Bombay High Court
AMOL SHANKAR PADALEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Decided
- Disposal
- Allowed
Holding
Given the applicant’s extended pre‑trial incarceration and the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial, the court held that bail must be granted, subject to conditions.
Summary
Amol Shankar Padale was arrested in October 2018 for a violent skirmish that escalated into a murder, for which he is charged under Sections 302, 307, 143, 147, 148, 149, 323 and 504 of the IPC and Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act. He has been in custody for 7 years and 10 months, with 17 of 25 witnesses examined and the trial still pending. The applicant sought bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, arguing that his prolonged pre‑trial detention violated his Article 21 right to speedy trial and personal liberty. The Court examined extensive jurisprudence emphasizing that bail is the rule and jail the exception, especially where trial delay is foreseeable and the presumption of innocence applies. Considering the unlikely near‑term conclusion of the trial, the constitutional mandate for speedy justice, and the lack of evidence of a risk to witnesses, the Court granted bail with strict conditions and disposed of the application.
Issues considered
- Whether bail can be granted to an under‑trial accused of serious offences after a prolonged pre‑trial detention.
- Whether the constitutional right to speedy trial under Article 21 mandates bail in such circumstances.
- Whether the risk of witness tampering or evidence interference outweighs the applicant’s liberty interest.
- Whether Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is applicable to the present bail application.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s. 483
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 437, 439, 496, 497, 498
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 143, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 323, 504
- Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 — s. 135
Subjects
- bail
- right to speedy trial
- Article 21
- presumption of innocence
- undertrial detention
- criminal procedure
- murder
- IPC
- constitutional law
Judgment
13.BA.169.2026.doc
HARSHADA H. SAWANT
(P.A.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BAIL APPLICATION NO.169 OF 2026
Amol Shankar Padale .. Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra .. Respondent
....................
Mr. Amit Pradhan, Advocate for Applicant.
Ms. Shilpa G. Talhar, APP for Respondent.
HC – 191 T. D. Lonare (HC), Nashik Road Police Station, Nashik.
...................
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : AUGUST 25, 2026
P.C.:
1. Heard Mr. Pradhan, learned Advocate for Applicant and Ms.
Talhar, learned APP for Respondent.
2. This is an Application under Section 483 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking Bail in connection with C.R.
No.476 of 2018 registered with Nashik Road Police Station for offences
punishable under Sections 302, 307, 143, 147, 148, 149, 323 and 504
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 135 of the Maharashtra
Police Act, 1951.
3. The dispute was with regard to skirmish which occurred in
the parking lot of the Society, which later on escalated to a full-fledged
fight whereby the parties started assaulting each other with wooden
logs and whatever came into their hands. In so far as the Applicant
1 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
before me is concerned, he is accused of having used a kitchen knife to
inflict a fatal blow on the deceased victim. The Applicant is in
incarceration for the past more than 7 years and 10 months, having
been arrested on 23.10.2018. The trial has commenced and 17 out of
25 probable witnesses have been examined whereas two witnesses
have been recalled.
4. In the case of Sandeep Kumar Bafna Vs. State of
Maharashtra1, the Supreme Court in paragraph No.25 has observed the
following:-
“25. The upshot of this analysis is that no vested right is
granted to a complainant or informant or aggrieved party to
directly conduct a prosecution. So far as the Magistrate is
concerned, comparative latitude is given to him but he must
always bear in mind that while the prosecution must remain
being robust and comprehensive and effective it should not
abandon the need to be free, fair and diligent. So far as the
Sessions Court is concerned, it is the Public Prosecutor who
must at all times remain in control of the prosecution and a
counsel of a private party can only assist the Public Prosecutor
in discharging its responsibility. The complainant or informant
or aggrieved party may, however, be heard at a crucial and
critical juncture of the Trial so that his interests in the
prosecution are not prejudiced or jeopardized. It seems to us
that constant or even frequent interference in the prosecution
should not be encouraged as it will have a deleterious impact on
its impartiality. If the Magistrate or Sessions Judge harbours the
opinion that the prosecution is likely to fail, prudence would
prompt that the complainant or informant or aggrieved party be
given an informal hearing. Reverting to the case in hand, we are
of the opinion that the complainant or informant or aggrieved
party who is himself an accomplished criminal lawyer and who
has been represented before us by the erudite Senior Counsel,
was not possessed of any vested right of being heard as it is
manifestly evident that the Court has not formed any opinion
adverse to the prosecution. Whether the Accused is to be
granted bail is a matter which can adequately be argued by the
State Counsel. We have, however, granted a full hearing to Mr.
Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate and have perused
1 (2014) 16 SCC 623
2 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
detailed Written Submissions since we are alive to impact that
our opinion would have on a multitude of criminal trials.”
5. It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail
Application has to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to
ascertain whether the Accused is likely to appear before the court for
trial. There are other broad parameters also like gravity of offence,
likelihood of Accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he
would influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his
antecedents which are required to be considered in such cases.
6. It is seen that while dealing with Bail Applications the
material available for consideration and adjudication is limited. It is
brought to the notice of the Court that trials are taking perpetuity to be
concluded and prisons are also simultaneously overcrowded in some
segments. This Court regularly deals with Bail Applications of under-
trials who have been in custody for long incarceration, and is also
equally aware of the conditions of our prisons. To give an example in
the city of Mumbai, a Report dated 12.12.2024 made by the
Superintendent of Mumbai Central Prison addressed to the Chief
Government Pleader was placed before this Court by the Public
Prosecutor which stated that the Mumbai Central Prison (Arthur Road
Jail) is overcrowded beyond its sanctioned capacity by more than 5 – 6
times and every barrack sanctioned to house 50 inmates, as on date
houses anywhere between 220 – 250 inmates. This situation is similar
3 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
in almost all jails in the State. Such an incongruity leads us to answer
the proposition: “How can Courts find a balance between the two
polarities?"
7. Argued before me is a case concerning liberty of an under-
trial who has been incarcerated for 7 years and 10 months, a situation
impacting the rights of the undertrial conferred by Article 21 of
Constitution to speedy justice as also personal liberty. In so far as the
power of high courts to grant bail is concerned, when the case is such
that involves a question of personal liberty of an undertrial who is
incarcerated for a very long period pending trial, the powers are wide
and unfettered by conditions, the principle rule being that bail is the
rule and refusal is the exception, allowing accused persons to better
prepare their defense.
8. In the case of Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson2, the Allahabad
High Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting
bail conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It
held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session
discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls
all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must
be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that
accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to
defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is
2 AIR 1931 ALL 356
4 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut
Conspiracy case.
8.1. Justice Mukerji writing for the Bench held as under:-
“9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an
attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the
High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason
for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek.
The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it
goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of
justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the
defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time
cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an
attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
a bail may be granted but not in other classes.
This being my reading of the law, I proceed to see whether
this is a case in which the applicants ought to be let out on bail.
On general principles, and on the principles on which sections
496 and 497 (as amended in 1923) are framed, the grant of bail
should be the rule and refusal of bail should be the exception. In
the case of a bailable offence, the law expressly says that if the
accused person applies for bail he shall be released (section
496). Section 497 applies to cases of non-bailable offence and
there it is said that the accused person shall be released on bail
except where there appears to be a reasonable ground for
believing that he has been guilty of a very heinous offence,
namely one which may be punished by either death or by
transportation for life : section 497(1). Again it is laid down
that where, at any stage of the investigation or trial, there are
not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person
has committed a non-bailable offence, but there are sufficient
grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall be
released on bail : section 497(2).
The principle to be deduced from sections 496 and 497 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, therefore, is that grant of bail is the
rule and refusal is the exception. (emphasis underlined) That
this must be so is not at all difficult to see. An accused person is
presumed under the law to be innocent till his guilt is proved.
As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to freedom and
every opportunity to look after his own case. It goes without
saying that an accused person, if he enjoys freedom, will be in a
much better position to look after his case and to properly
defend himself than if he were in custody. One of the complaints
made by the applicants in this case is that their letters sent from
the custody have been opened and inspected and censored, and,
5 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
therefore, they were not in a position to conduct their defence
with the aid of such friends as may he outside the prison. As I
have said, it is obvious that a presumably innocent person
should have his freedom to enable him to establish his
innocence.
This being the rule, there may, of course, be exceptions. I will
not attempt to lay down any cases of exceptions, because these
cases before us are not exceptions and I do not want to say
anything which will be only in the nature of an obiter dictum.”
8.2. Justice Boys writing a concurrent view held as under:-
“As to the object of keeping an accused person in detention during the
trial, it has been stated that the object is not punishment; that to keep
an accused person under arrest with the object of punishing him on the
assumption that he is guilty, even if eventually he is acquitted, is
improper. This is most manifest. The only legitimate purposes to be
served by keeping a person under trial in detention are to prevent
repetition of the offence with which he is charged, where there is
apparently danger of such repetition, and to secure his attendance at
the trial. The first of these purposes clearly to some extent involves an
assumption of the accused's guilt, but the very trial itself is based on a
prima facie assumption of the accused's guilt and it is impossible to
hold that in some circumstances it is not a proper ground to be
considered. The main purpose, however, is manifestly to secure the
attendance of the accused.”
9. In the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation3, in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered
the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail,
principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well
recognized principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail
jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the judgment reads as under:-
“Prevailing situation
6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The
statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd
long incarceration of the inmates of the prisons constitute
undertrial prisoners. Of this category of prisoners, majority may
3 (2022) 10 SCC 51
6 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
not even be required to be arrested despite registration of a
cognizable offence, being charged with offences punishable for
seven years or less. They are not only poor and illiterate but also
would include women. Thus, there is a culture of offence being
inherited by many of them. As observed by this Court, it
certainly exhibits the mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the
part of the investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest
is a draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and
thus to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an
impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually
opposite to each other.
Definition of trial
7. The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the
Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the
purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of
investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would
obviously be different between these two stages. In the former
stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted
for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters
substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a
trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence
to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards
enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among
other factors.
8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as
a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on
suspension of sentence.
Definition of bail
9. The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though
is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a
personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an
accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police
or by the investigating agency.
10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect
while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it
is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the
suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and
the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as:
“A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required
by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in
court at a future time.”
11. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as:
“to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security
being taken for his appearance on a day and at a place certain,
which security is called bail, because the party arrested or
imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind
themselves or become bail for his due appearance when
7 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
required, in order that he may be safely protected from prison,
to which they have, if they fear his escape, etc. the legal power
to deliver him.”
Bail is the rule
12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception
has been well recognised through the repetitive
pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh
Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v.
Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] ,
held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24)
“19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab
[Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is
set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88,
paras 27-30)
‘27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
deal with the right to ordinary bail because that
right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right
to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as
long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court
of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re
[Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC
OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 479-
80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance
of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be
applied in the solution of the question whether bail
should be granted or refused is whether it is
probable that the party will appear to take his trial
and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which,
significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases”
observations are to be found regarding the right to
bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N.
Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, 1931
SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was
observed, while dealing with Section 498 which
corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code,
that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the
High Court wide powers to grant bail which were
not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding
Section 497 which corresponds to the present
Section 437. It was observed by the court that there
was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle
governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by
Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be
exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson
[Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All
14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that
8 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down
any particular rules which will bind the High Court,
having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the court unfettered. According
to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise
from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases
and to say that in particular classes a bail may be
granted but not in other classes. It was observed that
the principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that
grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.
An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much
better position to look after his case and to properly
defend himself than if he were in custody. As a
presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his
own case. A presumably innocent person must have
his freedom to enable him to establish his
innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by
Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115]
that : (SCC p. 242, para 1)
“1. … the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice,
public safety and burden of the public treasury,
all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence
of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial
process. … After all, personal liberty of an
accused or convict is fundamental, suffering
lawful eclipse only in terms of “procedure
established by law”. The last four words of Article
21 are the life of that human right.”
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)
[Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1
SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by
Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p.
129, para 29)
“29. … There cannot be an inexorable formula
in the matter of granting bail. The facts and
circumstances of each case will govern the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting or
cancelling bail.”
30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8,
p. 806, para 39), it is stated:
“Where the granting of bail lies within the
discretion of the court, the granting or denial
is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and
9 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
circumstances of each particular case. Since
the object of the detention or imprisonment of
the accused is to secure his appearance and
submission to the jurisdiction and the
judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is
whether a recognizance or bond would effect
that end.”
It is thus clear that the question whether to
grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a
variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect
of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
Any one single circumstance cannot be treated
as of universal validity or as necessarily
justifying the grant or refusal of bail.’
* * *
24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the
Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is
concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the
rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India
and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental
Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be
suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the
Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a
vast number of substantive and procedural rights post
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] .”
13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay
Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras
21-23)
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down
from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure
the appearance of the accused person at his trial by
reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither
punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure
that an accused person will stand his trial when called
upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the
principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that
every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and
duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that
detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a
cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity
demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in
custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial
but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this
country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of
personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any
10 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon
which, he has not been convicted or that in any
circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon
only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left
at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of prevention being the
object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact
that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial
punitive content and it would be improper for any court to
refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct
whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to
refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of
giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”
Presumption of innocence
14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed
through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to
prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to
satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and
enlargement on bail is to be denied.
15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged
throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge
the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law,
until the individual is proven guilty.”
10. The Supreme Court in a landmark decision of 1978 in the
case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Public Prosecutor, High
Court of Andhra Pradesh4 observed as under:-
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle
around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is
finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things
stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate
stage and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure
the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take
judgment and serve sentence in the event of the court punishing him
with imprisonment. In this perspective…” (emphasis supplied)
11. Thereafter the Supreme Court in a plethora of judgements
have discussed the rights conferred by Article 21 qua grant of bail and
that such rights cannot be taken away unless the procedure is
4 1978 (1) SCC 240
11 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
reasonable and fair and in cases where there is unreasonable delay in
trial it would undoubtedly impact the rights of an undertrial.
12. In the landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of
India5, the Supreme Court held that the right to life and personal
liberty under Article 21 is not limited to mere animal existence but
includes the right to live with dignity. The court emphasized that the
procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable, and it
cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable.
13. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secy., State of
6
Bihar the Supreme Court held as under:-
“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a
person of liberty cannot “reasonable, fair or just” unless that
procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt
of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or
just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be
no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
The question which would, however, arise is as to what would
be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied
speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of
his fundamental right under Article 21.”
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. K. A.
Najeeb7 while commenting upon the possibility of early completion of
trial and extended incarceration held as under:-
“18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact
that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a
serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the
threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the
5 1978 (1) SCC 248
6 (1980) 1 SCC 81
7 Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 2021
12 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the
period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial
being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have
been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt
has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right
to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond
any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights
guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well
protected.”
15. Applicant in present case has been in custody for 7 years and
10 months. There is no possibility of the trial concluding in the near
future. Detaining an under-trial prisoner for such an extended period
further violates his fundamental right to speedy trial flowing from
Article 21 of the Constitution. At this juncture I deem it appropriate to
list certain observations of the Supreme Court shedding light on
concerns underlying the “Right to speedy trial” from the point of view
of an accused in custody whose liberty is affected. In the case of Abdul
Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs R.S. Nayak & Anr.8 the Supreme Court held
as under:-
“86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions
emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that
these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all
situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules.
These propositions are:
(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of
the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The
fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves
the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right
of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt
or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible
in the circumstances.
(2) Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses
all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has
understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted
view.
8 1992 (1) SCC 225
13 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
(3) The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the
point of view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be
as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be
subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to
his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation
and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation,
inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of
the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death,
disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.
(4) – (11) -------x-------” (emphasis supplied)
16. The Supreme Court has also held in a series of judgments
and orders that in situations where the under-trial-prisoner / accused
persons have suffered incarceration rather long incarceration for a
considerable period of time and there is no possibility of the trial being
completed within the foreseeable future, Constitutional Courts can
exercise power to release the accused under-trial on bail, as bail is the
rule and jail is the exception.
17. In the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
(Representing undertrial prisoners) Vs. Union of India 9, the Supreme
Court has held that:-
“17. We are conscious of the fact that the menace of drug trafficking
has to be controlled by providing stringent punishments and those who
indulge in such nefarious activities do not deserve any sympathy. But at
the same time we cannot be oblivious to the fact that many innocent
persons may also be languishing in jails if we recall to mind the
percentage of acquittals. Since harsh punishments have been provided
for under the Act, the percentage of disposals on plea of guilt is bound
to be small; the State Government should, therefore, have realised the
need for setting up sufficient number of Special Courts immediately
after the amendment of the Act by Amendment Act 2 of 1989. Even
after the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court refused to grant en
9 (1995) 4 SCC 695
14 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
bloc enlargement on bail on 1-2-1993 in Criminal Application No. 3480
of 1992 and B.D. Criminal No. 565 of 1992, no substantial
improvement in the pendency is shown since new cases continue to
pour in, and, therefore, a one-time exercise has become imperative to
place the system on an even keel. We also recommend to the State
Government to set up Review Committees headed by a Judicial Officer,
preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two other members
to review the cases of undertrials who have been in jail for long
including those released under this order and to recommend to the
State Government which of the cases deserve withdrawal. The State
Government can then advise the Public Prosecutor to move the court
for withdrawal of such cases. This will not only. help reduce the
pendency but will also increase the credibility of the prosecuting
agency. After giving effect to this order the Special Court may consider
giving priority to cases of those undertrials who continue in jail despite
this order on account of their inability to furnish bail.”
18. In the case of Avinash Ashok Torane Vs. The State of
Maharashtra10, this Court (Coram: N.J. Jamadar, J.) while dealing with
a bail application for offence under Section 302 of IPC considering
parity with another co-accused who was enlarged on bail considered
the unlikelihood of completion of trial coupled with the period of long
incarceration of 1 year 3 months of the Applicant and enlarged him on
bail.
19. In the case of Sonu Parmeshwar Jha Vs. The State of
Maharashtra11 this Court (Coram: M.S. Karnik, J.) was dealing with a
bail application for offences under Sections 302 and 304(b) of IPC and
considering circumstantial evidence against the accused as well as long
incarceration of accused of 1 year 7 months enlarged him on bail.
20. In the case of Santosh Ramprasad Hairijan Vs. The State of
Maharashtra12, in a case under Section 302 of IPC this Court taking
10 Bail Application No.3535 of 2023 decided on 08.01.2024
11 Bail Application No.4122 of 2021 decided on 18.01.2023
12 Bail Application No.1819 of 2024 decided on 29.11.2024
15 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
into account long period of incarceration undergone by accused of 3
years 4 months granted him bail.
21. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Anr.13, the Supreme Court while granting bail to
accused incarcerated for 4 years in paragraph Nos.16 and 17 held as
under:-
"16. Criminals are not born but made. The human potential in
everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond
redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when
dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint
has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is
committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the
offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and
economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental
neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the
manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted
with indigence or other privations.
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court
concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or
any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for
bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article
21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the
crime.
22. In the case of Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.14,
in a case under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC the Supreme Court
granted bail to the accused who was behind bars for 4 years citing
unlikelihood of completion of trial in the near future as also on parity
with the co-accused.
23. In the case of Roland Victor Monterio Vs. State of
13 (2024) 9 SCC 813
14 SLP (Crl.) No.8523 of 2024
16 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
Maharashtra15, this Court (Coram: N.J. Jamadar, J.) in a case under
Sections 302, 304-B and 498-A of the IPC granted bail to the accused
on account of his long incarceration of 4 years. Similarly in the case of
Naresh Harishchandra Mali Vs. The State of Maharashtra16, this Court
(Coram: N.J. Jamadar, J.) in a case under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC
granted bail to the accused as he was in prison for a period of more
than 5 years.
24. Recently, the Delhi High Court in the case of Raghvendr
Singh Vs. State of NCT of Delhi17 granted bail to the Accused who was
indicted for offence of murder citing his long incarceration for a period
of 5 and half years and enlarged him on bail.
25. In the case of Chintan Vidyasagar Upadhyay Vs. The State of
Maharashtra18, in a case under Sections 302 and 396 of IPC the
Supreme Court granted bail to the accused who had undergone 6 years
of pre-trial incarceration. Similarly in the case of Indrani Pratim
Mukerjea Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation 19 the Supreme Court in a
case under Section 302 of IPC granted bail to the accused, she having
undergone pre-trial incarceration of 6 and a half years.
26. The ignominy of the trial not being concluded in the near
foreseeable future is apparent and in view thereof on the ground of
15 Bail Application No.1981 of 2023 decided on 11.01.2024.
16 Bail Application No.3858 of 2022 decided on 27.07.2023.
17 2025 SCC Online Del 21.
18 SLP (Crl.) No.2543 of 2021 decided on 17.09.2021.
19 SLP (Crl.) No.1627 of 2022.
17 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
long incarceration, without delineating any opinion on merits of the
matter lest it should affect the ongoing trial, Applicant has made out
case for grant of bail on the ground of long incarceration. He is granted
bail subject to following conditions:-
(i) Applicant is directed to be immediately released from
prison in connection with Crime No. 476 of 2018;
(ii) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on
furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs. 25,000/- (Rs. Twenty Five
Thousand only) with one surety of the like amount;
(iii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at the
concerned Police Station, once every month on the first
Monday of the month between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m.;
(iv) Applicant shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and
attend the Trial Court on all dates, unless specifically
exempted and will not take any unnecessary
adjournments, if he does so it will entitle the
prosecution to apply for revocation of this order;
(v) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra
without prior permission of the Trial Court;
(vi) Applicant shall not influence with any of the witnesses
or tamper with the evidence in any manner;
18 of 19
13.BA.169.2026.doc
(vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed
of his current address and mobile contact number and /
or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from
time to time, as applicable; and
(viii)Any infraction of the conditions shall entail cancellation
of bail granted to the Applicant.
27. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are
limited for the purpose of granting bail only and I have not made any
observations on merits of the case. The trial shall be adjudicated on
the strength of the evidence led and strictly on its own merits being
uninfluenced with any of the prima facie observations made
hereinabove in this order.
28. Bail Application is allowed and disposed of in the above
terms.
H. H. SAWANT [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
Digitally signed
HARSHADA by HARSHADA
HANUMANT
HANUMANT SAWANT
SAWANT Date: 2026.08.26
12:22:23 +0530
19 of 19
Checking your session…