DINESH SITARAM JONWAL AND OTHERSversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

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       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD

          930 CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3364 OF 2024

1.    Dinesh Sitaram Jonwal

2.    Lalita Sitaram Jonwal

3.    Trupti Sunil Barandwal

4.    Sunil Shankarlal Barandwal               ….Applicants

VERSUS

The State of Maharashtra & another             …..Respondents

Ms. C. P. Raktate, Advocate holding for Mr. B. S. Deshmukh,
Advocate for Applicants.
Mr. S. P. Joshi, APP for the State.

                               CORAM : R. M. JOSHI, J.
                               DATE : 28th AUGUST, 2026.
PER COURT :


1.     After hearing learned Counsel for both sides and when this

Court has shown disinclination to grant relief to Applicant No. 2,

learned Counsel for Applicants, on instructions, seeks withdrawal of

application qua Applicant No. 2.



2.    Application stands dismissed qua Applicant No. 2-Lalita

Sitaram Jonwal as withdrawn.
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3.    On the basis of First Information Report No. 60/2024

registered with Osmanpura Police Station, Tq. & Dist. Chhatrapati

Sambhajinagar, of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A,

323, 504, 506 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act, investigation came to be done which has resulted into

filing of charge-sheet against the present Applicants and co-accused.

There is allegation in the First Information Report by Respondent No.

2 against her husband and his relatives including present Applicants.

There is allegation that after her marriage with accused No. 1, for

some time, she was given proper treatment in the house and

thereafter accused persons started causing harassment to her on

different grounds including household work.       There is allegation

against co-accused of they demanding Rs. 10,00,000/- for the

purpose of construction of house. Insofar as Applicant Nos. 1, 3 and

4 are concerned, allegations against them are vague.



4.    Learned Counsel for Applicants submits that this is a classic

case wherein distant relatives of the husband are roped in this crime

for the purpose of causing harassment to them.         It is pointed out

from the First Information Report so also charge-sheet that there are

no specific allegations against these Applicants constituting any
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offence much less offence under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code.

To support her submissions, she has placed reliance on following

judgments :-

(i)     Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam and others vs. State of Bihar &
        others, 2022 AIR(SC) 820.
(ii)    Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand & another
        2010 AIR (SC) 3363.
(iii)   Priti Kumari vs. State of Bhiar and others
        2019 DGLS(SC) 1254
(iv)    Geeta Mehrotra and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
        & another, 2012(10) SC 741.



5.      Learned APP opposed the application by referring to the First

Information Report so also statements recorded during the course of

investigation.    It is his submission that the contention of the

Applicants would be taken into consideration during trial.



6.      None appears for Respondent No. 2. Hence, side of Respondent

No. 2 could not be known. However, this Court has carefully gone

into the charge-sheet and collected evidence during course of

investigation.
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7.     It is settled position of law that the attempt of the informant in

dragging distant relatives in the matrimonial discord is seriously

taken note by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of judgments. It

is settled position of law that in any case, on the basis of vague and

general allegations, the distant relatives cannot be made to undergo

the rigors of trial.



8.    Coming to the facts in the present case, perusal of the First

Information Report so also statements recorded during the course of

investigation indicate that Applicant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were not

cohabiting with the informant at her matrimonial home. There are

no specific allegations against them.    The allegations against them

are as vague as possible.        Such vague allegations cannot be

substantiated during trial. Having regard to these facts, application

deserves to be allowed partly to the extent of Applicant Nos. 1, 3 and

4. The present case is duly covered by the guidelines laid down by

Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana and others Vs.

Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 SCC (SUPP) 1 335, which gives

guidelines for the decision of quashment of criminal proceedings.

Relevant observations made therein read thus :
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“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined   and   sufficiently    channelised   and   inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.


(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.


(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.


(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.


(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.


(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code of the concerned Act (under
which a    criminal    proceeding is       instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.


(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with   mala   fide    and/or    where     the   proceeding     is
maliciously   instituted   with      an   ulterior   motive   for
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      wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
      spite him due to private and personal grudge.”



9.    In the result, application is allowed qua Applicant Nos. 1, 3 and

4 in terms of prayer clause ‘B’.



                                                 ( R. M. JOSHI, J.)

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