PRAVIN SHRINIVAS MAHAJANversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

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                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                              CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        BAIL APPLICATION NO.3286 OF 2026

      Pravin Shrinivas Mahajan                                  .. Applicant
                 Versus
      The State of Maharashtra                                  .. Respondent

                                  ....................
       Mr. Satyawrat P. Joshi i/b. Mr. Priyesh More for the Applicant.
       Mr. Swapnil Patil, I.O. from Faraskhana Police Station, Pune.
       Ms. Shilpa G. Talhar, APP for Respondent-State.
                                      ...................

                                     CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
                                     DATE          : AUGUST 25, 2026
      P.C.:

      1.      Heard Mr. Satyawrat P. Joshi, learned Counsel for the Applicant

      and Ms. Shilpa Talhar, learned APP for Respondent-State.


      2.      This is an Application under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik

      Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking Bail in connection with C.R. No.89 of

      2021 registered with Farashkhana Police Station, Pune for offences

      punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.


      3.      Applicant seeks enlargement on bail. He is arraigned as accused

      in CR No.89 of 2021 registered with Faraskhana Police Station, District

      Pune for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.                 He is

      arrested on 05.05.2021 and has been in custody since then for a period

      of 5 years and 3 months pending trial. Learned Advocate for the

      Applicant submits that the issue of long incarceration be considered by


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the Court in the light of the findings recorded by the Addl. Sessions

Judge, Pune in the order dated 18 June 2026 in paragraph Nos.11 to

13.


4.     I have perused the said order. Prima facie, it is seen that though

the trial has commenced , it is going to take long period of time for it

to be completed. Four out of the 38 probable witnesses have been

examined by the prosecution. Though the findings            recorded in

paragraph Nos.11 to 13 are specifically with regard to the issue in

delay in commencing the trial, however, even after the trial has

commenced, it is seen that it was required to be concluded by the end

of July 2026, which has enabled the Applicant to file the present

Application before this Court.


5.     I have heard the submissions advanced by learned Advocate for

the applicant and perused the record with his able assistance.


6.     Learned Prosecutor Ms.Talhar, would vehemently submit that the

findings recorded by the learned Sessions Court in paragraph No.1

prima facie enures to the benefit of the prosecution inasmuch as

initially it was the applicant who took three years to commence with

the trial on the pretext of not having engaged an Advocate.


7.     In the case of Sandeep Kumar Bafna Vs. State of Maharashtra 1,

the Supreme Court in paragraph No.25 has observed the following:-

1    (2014) 16 SCC 623


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          “25. The upshot of this analysis is that no vested right is
          granted to a complainant or informant or aggrieved party to
          directly conduct a prosecution. So far as the Magistrate is
          concerned, comparative latitude is given to him but he must
          always bear in mind that while the prosecution must remain
          being robust and comprehensive and effective it should not
          abandon the need to be free, fair and diligent. So far as the
          Sessions Court is concerned, it is the Public Prosecutor who
          must at all times remain in control of the prosecution and a
          counsel of a private party can only assist the Public Prosecutor
          in discharging its responsibility. The complainant or informant
          or aggrieved party may, however, be heard at a crucial and
          critical juncture of the Trial so that his interests in the
          prosecution are not prejudiced or jeopardized. It seems to us
          that constant or even frequent interference in the prosecution
          should not be encouraged as it will have a deleterious impact on
          its impartiality. If the Magistrate or Sessions Judge harbours the
          opinion that the prosecution is likely to fail, prudence would
          prompt that the complainant or informant or aggrieved party be
          given an informal hearing. Reverting to the case in hand, we are
          of the opinion that the complainant or informant or aggrieved
          party who is himself an accomplished criminal lawyer and who
          has been represented before us by the erudite Senior Counsel,
          was not possessed of any vested right of being heard as it is
          manifestly evident that the Court has not formed any opinion
          adverse to the prosecution. Whether the Accused is to be
          granted bail is a matter which can adequately be argued by the
          State Counsel. We have, however, granted a full hearing to Mr.
          Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate and have perused
          detailed Written Submissions since we are alive to impact that
          our opinion would have on a multitude of criminal trials.”


8.   It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail Application has

to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain whether

the Accused is likely to appear before the court for trial. There are

other broad parameters also like gravity of offence, likelihood of

Accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would

influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his antecedents

which are required to be considered in such cases.


9.   It is seen that while dealing with Bail Applications the material


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available for consideration and adjudication is limited. It is brought to

the notice of the Court that trials are taking perpetuity to be concluded

and prisons are also simultaneously overcrowded in some segments.

This Court regularly deals with Bail Applications of under-trials who

have been in custody for long incarceration, and is also equally aware

of the conditions of our prisons. To give an example in the city of

Mumbai, a Report dated 12.12.2024 made by the Superintendent of

Mumbai Central Prison addressed to the Chief Government Pleader

was placed before this Court by the Public Prosecutor which stated that

the Mumbai Central Prison (Arthur Road Jail) is overcrowded beyond

its sanctioned capacity by more than 5 – 6 times and every barrack

sanctioned to house 50 inmates, as on date houses anywhere between

220 – 250 inmates. This situation is similar in almost all jails in the

State. Such an incongruity leads us to answer the proposition: “How

can Courts find a balance between the two polarities?"

10. Argued before me is a case concerning liberty of an under-trial

who has been incarcerated for 5 years and 3 months, a situation

impacting the rights of the undertrial conferred by Article 21 of

Constitution to speedy justice as also personal liberty. In so far as the

power of high courts to grant bail is concerned, when the case is such

that involves a question of personal liberty of an undertrial who is

incarcerated for a very long period pending trial, the powers are wide

and unfettered by conditions, the principle rule being that bail is the

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rule and refusal is the exception, allowing accused persons to better

prepare their defense.

11. In the case of Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson2, the Allahabad High

Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting bail

conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It

held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session

discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls

all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must

be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that

accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to

defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is

the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut

Conspiracy case. Justice Mukherjea writing for the Bench in paragraph

No.9 held as under:-

             “9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an
             attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the
             High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
             left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason
             for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek.
             The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it
             goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of
             justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the
             defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time
             cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an
             attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
             a bail may be granted but not in other classes.”


12. In the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of

Investigation3, in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered
2   AIR 1931 ALL 356
3   (2022) 10 SCC 51


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the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail,

principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well

recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail

jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of

India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the judgment reads as under:-

          “Prevailing situation
          6.     Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The
          statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd
          of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of
          this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to
          be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being
          charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They
          are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women.
          Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of
          them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the
          mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the
          investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a
          draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus
          to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an
          impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually
          opposite to each other.
          Definition of trial
          7.      The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the
          Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the
          purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of
          investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would
          obviously be different between these two stages. In the former
          stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted
          for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters
          substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a
          trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence
          to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards
          enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among
          other factors.
          8.    Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as
          a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on
          suspension of sentence.
          Definition of bail
          9.    The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though
          is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a
          personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an


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accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police
or by the investigating agency.
10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect
while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it
is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the
suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and
the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as:
      “A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required
      by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in
      court at a future time.”
11.   Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as:
      “to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on
      security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a
      place certain, which security is called bail, because the
      party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of
      those who bind themselves or become bail for his due
      appearance when required, in order that he may be safely
      protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his
      escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.”
Bail is the rule
12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception
has been       well recognised        through the repetitive
pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh
Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v.
Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] ,
held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24)
      “19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab
      [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
      565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is
      set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88,
      paras 27-30)
             ‘27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
             deal with the right to ordinary bail because that
             right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right
             to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that
             as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High
             Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In
             re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC
             OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 479-
             80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance
             of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be
             applied in the solution of the question whether bail
             should be granted or refused is whether it is
             probable that the party will appear to take his trial
             and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
             withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which,

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significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases”
observations are to be found regarding the right to
bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N.
Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor,
1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was
observed, while dealing with Section 498 which
corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code,
that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the
High Court wide powers to grant bail which were
not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding
Section 497 which corresponds to the present
Section 437. It was observed by the court that there
was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle
governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by
Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be
exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson
[Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All
14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that
it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down
any particular rules which will bind the High Court,
having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the court unfettered. According
to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise
from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases
and to say that in particular classes a bail may be
granted but not in other classes. It was observed that
the principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that
grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.
An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much
better position to look after his case and to properly
defend himself than if he were in custody. As a
presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his
own case. A presumably innocent person must have
his freedom to enable him to establish his
innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by
Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115]
that : (SCC p. 242, para 1)
      “1. … the issue [of bail] is one of liberty,
      justice, public safety and burden of the public
      treasury, all of which insist that a developed
      jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially
      sensitised judicial process. … After all, personal
      liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental,
      suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of


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                 “procedure established by law”. The last four
                 words of Article 21 are the life of that human
                 right.”
           29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)
           [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1
           SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by
           Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p.
           129, para 29)
                 “29. … There cannot be an inexorable formula
                 in the matter of granting bail. The facts and
                 circumstances of each case will govern the
                 exercise of judicial discretion in granting or
                 cancelling bail.”
            30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8,
            p. 806, para 39), it is stated:
                 “Where the granting of bail lies within the
                 discretion of the court, the granting or denial
                 is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and
                 circumstances of each particular case. Since
                 the object of the detention or imprisonment of
                 the accused is to secure his appearance and
                 submission to the jurisdiction and the
                 judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is
                 whether a recognizance or bond would effect
                 that end.”
                 It is thus clear that the question whether to
                 grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a
                 variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect
                 of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
                 Any one single circumstance cannot be treated
                 as of universal validity or as necessarily
                 justifying the grant or refusal of bail.’
                             *     *     *
     24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the
     Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is
     concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the
     rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India
     and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental
     Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be
     suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the
     Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a
     vast number of substantive and procedural rights post
     Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v.
     Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] .”
13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay
Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras
21-23)

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     “21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down
     from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure
     the appearance of the accused person at his trial by
     reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither
     punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
     considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure
     that an accused person will stand his trial when called
     upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the
     principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that
     every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and
     duly found guilty.
     22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that
     detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a
     cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity
     demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in
     custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial
     but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this
     country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of
     personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any
     person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon
     which, he has not been convicted or that in any
     circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon
     only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left
     at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
     23. Apart from the question of prevention being the
     object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact
     that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial
     punitive content and it would be improper for any court to
     refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct
     whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to
     refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of
     giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”
Presumption of innocence
14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed
through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to
prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to
satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and
enlargement on bail is to be denied.
15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged
throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge
the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law,
until the individual is proven guilty.”




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13. The Supreme Court in a landmark decision of 1978 in the case of

Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of

Andhra Pradesh4 observed as under:-

              “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
              principle around which other relevant factors must revolve.
              When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to
              incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are
              concerned with the penultimate stage and the principal rule to
              guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the
              applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve
              sentence in the event of the court punishing him with
              imprisonment. In this perspective…”          (emphasis supplied)



14. Thereafter the Supreme Court in a plethora of judgements have

discussed the rights conferred by Article 21 qua grant of bail and that

such rights cannot be taken away unless the procedure is reasonable

and fair and in cases where there is unreasonable delay in trial it

would undoubtedly impact the rights of an undertrial. Some of the

important decisions of the Supreme Court and some of the High Courts

are discussed herein under:-


14.1. In the landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of

India5, the Supreme Court held that the right to life and personal

liberty under Article 21 is not limited to mere animal existence but

includes the right to live with dignity. The court emphasized that the

procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable, and it

cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable.


4   1978 (1) SCC 240
5   1978 (1) SCC 248


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14.2. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secy., State of

Bihar6 the Supreme Court held as under:-

              “Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a
              person of liberty cannot “reasonable, fair or just” unless that
              procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt
              of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a
              reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or
              just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be
              no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
              reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of
              the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
              The question which would, however, arise is as to what would
              be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied
              speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
              imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of
              his fundamental right under Article 21.”

15. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb7

while commenting upon the possibility of early completion of trial and

extended incarceration held as under:-

              “18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact
              that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a
              serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the
              threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the
              respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the
              period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial
              being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have
              been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt
              has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right
              to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond
              any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights
              guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well
              protected.”

16. Applicant in present case has been in custody for 5 years and 3

months. There is no possibility of the trial concluding in the near

future. Detaining an under-trial prisoner for such an extended period

further violates his fundamental right to speedy trial flowing from

6   (1980) 1 SCC 81
7   Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 2021


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Article 21 of the Constitution. At this juncture I deem it appropriate to

list certain observations of the Supreme Court shedding light on

concerns underlying the “Right to speedy trial” from the point of view

of an accused in custody whose liberty is affected. In the case of Abdul

Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs R.S. Nayak & Anr.8 the Supreme Court held

as under:-

              “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions
              emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that
              these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all
              situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules.
              These propositions are:
              (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of
              the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
              speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The
              fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves
              the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right
              of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt
              or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible
              in the circumstances.
              (2) Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses
              all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
              appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has
              understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted
              view.
              (3) The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the
              point of view of the accused are:
              (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be
              as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be
              subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to
              his conviction;
              (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation
              and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation,
              inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
              (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of
              the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death,
              disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.
              (4) – (11) -------x-------”                (emphasis supplied)




8   1992 (1) SCC 225


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17.      The Supreme Court has also held in a series of judgments and

orders that in situations where the under-trial-prisoner / accused

persons have suffered incarceration rather long incarceration for a

considerable period of time and there is no possibility of the trial being

completed within the foreseeable future, Constitutional Courts can

exercise power to release the accused under-trial on bail, as bail is the

rule and jail is the exception.


18. In the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing

undertrial prisoners) Vs. Union of India9, the Supreme Court has held

that:-

              “17. We are conscious of the fact that the menace of drug
              trafficking has to be controlled by providing stringent
              punishments and those who indulge in such nefarious activities
              do not deserve any sympathy. But at the same time we cannot
              be oblivious to the fact that many innocent persons may also be
              languishing in jails if we recall to mind the percentage of
              acquittals. Since harsh punishments have been provided for
              under the Act, the percentage of disposals on plea of guilt is
              bound to be small; the State Government should, therefore,
              have realised the need for setting up sufficient number of
              Special Courts immediately after the amendment of the Act by
              Amendment Act 2 of 1989. Even after the Division Bench of the
              Bombay High Court refused to grant en bloc enlargement on
              bail on 1-2-1993 in Criminal Application No. 3480 of 1992 and
              B.D. Criminal No. 565 of 1992, no substantial improvement in
              the pendency is shown since new cases continue to pour in, and,
              therefore, a one-time exercise has become imperative to place
              the system on an even keel. We also recommend to the State
              Government to set up Review Committees headed by a Judicial
              Officer, preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two
              other members to review the cases of undertrials who have been
              in jail for long including those released under this order and to
              recommend to the State Government which of the cases deserve
              withdrawal. The State Government can then advise the Public
              Prosecutor to move the court for withdrawal of such cases. This
              will not only. help reduce the pendency but will also increase
              the credibility of the prosecuting agency. After giving effect to
9   (1995) 4 SCC 695


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               this order the Special Court may consider giving priority to cases
               of those undertrials who continue in jail despite this order on
               account of their inability to furnish bail.”


19. In the case of Avinash Ashok Torane                          Vs. The State of

Maharashtra10, this Court (Coram: N.J. Jamadar, J.) while dealing with

a bail application for offence under Section 302 of IPC considering

parity with another co-accused who was enlarged on bail considered

the unlikelihood of completion of trial coupled with the period of long

incarceration of 1 year 3 months of the Applicant and enlarged him on

bail.


20. In the case of Sonu Parmeshwar Jha Vs. The State of

Maharashtra11 this Court (Coram: M.S. Karnik, J.) was dealing with a

bail application for offences under Sections 302 and 304(b) of IPC and

considering circumstantial evidence against the accused as well as long

incarceration of accused of 1 year 7 months enlarged him on bail.


21. In the case of Santosh Ramprasad Hairijan Vs. The State of

Maharashtra12, in a case under Section 302 of IPC this Court taking

into account long period of incarceration undergone by accused of 3

years 4 months granted him bail.


22. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra

and Anr.13, the Supreme Court while granting bail to accused

10   Bail Application No.3535 of 2023 decided on 08.01.2024
11   Bail Application No.4122 of 2021 decided on 18.01.2023
12   Bail Application No.1819 of 2024 decided on 29.11.2024
13   (2024) 9 SCC 813


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incarcerated for 4 years in paragraph Nos.16 and 17 held as under:-

               "16. Criminals are not born but made. The human potential in
               everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond
               redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when
               dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint
               has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is
               committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the
               offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and
               economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental
               neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the
               manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted
               with indigence or other privations.
               17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court
               concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
               fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
               enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or
               any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for
               bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article
               21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the
               crime.

23. In the case of Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 14, in a

case under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC the Supreme Court granted

bail to the accused who was behind bars for 4 years citing unlikelihood

of completion of trial in the near future as also on parity with the co-

accused.


24. In the case of Roland Victor Monterio Vs. State of Maharashtra15,

this Court (Coram: N.J. Jamadar, J.) in a case under Sections 302, 304-

B and 498-A of the IPC granted bail to the accused on account of his

long incarceration of 4 years. Similarly                       in the case of Naresh

Harishchandra Mali Vs. The State of Maharashtra 16, this Court (Coram:

N.J. Jamadar, J.) in a case under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC granted


14   SLP (Crl.) No.8523 of 2024
15   Bail Application No.1981 of 2023 decided on 11.01.2024.
16   Bail Application No.3858 of 2022 decided on 27.07.2023.


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bail to the accused as he was in prison for a period of more than 5

years.


25. Recently, the Delhi High Court in the case of Raghvendr Singh Vs.

State of NCT of Delhi17 granted bail to the Accused who was indicted

for offence of murder citing his long incarceration for a period of 5 and

half years and enlarged him on bail.


26. In the case of Chintan Vidyasagar Upadhyay Vs. The State of

Maharashtra18, in a case under Sections 302 and 396 of IPC the

Supreme Court granted bail to the accused who had undergone 6 years

of pre-trial incarceration. Similarly in the case of Indrani Pratim

Mukerjea Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation 19 the Supreme Court in a

case under Section 302 of IPC granted bail to the accused, she having

undergone pre-trial incarceration of 6 and a half years.


27. Applicant is incarcerated for 5 years and 3 months pending trial.

There is no distinct possibility of trial concluding in the near

foreseeable future.


28. I am not inclined to consider the issue on merits for the simple

reason that lest that it will affect the trial, if any prima facie findings

are returned. Considering the long incarceration of Applicant for over 5

years and 3 months, I am inclined to grant bail to the Applicant on the


17   2025 SCC Online Del 21.
18   SLP (Crl.) No.2543 of 2021 decided on 17.09.2021.
19   SLP (Crl.) No.1627 of 2022.


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ground of long incarceration. He is granted bail subject to following

conditions:-


          (i)   Applicant is directed to be immediately released from

          prison in connection with Crime No. 89 of 2021;


          (ii) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on

          furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs. 25,000/- (Rs. Twenty Five

          Thousand only) with one surety of the like amount;

          (iii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at the

          concerned Police Station, once every month on the first

          Monday of the month between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.;

          (iv) Applicant shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and

          attend the Trial Court on all dates, unless specifically

          exempted and will not take any unnecessary adjournments,

          if he does so it will entitle the prosecution to apply for

          revocation of this order;

          (v) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra

          without prior permission of the Trial Court;

          (vi) Applicant shall not influence with any of the witnesses

          or tamper with the evidence in any manner;

          (vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed

          of his current address and mobile contact number and / or

          change of residence or mobile details, if any, from time to



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                       time, as applicable; and

                       (viii)Any infraction of the conditions shall entail cancellation

                       of bail granted to the Applicant.


      29. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are limited

      for the purpose of granting Bail only and I have not made any

      observations on merits of the case. The trial shall be adjudicated on

      the strength of the evidence led and strictly on its own merits being

      uninfluenced with any of the prima facie observations made

      hereinabove in this order.


      30. Bail Application is allowed and disposed of in the above terms.


rsk                                                   [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]

                Digitally signed
                by HARSHADA
      HARSHADA HANUMANT
               SAWANT
      HANUMANT Date:
      SAWANT   2026.08.25
                21:31:48
                +0530




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