SAGAR SHRAWAN BHOSLEversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASTRA

2026:BHC-AUG:46644-DB

                                                                560.2026APPEAL.odt



                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                             CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 560 OF 2026


                   Sagar Shrawan Bhosale
                   Age : 35 years, Occ : Labour,
                   R/o Dattanagar, Shrirampur,
                   Tq. Shrirampur, Dist. Ahilyanagar
                                                          ... APPELLANT

                              VERSUS


                   1.   The State of Maharashtra
                        through the Police Station Officer,
                        Shrirampor Taluka Police Station,
                        Tq. Shrirampur, Dist. Ahilyanagar
                                                          ... RESPONDENT
                                                 ...
                   Mr. Shaikh Mazhar A. Jahagirdar, Advocate for appellant.
                   Mr. N.B. Patil, APP for respondent/State.
                                                 ...

                          CORAM             : SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE &
                                              VAISHALI PATIL-JADHAV, JJ.

                          RESERVED ON   : 01.10.2026
                          PRONOUNCED ON : 06.10.2026



                   JUDGMENT [Per Vaishali Patil-Jadhav, J.] :


                   .          By way of this appeal, the appellant has

                   challenged the order dated 11.06.2026 passed by the

                   Special Judge under the MCOC Act, Shrirampur, District

                   Ahilyanagar (hereinafter referred to as ‘learned Special

                   Judge’), whereby the appellant's application for default bail

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is rejected and has also questioned the legality and validity

of the order dated 08.04.2026 passed by the learned

Special Judge whereby extension of time for filing the

chargesheet was granted under Section 21(2)(b) of the

Maharashtra     Control    of    Organised    Crime   Act,     1999

(hereinafter referred to as ‘MCOC Act’).

2.         Brief facts leading to the filing of present appeal

are as under:

           The appellant is the original accused in Crime

No. 08/2026 dated 13.01.2026 registered with Shrirampur

Taluka Police Station, District Ahilyanagar, for the offences

punishable under Sections 115(2), 118(1), 119(1), 189(1),

189(2), 190, 191(2), 191(3), 351(2), 351(3), 352 and 310(2)

of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNS’).

           During    the        course   of   investigation,     on

18.01.2026, Section 103(1) of BNS was added, and

subsequently on 31.01.2026, Section 111 of BNS was

added. The appellant was arrested on 13.01.2026 and was

produced for remand before the Judicial Magistrate First

Class at Shrirampur on the same day i.e. on 13.01.2026.

           On 05.03.2026, the investigation of the said FIR

was transferred for further investigation to the State


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Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Thereafter, on

02.04.2026, the respondent No. 2 received prior approval to

add Sections 3(1)(i) and (ii), 3(2) and 3(4) of the MCOC Act.

           The initial period of 90 days for completing the

investigation and filing the chargesheet was to expire on

12.04.2026. Consequently, respondent No. 2- Additional

Superintendent of Police, Bombay filed an application

before the learned Special Judge on 08.04.2026 seeking

extension of time to file the chargesheet. By the impugned

order dated 08.04.2026, the learned Special Judge allowed

the said application and granted an extension of 60 days,

thereby extending the period for filing the chargesheet up to

12.06.2026.

           Subsequently, on 08.06.2026, the Investigating

Officer made a further application along with a report to

the learned Special Judge, seeking an additional extension

of 30 days to complete the investigation. On 11.06.2026,

the learned Special Judge passed an order granting this

extension, thereby extending the period for filing the

chargesheet up to 10.07.2026.

           The present appellant filed an application for

default bail on 08.06.2026. The application for default bail


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was rejected by the learned Special Judge on 11.06.2026

on   the   ground      that    it    was     filed   prematurely.     The

chargesheet    in    the      matter       was   ultimately   filed   on

10.07.2026, after obtaining the sanction for prosecution

from the Additional DGP, CID, MS, Pune under Section

23(2) of the MCOC Act.

             Being aggrieved by the order dated 11.06.2026

rejecting the appellant's application for default bail and the

order of extension dated 08.04.2026, the appellant has

preferred the present appeal.

3.           Learned       Advocate        Mr.   Shaikh    Mazhar      A.

Jahagirdar appearing for the appellant submitted that the

report of the Public Prosecutor forwarded before the

learned    Special   Court          does   not   reflect   independent

application of mind, which is a mandatory requirement

under law.

             It was submitted that even the Special Court

has granted the extension in a mechanical manner. Perusal

of the order does not show application of mind by the

learned Special Court. There are no specific reasons

provided in the order, which is again a mandatory




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requirement under the law for extending the judicial

custody.

           It was further submitted that the impugned

order should be quashed on the ground that the appellant

was neither produced before the learned Special Court nor

was he given an opportunity to counter the application

seeking extension of detention period for filing of the

chargesheet, which clearly violates his right of being heard

or represented as contemplated under the law.

           Learned Advocate lastly submitted that since

the mandatory requirements under the law were not

complied with while passing the impugned order, the

appellant has acquired the indefeasible right to be released

on default bail under Section 187(4) of the Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "BNSS").         In

support of his submissions, learned Advocate placed

reliance on the following judgments:-

(i) Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya Vs. State

of Gujarat, [AIR 2022 SC 4641],

(ii) The judgment dated 09.01.2026 in Criminal Appeal

No.701/2025 (Akshay Mahadeo Kamble Vs. The State

of Maharashtra and others)


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(iii)   Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain Vs. State of

Jharkhand, 2026 INSC 456.



4.          Per contra, learned A.P.P. Mr. N.B. Patil for the

respondent-State    strongly   opposed       the     appeal     and

supported    the    impugned    order    dated        08.04.2026

contending that after the extension of 60 days granted by

the order under challenge, there was further extension of

30 days by order dated 11.06.2026 and while the 30 days

extension was in force, the charge-sheet came to be filed on

10.07.2026. Hence, after filing of the charge-sheet, the

appellant has lost his right of default bail under Section

187(4) of the BNSS. In support of his submissions, learned

A.P.P. has placed reliance on the following judgments:-

(i) M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of

Revenue Intelligence, [(2021) 2 SCC 485]

(ii) Qamar Ghani Usmani Vs. State of Gujarat [(2023) 18

SCC 155]

5.          Heard learned Advocate for the appellant and

the learned A.P.P. for respondent/State. Perused the

impugned order, appeal memo, annexures thereto and

citations relied upon by both the parties.


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6.          The moot question which needs to be decided by

this Court is :-

       Whether, the appellant is entitled to default bail

       under Section 187(4) of the BNSS as the appellant

       was neither given any notice of filing of the

       application for extension of time for completing

       the investigation nor was he kept present when

       the application was heard and the order was

       passed ?

7.          Before we deal with the present case, it will be

apposite to refer to Section 187 of BNSS (corresponding to

section 167 of the Cr.P.C.) and Section 21 (b) of the MCOC

Act, which read thus:-


         “187. Procedure when investigation cannot be
         completed in twenty-four hours.


         (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in
         custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot
         be completed within the period of twenty-four hours
         fixed by section 58, and there are grounds for
         believing that the accusation or information is well-
         founded, the officer-in-charge of the police station or
         the police officer making the investigation, if he is not
         below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith
         transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the
         entries in the diary hereinafter specified relating to
         the case, and shall at the same time forward the
         accused to such Magistrate.




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(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is
forwarded under this section may, irrespective of
whether he has or has no jurisdiction to try the case,
after taking into consideration whether such person
has not been released on bail or his bail has been
cancelled, authorise, from time to time, the detention
of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate
thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the
whole, or in parts, at any time during the initial forty
days or sixty days out of detention period of sixty
days or ninety days, as the case may be, as provided
in sub-section (3), and if he has no jurisdiction to try
the case or commit it for trial, and considers further
detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to
be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction.


(3)    The Magistrate may authorise the detention of
the accused person, beyond the period of fifteen
days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for
doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the
detention of the accused person in custody under this
sub-section for a total period exceeding


        (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates
to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment
for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or
more;


       (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates
to any other offence, and, on expiry of the said period
of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the
accused person shall be released on bail if he is
prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person
released on bail under this sub-section shall be
deemed to be so released under the provisions of
Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter;


(4) No Magistrate shall authorise detention of the
accused in custody of the police under this Section
unless the accused is produced before him in person
for the first time and subsequently every time till the
accused remains in the custody of the police, but the
Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial

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         custody on production of the accused either in person
         or through the audio-video electronic means.


         (5)   No Magistrate of the second class, not specially
         empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall
         authorise detention in the custody of the police.


                Explanation I.- For the avoidance of doubts, it
         is hereby declared that notwithstanding the expiry of
         the period specified in sub-section (3), the accused
         shall be detained in custody so long as he does not
         furnish bail.


                Explanation II.- If any question arises whether
         an accused person was produced before the
         Magistrate as required under sub-section (4), the
         production of the accused person may be proved by
         his signature on the order authorising detention or by
         the order certified by the Magistrate as to production
         of the accused person through the audio-video
         electronic means, as the case may be:


                Provided that in case of a woman under
         eighteen years of age, the detention shall be
         authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or
         recognised social institution:


                Provided further that no person shall be
         detained otherwise than in police station under police
         custody or in prison under judicial custody or a place
         declared as prison by the Central Government or the
         State Government."

.          Section 21 of the MCOC Act, which deals with

the   modified   application     of   Section     167    of   Cr.P.C.

(corresponding to Section 187 of BNSS), is reproduced

hereunder for ready reference:



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        “21. Modified application             of    certain
        provisions of the Code. -


        (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
        Code or in any other law, every offence
        punishable under this Act, shall be deemed to be
        a cognizable offence within the meaning of
        clause (c) of section 2 of the Code and
        "cognizable case" as defined in that clause shall
        be construed accordingly.


        (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation
        to a case involving an offence punishable under
        this Act subject to the modifications that, in sub-
        section (2), -


        (a) the references to "fifteen days", and "sixty
        days", wherever they occur, shall be construed
        as references to "thirty days" and "ninety days",
        respectively;


        (b) after the proviso, the following proviso shall be
        inserted, namely:—


        "Provided further that if it is not possible to
        complete the investigation within the said period
        of ninety days, the Special Court shall extend the
        said period upto one hundred and eighty days,
        on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating
        the progress of the investigation and the specific
        reasons for the detention of the accused beyond
        the said period of ninety days.


        ...................."


8.         Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note

that by virtue of the notification dated 16.07.2024, issued

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by the Ministry of Law and Justice, references to the Cr.P.C.

in any enactment shall be read as references to the

corresponding provisions of the BNSS. Accordingly, in the

present case, Section 167 Cr.P.C. is to be read as Section

187 BNSS, for the purposes of the MCOC Act. Also, since

the mandatory requirements under Section 167 of the

Cr.P.C. and the corresponding provisions under the BNSS

are pari materia, the legal position laid down in the

judgments relied upon by both the parties would remain

unaffected.



9.            Here it will also be profitable to refer to the

decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jigar Vs. State

of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484, wherein the Apex Court

has considered the scope and import of the requirement of

notice and production of the accused at the stage of

consideration of an application for extension of time for

completion of investigation and observed as follows:-


        "41. Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of
        Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no
        Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the
        Accused in the custody of the police unless the
        Accused is produced before him in person. It also
        provides that judicial custody can be extended on the
        production of the Accused either in person or through

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the medium of electronic video linkage. Thus, the
requirement of the law is that while extending the
remand to judicial custody, the presence of the
Accused has to be procured either physically or
virtually. This is the mandatory requirement of law.
This requirement is sine qua non for the exercise of
the power to extend the judicial custody remand. The
reason is that the Accused has a right to oppose the
prayer for the extension of the remand.

42. When the Special Court exercises the power of
granting extension under the proviso to Sub-section
(2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act, it will necessarily
lead to the extension of the judicial custody beyond
the period of 90 days up to 180 days. Therefore, even
in terms of the requirement of Clause (b) of Sub-
section (2) of Section 167 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, it is mandatory to procure the presence of
the Accused before the Special Court when a prayer
of the prosecution for the extension of time to complete
investigation is considered. In fact, the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the first part of paragraph 53(2)
(a) in its decision in the case of Sanjay Dutt : (1994) 5
SCC 410 holds so.

43. The requirement of the report under proviso
added by Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015
Act to Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of
Code of Criminal Procedure is two-fold. Firstly, in the
report of the Public Prosecutor, the progress of the
investigation should be set out and secondly, the
report must disclose specific reasons for continuing
the detention of the Accused beyond the said period
of 90 days. Therefore, the extension of time is not an
empty formality. The Public Prosecutor has to apply
his mind before he submits a report/an application
for extension. The prosecution has to make out a case
in terms of both the aforesaid requirements and the
Court must apply its mind to the contents of the report
before accepting the prayer for grant of extension.



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44. As noted earlier, the only modification made by
the larger Bench in the case of Sanjay Dutt to the
decision in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur
(1994) 4 SCC 602 is about the mode of service of
notice of the application for extension. In so many
words, in paragraph 53(2)(a) of the Judgment, this
Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt (1994) 5 SCC 410
held that it is mandatory to produce the Accused at
the time when the Court considers the application for
extension and that the Accused must be informed
that the question of extension of the period of
investigation is being considered. The Accused may
not be entitled to get a copy of the report as a matter
of right as it may contain details of the investigation
carried out. But, if we accept the submission of the
Respondents that the Accused has no say in the
matter, the requirement of giving notice by producing
the Accused will become an empty and meaningless
formality. Moreover, it will be against the mandate of
Clause (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section
167 of Code of Criminal Procedure. It cannot be
accepted that the Accused is not entitled to raise any
objection to the application for extension. The scope of
the objections may be limited. The Accused can
always point out to the Court that the prayer has to
be made by the Public Prosecutor and not by the
investigating agency. Secondly, the Accused can
always point out the twin requirements of the report
in terms of proviso added by Sub-section (2) of
Section 20 of the 2015 Act to Sub-section (2) of
Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The
Accused can always point out to the Court that unless
it is satisfied that full compliance is made with the
twin requirements, the extension cannot be granted.

45. The logical and legal consequence of the grant
of extension of time is the deprivation of the
indefeasible right available to the Accused to claim a
default bail. If we accept the argument that the failure
of the prosecution to produce the Accused before the
Court and to inform him that the application of
extension is being considered by the Court is a mere
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        procedural irregularity, it will negate the proviso
        added by Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015
        Act and that may amount to violation of rights
        conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The reason
        is the grant of the extension of time takes away the
        right of the Accused to get default bail which is
        intrinsically connected with the fundamental rights
        guaranteed Under Article 21 of the Constitution. The
        procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the
        Constitution which is required to be followed before
        the liberty of a person is taken away has to be a fair
        and reasonable procedure. In fact, procedural
        safeguards play an important role in protecting the
        liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The failure to
        procure the presence of the Accused either physically
        or virtually before the Court and the failure to inform
        him that the application made by the Public
        Prosecutor for the extension of time is being
        considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity. It is
        gross illegality that violates the rights of the Accused
        Under Article 21."

10.         From a perusal of the above-referred provisions

and the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

Jigar (supra), the following principles of law emerge as the

mandatory    requirements     to   be   complied    with,    while

deciding the extension application under Section 187(4) of

BNNS and Section 21 of the MCOC Act:-


(i)   Section 187(4) mandates that if the investigation is

not completed and charge-sheet is not filed within a period

of 60 days or 90 days, an indefeasible right to get default

bail accrues in favour of the accused.

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(ii)    The application for extension of period for filing of

charge-sheet, filed by the public prosecutor, must indicate

independent application of his mind. The report submitted

by the Investigating Officer should not be merely forwarded

as it is.


(iii)   The accused must be given notice of the application

filed by the Investigating Officer for extension of period of

investigation.


(iv)    The concerned Special Court must give reasons while

passing     the   order,   granting   extension    of   time    for

investigation.


(v)     Section 187(4) mandates production of the accused

either in person or through audio-video electronic means

while the extension application for judicial custody is

decided.


(vi) The accused must be given an opportunity to oppose

the prayer for extension of time, although the scope of such

opposition may be limited.


11.          The position regarding the crystallization of the

right to default bail has been further elucidated by the

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Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No.701

of 2025 (Akshay Mahadeo Kamble Vs. The State of

Maharashtra      and    others),    to   which     one    of   us

(Sandipkumar C. More, J.) is a party. After considering the

observations made by the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt Vs.

The State reported in 1994 AIR SCW 3857 and Sadhwi

Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra

reported in AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 755, this Court observed

as follows :-


         "18. In the case of Sanjay Dutt (supra), it is
         specifically observed that grant of bail in such
         situation is subject fo refusal of prayer for
         extension of time, if such prayer is made. It is
         further observed that if the accused applies for
         bail under this provision on expiry of the period of
         180 days or the extended period, as the case may
         be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith.
         Thus, the filing of the charge-sheet is an important
         fact in acquiring the right of default bail. Similarly,
         in the case of Sadhwi Pragnya Singh Thakur
         (supra) it has been observed that right under
         Section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. to be released on bail on
         default if charge-sheet is not filed within 90 days
         from the date of first remand is not an absolute or
         indefeasible right, and the said right would be lost
         if the charge-sheet is filed and would not survive
         after the filing of the charge-sheet. Admittedly,
         such right lapses on filing of the charge-sheet, but
         in the instant case, when the extension order is
         already held bad and illegal by us, then till filing
         of charge-sheet the appellant was having right to
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         default bail which was refused to him merely
         because extension order was already passed by
         that time."




12.        The crux of the ratio laid down by this Court

in Akshay (supra), is that the right of an accused to be

released on default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is

defeated only if the chargesheet is filed within the statutory

period of 90 days or a validly extended period. If an

application for default bail is filed by the accused before the

chargesheet is submitted, the right becomes crystallized

and cannot be defeated by the subsequent filing of the

chargesheet. If the foundation of the extended period itself

is illegal, then the filing of the chargesheet during such an

illegally extended period cannot be used to defeat the

accrued right of the accused.


13.        Now coming to the facts of the case in hand, let

us apply the aforementioned mandatory requirements of

law. We have perused the application dated 08.04.2026

filed by the public prosecutor, which has only reproduced

the report given by the Investigating Officer and there is no

independent application of mind by the public prosecutor


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while seeking extension of 60 days for completing the

investigation and filing of charge-sheet. We have also

perused the impugned order dated 11.06.2026 passed by

the learned Special Court, which also does not give any

reason. The extract of reasons recorded for extension of

time for filing the charge-sheet and to conclude the

investigation, is reproduced hereinbelow:-


        "4. Having heard, I have gone through the report of
        the prosecution as well as the separate report filed by
        the Investigating Officer Mr. Kishor Salvi, Addl.
        Superintendent of Police, State Crime Investigation
        Department, Kokan Bhavan, New Bombay. On going
        through the report of the prosecution and the
        Investigating Officer and on hearing them, I am of
        the opinion that there is progress in the
        investigation and further extension 60 days is
        necessary looking to the nature of the crime."




14.        The reasons given by the learned Special

Court are mechanical and do not reflect any application

of mind and neither give any justifiable reason. Perusal

of the order shows that no opportunity was given to the

appellant to oppose the prayer for extension of time to

file the charge-sheet. The order also reflects that the

mandatory requirement of Section 187(4) of BNSS in

respect of production of the accused in the Court
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physically or via electronic media was not followed before

passing the impugned order. Hence, the order extending

the time for filing the charge-sheet is passed without

following the mandatory requirement under Section

187(4) of BNSS and Section 21 of MCOC Act.


15.        Even though the appellant has not challenged

the second extension granted by the Special Court by order

dated 11.06.2026 but the same is produced by the A.P.P. as

Annexure to his affidavit in reply. Perusal of the said order

also reflects that though the Advocate of the appellant was

heard while granting the second extension but the accused

was not intimated about filing of the application for further

extension and was also not produced in the Court,

physically or by way of video conferencing. Learned

Advocate for the appellant has informed this Court that the

Advocate was present in the Court, as on the same date the

application for default bail was heard. So co-incidently, the

Advocate was present while hearing of application for

second extension. The second extension order also reflects

that no intimation about filing of second extension

application was given to the appellant and also the order



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does not give any reason for further extension unlike the

first order.


16.            In similar set of facts, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Md. Ariz Hasnain (supra) dealt with a case

wherein the appellant had approached the Supreme Court

challenging the first extension order granted without

producing the accused before the Court. During the

pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, the trial

Court granted a second extension and the chargesheet was

filed. Despite these subsequent developments, the Supreme

Court allowed the appeal and held that since the first

extension itself was illegal on account of non-compliance

with the mandatory requirement of production of the

accused and non-application of mind by the Public

Prosecutor, the indefeasible right to default bail had

crystallized in favour of the accused. The Court observed

that a subsequent extension or even the filing of the

chargesheet cannot cure the illegality of the first extension,

and the accused's right to default bail, once acquired,

cannot be defeated. In the present case, the facts are

almost identical. The impugned first extension order suffers

from the same infirmities as in Md. Ariz Hasnain (supra),
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and accordingly, the ratio of the said judgment applies

squarely to the facts of the present case.


17.          We have carefully perused the judgment relied

on by learned APP in Qamar Ghani Usmani (supra). We

find that the said judgment is factually distinguishable

from the present case. In that case, although the first

extension was granted without producing the accused, he

was informed about it the very next day. Despite having

knowledge,    the   accused   did   not   challenge   the   first

extension. More importantly, the second extension was

granted in his presence, and even at that time, the accused

did not raise any grievance about the same or challenge the

legality of the first extension. The Supreme Court therefore,

held that the accused had acquiesced to the extension and

he was not entitled to default bail as he had allowed the

extended period to pass without any legal challenge.


             In stark contrast, in the present case, the

appellant was neither produced before the Court nor

informed of the filing of the extension application, which is

a mandatory requirement under Section 187(4) of BNSS

read with Section 21 of the MCOC Act. He challenged the


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illegality at the earliest opportunity and filed his application

for default bail before the expiry of 1st extension period.

The reliance placed by the learned A.P.P. on the judgment is

therefore misplaced. Consequently, the said judgment being

distinguishable on facts does not advance the case of the

respondents.


18.         The order dated 08.04.2026 by which the

learned Special Court granted an extension of 60 days for

completing the investigation and filing the charge-sheet,

shows that the mandatory requirement of law, that the

public prosecutor must apply his independent mind, is not

followed. The order of the learned Special Court does not

reflect   any   independent   reasons,   while    granting    the

extension for filing the charge-sheet and completing the

investigation. It is also a fact that the appellant was not

informed about the filing of the extension application nor

the appellant was produced before the Court physically or

by way of video conferencing.


19.         The present appeal is filed by the appellant on

30.06.2026, after the first extension was granted on

08.04.2026. While this application was pending in this


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Court, the learned Special Judge granted the second

extension by order dated 11.06.2026 and rejected the

default bail application by order dated 11.06.2026 and the

charge-sheet is filed on 10.07.2026 while the second

extension was still in force.


            The non-compliance with all these mandatory

requirements makes the extension illegal and arbitrary

entitling the appellant to claim the default bail. In view of

the fact that the order dated 08.04.2026 extending the time

for completion of investigation is held to be illegal and since

the charge-sheet came to be filed well after the expiry of

statutory period of 90 days, the appellant is entitled to get

the default bail and thus has acquired indefeasible right to

be released on bail.


20.         Considering all the aforesaid aspects, we pass

the following order.


                           ORDER


(i)    The appeal is hereby allowed.


(ii)   The impugned order dated 08.04.2026 passed by the

learned Special Judge under MCOC Act, Shrirampur

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granting further extension of 90 days and 60 days to the

investigating agency for filing charge-sheet on completion of

investigation resorting to the provisions of Section 21(2)(b)

of the MCOC Act is quashed and set aside.


(iii)   The impugned order dated 11.06.2026 passed by the

learned Special Judge under MCOC Act, Shrirampur

rejecting the application for default bail is quashed and set

aside.


(iv)    The appellant shall be released on default bail under

Section 187(4) of the BNSS upon furnishing bail bond and

sureties to the satisfaction of the learned Special Judge

under MCOC Act, Shrirampur. The Special Court shall be

entitled to impose suitable condition to secure the presence

of the accused during the trial.


(v)     The appeal is disposed of accordingly.




[VAISHALI PATIL-JADHAV]            [SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE]
          JUDGE                            JUDGE




             After pronouncement of the judgment, learned

APP seeks stay of this order for at least four weeks so that it

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can be challenged before the Apex Court. However, we have

decided the matter on merits after giving due opportunity

to both the sides, therefore, we are not inclined to grant

stay at this juncture. As such, request for stay of the order

is rejected.



[VAISHALI PATIL-JADHAV]         [SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE]
          JUDGE                         JUDGE




sga




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