Bombay High Court
RUSHALI JEEVAN BARDIYA AND ANOTHERversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
- Disposal
- APPLICATION ALLOWED
Holding
The Court held that the FIR does not prima facie disclose an offence under Section 406 IPC and therefore the criminal application under Section 482 CrPC is allowed, quashing the FIR.
Summary
Rushali Bardiya and Amit Jain filed a criminal application under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashment of FIR No. 422/2024, which alleged that they induced an informant to invest money with a co‑accused, invoking Section 406 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The applicants contended that the offence of criminal breach of trust requires entrustment of property, which was absent, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ankur Gupta v. State of U.P. The respondents argued that the FIR’s allegations were sufficient to attract criminal trial. The Court examined the definition of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 IPC and held that no entrustment existed, so the FIR did not prima facie disclose an offence under Section 406. Applying the Bhajan Lal guidelines for quashment under Section 482, the Court concluded that the FIR did not constitute a cognizable offence and allowed the application, quashing the FIR.
Issues considered
- Whether the FIR discloses a cognizable offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC.
- Whether the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in the absence of a prima facie case.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure — s. 155(2), 156(1), 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 34, 405, 406
Subjects
- criminal breach of trust
- Section 406 IPC
- Section 482 CrPC
- quashment of FIR
- cognizable offence
- Bhajan Lal guidelines
- entrustment
Judgment
2026:BHC-AUG:38695-DB
938-APPLN-4219-24.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4219 OF 2024
1. Rushali Jeevan Bardiya
2. Amit Padamkumar Jain ..APPLICANTS
VERSUS
1. State of Maharashtra
2. Akshay Bhausaheb Pawar ..RESPONDENTS
....
Mr. M.K. Bhosale, Advocate for applicants
Mr. S.P. Joshi, A.P.P. for respondent no.1 – State
Mr. S.S. Patunkar, Advocate i/b J.P. Legal Associates for respondent no.2
....
CORAM : R.M. JOSHI, J.
DATE : 27th AUGUST, 2026
PER COURT :
1. This application is filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal
Procedure seeking quashment of F.I.R. bearing Crime No. 422 of 2024
registered with Cantonment Police Station, Aurangabad for the offence
punishable under Section 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The F.I.R. indicates that it is the case of informant that he has
acquaintance with the present applicants and at their instance some money
was invested with the co-accused i.e. Accused No.1.
3. Learned counsel for the Applicants submits that the allegations in
the F.I.R. do not attract offence of criminal breach of trust against the present
1 / 4
938-APPLN-4219-24.odt
applicants. It is his submission that in order to apply said offence, there has
to be entrustment of any property which is absent in the present crime. He
relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ankur
Gupta Vs. State of U.P., 2019(3) Crimes 81(SC). He, therefore, contends that
in absence of any evidence in order to attract the provisions of Section 406 of
the I.P.C., the Applicants cannot be compelled to undergo rigors of criminal
trial.
4. Learned A.P.P. and learned counsel for Respondent No.2 –
Informant opposed the application. According to them, the statement in the
F.I.R. indicates that it was the present Applicants, who instigated the
informant to invest money with the co-accused. This according to him is
sufficient for the Applicants to undergo rigors of criminal trial.
5. In order to attract the offence punishable under Section 406 of the
I.P.C., the act of Applicants prima facie must prove criminal breach of trust. It
would be relevant to take note of Section 405 of the I.P.C., which defines
criminal breach of trust, which reads thus :-
“Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with
any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or
converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or
disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law
prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of
any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made
touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other
person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.
2 / 4
938-APPLN-4219-24.odt
6. Perusal of the above definition indicates that entrustment of the
property is a pre-condition in order to apply the said provision. In this
backdrop, case of the informant does not indicate any entrustment with the
Applicants. As such, no offence under Section 406 of the I.P.C. is prima facie
made out against the Applicants.
7. At this stage, it would be useful to refer to judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.,
1992 SCC (SUPP) 1 335, which gives guidelines for the decision of quashment
of criminal proceedings. Relevant observations made therein read thus :
“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down
any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3 / 4
938-APPLN-4219-24.odt
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code of the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
8. The guidelines laid down in the above judgment squarely apply to
the present case. Even if the case of prosecution is accepted to be true, offence
punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code does not get attracted.
The applicant therefore cannot be forced to undergo rigors of trial.
9. As such, the Criminal Application deserves to be allowed and
accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clause [B].
( R.M. JOSHI, J. )
SSD
4 / 4
Checking your session…