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Bombay High Court

ASHOK KHEMCHAND KOTHARI AND ANRversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

Decided
Disposal
Disposed Off

Holding

The High Court quashed FIR No. 438 of 2024 (renumbered as FIR No. 55 of 2024) and the accompanying charge‑sheet, directing the applicants to pay costs of Rs. 15,000 to a charitable trust.

Summary

The applicants, Ashok Khemchand Kothari & ors., were accused in FIR No. 438 of 2024 for offences under Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC arising from a loan dispute with the complainant, who filed the FIR on behalf of his deceased wife, a licensed money‑lender. The applicants repaid the entire loan amount and the complainant executed an affidavit consenting to the quashing of the FIR. The High Court examined its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (and the analogous Section 528 of the BNSS) and the guidelines laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal for quashing FIRs. It held that, since the dispute was commercial, the offences were non‑heinous and the parties had reached an amicable settlement, the FIR could be quashed, but costs of Rs. 15,000 were to be paid to a charitable trust. The application for quashing was therefore allowed subject to payment of costs.

Issues considered

  • The appropriateness of quashing FIR No. 438 of 2024 on the basis of a mutual settlement between the parties
  • Whether the High Court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (and Section 528 BNSS) to dismiss the criminal proceedings for non‑heinous offences
  • The propriety of imposing costs on the applicants in a consent‑quashing petition

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • quashing of FIR
  • Section 482 CrPC
  • consent settlement
  • costs in criminal proceedings
  • non‑heinous offences
  • commercial loan dispute
  • IPC 406
  • IPC 420
  • IPC 120B

Judgment

                                                                             101. APL 436-2025.doc



                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 436 OF 2025

                      Ashok Khemchand Kothari & ors.                     .Applicants

                                     Vs.

         Digitally
                      The State of Maharashtra & anr.                    .Respondents
         signed by
         ANAND
ANAND    SUDHAKAR
SUDHAKAR SUDAME       Mr. Chaitanya Pendse a/w. Mr. Chandrabhushan Shukla & Mr. Vihaan
SUDAME   Date:
         2026.09.18
         10:29:04
                      Jadhav i/b. C S Legal, Advocates, for the Applicants
         +0530
                      Ms. R. V. Newton, APP, for Respondent No. 1 – State
                      Mr. Ketan Bhosale, Advocate, for Respondent No. 2

                                           CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

                                           DATE    : 11.09.2026
                      P. C.

                      1.      Heard Mr. Pendse, learned Counsel for the Applicants,

                      Ms. Newton, learned APP for Respondent No. 1 and Mr. Bhosale,

                      learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2/Complainant.

                      2.      At the outset, Mr. Pendse submits that this Court may grant leave

                      to incorporate the details of the Charge-sheet which has been filed.

                      Draft amendment is tendered to the Court. The same is taken on record

                      and is allowed. Amendment is permitted to be carried out in the

                      Court’s record within a period of two weeks from today. Re-verification

                      stands dispensed with.




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3.      Mr. Bhosale submits that he needs to file his Vakalatnama on

behalf of Respondent No. 2/Complainant. The Respondent No. 2

himself is the First Informant, who had lodged the complaint on behalf

of his wife, who is demised and who was holding a money lender

license. There was a business relationship transaction of borrowing of

money between the parties. Affidavit has been filed by the Respondent

No. 2/Complainant for consent quashing, a copy of which is appended

at page 23 (Exh.B). It is dated 28.03.2025. In paragraph Nos. 3 & 4 of

the said Affidavit, it is stated as under :-

        “3. I say that the Applicants had approached my wife
        and proposed to repay the entire loan amount and settle
        the issue. I say that the Applicants have now re-paid the
        entire loan amount. The Applicants and my wife Nandini
        Nimesh Suchde have amicably settled the issue and thus
        on the instructions and being authorised by my wife
        Nandini Nimesh Suchde I have agreed for quashing of the
        FIR by mutual consent.

        4.    I say that in view of the amicable settlement arrived
        between the Applicants and my wife Nandini Nimesh
        Suchde, I have executed this present affidavit giving my
        consent for quashing of the FIR No. 438 of 2024
        registered by the Worli Police Station for the offences
        punishable U/s. 406, 420 and 120B of IPC.”

4.      The Respondent No. 2 has received his entire amount. He is

present in Court. He confirms receipt of the amount and the amicable

settlement between the parties having interacted with him. There is no

reason to disbelieve him.


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5.      Ms. Newton persuades the Court that there is one antecedent

against the Applicants. Be that as it may, appropriate Course of action

can be taken by the prosecution regard to the same. Merely because

there is an antecedent insofar as the present transaction is concerned,

since it has now been fructified and the parties are desirous of moving

ahead, the Court should put a quietus to the whole issue. In any event,

the relationship between the parties was a business relationship which

had a Civil flavour.

6.      Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 conferred

inherent powers on High Courts to pass such orders as are justified to

give effect to any order in the Court, prevent abuse of process of any

Court or secure the ends of justice. In the BNSS this provision stands

incorporated with Section 528 which substantially reproduces the

language and intent of Section 482 of the CRPC, 1973 High Courts

invoke this provision to step in where cases have been instituted with

malafide motives or to harass the accused person thereby avoiding

procedural harassment. It empowers Court to dismiss FIRs or criminal

proceedings if there is no prima facie case or evidence against the

accused person/s or if orders are made in violation of the principles of

natural justice. The exercise of such powers under Section 482 of CRPC

and now Section 528 of BNSS remains discretionary and varies from


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case to case.

7.      In State of Harayana vs Bhajan Lal 1 the Supreme Court laid

down model categories and guidelines in paragraph No. 102 of the said

judgment in which the FIRs can be quashed. The Supreme Court has

further asserted that power under Section 482 is an acknowledgment

of "powers inherent" and not the source of powers additional. It has

held that even non compoundable offences can be quashed where

necessary. It has held that High Courts have to decide whether the

prosecution of an offence would further or be against the interest of

justice. It is also held that grievous offences such as murder, rape, and

dacoity cannot ordinarily be quashed even after settlement because

they involve societal implication.


8.      In the above context, when parties settle their private dispute or

the lis between them is purely civil and commercial or matrimonial and

the offence is not heinous or does not impact the society at large, the

Court can consider such request. In such a case awarding costs for

putting the criminal law into motion on the act of the accused persons

and thereafter both parties seeking quashing of proceedings by

consent, in my opinion, can be considered by Court which can impose

costs on the parties, especially so in matters coming before the Court


1
     1992 AIR 604

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by “consent quashing”.


9.      For above levy of costs the legal principle rests on the logic that

criminal law cannot be used as a bargaining chip or a tool for private

settlements after draining the State and judicial resources. In simple

words, Courts cannot be used as a recovery mechanism to settle scores

and/or bring the parties into subjugation. I am of the firm opinion that

imposition of costs in consent quashing matters is required to be levied

for three main reasons viz., wastage of public resources, consumption

of valuable judicial time and for deterrence against vexatious litigation.

This is because after criminal machinery is set into motion, the Police

Department is forced to take cognizance, conduct investigations, attend

courts, deploy personnel, collect evidence and draft chargesheets, all

using public funds/ public exchequer. Equally substantial judicial time

of the Trial Courts and Sessions Courts is wasted for handling a case,

presentation of a case, issuance of summons, scheduling of trial dates,

appointment of prosecutors and their fees, etc. and ultimately if

consent quashing is allowed such judicial time stands completely

wasted, which could have otherwise been used for genuine Trial Court

matters/ litigation in one way such matters result in clogging the legal

system and lead to humongous pendency which becomes difficult to

tackle.

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10.     Another aspect to consider for imposing costs is that it curbs the

growing trend of filing strategically exaggerated criminal complaints

(especially matrimonial or commercial disputes) simply to force

financial and legal settlements. In a given case made out on merits of

the matter, even the Complainant can be put to costs while considering

a quashing Petition purely on merits depending upon the facts of each

case before Court. In some strong circumstances, even the State

machinery can be put to costs if a purely civil dispute between parties

strongly emanating from the facts on record is registered as criminal

case and given the flavor of criminality. This Court is also equally

conscious about not imposing costs blindly or mechanically if a

particular party is not found to be remiss or at explicit fault for abusing

the law, as also conscious about heinous offences impacting the society

at large while considering consent quashing.


11.     Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,

I am of the opinion that the Applicants, for their actions resulting in

the complainant invoking criminal proceedings and now both the

parties seeking quashing by consent, the Applicants, should pay costs.

Hence, the Applicants are directed to pay costs of Rs. 15,000/- towards

the Corpus of A.K. Munshi Yojana a trust which runs medical centres,

vocational training centres and which also runs a Special School called

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J.T. Sheth Mandbuddhi Vikas Kendra, imparting education and training

to the needs of 150 special children in the field of Education (Classes

for 6 to 18 years), early intervention (upto 6 years) and vocational

training (18 years above) having its school address and building at A.K.

Munshi Yojana Chowk, 3rd Panjarapole Lane, C.P. Tank, Mumbai – 400

004 [Contact Nos. 22425513 / 22423654] registered under the Society

Registration Act, XXI of 1980 under No. : 387/81 GBBSD and the

Public Trust Act, XXIX of 1950 under No. F-6809. RCI Reg. No. 0163

within a period of two weeks from the date of uploading of this order.

The Applicants are present in Court and through their learned

Advocate agrees to pay the aforesaid costs amount to the charity.


12.     In view of the above matter, the present Application deserves to

be allowed subject to payment of costs as directed herein above. The

Application stands allowed in terms of newly amended prayer clause

(a) as per the draft amendment granted today which reads as under :-

        “a)     This Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash the FIR No. 438 of
        2024 i. e. renumbered by Respondent No. 1 as F.I.R. No. 55 of 2024
        along with the Chargesheet arising out of F. I. R. No. 438 of 2024
        renumbered by Respondent No. 1 as F. I. R. No. 55 of 2024 by
        Respondent No. 2, filed before the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate’s 47 th
        Court at Esplanade bearing Case Number PW/999/2025, for the
        said offences charged U/s. 406, 420 and 120B of IPC on such terms
        and conditions that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper.”


13.     List the Application for compliance of the order regarding


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payment of costs on 28.09.2026.


14.     Advocate for the Applicants shall remain present and show

compliance on behalf of the Applicants on the returnable date for

compliance. If he does not remain present and there is non-compliance

of this order, Court will pass appropriate order for recall of this order,

which shall be noted by the Applicants.


15.     Criminal Application is allowed and disposed.



                                                 (MILIND N. JADHAV, J.)




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