Bombay High Court
VIKAS BHASKAR DONGREversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS
- Decided
- Disposal
- Allowed
Holding
The High Court quashed the FIR and chargesheet under Sections 406, 420 and 34 IPC, subject to the applicant paying costs of Rs.25,000 to a charitable trust.
Summary
The applicant sought consent quashing of criminal proceedings arising from a vehicle sale dispute, wherein both parties had settled their civil differences and exchanged outstanding amounts. The High Court examined its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (and the analogous Section 528 of the BNSS), and the Supreme Court's guidelines in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal for quashing FIRs. It held that the offences—IPC Sections 406, 420 and 34—were not heinous and the dispute was essentially civil, permitting quashing. However, the Court imposed costs of Rs.25,000 on the applicant to be paid to a charitable trust to deter misuse of criminal law. The application was therefore allowed, the FIR and chargesheet were quashed, and the cost order was directed.
Issues considered
- Whether a criminal proceeding arising from a civil/commercial dispute can be quashed by consent under Section 482 CRPC/Section 528 BNSS.
- Whether the offences under IPC Sections 406, 420 and 34 are amenable to quashing despite being non‑compoundable.
- Whether the Court may impose costs on the applicant in a consent‑quashing application.
Legislation cited
- Bombay (BNSS) (presumed statutory provision) — s. 528
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 482
- Indian Penal Code — s. 34, 406, 420
- Public Trust Act — s. XXIX of 1950
- Society Registration Act — s. XXI of 1980
Subjects
- consent quashing
- Section 482 CRPC
- Section 528 BNSS
- civil settlement
- costs order
- IPC 406
- IPC 420
- abuse of process
Judgment
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HARSHADA H. SAWANT
(P.A.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.1766 OF 2026
Vikas Bhaskar Dongre .. Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra and Ors. .. Respondents
....................
Mr. Karim Pathan a/w. Mr. Fazal Shaikh, Advocates i/by Mr.
Pramod Chauhan for Applicant.
Ms. Shilpa G. Talhar, APP for Respondent No.1.
Ms. Faiyaz Khan, Advocate i/by Nida Sameer Arshad Shaikh for
Respondent Nos.2, 3, 5 to 8.
Ms. Rupali Ahire a/w. Mr. Gobindram Talreja, Advocates i/by Mr.
Vinod Talreja for Respondent No.4.
PSI – Dipak Thorat, Oshiwara Police Station.
...................
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : OCTOBER 08, 2026
P.C.:
1. Heard Mr. Pathan, learned Advocate for Applicant; Ms.
Talhar, learned APP for Respondent No.1; Ms. Khan, learned Advocate
for Respondent Nos.2, 3, 5 to 8 and Ms. Ahire, learned Advocate for
Respondent No.4.
2. The dispute between the parties emanates from a
transaction relating to sales and purchase of a vehicle. The parties have
reconciled their disputes and have requested the Court for consent
quashing. The parties have also exchanged their outstanding amounts
with each other which is part of the Consent Terms. All 7
Complainants arrayed as Respondent Nos.2 to 8 have filed their
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Affidavits which are taken on record. The Consent Affidavits are taken
on record. I have perused the same and the same are in order.
Adhering to the request made by the parties, I am inclined to accept
the request for consent quashing.
3. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 conferred
inherent powers on High Courts to pass such orders as are justified to
give effect to any order in the Court, prevent abuse of process of any
Court or secure the ends of justice. In the BNSS this provision stands
incorporated with Section 528 which substantially reproduces the
language and intent of Section 482 of the CRPC, 1973 High Courts
invoke this provision to step in where cases have been instituted with
malafide motives or to harass the accused person thereby avoiding
procedural harassment. It empowers Court to dismiss FIRs or criminal
proceedings if there is no prima facie case or evidence against the
accused person/s or if orders are made in violation of the principles of
natural justice. The exercise of such powers under Section 482 of CRPC
and now Section 528 of BNSS remains discretionary and varies from
case to case.
4. In State of Harayana vs Bhajan Lal1 the Supreme Court laid
down model categories and guidelines in paragraph No. 102 of the
said judgment in which the FIRs can be quashed. The Supreme Court
has further asserted that power under Section 482 is an
1 1992 AIR 604
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acknowledgment of "powers inherent" and not the source of powers
additional. It has held that even non compoundable offences can be
quashed where necessary. It has held that High Courts have to decide
whether the prosecution of an offence would further or be against the
interest of justice. It is also held that grievous offences such as murder,
rape, and dacoity cannot ordinarily be quashed even after settlement
because they involve societal implication.
5. In the above context, when parties settle their private dispute
or the lis between them is purely civil and commercial or matrimonial
and the offence is not heinous or does not impact the society at large,
the Court can consider such request. In such a case awarding costs for
putting the criminal law into motion on the act of the accused persons
and thereafter both parties seeking quashing of proceedings by
consent, in my opinion, can be considered by Court which can impose
costs on the parties, especially so in matters coming before the Court
by “consent quashing”.
6. For above levy of costs the legal principle rests on the logic
that criminal law cannot be used as a bargaining chip or a tool for
private settlements after draining the State and judicial resources. In
simple words, Courts cannot be used as a recovery mechanism to settle
scores and/or bring the parties into subjugation. I am of the firm
opinion that imposition of costs in consent quashing matters is
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required to be levied for three main reasons viz., wastage of public
resources, consumption of valuable judicial time and for deterrence
against vexatious litigation. This is because after criminal machinery
is set into motion, the Police Department is forced to take cognizance,
conduct investigations, attend courts, deploy personnel, collect
evidence and draft chargesheets, all using public funds/ public
exchequer. Equally substantial judicial time of the Trial Courts and
Sessions Courts is wasted for handling a case, presentation of a case,
issuance of summons, scheduling of trial dates, appointment of
prosecutors and their fees, etc. and ultimately if consent quashing is
allowed such judicial time stands completely wasted, which could have
otherwise been used for genuine Trial Court matters/ litigation in one
way such matters result in clogging the legal system and lead to
humongous pendency which becomes difficult to tackle.
7. Another aspect to consider for imposing costs is that it curbs
the growing trend of filing strategically exaggerated criminal
complaints (especially matrimonial or commercial disputes) simply to
force financial and legal settlements. In a given case made out on
merits of the matter, even the Complainant can be put to costs while
considering a quashing Petition purely on merits depending upon the
facts of each case before Court. In some strong circumstances, even the
State machinery can be put to costs if a purely civil dispute between
parties strongly emanating from the facts on record is registered as
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criminal case and given the flavor of criminality. This Court is also
equally conscious about not imposing costs blindly or mechanically if a
particular party is not found to be remiss or at explicit fault for abusing
the law, as also conscious about heinous offences impacting the society
at large while considering consent quashing.
8. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, I am of the opinion that the Applicant for his actions resulting in
the complainant invoking criminal proceedings and now both the
parties seeking quashing by consent, the Applicant should pay costs.
Hence, Applicant is directed to pay costs of Rs.25,000/- towards the
Corpus of A.K. Munshi Yojana a trust which runs medical centres,
vocational training centres and which also runs a Special School called
J.T. Sheth Mandbuddhi Vikas Kendra, imparting education and training
to the needs of 150 special children in the field of Education (Classes
for 6 to 18 years), early intervention (upto 6 years) and vocational
training (18 years above) having its school address and building at A.K.
Munshi Yojana Chowk, 3rd Panjarapole Lane, C.P. Tank, Mumbai – 400
004 [Contact Nos. 22425513 / 22423654] registered under the Society
Registration Act, XXI of 1980 under No. : 387/81 GBBSD and the
Public Trust Act, XXIX of 1950 under No. F-6809. RCI Reg. No. 0163
within a period of two weeks from the date of uploading of this order.
Applicant is present in Court and through his learned Advocates agree
to pay the aforesaid costs amount to the charity.
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9. In view of the above matter, the present Application deserves
to be allowed subject to payment of costs as directed herein above. At
the request of parties, it is so allowed in terms of prayer clauses ‘a’
which reads thus:-
“a) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash the chargesheet/criminal
proceedings in FIR being C.R. No. 134 of 2019, registered with
Oshiwara Police Station, Mumbai, for offences punishable under
Sections 406, 420 & 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and the
consequent Chargesheet/C.C. No. Police Case/PW/479/2025,
arising therefrom and pending before the Id. J.M. Railway Court,
Andheri Court, Mumbai;”
10. List the Application for compliance of the order regarding
payment of costs on 23rd October 2026.
11. Advocate in Application for Applicant shall remain present
and show compliance on behalf of Applicant on the returnable date for
compliance. If learned Advocate for Applicant not remain present and
there is non-compliance of this order, Court will pass appropriate order
for recall of this order, which shall be noted by the Applicant/parties to
Application.
12. Criminal Application is allowed and disposed.
H. H. SAWANT [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
Digitally signed by
HARSHADA HARSHADA
HANUMANT
HANUMANT SAWANT
SAWANT Date: 2026.10.10
12:54:53 +0530
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