the Court that he was on
bail in an ofence under this Act, or under any other Act, on the date
of the ofence in question.
(6) The limitations on granting of bail speciied in sub-section (4)
are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for
the time being in force on the granting of bail.
(7) The police oicer seeking the custody of any person for pre-
indictment or pre-trial interrogation from the judicial custody shall ile
a written statement explaining the reason for seeking such custody
and also for the delay, if any, in seeking the police custody.”

9. Perusal of the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned Senior

Counsel for the Appellant shows that, the position under the law in

respect of the issue involved in this Appeal is well settled.

10. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra), the case was under the Terrorist

and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA). One of the

question for consideration was about the true ambit and scope of

Section 20(4) and Section 20(8) of the TADA in the matter of grant of

bail to an accused brought before the Designated Court and the factors

which the Designated Court has to keep in view while dealing with an

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application for grant of bail under Section 20(4) and for grant of

extension of time to the prosecution for further investigation under

clause (bb) of Section 20(4) and incidentally whether the conditions

contained in Section 20(8) of the TADA control the grant of bail under

Section 20(4) of the Act. The observation in para 19 of the said

judgment shows that, Section 20(4) of the TADA made Section 167 of

Cr.P.C. applicable in relation to case involving an ofence punishable

under TADA, subject to the modiications speciied therein. After clause

(b) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA, another clause (bb) was

inserted, which reads as under :

“(bb) in sub-section (2), after the proviso, the following proviso shall
be inserted, namely:-
‘Provided further that, if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty
days, the Designated Court shall extend the said period up to
one year, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the
progress of the investigation and the speciic reasons for the
detention of the accused beyond the said period of one
hundred and eighty days; and' ".

Considering the said clause (bb), following observations were

made:

“23. We may at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb) of
sub-section (4) of Section 20, point out that the Legislature has
provided for seeking extension of time for completion of investigation
on a report of the public prosecutor. The Legislature did not purposely
leave it to an investigating oicer to make an application for seeking
extension of time from the court. This provision is in tune with the
legislative intent to have the investigations completed expeditiously
and not to allow an accused to be kept in continued detention during
unnecessary prolonged investigation at the whims of the police. The
Legislature expects that the investigation must be completed with

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utmost promptitude but where it becomes necessary to seek some
more time for completion of the investigation, the investigating
agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the public prosecutor in
the irst instance and satisfy him about the progress of the
investigation and furnish reasons for seeking further custody of an
accused. A public prosecutor is an important oicer of the State
Government and is appointed by the State under the Code of Criminal
Procedure. He is not a part of the investigating agency. He is an
independent statutory authority. The public prosecutor is expected to
independently apply his mind to the request of the investigating
agency before submitting a report to the court for extension of time
with a view to enable the investigating agency to complete the
investigation. He is not merely a post oice or a forwarding agency. A
public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given by the
investigating oicer for seeking extension of time and may ind that
the investigation had not progressed in the proper manner or that
there has been unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in
completing the investigation. In that event, he may not submit any
report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus,
for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor
after an independent application of his mind to the request of the
investigating agency is required to make a report to the Designated
Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and
disclosing justiication for keeping the accused in further custody to
enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The
public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating oicer
along with his request or application and report, but his report, as
envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has
applied his mind and was satisied with the progress of the
investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the
investigation necessary. The use of the expression "on the report of
the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and
the speciic reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said
period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Section 167 as
amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the
legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and
to grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The
report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality
but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance
afects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply
with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an
investigating oicer for extension of time is no substitute for the
report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged
by clause (bb) is iled or the report iled by the public prosecutor is not
accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension of time
under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary
corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to seek bail and

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the court 'shall' release him on bail if he furnishes bail as required by
the Designated Court. It is not merely the question of form in which
the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of
substance. The contents of the report to be submitted by the public
prosecutor, after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist
the Designated Court to independently decide whether or not
extension should be granted in a given case. Keeping in view the
consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in
further custody, the Designated Court must be satisied for the
justiication, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant
extension of time to complete the investigation. Where the
Designated Court declines to grant such an extension, the right to be
released on bail on account of the 'default' of the prosecution
becomes indefeasible and cannot be defeated by reasons other than
those contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 as discussed in
the earlier part of this judgment. We are unable to agree with Mr
Madhava Reddy or the Additional Solicitor General Mr Tulsi that even
if the public prosecutor 'presents' the request of the investigating
oicer to the court or 'forwards' the request of the investigating
oicer to the court, it should be construed to be the report of the
public prosecutor. There is no scope for such a construction when we
are dealing with the liberty of a citizen. The courts are expected to
zealously safeguard his liberty. Clause (bb) has to be read and
interpreted on its plain language without addition or substitution of
any expression in it. We have already dealt with the importance of the
report of the public prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a
'post oice' of the investigating agency nor its 'forwarding agency'
but is charged with a statutory duty. He must apply his mind to the
facts and circumstances of the case and his report must disclose on
the face of it that he had applied his mind to the twin conditions
contained in clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20. Since the law
requires him to submit the report as envisaged by the section, he must
act in the manner as provided by the section and in no other manner.
A Designated Court which overlooks and ignores the requirements of
a valid report fails in the performance of one of its essential duties
and renders its order under clause (bb) vulnerable. Whether the public
prosecutor labels his report as a report or as an application for
extension, would not be of much consequence so long as it
demonstrates on the face of it that he has applied his mind and is
satisied with the progress of the investigation and the genuineness of
the reasons for grant of extension to keep an accused in further
custody as envisaged by clause (bb) (supra). Even the mere
reproduction of the application or request of the investigating oicer
by the public prosecutor in his report, without demonstration of the
application of his mind and recording his own satisfaction, would not
render his report as the one envisaged by clause (bb) and it would not
be a proper report to seek extension of time. In the absence of an

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appropriate report the Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to
deny to an accused his indefeasible right to be released on bail on
account of the default of the prosecution to ile the challan within the
prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail
bonds as directed by the court. Moreover, no extension can be granted
to keep an accused in custody beyond the prescribed period except to
enable the investigation to be completed and as already stated before
any extension is granted under clause (bb), the accused must be put on
notice and permitted to have his say so as to be able to object to the
grant of extension.”

11. In Shaikh Moin Shaikh Mehmood (supra), the order impugned was

by the Trial Court allowing the application for extension of time to ile

the charge-sheet in the crime registered under the provisions of Indian

Penal Code, Arms Act and MCOCA. It was the case of the Appellant

therein that, the report for extension of time to ile the charge-sheet

did not satisfy the requirement of Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA. This

Court, considering the earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court,

observed that Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA and Section 20(4)(bb) of

the TADA were practically identical and Section 49(2)(b) of the

Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, which replaced the TADA Act, also

carried the identical provision. Considering the issue involved therein, it

was observed as under :

“21. Notwithstanding the strenuous submissions of the learned APP-
Shri San Shri Sangle, we ind in the case in hand, the application
tendered "through the APP" can be hardly said to be a report of the
prosecutor. A representative of the Police Station, Ramtirth is shown
to have signed below the said application. In fact, the certiied copy of
the application placed before us indicates that no authority has signed
below the said application and the prosecutor has signed the said
application which hardly could be said to be his report.
22. In the light of the above, we deem it advantageous, for the beneit
of the litigants and the lawyers, to observe that a report as

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understood under the above reproduced provisions of the various
enactments, has to be an independent report comprising of (a)
reasons evidencing the personal satisfaction of the public prosecutor
as regards the progress in investigation made, (b) the reasons for
which the investigation could not be completed and (c) the object to
be achieved through investigation for which an extended period of
time is necessary. These ingredients have to form a part of the report
of the prosecutor and he has to tender the said report to the Special
Court under his signature. It cannot be in the form of a miscellaneous
application to be iled for seeking extension of time. In addition to his
report, he should append the report of the Investigation Agency so as
to convince the Special Court that extension needs to be granted.”

12. In Darshan Subhash Nandagawali (supra), the Appellant was one of

the accused in the crime registered for the ofences punishable under

the Indian Penal Code, Arms Act and MCOCA. The challenge in the said

Appeal was to the orders passed by the Trial Court extending the time

for investigation. This Court considering the decision in Hitendra Vishnu

Thakur (supra), made the following observation:

“8. We had an opportunity to peruse the applications iled by the
learned Public Prosecutor before the Special Court on 07.11.2022 and
second application dated 07.01.2023, with the copies of applications
produced along with the Pursis dated 19.04.2023, which were
addressed by the Investigating Oicer to the Public Prosecutor
attached to the Special Court, dated 05.11.2022 and 06.01.2023. On
minute observations, we are surprised to know that all the contents
word by word, paragraph by paragraph, including full stops and
commas, in these applications are identically the same. Thus, the only
conclusion which could be drawn is that application which was
forwarded by the Investigating Oicer on 05.11.2022 addressed to
the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, is copied word by
word and paragraph by paragraph in the application addressed to the
Special Court dated 07.11.2022 by the Public Prosecutor. This
application presented before the Special Court is jointly signed by the
Investigating Oicer and Public Prosecutor attached to the Special
Court.
11. The above dictum as laid down by the Apex Court clearly goes to
show that the duty of the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special

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Court is something special in which he has to apply his mind
independently and satisfy himself as to whether there is actually need
for extension of time to ile charge-sheet. Only then the Public
Prosecutor, after verifying the case papers and reasons given by the
Investigating Oicer, may apply by submitting his report to the Special
Court for such extension. The Public Prosecutor along with his report
may attach the request of the Investigating Oicer made to him, but
he has to apply his mind and demonstrate by giving his reasons as to
why he is supporting the contentions raised by the Investigating
Oicer for extension of time.
12. The Apex Court very clearly observed in the above quoted
paragraph 23 that the Public Prosecutor may label his report as a
report or as an application for extension and it would not be of much
consequence, so long as it demonstrates on the face of it, that the
Public Prosecutor has applied his mind and he is satisied with the
progress of the investigation, the genuineness of the reasons for grant
of extension thereby keeping accused in further custody. However,
mere reproduction of the application or request of the Investigating
Oicer by the Public Prosecutor in his report, without demonstration
of the application of his mind and recording his own satisfaction,
would not render his report as the one envisaged in clause (b) proviso
of Section 21(b) and it would not be a proper report to seek extension
of time. Likewise, in absence of an appropriate report, the Designated
Court would have no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his
indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of default of the
prosecution to ile challan within the prescribed time, if the accused is
ready and willing to furnish bail bonds. The Court is duty bound to
protect the rights of accused and also to follow the law laid down and
no extension can be granted beyond the prescribed period without
following such law laid down under Section 21 and by the Apex Court
in various decisions.”

13. In Akshay Mahadeo Kamble (supra), the order impugned was

passed by the Trial Court granting extension of 90 days sought by the

Investigating Oicer for completing the investigation and iling the

charge-sheet. One of the ground raised in the Appeal was that, the

application for extension of time was not iled by the Public Prosecutor

but was iled by the Investigating Oicer through the APP without his

signature. This Court considering the provisions of Section 21 of the

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MCOCA, made the following observations :

11. In support of the aforesaid grounds the learned counsel for
the appellant heavily relied on the judgments of this Court as well as
Hon'ble Apex Court. In Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 2018 (supra),
following observation is made by this Court.
"Both the applications iled under Section 21 of the MCOC
Act, were addressed to the learned Special Judge, but the
applications were prepared and signed by the investigating
oicer, Sub-Divisional Police Oicer, Sub Division Osmanabad.
On the application dated 18th September, 2018, there is
signature of Motichand Rathod, SDPO and on the left side of this
signature, there is signature of Special Prosecutor appointed by
the State showing that through Special Prosecutor application
was presented before the learned Special Judge by SDPO. The
contents of the application also show that the application was
drafted, prepared by the investigating oicer. Except the
signature of the learned Special Prosecutor on both the
applications, there is nothing to show that the learned Special
Prosecutor has considered the contentions of the investigating
oicer made for getting extension of time and he was satisied
that there were reasons for extension of time. Thus, the
applications as they are, do not show that the Special Prosecutor
had applied his mind, he was satisied about the grounds
mentioned for getting extension of time. On the application
dated 19th September, 2018, in addition to the signature of the
learned Special Prosecutor, two more words are written like
"submitted by".
With this observation this Court had allowed the appeal setting
aside the order of extension of time for investigation passed by the
learned Special Judge in the said matter.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the
judgment in of this court at Nagpur Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 43
of 2023 (supra), wherein following observation is made.
"We had an opportunity to peruse the applications iled by
the learned Public Prosecutor before the Special Court on
07.11.2022 and second application dated 07.01.2023, with the
copies of applications produced along with the Pursis dated
19.04.2023, which were addressed by the Investigating Oicer
to the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, dated
05.11.2022 and 06.01.2023. On minute observations, we are
surprised to know that all the contents word by word, paragraph
by paragraph, including full stops and commas, in these
applications are identically the same. Thus, the only conclusion

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which could be drawn is that application which was forwarded
by the Investigating Oicer on 05.11.2022 addressed to the
Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, is copied word
by word and paragraph by paragraph in the application
addressed to the Special Court dated 07.11.2022 by the Public
Prosecutor. This application presented before the Special Court
is jointly signed by the Investigating Oicer and Public
Prosecutor attached to the Special Court".
In the same judgment this Court has made reference to the
observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087
as follows:
"The above dictum as laid down by the Apex Court clearly
goes to show that the duty of the Public Prosecutor attached to
the Special Court is something special in which he has to apply
his mind independently and satisfy himself as to whether there is
actually need for extension of time to ile charge-sheet. Only
then the Public Prosecutor, after verifying the case papers and
reasons given by the Investigating Oicer, may apply by
submitting his report to the Special Court for such extension. The
Public Prosecutor along with his report may attach the request
of the Investigating Oicer made to him, but he has to apply his
mind and demonstrate by giving his reasons as to why he is
supporting the contentions raised by the Investigating Oicer
for extension of time".
On going the above observations, it is clearly evident that the
application/report for extension is supposed to be iled independently
by the Special Public Prosecutor and it cannot be merely submitted by
the Investigating Oicer through learned Special Prosecutor. It has
been speciically observed that the request of Investigating Oicer for
extension of time is no substitute for the report of Public Prosecutor
as per the proviso to Section 21 of MCOC Act. Moreover, in the light of
observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Thakur
(supra), it has been laid down that the Public Prosecutor attached to
the Special Court is having some special duty in which he has to apply
his mind independently and satisfy himself whether there is actual
need for extension of time to ile charge-sheet. Only on such
satisfaction of Public Prosecutor after verifying the material on
record, he shall submit report to the Special Court for such extension.
A duty is therefore cast upon the learned Prosecutor so attached, to
apply his mind for seeking extension and that too after going through
material on record. He cannot merely act as a post oice. By
observing this, the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in the
aforesaid judgments, have rejected the extension of time to ile
charge-sheet, as prayed. The same view is reiterated by this Court in

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the case of Shaikh Moin v. State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal
No. 502 of 2020 that how should be the approach of Public
Prosecutor by making the following observation.
"In Asiam Babalal Desai (supra), Hon'ble Justice Ahmedi,
speaking for the majority, referred with approval to the law laid
down in Rajnikant Jivanlal (supra) wherein it was observed as
under:
The public prosecutor is expected to independently apply
his mind to the request of the investigating agency before
submitting a report to the court for extension of time with a
view to enable the investigating agency to complete the
investigation. He is not merely a post oice or a forwarding
agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the
reasons given by the investigating oicer for seeking extension
of time and may ind that the investigation had not progressed
in the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary,
deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the investigation. In
that event, he may not submit any report to the court under
clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension
of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an
independent application of his mind to the request of the
investigating agency is required to make a report to the
Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the
investigation and disclosing justiication for keeping the accused
in further custody to enable the investigating agency to
complete the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach
the request of the investigating oicer along with his request or
application and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause
(bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind
and was satisied with the progress of the investigation and
considered grant of further time to complete the investigation
necessary. The use of the expression "on the report of the public
prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the
speciic reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said
period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Section
167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of
the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody
unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of the
public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore,
is not merely a formality but a very vital report, because the
consequence of its acceptance afects the liberty of an accused
and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as
contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating oicer
for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public
prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb)
is iled or the report iled by the public prosecutor is not

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accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension
of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic,
the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be
entitled to seek bail and the court 'shall' release him on bail if he
furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court.”

14. In State of Maharashtra (supra), the Appeal was by the State

against the order passed by the High Court setting aside the order

passed by the Trial Court granting extension of time for investigation,

on the ground that the mandatory requirement of the proviso of clause

(b) of sub-section (2) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1967 was not met. In that case, the irst report for

extension of time for investigation was made by the Investigating

Oicer and on the same day, another report was submitted by the

Public Prosecutor. It was observed that “Undoubtedly the request of an

IO for extension of time is not a substitute for the report of the Public

Prosecutor but since we ind that there has been, as per the comparison of

the two documents, an application of mind by the Public Prosecutor as

well as an endorsement by him, the inirmities in the form should not

entitle the respondents to the beneit of the default bail when in

substance there has been an application of mind."

15. Coming to the case at hand, the Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli has

passed the following order, which is impugned in this Appeal.

“1. Accused No.1 Nilesh Gadade Accused No. 2 Kiran Shankar
Lokhande, accused No. 4 Sagar @ Nanaso Manik Chougule No. 5 Atul
Dadaso Waydandé and No. 6 Sandesh @ Sandry Ramchandra

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Ghagare, Accused No. 8 Malik Shaikh, and Accused No. 9 Mohammad
Jamal Nadaf are produced on V.C. from concerned Jails, there
respective Advocates are present. I.O. and Additional P. P. present.
Learned additional P. P. iled report for extension of period of
90 days as per section 21(2)(b). Copy of application of served on
accused in Jail.
Heard learned A.P.P., I. O. also heard advocates representing
respective accused. Perused report. The ofence of registered on
12.06.2026. The extension is sought as absconding accused are to be
traced, investigation in respective of bank detail and money trails of
syndicate activities are to be traced, permission for charge-sheet from
competent authority is to be obtained. Considering the these reasons
as well as previous investigation papers, I hold that extension is
necessary.
Hence, the order.
ORDER

1. The extension of further period of the 90 days from
10.09.2026 is granted as prayed as per section 21(2)(b) of MCOC Act.”

16. The aforesaid impugned order is passed on the report/application

by the Sub-Divisional Police Oicer, Miraj Division, Miraj dated 07 th

September, 2026. The copy of the said report is enclosed to the Appeal

from page Nos. 125 to 142. Perusal of the same goes to show that, the

Investigating Oicer gave the details of the crime, the investigation

done, and the grounds for extension of time up to 90 days to carry out

the investigation from 10th September, 2026. The last page of the said

report/application shows that, it was iled through the Special P.P. There

is a signature under the words 'iled by', which appears to be made by

the Special P.P. Whatever report/application was iled, upon which the

impugned order came to be passed, was by the Investigating Oicer.

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The said application nowhere shows that it was the report as

contemplated under the provisions of Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA, which

requires the report of the Public Prosecutor. There is nothing to show

that, the Special P.P. applied his mind to the request made by the

Investigating Oicer. The said report/application nowhere indicates that

the Special P.P. was satisied with the request made by the Investigating

Oicer for extension of time for investigation. Mere endorsement 'iled

by' and the signature below that, cannot be said that the said

report/application fulilled the requirement of the aforesaid provision

requiring submission of the report by the Public Prosecutor. The said

report/application is sans independent consideration, application of

mind and satisfaction of the Special P.P. Even the order impugned

nowhere records the inding that, the report/application was submitted

after application of mind and satisfaction of the Special P.P. From this, it

is clear that, the impugned order was passed on the report/application

which did not fulill the requirement of law. Though there is no

prescribed format for such report/application, as contended by the

learned Special P.P., the aforesaid provision of Section 21 of the MCOCA

and the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions mandates that, the

report/application for extension of time to carry out the investigation

should satisfy the aforesaid requirement under the law. The

report/application iled by the Investigating Oicer, upon which the

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impugned order is passed, was merely iled through the learned Special

P.P. with his signature. In these facts and circumstances of the case and

in the light of the above legal position, the impugned order is

unsustainable in the eye of law and therefore needs to be interfered

with.

17. As regards prayer clause (b) is concerned, it is submitted by the

learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the Appellant has already

iled an application for bail before the learned Additional Sessions

Judge and Special Judge, (MCOCA Court), Sangli which the Appellant

would pursue and he would therefore not press prayer clause (b).

18. At this stage the learned Special P.P. submits that, the State

wants to challenge this order before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and

prays for stay for a period of four (4) weeks. The prayer is opposed by

the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant. He submit that, since this

Court has allowed the Appeal, the right has accrued to the Appellant for

default bail and the Appellant has iled the application before the

learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, (MCOCA Court),

Sangli and the stay will afect the Appellant’s right. This Court has

considered the matter on merits. Considering the ground on which the

impugned order is quashed and set aside and as the full text of this

order would be ready today itself, the prayer made by the learned

Special P.P. stands rejected. In view of the above, the following order:

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ORDER

i. The Criminal Appeal is allowed.

ii. The impugned order dated 8th September, 2026 passed by
the Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge,
(MCOCA Court), Sangli in Crime No. 235 of 2026 is
quashed and set aside.

[Neeraj P. Dhote, J.] [Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]

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