SAKHARAM SHRIKISAN SHINDE AND ANOTHERversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

2026:BHC-AUG:41972-DB
                                                                           APPLN-4814-2024.odt



                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                           CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4814 OF 2024

          1.    Sakharam S/o Shrikisan Shinde
          2.    Tukaram S/o Shrikisan Shinde                    ...Applicants

                Versus

          1.    The State of Maharashtra
          2.    Sanjay S/o Jagannath Shinde                     ...Respondents

                                               ...
          Mr. R. M. Deshmukh, Advocate for the Applicants
          Mrs. P. J. Bharad, APP for the Respondent No. 1– State
          Mr. Yogesh Neb, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2 (appointed)
                                               ...
                                                     CORAM       : R.M. JOSHI, J
                                                     DATE        : SEPTEMBER 07, 2026
          P. C. :

          1.            By this application the applicants seeks quashment of the First

          Information    Report    bearing    Crime      No.   0492/2024     registered     at

          Ghansawangi Police Station, District Jalna and the pending criminal

          proceedings bearing Special Case No. 45 of 2025, for the offences

          punishable under sections 324, 323, 506, 504, 201, 34 of Indian Penal Code

          (for short ‘IPC’) and under section 92(b), 92(e) of the Rights of Persons with

          Disabilities Act, 2016 (for short ‘the Act’)


          2.            It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant, Sanjay

          Jagannath Shinde, who filed First Information Report bearing Crime No.

          0492/2024 on 13.11.2024, is the owner of agricultural land situated at Gut



                                              Page 1 of 7
                                                             APPLN-4814-2024.odt



No. 20, Nagobachi Wadi Shivar, Gunj Village, Taluka Ghansawangi, District

Jalna. A civil dispute regarding the partition and division of the said

ancestral property has been pending in court between the complainant and

the applicants since the demise of the complainant's grandfather on

07.09.2023. On 08.09.2023, an argument ensued between the parties when

the complainant requested the applicants not to swap or alter the land

boundaries during the partition. On the date of the incident, the applicants

allegedly verbally abused the complainant outside his house over the

ongoing land dispute and issued death threats. Knowing that the

complainant had a pre-existing disability and had undergone hip and waist

surgery, the applicants deliberately assaulted complainant at the surgical

site before relatives intervened to stop the attack. The complainant initially

lodged a Non-Cognizable (NC) complaint and subsequently escalated the

matter to the Disability Commissioners in Delhi and Pune, who forwarded

the grievance to Ghansawangi Police Station District Jalna.. Consequently,

the present FIR was registered against the applicants, and upon completion

of the investigation, a charge-sheet came to be filed.


3.          Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the

allegations in the FIR are false, malicious, and stem from a civil land

dispute. He further submitted that there was an unexplained delay of more

than one year in registering the FIR and contended that the applicants no



                                   Page 2 of 7
                                                             APPLN-4814-2024.odt



longer own any land in Gut No. 20, demonstrating the falsity of the

complaint. He contended that Section 92(b) of the Act was falsely invoked

as an afterthought, noting that the complainant was not born disabled. He

submitted that continuing the criminal proceedings without evidence

constitutes an abuse of the legal process.


4.          Learned APP and learned counsel for Respondent No. 2

opposed the application. They submitted that the delay in filing the FIR was

justified because of the complainant's situation, and that the disability

certificate is a valid document issued by a competent authority. They argued

that the FIR clearly made out a prima facie cognizable offence. They further

submitted that issues about the land dispute and the truth of the medical

certificate cannot be decided right now and must be proved during the trial.


5.          Perusal of the documents on record and considering the

submissions of the learned counsel for both sides, this Court finds that there

is an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than one year in lodging the

FIR, which shows serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations.

Furthermore, there are fatal contradictions between the allegations made in

the FIR and the material evidence on record. The medical certificates on

record show injuries to the face of the complainant, whereas the allegations

in the FIR and his supplementary statement indicate that he was hit on the

hand with a stick.

                                   Page 3 of 7
                                                              APPLN-4814-2024.odt




6.           At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of Section 92 of

the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which reads thus:

          92. Punishment for offences of atrocities. —
          Whoever,-
          (a) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
          humiliate a person with disability in any place within public
          view;
          (b) assaults or uses force to any person with disability with
          intent to dishonour him or outrage the modesty of a woman
          with disability;
          (c) having the actual charge or control over a person with
          disability voluntarily or knowingly denies food or fluids to
          him or her,
          (d) being in a position to dominate the will of a child or
          woman with disability and uses that position to exploit her
          sexually;
          (e) voluntarily injures, damages or interferes with the use
          of any limb or sense or any supporting device of a person
          with disability;
          (f) performs, conducts or directs any medical procedure to
          be performed on a woman with disability which leads to or
          is likely to lead to termination of pregnancy without her
          express consent except in cases where medical procedure
          for termination of pregnancy is done in severe cases of
          disability and with the opinion of a registered medical
          practitioner and also with the consent of the guardian of
          the woman with disability, shall be punishable with
          imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
          months but which may extend to five years and with fine.

      Insofar as the provisions of the said Act are concerned, the material

on record demonstrates that the alleged altercation was purely the outcome

of a pre-existing civil dispute regarding land partition, devoid of any specific

intent to target the complainant on account of his disability. Section 92(b)

mandates specific intent to dishonour a person with a disability, whereas



                                   Page 4 of 7
                                                              APPLN-4814-2024.odt



the disability certificate was obtained subsequent to the alleged incident.

Similarly, Section 92(e) is not attracted due to the fatal contradiction

between the complainant’s statement alleging a stick blow to his hand and

the medical injury certificate showing injuries exclusively to the face,

thereby failing to establish any deliberate injury targeted at a limb or

surgical site. The essential ingredients to constitute offence under section 92

of the Act of 2016, are absent. Moreover the injury certificate is also

doubtful showing the date of the examination of the injured on 08.10.2024,

though the incident allegedly occurred on 08.09.2023. Consequently, the

invocation of the Act appears to be a clear afterthought, intended to color a

civil property dispute with a criminal hue.


7.          This Court also finds that the alleged offences under the IPC are

highly doubtful in the aforementioned circumstances. It would be relevant

to take note of Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC, which read thus:

          323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—
          Whoever, except in the case provided for by section334,
          voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with
          imprisonment of either description for a term which may
          extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one
          thousand rupees, or with both.

          324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or
          means.—
          Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334,
          voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for
          shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which,
          used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by
          means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any

                                   Page 5 of 7
                                                             APPLN-4814-2024.odt



          poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any
          explosive substance or by means of any substance which it
          is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or
          to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall
          be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
          term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
          both.


            In view of the above discussion, this Court observes that the

nature of the injuries recorded does not indicate the use of any dangerous

weapon, thereby failing to make out a prima facie case under Section 324 of

the IPC. Consequently, continuing the criminal proceedings against the

applicants on the basis of such FIR would amount to an abuse of the process

of law, and no offence is made out under the provisions of the said Act. It is

evident that the allegations under the said Act are doubtful and arise out of

a pre-existing land dispute between the parties, indicating that the criminal

proceedings were manufactured by the informant to target the applicants,

falling within the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. As far as the use of

the stick is concerned, needless to say, it depends upon the nature of the

injury and the manner in which the assault was committed. In the absence

of any such indication, it cannot be held that the stick is a dangerous

weapon so as to attract the provisions of Section 324 of the IPC. This Court,

therefore, finds substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the

applicant that, at most, an offence under Section 323 could be made out.



                                  Page 6 of 7
                                                             APPLN-4814-2024.odt



Since an offence under Section 323 is non-cognizable in nature, no criminal

proceeding can be continued against the applicant on the basis of the First

Information Report.


8.          This Court finds substance in the contention of the learned

advocate for the applicants that the possibility of the Medical Officer having

issued a false medical certificate to accommodate the informant cannot be

ruled out. Hence, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clauses ‘C’ &

‘C-1’.


9.          Issue notice to the Medical Officer who issued the medical

certificate dated 08.10.2023 (at page no. 102 of the petition) to explain the

relevant facts of examination of injured. Although the application is allowed

and disposed of on merits, the matter shall remain pending solely for taking

necessary action against the Medical Officer.


10.         Fees of the appointed Counsel is quantified at Rs. 10,000/- to

be paid by the High Court Legal Services Sub-Committee, Aurangabad.



                                                     (R. M. JOSHI, J.)
Malani




                                  Page 7 of 7