Bombay High Court
ABDUL SHAKUR WALESAB NADAFversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Decided
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The conviction under Section 302 IPC is upheld and the appeal dismissed.
Summary
The appellant was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC for stabbing his wife, resulting in her death. The prosecution relied on the testimony of a child eyewitness, multiple oral dying declarations, an extra‑judicial confession, and forensic evidence showing the appellant's blood on the seized knife and clothing. The defence argued lack of eye‑witness, absence of fingerprint evidence, and inconclusive blood‑group analysis. The Court examined the reliability of the child’s testimony, the admissibility and weight of dying declarations, and the credibility of the extra‑judicial confession, finding them trustworthy and corroborated by medical and forensic findings. It held that the prosecution had proved the appellant’s presence and participation beyond reasonable doubt, and that the lack of fingerprint or definitive blood‑group matching did not create reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.
Issues considered
- Did the prosecution establish the appellant's presence at the crime scene beyond reasonable doubt?
- Are the oral dying declarations admissible and sufficient to support conviction without further corroboration?
- Is the extra‑judicial confession reliable and can it be used as evidence?
- Does the absence of fingerprint evidence or conclusive blood‑group matching defeat the murder charge?
- Is the testimony of the minor child witness reliable and free from tutoring?
- Should the conviction under Section 302 IPC be affirmed?
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 313
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 302, 307
Subjects
- murder
- Section 302 IPC
- dying declaration
- extra‑judicial confession
- child witness
- forensic evidence
- bloodstain analysis
- appeal dismissed
Judgment
Cr.A.498-2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 498 of 2019
Abdul Shakur Walesab Nadaf
(at present in Amravati Central Prison)
Aged 52 years.
R/o. Surle, Tal. Mangaon, Dist. Raigad. ...Appellant
vs.
The State of Maharashtra
(Through the Senior Inspector of Police,
Mangaon Police Station, Dist. Raigad). ...Respondent
Mr. Valmiky Narvekar a/w. Ms. Ankita Rai, for the Appellant.
Ms. Sharmila Kaushik, APP for the State.
VISHAL CORAM: MANISH PITALE &
SUBHASH
PAREKAR SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ
Digitally signed by
VISHAL SUBHASH
PAREKAR
Date: 2026.08.28
RESERVED ON: 8th JULY, 2026
14:30:24 +0530
PRONOUNCED ON: 28th AUGUST, 2026
--------------
JUDGMENT: (Per Shreeram Shirsat, J.)
1. The present Appeal has been filed challenging the impugned
judgment and order dated 03.08.2018 passed by the Sessions Judge,
Mangaon, Raigad district in Sessions Case No. 46/2016, whereby the
Appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and has been sentenced to undergo
Imprisonment for Life and pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default, to
undergo Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) for 2 years and also ordered Rs.
40,000/- to be paid to the sons of the deceased after the period of Appeal.
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2. Brief facts of the prosecution case are as under:
a. It is the case of the prosecution that on 04.05.2016, Sarfaraz
Abdul Karim Dhangu (First Informant) approached Mangaon
Police Station with respect to the assault on his sister-
Mehjabin Abdul Shakur Nadaf (the deceased). He informed
the police that at around 6:30 a.m., he received a phone call
from his maternal cousin, Mubina Abdul Gani Pathan who told
him that Abdul Shakur Nadaf (the Appellant) had stabbed his
wife (the deceased) and that she was sitting on the staircase in
front of Mubina’s house.
b. It is further the case of the prosecution that upon the First
Informant reaching Mubina’s house, he found his sister lying
in an injured condition outside the house, in a pool of blood.
Thereafter, the First Informant and other relatives of the
deceased took her to Mangaon Rural Hospital. The doctors
found injuries on her head, back, palm, waist and her stomach
with her intestines coming out. Upon the referral of the
doctor, the deceased was shifted to Sir J.J. Hospital at
Mumbai for further treatment.
c. It is further the case of the prosecution that an F.I.R was filed
by the brother of the deceased at Mangaon Police Station vide
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Crime No.86 of 2016 under Section 307 of the IPC on
04.05.2016 and the Appellant came to be arrested on the
same day. However, during the course of her treatment at Sir
J.J. Hospital, she succumbed to her injuries on 05.05.2016.
Thereafter, further investigation was carried out and the
charge-sheet came to be filed under Section 302 of the IPC.
3. To effectively prove the guilt of the Accused-Appellant, the
prosecution in all examined 7 witnesses (P.W. 1 to P.W. 7):
P.W NAME ROLE
1. Sarfaraj Abdul Karim Dhangu First Informant and brother of the
deceased.
2. Jakir Najir Khan Witness who saw the Appellant in blood-
stained clothes and;
The Appellant tendered the extra-judicial
confession before him.
3. Mubina Abdul Gani Pathan Maternal cousin of the deceased who first
saw the deceased in an injured condition.
4. Daniyal Abdul Shakur Nadaf Son of the Appellant and the deceased
and;
Eye-witness to the incident.
5. Sunil Prahlad Shelake Panch witness
Spot Panchnama dated 04.05.2016
relating to the clothes of the deceased
and; Arrest Panchnama of the Appellant
dated 04.05.2016
6. Datta Kisan Nalawade Investigating Officer (I.O.)
7. Dr. Harsh Olhas Panshewdikar Medical Officer at Sir J.J. Hospital,
Mumbai who conducted the Post-Mortem
of the deceased.
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4. On completion of the prosecution evidence, statement of the
Appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein the Appellant
denied the case of the prosecution. The Appellant neither chose to lead any
defence evidence, nor did he examine himself on oath. After hearing the
prosecution as well as the defence and upon appreciation of the evidence
on record, the Sessions Judge, vide judgment and order dated 03.08.2018,
was pleased to convict the Appellant for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo Imprisonment for
Life and pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and in default, to undergo R.I. for 2
years and also ordered Rs. 40,000/- to be paid to the sons of the deceased
after the period of Appeal.
5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction in Sessions
Case No. 46/2016, dated 03.08.2018, passed by the Sessions Judge,
Mangaon, the Appellant has approached this Court by way of the present
Appeal.
6. Heard Ld. Counsel Adv. Valmiky H. Narvekar for the Appellant and
Ld. APP Sharmila S. Kaushik for the Respondent-State.
7. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant primarily contended that there is
no eye-witness to the incident. Apart from the presence of the minor son,
no other witness was present at the time of the incident. It was further
argued by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the prosecution failed to
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prove the presence of the Appellant at the crime scene as a result of
varying statements given by several witnesses. It was further argued that
P.W. 2 deposed to the effect that the Appellant had confessed to the
murder of his wife and had also seen the Appellant with blood on his
clothes, however there is no corroboration to this effect. Additionally, the
statement of P.W. 2 is in contradiction to the statement of P.W. 4 wherein,
the suggestion that the deceased and the Appellant resided together was
denied. He further argued that a similar contradiction was also brought out
in the cross-examination of P.W. 6- the I.O., who stated that the deceased
and the Appellant were residing separately as a result of a dispute between
them. Therefore, it was contended that P.W. 2 is not a reliable witness to
sustain the conviction of the Appellant. It was further argued that no
fingerprint evidence on the alleged weapon i.e. the knife, was brought on
record to link the Appellant to the incident. Further, no forensic analysis
took place to actually link the wounds to the alleged weapon used. Thus, it
was argued that the usage of the said knife by the Appellant, to attack the
deceased has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It was further
submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, that the dying declaration
made by the deceased to P.W. 1, naming the Appellant as the assailant,
while she was being taken to Sir J.J. Hospital Mumbai in the ambulance, is
unreliable and should not be considered. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant
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substantiates the aforesaid argument by contending that the deceased had
numerous serious injuries including- head injuries, ruptured intestine, etc.
and thus it would be impossible that such an injured person would be in
the state to narrate the entire sequence of events. It was further contended
by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that out of the 28 articles/samples
seized by the police, 15 came back as inconclusive and although the
remaining samples match the blood type of the Appellant, the blood type of
the deceased has not even been determined, let alone be matched to the
blood found on the said seized articles/samples. Thus it was contended
that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the Appellant
beyond reasonable doubt and hence he is entitled to acquittal.
8. In support of his contentions, the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has
relied upon the following authorities:
i. Bhanmati vs. The State of Haryana1
ii. Shivaji Kisan Narawane vs. State of Maharashtra2
iii. Sahadevan and Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu3
iv. State of Rajasthan vs. Hanuman4
v. Ishwarbhai Narayan Makwana vs. State of Maharashtra5
vi. Arbind Singh vs. State of Bihar6
1 Cr. Appeal No. 114 of 2019
2 SLP Cri. No. 17258 of 2024
3 2012 (6) SCC 403
4 Cri. Appeal No. 631 of 2017
5 2013 ALL MR (Cri) 998
6 1994 SCC (Cri) 1418
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5. Per Contra, the Ld. APP submitted that the prosecution has
successfully established its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the
Sessions Court has rightly convicted him for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC. The Ld. APP submitted that the contention, that the
presence of the Appellant at the scene of the crime has not been
established, is without merit. She submitted that the Appellant himself, in
his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., admitted that he and the
deceased were residing together. Further, the Appellant did not dispute the
statement of P.W. 4 that on the day of the incident, the Appellant, the
deceased, P.W. 4 and the brother of P.W. 4 were present in the house.
Thus, the presence of the Appellant at the place of the incident during the
relevant time stands established. It was further submitted that the
submission made by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, that the knife seized
was not sent for forensic examination is incorrect. It was submitted that the
FSL Report clearly refers to the knife as ‘Article 9’ and the blood detected
on it was found to match the blood group of the Appellant. Therefore, it
was contended that the FSL evidence further corroborates the presence of
the Appellant at the scene of the crime. It was further argued that the
dying declaration made by the deceased to her P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3
inspires confidence and therefore can be a ground for confirming the
conviction of the Appellant and lastly urged that the Appeal be dismissed.
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6. The Ld. APP has relied upon Raj Kumar @ Suman vs. State (NCT of
Delhi)7 to buttress her arguments.
7. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the rival
parties, it would be appropriate for this Court to examine the contentions
raised in light of the following aspects:
a) TESTIMONY OF THE EYE WITNESS P.W. 4 :
8. P.W. 4 is the son of the Appellant and the deceased. In his
testimony, he deposed that at the time of incident, he along with his
mother (the deceased herein), his brother and his father (the Appellant
herein) were in the house and that he was sleeping. He further deposed
that the Appellant had dealt a knife blow on the stomach and back of his
mother. He deposed that the Appellant took him and his brother out of the
house and that the Appellant was to go to the police station. He further
deposed that the police recorded his statement and his statement was also
recorded by the Magistrate. He identified his father in the court. He also
identified the knife before the court. In the cross-examination, it was put to
him that at the time of the incident, they were residing at the house of his
maternal uncle at Morba and that his father and mother were not residing
jointly, to which this witness has answered in the affirmative. However, in
the re-examination by the Ld. APP, it was clarified that at the time of
7 Criminal Appeal No. 1471 OF 2023
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incident, they were residing at Surle, at the house of the Appellant.
Further, in the cross-examination to this limited aspect, the witness has
maintained his stance on the fact that at the time of incident they were
residing at Surle.
9. From the evidence, it can be seen that P.W. 4 is a minor studying in
the second standard and is not aware of his age. The Trial Court, therefore,
took due precaution to ascertain whether the witness understood the
meaning of the term ‘oath’. The court specifically asked him whether he
knew what an ‘oath’ meant, to which he gave a satisfactory answer.
Accordingly, the Trial Court proceeded to record his evidence on oath. He
categorically deposed as follows:
“1) …. My father had dealt a knife blow on the stomach, back of my
mother. Thereafter my father took me and my brother out of the house.
Thereafter my father was to go to the police station.”
10. Upon the perusal of the entire examination of this witness, we are of
the considered opinion, that the contention appears to be that they used to
stay permanently at Surle and intermittently used to stay with his maternal
uncle at Morba. What is of utmost importance is that P.W. 4, has
categorically and unequivocally deposed that the Appellant had dealt a
knife blow on the stomach and back of the deceased. There is no cross-
examination on this aspect. The deposition of P.W. 4 is corroborated by the
Appellant himself in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement, to the effect of his presence
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during the incident. It reads as follows:
“Q.65. It has come in the evidence of PW 4 Daniyal Abdul Shakur
Nadaf say that, at the time of incident himself, his mother, his brother
and father were in the house. What you have to say about it?
Ans. It is true.”
Therefore, we have no doubt in coming to a conclusion that the
Appellant and the deceased were together at the time of the incident.
Further, P.W. 7- the doctor also testified to there being injuries on the
stomach as well as on the back of the deceased and has therefore
corroborated the testimony of the child-witness. We find the evidence of
this witness to be truthful, trustworthy and not a result of any tutoring and
in absence of any cross-examination, the evidence of P.W. 4 stands
unshaken.
11. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Arbind Singh vs. State of Bihar 8 to
discredit the testimony of the child-witness as being unreliable and prone
to tutoring. The relevant paragraph reads as under:
“3….There are also certain other statements made in the course of her
deposition which would suggest that possibility of tutoring could not
be ruled out. Having taken a careful look at the evidence of this child
witness we are of the opinion that implicit faith and reliance cannot
be placed on her testimony since it is not corroborated by any
independent and reliable evidence. It is well-settled that a child
witness is prone to tutoring and hence the court should look for
corroboration particularly when the evidence betrays traces of
tutoring. We, therefore, think that appellant 1 was entitled to benefit
of doubt.”
8 1994 SCC (Cri) 1418
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12. This judgment can be distinguished on the facts of the case. In the
facts of the present case, we do not find the evidence of P.W. 4 to be an
outcome of any tutoring. Further, we find sufficient corroboration to what
has been deposed by P.W. 4 and therefore, the said judgment cannot be
said to be applicable to the facts of the present case.
b) ORAL DYING DECLARATIONS TO P.W. 1, P.W. 2 & P.W. 3 :
13. Before analysing the evidence with respect to Oral Dying
Declaration, a useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Bhajju alias Karan Singh vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh9 wherein it has been observed as under :-
“23. The “dying declaration” essentially means the statement
made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the
circumstances of the transaction resulting into his death. The
admissibility of the dying declaration is based on the principle
that the sense of impending death produces in a man's mind,
the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man
under oath. The dying declaration is admissible upon the
consideration that the declaration was made in extremity,
when the maker is at the point of death and when every hope
of this world is gone, when every motive to file a false suit is
silenced in the mind and the person deposing is induced by
the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.
24. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true
and voluntary, it undoubtedly can base its conviction on the
dying declaration, without requiring any further
corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of
law that the dying declaration cannot for the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence.”
9 (2012) 4 SCC 327
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14. P.W. 1- Sarfaraz Abdul Karim Dhangu, the brother of the deceased
and the Complainant, deposed that when he was taking his sister in an
ambulance to Mumbai, she told him that she had woken up in the morning
to observe ‘upas’ and that some quarrel took place between herself and the
Appellant. She further narrated to him that thereafter the Appellant
assaulted her with a knife. He further deposed that subsequently the
deceased died in the hospital. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the statement made by the deceased to P.W. 1, relating to the
circumstances in which she sustained the injuries leading to death,
assumes significance of a dying declaration and is required to be
considered accordingly.
15. P.W. 2, the landlord of the deceased and the Appellant deposed that
he saw the deceased lying on the staircase of one Sharmir Pathan in a pool
of blood. He further deposed that the deceased had injuries on her
stomach, her intestine had come out and she had head injuries. He further
deposed that the police Patil enquired about her injuries and that she told
him that the quarrel took place between her and the Appellant. She further
said that pursuant to the quarrel, the Appellant dealt the knife blow on her
person and thereby she sustained injuries. He also deposed that the
deceased went on to narrate that about two days back, some dispute had
taken place between her brother and the Appellant and that the Appellant
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was telling her to lodge a complaint against her brother regarding the same
and therefore the quarrel took place. The testimony of P.W. 2 also lends
material corroboration to the version of the prosecution regarding the
circumstances in which the deceased sustained the injuries at the hands of
the Appellant.
16. P.W. 3- the cousin sister of the deceased, deposed that the deceased
frequently visited the Appellant. She further deposed that at about 6:30
a.m., she heard shouts like “Baji, Baji" and when she opened the door, she
saw that the deceased was sitting on the staircase- bleeding, in an injured
condition. She further deposed that she asked the deceased as to what
happened, to which she replied that her husband had assaulted her. P.W. 3
further stated that the deceased narrated that a quarrel took place between
her and the Appellant at night and even in the morning. Thereafter, the
Appellant gave a knife blow on her stomach, back and different parts of the
body, due to which she sustained the injuries. The witness further deposed
that the deceased asked to be taken to the hospital and when the deceased
was taken, the doctor referred her to Mumbai for further treatment.
Thereafter, she was taken to Sir J.J. Hospital, where she succumbed to her
injuries. There is nothing in the cross-examination of this witness which
would discredit her. It would be important to take into consideration a
categorical admission in the cross-examination of P.W. 3, wherein it is
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stated that the deceased was talking to her till she reached Sir J.J. Hospital.
The other suggestions like the quarrel did not take place and that the
Appellant did not assault the deceased have been categorically denied by
this witness. This testimony is relevant and lends further credence to the
case of the prosecution.
17. It will now be relevant to note that P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 are all
consistent in their deposition and that there is no discrepancy in their
evidence. All of the aforesaid witnesses have deposed in unequivocal and
categorical terms as to what was narrated to them by the deceased. Upon
perusal of the oral dying declarations, made to various witnesses, it can be
seen that the deceased clearly, coherently and cogently narrated the
incident and also remained consistent in naming the Appellant. Just
because the prosecution has not examined Police Patil and the doctor who
were also present when the deceased had made the oral dying declaration
to PW 2 and PW 3, the same will not diminish the value of the dying
declaration. This Court finds that the oral dying declarations given to P.W.
1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 are true and free from any embellishment. It is
pertinent to note that there is neither rule of law nor of prudence that
dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration and if the
court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can
base conviction on it, without any corroboration. We are of the opinion
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that, there is nothing on record to come to the conclusion or harbor a
reasonable suspicion or doubt that the deceased could have been tutored.
Additionally, this Court also does not find that the dying declarations are a
manifestation of fiction or a product of imagination of the mind of the
deceased. The deceased was in a position to speak till they reached the
hospital as deposed by PW 3 and therefore the narration given by the
deceased which has been deposed by PW 1 to Pw 3 is in a natural way and
does not smack of any tutoring.
18. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Irfan alias Naka vs. The State of Uttar
Pradesh10.
“15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is
worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-
examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an
obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists
that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire
full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on
guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of
either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court
must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind
after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once
the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary,
undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further
corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that
the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless
it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule
of prudence.
……..
62. There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a dying
declaration should be accepted; the duty of the Court is to decide
10 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060
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this question in the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case
and be fully convinced of the truthfulness of the same. Certain
factors below reproduced can be considered to determine the same,
however, they will only affect the weight of the dying declaration
and not its admissibility: -
(i) Whether the person making the statement was in expectation of
death?
(ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at the earliest
opportunity? “Rule of First Opportunity”
(iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe the dying
declaration was put in the mouth of the dying person?
(iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of prompting,
tutoring or leading at the instance of police or any interested party?
(v) Whether the statement was not recorded properly?
(vi) Whether, the dying declarant had opportunity to clearly observe
the incident?
(vii) Whether, the dying declaration has been consistent
throughout?
(viii) Whether, the dying declaration in itself is a manifestation
/fiction of the dying person’s imagination of what he thinks
transpired?
(ix) Whether, the dying declaration was itself voluntary?
(x) In case of multiple dying declarations, whether, the first one
inspires truth and consistent with the other dying declaration?
(xi) Whether, as per the injuries, it would have been impossible for
the deceased to make a dying declaration ?
19. The above-mentioned judgment has laid down certain factors which
can be considered to determine when a dying declaration should be
accepted. A conjoint reading of the depositions of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W.
3 would show that there is absolute consistency in the deposition of these
witnesses, with respect to the oral dying declaration made by the deceased
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to each of them. PW 3 has answered in the cross examination that till they
reached the hospital the deceased was talking to them. The evidence on
record, if perused minutely, fulfils all the requisites enumerated by the
Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment.
20. The basic premise of the law on dying declaration is, ‘ nemo moritus
praesumitur mentire’ i.e. a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his
mouth, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of such a statement.
Thus, the oral dying declarations made to P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3
appear to be true, voluntary and devoid of tutoring.
c) EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION
21. Further, there is also evidence in the nature of extra-judicial
confession which was made by the Appellant before P.W. 2, the landlord.
P.W. 2 deposed that on 04.05.2016 at about 5:00 a.m., when he had gone
for morning prayer along with Anis Rizwan and Tabrej to the mosque at
Morba and after prayer when he was proceeding towards his house at
about 6:00 a.m., he met the Appellant at the S.T. Bus Depot stand, along
with his two sons. He deposed that blood could be seen on the Appellant
and his clothes. Upon enquiry, the Appellant told him that there was a
quarrel between him and his wife. He further told P.W. 2 that, “ck;dkspk
vkt dke d:u Vkdykp” and stated that he is going to Mangaon Police
Station. This witness deposed that as he suspected the Appellant, he told
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him that he would come along with him.
22. This Court has in several cases held that an extra-judicial confession,
if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon
by the court. However, the confession will have to be proved like any
other fact and the value of the evidence as to confession, like any other
evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been
made. No doubt, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the extra-judicial
confession is a weak piece of evidence, however, what has to be seen is
whether the extra-judicial confession inspires confidence and is
corroborated by other prosecution evidence. We have also gone through
the cross-examination of P.W. 2, but we do not find anything substantial
which would discredit this witness.
23. The corroboration of the circumstances during which the extra
judicial confession was made as deposed by P.W. 2, finds place in the
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. When the question was put
to the Appellant, that it has come in the evidence of P.W. 2 that at that
time Shakur Nadaf along with his two sons met him on the ST stand, he
replied in the affirmative. So also, when it was put to him that it has come
in the evidence that blood was found on his person and clothes, he once
again replied in the affirmative. The answers to Question Nos. 24 and 25
are reproduced hereinbelow:
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“24] Further it has come in his evidence that, at that time Shakur
Nadaf along with his two sons met me on the S.T. stand. What
you have to say about it ?
Ans: It is true.
25] Further it has come in his evidence that, the blood was found
on his person and clothes. What you have to say about it ?
Ans: It is true.”
24. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant relied upon the judgment in the
case of Sahadevan and Another vs. State of Tamil Nadu 11 and has invited
the attention of this Court to paragraph 16, which deals with the analysis
of extra-judicial confession:
16] Upon a proper analysis of the above-referred judgments of
this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which
would make an extra- judicial confession an admissible piece of
evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an
accused. These precepts would guide the judicial mind while
dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily
relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been
made by the accused.
i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It
has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution.
ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.
iii) It should inspire confidence.
iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and
evidentiary value, if it is supported by a chain of cogent
circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution
evidence.
v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction,
it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and
inherent improbabilities.
vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other
fact and in accordance with law.”
25. The above-cited judgment cited by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant
in fact supports the case of the prosecution. We find that the extra-judicial
11 (2012) 6 SCC 403
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confession is without coercion and is trustworthy. We also do not find that
it suffers from any material discrepancies or inherent infirmities. The
Appellant has made the extra-judicial confession in a most natural way.
This Court has come to the conclusion that the extra-judicial confession
was made voluntarily and was truthful. In our view, it inspires complete
confidence. Thus, the overall evidence with respect to the extra-judicial
confession, is found to be worthy of consideration and reliance.
d) MOTIVE
26. To prove motive the prosecution has examined P.W. 1 who has
deposed that there was a long standing dispute between his sister (the
deceased) and the Accused ( the Appellant). P.W. 2 has deposed that the
deceased had told that the quarrel took place between her and her
husband (the Appellant) and therefore the Appellant dealt the knife blow
on her person by which she sustained injuries. P.W. 3 has also deposed that
when she asked her what had happened , she told her that quarrel took
place between them at night hours and even in the morning and therefore
her husband gave knife blow on her stomach, back and different parts of
the body thereby she sustained bleeding injuries. Nothing has been brought
out in the cross-examination of these three witnesses which will discredit
their testimonies. In our opinion the prosecution has proved motive beyond
reasonable doubt.
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e) CASE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE :
27. It will also be pertinent to take into consideration the nature of
injuries and the cause of death. P.W. 7- the doctor who conducted the post-
mortem, deposed that on 04.05.2016, he was attached to Sir J.J. Hospital,
Mumbai and on that day, the deceased was brought by J.J. Marg Police
Station with a history of injury by a sharp-edged weapon, caused to her by
her husband, under the influence of alcohol. He further deposed that the
deceased was initially taken to Mangaon Rural Hospital and then referred
to Sir J.J. Hospital where she died during treatment. He further referred to
the external injuries which were found on the body of the deceased. The
following are the injuries noted by P.W. 7:
“03. I along with resident Dr. Mr. Kamble perform PM on dead body.
Following external injuries were found.
Stitched CLW of size 8cm x 0.2 cm over forehead above left
eyebrow, black coloured four stitches noted, on dissection it is muscle
deep, blood infilteration noted around margins, margins irregular,
dark red in colour.
Abrasion of size 1.5 x 0.5 cm over right side of nose, dark red in
colour.
Stitched CLW of size 2 x 0.1 cm over right anterior side of neck, on
dissection it is muscle deep, blood infilteration noted around margins,
dark red in colour.
Stitched stab wound of size 3 x 0.2 cm over right side of chest
below right breast three black coloured stitches noted on dissection it
is cavity deep, margins inverted, blood infilteration noted around
margins, dark red in colour.
Stitched stab wound of size 4 x 0.2 cm over right inguinal area, for
black coloured stitches noted, on dissection, margins inverted, it is
cavity deep, blood infilteration noted around margins, dark red in
colour.
Stitched CLW of size 4 x 0.2 cm over left wrist, four stitches, black
colour noted, on dissection it is muscle deep, margins, irregular blood
infilteration noted around margins, dark red in colour.
FMDDMC/AMK/473/16, ADR No. 00/16, Sir J.J. Marg Police
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Station, Mumbai date 05.05.2016 column No. 17 separate sheet.
Stitched CLW of size 1.5 x 0.2 cm over base of left thumb over
palm, two stitches noted, black coloured, on dissection it is muscle
deep, margins, irregular blood infiltration noted around margins, dark
red in colour.
Stitched CLW of size 3 x 0.2 cm over lateral border of right thigh, 4
black coloured stitches noted, on dissection it is muscle deep, margins,
irregular blood infilteration noted around margins, dark red in colour.
Stitched CLW of size 3 cm x 0.2 cm over lateral border of right
thigh, below injury no (8), 5 cm. On dissection it is muscle deep,
margins, irregular blood infiltration noted around margins, dark red in
colour.
Stitched CLW of size 4 x 0.2 over anterior aspect of right thigh, two
black coloured stitches noted, on dissection it is muscle deep, margins,
irregular blood infilteration noted around margins, dark red in colour.
Stitched CLW of size 1.5 x 0.5 cm over anterior aspect of right
thigh, 6 cm below injury no (10), two black coloured stitches noted,
on dissection it is muscle deep, margins, irregular blood infiltration
noted around margins, dark red in colour.
Stitched CLW of size 4 x 0.2 cm over back below left sidede angle
of scapula, three black coloured stitches noted, on dissection it is
muscle deep, blood infilteration noted around margins, dark red in
colour.
Stitched CLW of size 4 x 0.2 cm over back, on left side, 13 cm
below injury no.12, three black coloured stitches noted, on dissection
it is muscle deep, blood infilteration noted around margins, dark red
in colour.
04. On internal examination column No.19-
Under scalp contusion of size 13 cm x 3 cm over left parietal region,
blood infilteration noted around margins, dark red in colour.
Under scalp contusion of size 8 cm x 3 cm over left frontal region,
blood infilteration noted around margins, dark red in colour.
05. Fracture of right sided 8th rib noted, blood infilteration of
corresponding skin, muscle noted, dark red in colour.
06. Laceration of lower lobe over right lateral side noted, pale.”
28. P.W. 7 further deposed that the stab injuries are possible with a
sharp and pointed weapon and the other injuries are possible with a hard,
pointed and rough weapon. He also deposed that head injuries are possible
if the head of a person is banged into the wall. He stated that the injuries
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on the deceased were possible by Article 'D'- the knife, shown to him in the
court. In the cross-examination, the only question which was asked to him
was whether the police had shown the weapon to him, to which he replied
in negative. Beyond that, there is no cross-examination. P.W. 7 the doctor
has also issued the cause of death certificate wherein the provisional cause
of death is stated to be head injury with multiple injuries over body
(unnatural). The prosecution has therefore proved that this is a case of
culpable homicide.
f) RECOVERY OF BLOOD STAINED CLOTHES AND KNIFE :
29. P.W. 5- the panch witness to recovery of clothes of the Appellant has
deposed that he was called for panchnama in Mangaon Police Station on
04.05.2026, where one light green ladies Kurta with blood stains and holes
was produced, which was seized under the panchnama. He has further
deposed that an arrest panchnama of the accused was prepared. He also
deposed that the accused had injury to his left hand and it was banded. He
has further deposed that the clothes of the accused were blood stained. If
the CA report at Exhibit 26 is perused, it shows that on Exhibit 1( kurta),
Exhibit 2 ( pant), Exhibit 3 ( shirt), ‘ Human Blood’ was found of ‘A’ group.
Even on Exhibit 8( Oadhani), Exhibit 9( Knife) and Exhibit 9A
( Handkerchief), ‘Human blood’ was found of ‘A’ group which is of the
Appellant ( Exhibit 28). As it has come in the evidence that there was
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injury on his left hand, the finding of human blood of A group which is of
the Appellant, on all the exhibits referred herein above further corroborates
the presence of the Appellant and his culpability. The possibility of the
scuffle also cannot be ruled out. There is no cross examination on this
aspect of injury to the Appellant and merely a suggestion has been put
which has been denied by PW 5. Further no question is put to the IO as
well on the aspect of injury. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant had
submitted that there is no medical record to show that there was any injury
and only the statement of the Panch cannot be believed. The answer of the
Appellant to question 78, in the statement under section 313 of the Cr.PC,
will clinch the issue. Said question and answer is reproduced herein below.
Q. 78: Further it has come in his evidence that, he had injury to left
hand. It was banded. His clothes were blood stained. What do you
have to say about it?
Ans : It is true.
30. What we have observed is that, the date of incident is 4/5/2016, the
blood samples were received by the FSL Kalina on 16/5/2016. The analysis
started on 23/5/2016 and completed on 15/6/2016. The results of the
examination of blood samples of the deceased are “ haemolysed hence
unsuitable for blood grouping “ and “inconclusive” ( Exhibit 35). It is a
sorry state of affairs that in such cases, where prompt examination is
expected, which can give proper results, the examination is carried out in
such a delayed manner. Be that as it may, the finding of blood of group A
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of the Appellant on the knife, Kurta and Oadhani corroborates the
involvement of the Appellant in the present crime. The contention of the
Ld. Counsel that conviction cannot be based just because the blood group
of the Appellant is the same as found on the knife. Although it is true that
conviction cannot be solely based on it, nevertheless can be a corroborating
circumstance which can be taken into consideration.
31. Further failure on the part of the prosecution to conclusively
determine the blood group of the deceased and therefore to match the
same with the blood stains recovered from the spot of the incident, cannot
be said to be fatal to the prosecution. It is true that the conclusive finding
with regard to the blood stains would have further strengthened the case of
the prosecution and corroborated the witness testimonies, however, the
absence thereof does not convince us to conclude otherwise, in the light of
the other evidence available on record. It would be unfair to disregard the
other evidence brought on record by the prosecution, such as the oral
dying declarations which are consistent, the child witness who witnessed
the Appellant stabbing his mother and withstood the cross-examination
without any contradictions and especially the extra-judicial confession
which appears voluntary and true. This is not a case resting on
circumstantial evidence , where each link in the chain must independently
and conclusively point to the guilt of the accused. Where the direct ocular
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testimony and oral dying declarations establish the complicity of the
Appellant beyond reasonable doubt, the mere failure to determine the
blood group and to link the same to the weapon involved cannot be
permitted to create a doubt about the circumstances that the substantive
evidence establishes.
32. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment of Prabhu Dayal
vs. State of Rajasthan12, wherein the Apex Court has been pleased to
observe as under :
“24. In State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, this Court concluded that
even when the origin of the blood cannot be determined, it does not
necessarily prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. In that case,
the murder weapons had been recovered with blood on them, and
the origin of the blood on one of the weapons could not be
determined. Therein, the Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 514-15,
paras 25-27)
“25. Failure of the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to
disintegration of the serum in the meanwhile does not mean that the
blood stuck on the axe would not have been human blood at all.
Sometimes it happens, either because the stain is too insufficient or
due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a
serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood. Will it then
mean that the blood would be of some other origin? Such guesswork
that blood on the other axe would have been animal blood is
unrealistic and far-fetched in the broad spectrum of this case. The
effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative
doubts. Unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a
judicially conscientious mind entertains with some objectivity, no
benefit can be claimed by the accused.”
33. A reference could also be made to another landmark judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh13.
12(2018 )8 SCC 127
13 Cr. Appeal No. 727 of 2014
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“9. We are also conscious of the fact that, at times, it may be very
difficult for the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to the
disintegration of the serum, or insufficiency of bloodstains, or
haematological changes etc. In such situations, the Court, using its
judicious mind, may deny the benefit of doubt to the accused,
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, if other
evidence of the prosecution is credible and if reasonable doubt does
not arise in the mind of the Court about the investigation.
Thus, in the case of R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC
266, this Court had observed:
“31. A failure by the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due
to disintegration of the serum does not mean that the blood stuck on
the axe could not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it is
possible, either because the stain is insufficient in itself, or due to
haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that a serologist
may fail to detect the origin of the blood in question. However, in
such a case, unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a
judicially conscientious mind may entertain with some objectivity,
no benefit can be claimed by the accused in this regard. Once the
recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by the
accused, the matching or nonmatching of blood group(s) loses
significance.”
Similar observations were made by this Court in the case of Gura
Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205, wherein it was
observed that it was not possible to accept the submission made on
behalf of the accused that in the absence of the report regarding the
origin of the blood, the accused could not have been convicted,
inasmuch as it was only because of the lapse of time that blood
could not be classified successfully.
In the case of Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC
768, this Court had ruled that as the recovery was made pursuant to
a disclosure statement made by the accused, and the serological
report had found that the blood was of human origin, the non-
determination of the blood group had lost its significance.
In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Others, (1999)
3 SCC 507, the Court had observed that the failure of the serologist
to detect the origin of the blood, due to disintegration of the serum,
did not mean that the blood stuck on the weapon could not have
been human blood at all. In this context, it was noted that it could
not be said that in all cases where there was a failure in detecting
the origin of blood, the circumstance arising from recovery of the
weapon would stand relegated to disutility. It was thus observed
that unless the doubt was of a reasonable dimension which a
judicially conscientious mind entertained with some objectivity, no
benefit could be claimed by the accused.
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10. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused would
be in a disadvantageous position in case if the aforementioned
dictum laid down by this Court in the cases of R. Shaji (supra), Gura
Singh (supra), Jagroop Singh (supra) and Teja Ram (supra) relating
to the bloodstains is applied in each and every case. Non-
confirmation of bloodgroup or origin of the blood may assume
importance in cases where the accused pleads a defence or alleges
mala fides on the part of the prosecution, or accuses the prosecution
of fabricating the evidence to wrongly implicate him in the
commission of the crime.
11. In the case of John Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of
Police, Tamil Nadu, (2010) 14 SCC 129, this Court, on facts,
observed that the evidence of recovery of weapons was credible. The
Forensic Science Report (FSL) report had disclosed that the blood
was of human origin. The Court proceeded to conclude that since
the evidence of recovery of weapon was proved to the satisfaction of
the Court, it was sufficient that the prosecution had proved that the
bloodstains were of human origin, even though the blood group
could not be ascertained.
12. The cases discussed above highlight the burden that the
prosecution would ordinarily have to discharge, depending on the
other facts and circumstances of the case, for the evidence relating
to recovery to be considered against the accused. At the same time,
as mentioned above, we are conscious of the fact that it may not
always be possible to inextricably link the bloodstains on the items
seized in recovery to the blood of the deceased, due to the possibility
of disintegration of bloodstains on account of the timelapse in
carrying out the recovery. For this reason, in Prabhu Dayal v. State
of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127, where one of us (Mohan M.
Shantanagoudar J.) had the occasion to author the judgment, this
Court, relying on Teja Ram (supra), had held that the failure to
determine the blood group of the bloodstains collected from the
scene of offence would not prove fatal to the case of the prosecution.
In Prabhu Dayal case (supra), although the FSL report could not
determine the blood group of the bloodstains on account of
disintegration, the report clearly disclosed that the bloodstains were
of human origin, and the chain of circumstantial evidence was
completed by the testimonies of the other witnesses as well as the
reports submitted by the Ballistic Expert and the Forensic Science
Laboratory regarding the weapon used to commit murder.
13. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise that if
the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to
be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the
blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though
the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood.
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The Court will have to come to the conclusion based on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and there cannot be any fixed formula
that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove, that the blood
groups match.”
34. The upshot of these two judgments is that, if the recovery of
bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution and if the investigation was not found to be tainted,
then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood
found on the articles is of human origin, even though the blood
group is not proved because of disintegration of blood. In the
present case the panchnamas at Exhibits 18 and 20 for the recovery
of the knife, blood stained clothes of the deceased, blood stained
clothes of the Appellant and other recovered articles are admitted.
The blood is found to be of Human origin. There are no allegations
against the investigating agency about the investigation being
tainted and therefore even if the blood group is inconclusive, it will
not affect the case of the prosecution. We are, therefore, of the view
that in the facts of the present case, this circumstance neither
advances the case of the prosecution nor does it detract from it and
the conviction can be sustained independently. Taking into
consideration the overall circumstances that there are eye
witnesses, oral dying declarations and extra judicial confession,
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even if the blood group of the deceased is inconclusive, it would not
affect the fabric of the prosecution case.
g) JUDGEMENTS RELIED UPON BY THE APPELLANT :
35. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on the
judgment in the case of Bhanmati vs. State of Haryana (supra). In
this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court had acquitted the Appellant of all
the charges. The core issue in this case was that the courts below
had placed substantial reliance on a mere recovery of a weapon.
The Hon’ble Apex Court held that mere recovery of the material
object, namely a ‘gandasi’, by itself cannot be the sole basis for
recording a conviction. The Hon’ble Court further noted that there
were no fingerprints of the Appellant on the recovered weapon and
that the evidence was inadequate to conclusively establish that the
recovered weapon had been used in the commission of the offence
and that in any case the evidence was inadequate to conclusively
show that the weapon recovered was used for committing the
offence. However, the facts of the present case significantly differ
from those mentioned in the case above. In the case at hand, there
is ample material in the nature of oral dying declarations, extra-
judicial confession and even the knife was found at the spot which
is not disputed since the panchanama of the same has been
Vishal Parekar ….30
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admitted by the defence. Just because the prosecution failed to
produce fingerprint evidence, the same cannot be considered as a
ground to acquit the Appellant, in the peculiar facts of the present
case.
36. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon the
judgment of Shivaji Kisan Narawane vs. State of Maharashtra14 and
has invited the attention of this Court to paragraph 14, which reads
as under:
“14] The prosecution further contends that the appellant's
alleged presence at the crime scene is substantiated by CDR and
the recovery of purported murder weapons, including a knife and
a grinding stone (Article 24). While the CDR may indicate that
the appellant was in the vicinity around the time in question, it
does not conclusively link him to the crime. Cell phone location
data, at best, establishes proximity; it does not confirm
participation or knowledge of an illegal act. The prosecution has
not produced any direct evidence-such as eyewitness testimony
or forensic material-showing the appellant actively engaging in
the offence. As for the recovery of the grinding stone (Article
24), the record reveals that it was found in an open area
accessible to multiple individuals. This fact significantly
diminishes its probative value. The prosecution must
demonstrate not only that the stone was the weapon used, but
also that the appellant had exclusive possession or control of it at
the relevant time. In the absence of fingerprints, bloodstains
conclusively identified as belonging to the appellant, or any
other form of forensic linkage, the mere discovery of a
potentially incriminating article fails to establish guilt. When
weighed against the stringent standards applicable in
circumstantial evidence cases, such tenuous connections are
insufficient to fix culpability on the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.”
37. As stated above, there is ample material in the nature of oral dying
14 Cri. Appeal arising out of SLP (Cr.) No. 17258 of 2024.
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declarations, extra-judicial confession and an eye- witness. Just because the
prosecution failed to produce fingerprint evidence, the same cannot be
considered as a ground to acquit the Appellant, in the peculiar facts of the
present case.
38. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant relies upon the judgment in
Ishwarbhai Narayan Makwana vs. The State of Maharashtra 15, particularly
paragraph 13 thereof, to contend that the inability of the prosecution to
produce fingerprint evidence would fail to meet the required standards to
establish the guilt of the Appellant. Therefore, it can be seen that in some
cases even if no steps are taken to find out the fingerprints on the handle
of the knife, the same may not be fatal to the prosecution if there is other
material sufficient enough to establish the guilt of the Appellant.
39. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has further relied upon the
judgment of State of Rajasthan vs. Hanuman16 and has invited the
attention to paragraph 6 of the said judgment:
“6] We find that the incriminating circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution, i.e., the motive and the recovery of the blood stained
weapon, even taken in conjunction cannot constitute the complete
chain of incriminating circumstances required to bring home the
charges against the accused. The High Court seems to have
overlooked the FSL report which fact was stressed upon by learned
counsel for the appellant. However, in our view, even if the FSL
report is taken into account, then also, other than the fact that the
weapon recovered at the instance of the accused tested positive for
the same blood group as that of the deceased (B +ve), nothing
much turns on the said report.”
15 2012 ALL MR (Cri) 988.
16 SCI Cri. Appeal No. 631/2017 Dt. 19-06-2025
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40. The case herein was of an appeal against acquittal and a case of
circumstantial evidence, where the Court had come to a conclusion that the
incriminating circumstances relied upon by the prosecution i.e. the motive
and the recovery of blood-stained weapon, even taken in conjunction,
could not constitute the complete chain of incriminating circumstances
required to bring home the charges against the accused. Further, the Ld.
Counsel for the Appellant also invited attention of this Court to paragraph
7 of the said judgment, wherein it was held that mere recovery of blood-
stained weapon, even bearing the same blood group of the victim, would
not be sufficient to prove the charge of murder.
41. While not disputing the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court, we are of the opinion the present case does not hinge only on
the findings or the outcome of the blood stains analysis. There is ample
evidence in terms of oral dying declarations and extra-judicial confession
and therefore, even if we discount the blood-stained weapon, the same
would not affect the fabric of the prosecution case. Therefore, this
judgment, which is in the case of an appeal against acquittal, is of no avail
to the present Appellant.
42. The Ld. APP relied upon the judgment of Raj Kumar @ Suman vs.
State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) to emphasise on the importance of statement
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. We agree with the guidelines
Vishal Parekar ….33
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laid down by the Apex Court and in the case in hand the Appellant was
given an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him.
The Appellant having understood the questions put to him has rightly
answered the questions. The question that would therefore arise is whether
such material should be taken into consideration whilst appreciating the
evidence. The wordings of the section itself are very clear. Section 313(4)
of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
313(4)….The answers given by the accused may be taken into
consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or
against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence
which such answers may tend to show he has committed.
43. The Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar Singh @ Raju @ Batya v
State of Rajasthan17 has held as under
“32 In Ramnaresh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2012 SC 1357,
this Court held as under: “It is a settled principle of law that the
obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313
CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording of a
statement under this provision of CrPC is to give an opportunity to the
accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as
to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does
not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow.
Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his
statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the
case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering
conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.”
44. The Appellant in response to some of the questions put in the
statement recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C., has given positive
answers which further corroborates the case of the prosecution.
17 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 931-932 of 2009
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45. Taking into consideration the overall conspectus of the case, we are
of the opinion that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable
doubt and the resultant conviction is proper. The Appeal therefore stands
dismissed and the conviction of the Appellant is upheld.
Hence, the following order.
ORDER
(i) The Appeal stands dismissed.
(ii) All pending Applications are also disposed of.
(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.)
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