AKBAR UDDIN S/O. SULTAN SALAHUDDIN OWAISIversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

2026:BHC-AUG:34939-DB




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                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
                                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                           CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1920 OF 2022

              Akbar Uddin s/o Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi
              age 52 years, occ. MLA
              r/o Banjara Hill, Road No. 12
              House No. 8-2-686/B/A/Hyderabad (Telangana) .. Applicant

              versus

              1.    The State of Maharashtra

              2.    Rajasingh T. Naval Singh Lodh
                    age 45 years, occ. MLA
                    r/o 13-5-158/41,
                    Kshatriya Nagar, Tappachabutra
                    Amalpur, Hyderabad (Telangana)           .. Respondents

              Mr. N. S. Ghanekar, along with Mr. S. S. Subhedar, Advocates for the
              Applicant.
              Ms. R. P. Gour, APP for the State.

                                           CORAM : R. M. JOSHI, J.
                                           DATE : 6th AUGUST, 2026.
              JUDGMENT :


              1.    This application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal

              Procedure seeks quashment of proceeding in RCC No. 17/2021

              pending before learned JMFC, Ardhapur, District Nanded, for offences

              punishable under Section 295A and 298 of Indian Penal Code and

              order dated 15.11.2021 of taking cognizance and issuance of

              summons against the Applicant.
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2.    It is the contention of learned Counsel for the Applicant that

Respondent No. 2 filed private complaint against the Applicant before

the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in respect of offence

under Sections 295A and 298 of Indian Penal Code claiming that on

03.01.2013, while he was browsing internet YouTube, he came across

a video in which the Applicant was addressing public meeting.

According to Respondent No. 2, accused has used derogative words

against his community and Lord Shriram.       The Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Hyderabad passed order under Section 156(3) of Code of

Criminal Procedure and after registration of crime with Mangalghat

Police Station, the same came to be transferred to Ardhapur police

station,   District   Nanded,    Maharashtra,     for   investigation.

Investigation into Crime No. 68/2013 was completed with filing of

charge-sheet on 15.03.2021. Pursuant to the filing of said charge-

sheet, criminal proceeding was registered as RCC No. 17/2021. The

learned Magistrate passed order on 15.11.2021 issuing summons to

the Applicant/accused. Thus, according to the Applicant, cognizance

of this crime has been taken on 15.11.2021.



3.    Applicant seeks quashment of the First Information Report,

charge-sheet and order of issuance of process against him on the
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ground that the offence under Section 298 of Indian Penal Code is

punishable with imprisonment of one       year and the offence under

Section 295A is punishable with imprisonment which may extent to 3

years, and as per Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the

maximum period of limitation for taking cognizance by the Court is

three years from the date of alleged commission of crime. It is his

submission that since cognizance has been taken on 15.11.2021, i.e.

beyond three years, the proceeding cannot survive. He further claims

that the allegations against him do not disclose any deliberate act

committed by him with malicious intention to outrage the religious

feelings of any person. It is his claim that the allegations do not show

that the Applicant insulted or attempted to insult the religion or

religious beliefs of any class.   It is also claimed that outrage of

religious sentiments of any citizen with respect of online content is a

subjective judgment. On these amongst other contentions, the reliefs

as recorded hereinabove are sought.



4.    Learned Counsel for the Applicant, at the outset, submits that

the proceedings are barred by limitation in view of provisions of

Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure which mandates

cognizance of offence to be taken within a period of three years in
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case the punishment is upto three years and one year in case

punishment is upto one year as applicable in this case for offences

under Sections 295A and 298 respectively of Indian Penal Code. In

order to support his submissions, he drew attention of the Court to

the fact that the alleged statement has been made on 08.12.2011 in a

speech addressing public rally however, First Information    Report

came to be lodged in the year 2013 and the order of cognizance has

been taken on 15.11.2021.     Thus, it is his submission that the

proceedings including First Information Report and order of taking

cognizance cannot sustain.



5.   On merits, it is his submission that the alleged statements

made by the Applicant are required to be taken into consideration in

the backdrop of the subject on which he was speaking. According to

him, the subject of the speech was the judgment of Allahabad High

Court in Ram Janmabhoomi case.        It is his submission that the

Applicant was deliberating the issues which were raised/canvassed

before the Allahabad High Court.   It is his submission that in the

said context, if any statement was made, it cannot be called as

intentional, deliberate or malicious with an aim to hurt religious
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feelings of any class of the society. To support his submissions, he

placed reliance on following judgments :-

(i)     Harijinder Singh @ Zinda & Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors.
        [2025] 6 S.C.R. 168 (on the point of Section 295A)

(ii)    Ramji Lal Modi vs. The State of U.P.
        (1957) Supreme Court Reports 8
        (challenge to constitutional validity of Section 295A)

(iii)   Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan vs. Union of India (UOI) and others
        (2014) AIR (SC) 1591

(iv)    Rajendra Sail vs. Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association
        and others,
        (2005) AIR (SC) 2473.

(v)     Sudheer Rikhari vs. State of Goa and others
        2021 Supreme(Bom) 1025
        (Section 295A -wherein in complaint no allegation of intentional
        outraging of religious feelings has made)

(vi)    Shri Dulal Ghosh vs. The State of Tripura & others
        AIRONLINE 2021 TRI 92
        (petitioner claims twisting of his post and also claims no
         intention to hurt religious feelings)



6.      Learned APP opposed the application by contending that once

offence punishable under Sections 295A and 298 of Indian Penal

Code is made out, there is no question of causing interference in the

order of issuance of process or charge-sheet which was preceded by

First Information Report. It is submitted that the Applicant being a

member of Legislative Assembly was fully conscious of his statements
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and impact thereof when he addressed a public rally. According to

her, the statements made in the speech, as recorded in the complaint

filed by Respondent No. 2, are prima facie sufficient to show that it

was an intentional, deliberate and malicious act on the part of the

Applicant which would hurt sentiments and religious beliefs of class

of citizens. It is further argued that the right of speech and freedom

of expression cannot be extended to such an extent that a person is

permitted to hurt religious beliefs which constitutes an offence. She

further argued that evidence collected during the course of

investigation i.e. the audio/video of the speech given by the Applicant

clearly indicates his intention by the manner in which those words

were uttered. According to her the tone and throw reflect clear cut

intention and malice of mocking the religious belief of Hindu

community and to hurt the same. She sought to place reliance on

this evidence collected during course of investigation. In respect of

submission with regard to Section 298       of Indian Penal Code the

period of limitation for lodging complaint would be one year, she

refers to sub-section 3 of Section 468 which, according to her, deals

with the situation wherein the period of limitation is to be

determined in respect of more than one offence to be tried together.

She submits that since offence under Section 298 is tried with
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Section 295A of Indian Penal Code, cognizance has been taken within

limitation. In response to the argument with regard to Section 468 of

Code of Criminal Procedure, it is submitted that computation of

period of limitation and the relevant date for that purpose would be

the date of filing of complaint or date of intimation of criminal

proceeding and not the date of order of issuance of summons to the

accused.     To support these submissions, reliance is placed on

following judgments :-

(i)     Roma Ahuja vs. State and Another
        AIR 2026 Supreme Court 1793
        (on Section 468 of Cr.P.C.)

(ii)    Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar vs. State of Maharashtra & others
        (2019) 14 Supreme Court Cases 350
        (on point of scope of quashment proceeding)

(iii)   Amish Devgan vs. Union of India and others
        (2021) 1 Supreme Court Cases 1
        (on hate speech)


7.      At the outset, it needs to be recorded that for the purpose of

considering the prayer for quashment of First Information Report,

charge-sheet and order of issuance of process against Applicant, this

Court would be guided by the guidelines laid down by Hon’ble

Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal

and others, AIR 1992 SCC 335.           The relevant paragraph reads

thus :-
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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined    and   sufficiently   channelised   and   inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.


(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.


(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.


(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.


(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.


(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code of the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.


(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with   mala   fide   and/or    where   the   proceeding    is
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     maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
     vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him
     due to private and personal grudge.”



8.    Similarly, in case of Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the law on the point of

quashment of criminal proceeding has held as under :-

     “5.    Quashing the criminal proceedings is called for only
     in a case where the complaint does not disclose any
     offence, or is frivolous, vexatious, or offence of which
     cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to
     the High Court to quash the same. It is not necessary that
     a meticulous analysis of the case should be done before
     the trial to find out whether the case would end in
     conviction or acquittal. If it appears on a reading of the
     complaint and consideration of the allegations therein, in
     the light of the statement made on oath that the
     ingredients of the offence are disclosed, there would be no
     justification for the High Court to interfere.”



      Thus, acceptance of complaint/First Information Report as it is

if makes out an offence, it would not be open for the Court to cause

interference therein and quash the same at this stage. On the other

hand, on accepting the case of prosecution as it is, if no case is made

out, then the Court is duty bound to quash the proceeding.           This
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would follow also in case allegations are absurd or improbable or it is

a case of abuse of process of law.



9.      Before dealing with the factual aspect of the case, it would be

relevant to take note of relevant provisions applicable to the instant

case.     The Applicant is charged for the offence punishable under

Sections 295A and 298 of Indian Penal Code, which read thus :

        295A. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to
        outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its
        religion or religious beliefs—

              Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of
        outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of
        India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or
        by visible representations or otherwise, insults or
        attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of
        that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
        description for a term which may extend to three years,
        or with fine, or with both.




        298. Uttering, words, etc., with deliberate intent to
        wound the religious feelings of any person.—

              Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding
        the religious feelings of any person, utters any word or
        makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes
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      any gesture in the sight of that person or places, any
      object in the sight of that person, shall be punished with
      imprisonment of either description for a term which may
      extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.



      Above provisions indicate that in order to constitute an offence

under these provisions, the prosecution must show that there was

any deliberate/intentional act on the part of the accused to outrage

and would the religious feelings of any class by insulting religion or

religious beliefs.



10.   The terms ‘deliberate’ and ‘malicious’ are not defined by Indian

Penal Code and as such, general definition of these terms is required

to be considered. As per dictionary meaning, deliberate act is the one

which is done for a purpose in planned and decided manner and not

by chance. In other words, if any act is calculated, then it would be

called as deliberate. The word ‘malicious’ is defined as an act done

with a purpose to hurt, upset or harm another person. Thus, if an

act is done to cause hurt, whether physical or emotional, or upset

any person, would be called as an malicious action. Needless to say

the intention of a person and as to whether the act was deliberate or

otherwise would be required to be considered in the backdrop of the
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overall facts and circumstances of the case. However, the words by

themselves in isolation can not determine the same.



11.   Needless to state that while deciding existence / occurrence of

offence, more particularly, which is verbal in nature, the factual

circumstances of the case are required to be considered in order to

ascertain intent/malice etc. The Court, in the case like one in hand,

has to see whether prima facie    act attributed to the Applicant is

intentional or unintentional i.e. unplanned or committed by mistake

or is calculated and measured one. This Court would also required

to see as to whether the statements made were intended or even

attempted to insult the religious feelings. Whenever any words are

spoken the tone of utterances also would indicate the intent to a

great extent. It is said that the tone, pitch and throw of the words

determine the underline intent of the speaker.        Even innocuous

words otherwise may become lethal to hurt emotions. Not to ignore

as to how a listener perceives the speaker’s real goal. The vocabulary

itself is not the meaning of words but the way it is spoke, its tone

which would carry emotions of person that would set true meaning of

what is intended to be communicated. The intent always would be

subtle and invisible layer, which could be gathered from the way
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words are spoken. Of course, this aspect would be considered during

trial.    In this context, the submissions of learned APP become

relevant to draw attention of the Court, to the tone and way of the

utterances in question by Applicant so also response of the listeners.



12.      Our constitution guarantees freedom of religion which includes

right of a person to practice his religion, freedom of conscience and

the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. It is open

for the citizens to follow a religion of their choice     which would

obviously include right of not to follow any religion. Even an Atheist

denying existence of God or a non believer is permitted to have his

own opinion and it may not be treated as hurting religious

sentiments of others.      However, at the same time, he cannot be

allowed to disrespect any religion and hurt the beliefs of the persons

following such religion.



13.      Often, religious feelings are nothing but faith, practices and

value which are embeded into the minds of the people based upon

the beliefs, holy scriptures and the history.      Once the same is

accepted, it is not necessary that every belief must pass the test of

rationality or scientific proof. It is even in such case there would be
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no reason to allow intentional and malicious hurting of religious

feelings or sentiments of any class of persons.



14.   Coming to the grounds of challenge, this Court at the first

would like to deal with the ground raised by the Applicant with

regard to the cognizance of the offence being taken beyond the period

of limitation. In this regard, certain facts which are not in dispute

are required to be considered, such as the Applicant does not dispute

to have delivered the speech in question on 08.12.2011 and the

contention of the complainant with regard to the contents of the said

speech are also not in dispute. It is the case of the Applicant that

since the alleged speech has been given on 08.12.2011 and as

cognizance of the same has been taken by the concerned Magistrate

on 15.11.2021, in view of Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure,

the said cognizance has been taken beyond limitation and as such,

criminal proceeding cannot sustain against the Applicant.       It is

pertinent to note that a complaint was made by the complainant in

respect of the speech delivered on 08.12.2011 on 03.01.2013. Now,

question arises as to whether the action against the Applicant

instructed on the basis of said complaint under penal law is time

barred.
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15.   It would be relevant to take note of the judgment in case of

Ghanshyam Soni vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and another, 2025

(SC) 676, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering

entire law on the point, has made following observations :

      “15. It is a settled position of law that for the
      computation of the limitation period under Section 468
      CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint
      or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date
      on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The dicta laid
      down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v.
      State of Andhra Pradesh makes it unequivocally clear
      that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take
      cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three
      years from the date of the commission of offence as
      mandated under section 468 CrPC. The relevant portion
      is reproduced as under :-


          “50. The Code imposes an obligation on the
          aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate
          forum within the period provided by law and once
          he   takes   such   action,      it   would   be   wholly
          unreasonable and inequitable if he is told that his
          grievance would not be ventilated as the court had
          not taken an action within the period of limitation.
          Such interpretation of law, instead of promoting
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justice would lead to perpetuate injustice and
defeat the primary object of procedural law.


51.   The matter can be looked at from different
angle also.        Once it is accepted (and there is no
dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of
the complainant or prosecuting agency to take
cognizance of an offence or to issue process and
the only thing the former can do is to file a
complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance
with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings
has been taken within the period of limitation, the
complainant is not responsible for any delay on the
part of the court of Magistrate in issuing process or
taking cognizance of an offence.              Now, if he is
sought to be penalized because of the omission,
default or inaction on the part of the court or
Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be
tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a
provision     is     totally    arbitrary,   irrational   and
unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law
would interpret a provision which would help
sustaining the validity of law by applying the
doctrine of reasonable construction rather than
making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by
adopting rule of litera legis.               Connecting the
provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code
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with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by
the court may make it unsustainable and ultra
vires Article 14 of the Constitution.


52.   In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation, the
relevant date must be considered as the date of
filing of compliant or initiating criminal proceedings
and not the date of taking cognizance by a
Magistrate of issuance of process by a court. We,
therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has
been held that the crucial date for computing the
period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the
Magistrate/court and not of filing of complaint or
initiation of criminal proceedings.


53.   In the instant case, the complaint was filed
within a period of three days from the date of
alleged offence. The complaint, therefore, must be
held to be filed within the period of limitation even
though cognizance was taken by the learned
Magistrate after a period of one year.     Since the
criminal proceedings have been quashed by the
High Court, the order deserves to be set aside and
is accordingly set aside by directing the Magistrate
to proceed with the case and pass an appropriate
order in accordance with law, as expeditiously as
possible.”
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      The law on the point thus is clear to say that the period of

limitation would be calculated on the basis of the date of offence and

the complaint or First Information Report lodged in that regard and

not order of issuance of process.          The offence punishable under

Section 295A attracts maximum sentence of three years and as such,

period of limitation would be three years in view of Section 468 of

Code of Criminal Procedure.         Section 468(3) contemplates the

situation in which there are more than one offences sought to be

tried in one trial and in case of two offences, if one offence is within

limitation irrespective of the fact whether cognizance of second

offence is within limitation or not, both offences would be treated

within limitation and as such, even in the present case, offence

under Section 298 can be proceeded with as its cogniznace has been

taken along with offence under Section 295A and that too within

period of three years.      The objection raised by Applicant in this

regard, therefore, fails.



16.   It would be fruitful to take note of the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in case of Ramji Lal Modi (supra) in which

constitutional validity of Section 295A was challenged and decided.
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The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while upholding constitutional validity

of the said provision, has made following observations :-

     “…… We are unable, in view of the language used in the
     impugned section, to accede to this argument. In the first
     place cl. (2) of Art. 19 protects a law imposing reasonable
     restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech
     and expression “in the interests of” public order, which is
     much wider than “for maintenance of” public order.            If,
     therefore, certain activities have a tendency to cause public
     disorder, a law penalising such activities as an offence
     cannot but be held to be a law imposing reasonable
     restrictions “in the interests of public order” although in
     some cases those activities may not actually lead to a
     breach of public order. In the next place s. 295A does not
     peanlise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult
     the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but
     it penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties
     of attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a
     class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate
     and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of
     that class.    Insults to religion offered unwittingly or
     carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention
     to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come
     within the section. In only punishes the aggravated form of
     insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate
     and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of
     that class.   The calculated tendency of this aggravated
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      form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order and the
      section, which penalises such activities, is well within the
      protection of cl.(2) of Art. 19 as being a law imposing
      reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to
      freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)
      (a). Having regard to the ingredients of the offence created
      by the impugned section, there cannot, in our opinion, be
      any possibility of this law being applied for purposes not
      sanctioned by the Constitution.         In other words, the
      language employed in the section is not wide enough to
      cover restrictions both within and without the limits of
      constitutionality permissible legislative action affecting the
      fundamental     right   guaranteed    by   Art.   19(1)(a)   and
      consequently, the question of severability does not arise
      and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the
      petitioner have no application to this case.
            For the reasons stated above, the impugned section
      falls well within the protection of cl. (2) of Art. 19 and this
      application must, therefore, be dismissed.”



      This judgment, therefore, clearly indicates that Section 295A

does not penalise any and every act of insult or attempt to insult the

religion or religious beliefs of the class of citizens but it penalises only

those acts of insult or those varieties of attempt to insult the religion

or religious beliefs which are perpetrated with deliberate and

malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.
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Exception thereto would be insult to the religion offered unwittingly

or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to

outrage the religious feelings of that class. This judgment, therefore,

clearly lays down the guidelines as to what a Court is required to see

for the purpose of quashment of proceeding involving offence

outraging religious beliefs.



17.   Here in this case, admittedly, the Applicant who is member of

Legislative Assembly in State of Andhra Pradesh was addressing an

election rally at Nanded.      During the speech he wrecked up issue

with regard to the decision of Allahabad High court in Ram

Janmabhoomi case. In the initial part of the speech, as it appears

from its text, references were made with regard to the issues involved

in the proceedings before the Allahabad High Court and also about

various claims made by different persons at different places with

regard to the birth place of Lord Shriram. The Applicant, however,

then referred certain statements ( as mentioned in bracketed portion

of page No. 22 annexed to the application), which this Court does not

wish to record in this order in order to avoid unwanted publicity

thereto, prima facie indicates intention to mock the religious figures;

Lord Shirram and his mother. Even otherwise, any such statement
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would be derogating to any woman and her child. In case, when such

statement is made in respect of Lord Shriram, who is worshiped in

this country, on the face of it, it would wound and hurt religious

sentiments/feelings    of   the   class    of   persons   who   are   his

believers/followers.



18.   Needless to say that any prudent/reasonable person, leave

apart, a member of Legislative Assembly, who is supposed to be more

responsible than citizens, would not make any such statement fully

knowing the fact that he is likely to hurt religious feelings of any

person or class of persons. Inspite of the same statement is made

and more particularly in the sequence of events as occurred during

the speech, prima facie, it could be said that in a planned and pre-

determined manner it was said so. On the face of it, there is nothing

to indicate that it was made hurriedly or carelessly, on the contrary,

it appears to be a measured statement. Apart from the fact that the

manner and the tone in which those statements are made, the

statements themselves are sufficient to outrage the religious beliefs of

a class of people.     Pertinently, those statements do not take the

issues and objections raised before Allahabad High Court in the

proceeding of Ram Janmabhoomi any forward. They are in form of
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mocking and apparently not instantaneous and, therefore, prima

facie, there is substance in the complaint made by the complainant

with regard to his religious feelings being outraged by the statements

made by the Applicant.         Since, the Applicant invites these

observations for deciding the proceeding of quashment, they are

made on prima facie consideration of record. Needless to say that the

Trial Court would not get influenced by the same while deciding trial

on merit.



19.   In view of settled position of law with regard to the quashment

of criminal proceeding, if the offence is made out against any person,

and contents of the First Information Report or evidence collected

during the course of investigation are sufficient to indicate his

involvement therein, question of quashment of such proceeding

would not arise.



20.   Even otherwise, freedom of speech is not an unfettered right of

any individual and it is always subject to the reasonable restrictions.

Constitutional validity of provisions of Section 295A being upheld by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court indicates that no one is permitted to

outrage/insult the religious feelings of any class of persons and once
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it is found that such act is neither unwitting nor careless or without

any deliberate or malicious intention of outraging the feelings,

invocation of provisions of Section 295A against such person would

be justified. In such cases it could not be said that such person is

required to undergo unnecessary rigours of the trial.        Undeniably,

constitutional structure promotes tolerance and values like liberty,

fraternity.      However,       tolerance    cannot   be   misconstrued/

misunderstood to there being a license to intentionally hurt the

religious feelings of others.



21.   Coming to the judgments cited on behalf of both the sides,

judgment in case of Harjinder Singh (supra) indicates that in the

facts of the case, the intention of the accused to outrage religious

sentiments and feelings was absent.           The Division Bench of this

Court in case of Sudheer Rikhari (supra) observed in paragraph No.

29 that in the complaint even there are no allegation of deliberate or

malicious intention to outrage religious feelings of any class of

persons. Similarly, in case of Dulal Ghosh (supra), it was the case of

the petitioner therein that his post has been deliberately twisted and

mis-interpreted. He, infact, specifically claims therein that he had no

intention to demean holy book Geeta. In the instant case, there is no
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dispute about the fact that the Applicant during the speech has

uttered   apparently    outrageous     statements    hurting    religious

sentiments of the class of persons.          Pertinently, even in the

application no specific plea is raised that Applicant had no intent to

hurt religious sentiments of a class of persons.     Thus, for want of

similarity of facts, the said judgments have no application to the

present case.   In the facts of the case, this cannot be called that

complaint is absurd or inherently improbable. Not to mention that

no case is sought to be made out that complaint is out of vengeance

or with ulterior motive to wreak personal vengeance / grudge. Thus,

the case in hand does not satisfy the requirements/guidelines laid

down in case of Bhajanlal (supra).



22.   Before parting it needs to be recorded that Learned APP, during

the course of arguments, made submission to the effect that the

speech in question is still available on YouTube (a social media

platform). If it is true that the speech of the Applicant is available on

YouTube inspite of the fact that the competent Court has taken

cognizance of the charge-sheet against the Applicant and has issued

process against him, it is a matter of serious concern. Needless to

say that once cognizance is taken by the competent Court in respect
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of the contents of any speech, its availability on the public platform

would only lead to perpetuating and continuation with the insult of

the religious feelings of a class of persons of which cognizance has

already been taken. This Court for want of appropriate parties to the

present proceeding, is unable to issue any direction.      However, it

hopes and trusts that the Government would take appropriate steps

in that regard forthwith.



23.   Application, since sans merit, deserves to be dismissed and

accordingly stands dismissed.



                                                ( R. M. JOSHI, J.)

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