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Bombay High Court

ATUL BALASO MOREversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

Decided
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

Bail is denied because prima facie evidence establishes the accused’s guilt and no material change in circumstances warrants relief.

Summary

The High Court considered a bail application filed by Atul Balaso More, accused of offences under Sections 376(2)(j), 376(2)(n), 377 of the IPC and Sections 4, 6, 8, 12 of the POCSO Act, alleging sexual assault of a six‑year‑old girl who addressed him as “Atul Nana”. The applicant argued that the trial had been pending for over three years, that there was no direct evidence, and that the delay in filing the FIR indicated false implication. The State opposed bail, relying on the victim’s Section 164 statement, corroborative statements of neighbours, a shopkeeper, and a medico‑legal report indicating injury. The Court examined the prima facie material, noting the gravity of the offence, the trust relationship, and the risk of witness tampering, and found no material change in circumstances since the earlier denied bail. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the prosecution’s case is sufficiently substantiated to deny bail.

Issues considered

  • The appropriateness of granting bail to an accused in a POCSO case involving a minor when prima facie evidence exists.
  • Whether the prolonged pre‑trial detention and alleged delay in reporting constitute a ground for bail.
  • Whether there is a risk of witness tampering or influence given the accused's proximity to the victim.
  • Whether the applicant has demonstrated a material change in circumstances since the earlier bail denial.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • bail
  • sexual assault
  • POCSO
  • child sexual abuse
  • prima facie evidence
  • witness tampering
  • undertrial detention
  • trust relationship
  • speedy trial

Judgment

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Amberkar

                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                             BAIL APPLICATION NO. 3403 OF 2026

           Atul Balaso More                                 .. Applicant
                      Versus
           The State of Maharashtra & Anr.                  .. Respondents
                                       ....................
            Mr. Chaitanya Mulawar, Advocate for Applicant.
            Ms. Sangita Phad, APP for Respondent No.1 – State.
            Ms. Tithi Raut, Advocate appointed through Legal Aid for
             Respondent No.2.
            Mr. B.M. Mohite, Walchandnagar Police Station.
                                           ...................
                                          CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
                                          DATE  : SEPTEMBER 23, 2026
           P. C.:

           1.       Heard Mr. Mulawar, learned Advocate for Applicant and Ms.

           Phad, learned APP for Respondent No.1 – State and Ms. Raut, learned

           Advocate appointed through Legal Aid for Respondent No.2.


           2.       Bail Application is filed by Applicant under Section 483 of the

           Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking Regular Bail in

           connection with C.R. No.322 of 2023 registered with Walchandnagar

           Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(j),

           376(2)(n) and 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”)

           read with Sections 4, 6, 8 and 12 of the Protection of Children from

           Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short “POCSO Act”).




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3.    Applicant before me is the sole accused and he is in

incarceration since 29.05.2023 i.e. 3 years, 3 months and 25 days.

Earlier Bail Application No.2477 of 2024 filed by Applicant was

disposed as withdrawn with liberty to file afresh after charge is framed

by this Court by order dated 21.01.2025 (Corum: Shri. Nitin W.

Sambre J.) appended at Exhibit - ‘B’ at page No.105 of the Application.


4.    Facts of the prosecution case are extremely narrow. Age of

Applicant at the time of filing of FIR was 40 years and that of the

victim was 6 years. First Informant is the mother of the victim.

Applicant is the neighbour of First Informant who is known to family

of First Informant since many years. Prosecution case is that on

29.05.2023 at 09:00 am when Complainant was washing clothes

outside her house and other family members had gone to work, victim

called neighbor’s daughter Ms. Swara to play and bolted the door from

inside. When Complainant asked her to open the door and slapped her

once by saying, “what kind of game are you playing by closing the

door of the house from inside?”. The victim answered that she took off

Ms. Swara’s pants and touched her thigh to check whether she was

hurt. So Complainant asked victim who taught you that, and she

answered Atul Nana i.e. present Applicant. Victim further told

Complainant that when Complainant is not at home, Atul Nana called

victim to his house and outraged her modesty by doing dirty things.


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Therefore, Complainant called her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-

law and narrated them all above facts. Hence, on 29.05.2023,

Complainant filed FIR No.322 of 2023 against Applicant for offences

under IPC and POCSO Act.


5.    Mr. Mulawar, learned Advocate for Applicant would submit that

Applicant has undergone a substantial period of 3 years, 3 months and

25 days pending trial. He would submit that Special Case No. 376 of

2025 is still pending for framing of charges since the one and half

years. He would submit that there was dispute between the

Complainant and Applicant’s family. He would contend that Applicant

has been falsely implicated in the present crime owing to strained

family relations and there is an inordinate unexplained delay in

reporting the crime as FIR reveals that alleged incident took place

much earlier. He would submit that FIR does not mention specific date

and time of incident, which clearly shows that on the basis of hearsay,

fabricated case is filed against Applicant. He would submit that

allegations in the crime are such that medical examination would be

crucial to corroborate the prosecution case. He would submit that

there is neither single eye witness or independent witness who has

seen Applicant committing the alleged offence. He would submit that

there is no direct evidence about forceful physical relation by

Applicant. Hence, there is no prima facie material on record to


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corroborate the guilt of Applicant which entitles the Applicant for

grant of bail.


6.    Ms. Phad, learned APP for State has vehemently opposed the

Bail Application. She has drawn my attention to the order dated

13.02.2026 passed by Addl. Sessions Judge while rejecting the 2 nd Bail

Application of the Applicant and would submit that the grounds for

bail taken up by Applicant in the present Application have already

been dealt with by this Court in that order and as such there is no

change in circumstances for maintaining the present Application for

grant of bail. She has drawn my attention to the statement of the

victim at page No.43 of the Application and her Section 164 statement

to submit that the same completely corroborates with the prosecution

case. She would submit that prosecution is desirous of examining 23

prosecution witnesses in trial and the same will be completed

expeditiously which would eventually prove the guilt of Applicant as

there is sufficient prima facie material on record to establish his guilt.

She would submit that offence committed by Applicant is extremely

serious and its gravity needs to be taken into consideration by the

Court. She would submit that enlarging the Applicant on bail may lead

to he tampering with evidence as also influencing the witnesses as

Applicant resides in the same vicinity as that of First Informant which




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would create a hurdle in the trial. Hence she has urged the Court to

reject the Bail Application.


7.    Ms. Raut, learned appointed Advocate for Respondent No.2

would support the arguments advanced by Ms. Phad, learned APP and

additionally would submit that the offence committed by Applicant is

extremely serious in nature and in the peculiar facts of the present

case wherein the victim used to look upto Applicant as uncle or father

figure by addressing him as “Atul Nana”, the gravity of offence is

amplified owing to the trust reposed by First Informant’s family as also

by the victim in him and he having breached the trust. She would

submit that delay in reporting matters arising out of POCSO Act is not

fatal to the prosecution case as the victim being a 6 year old child was

scared to disclose the said incident to anyone and her abnormal

behaviour later noticed by her mother revealed the alleged incident.

She would submit that Medico-legal Examination Report also

corroborates the prosecution case and that it is a matter of trial.

However on overall consideration of the material on record, she would

submit that complicity of Applicant in the present crime is prima facie

established and hence she would urge the Court to reject the Bail

Application.


8.    I have heard Mr. Mulawar, learned Advocate for Applicant, Ms.

Phad, learned APP for Respondent No.1 – State and Ms. Raut, learned

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Advocate appointed through Legal Aid for Respondent No.2 and with

their able assistance perused the record of the case. Submissions made

by them have received due consideration.


9.    In the present case what is prima facie seen is the gravity of the

offence vis-a-vis the affinity and access of Applicant to the victim.

From the statements of witnesses on record it is prima facie seen that

the victim used to practically visit the house of Applicant often as he

was her uncle and was known to family. He was residing next-door,

was a neighbour with family-like relations with them due to which

they reposed full trust in him. Perusal of Section 161 statement and

Section 164 statement of the First Informant as also the victim reveal

serious allegation against the Applicant which are prima facie found to

be consistent in the statements which are recorded. There is nothing

placed on record for me to disbelieve those statements at this prima

facie stage which is the substantial material and the said statements

are consistent.


10. It is seen that prima facie, statement of shopkeeper – Vishal

Narute appended at page No.54 of application corroborates the

prosecution case and shows that victim used to visit his shop often to

buy tobacco, milk, chocolates, etc. for Applicant. It is seen that victim

acknowledged the fact that she used to come to his shop on request of

Applicant. Furthermore, it is seen that statement of neighbour – Dipak

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More appended at page No.55 of application shows that Dipak resides

on the way to shop of Vishal Narute and he has seen victim entering

house of Applicant carrying milk bag, tobacco packets, etc. and victim

has also acknowledged the same thing.


11. On      perusal   of   Medico-legal   Examination    report    dated

29.05.2023 appended at page No.58 of application it is seen that

examining doctor has given positive report that victim suffered pain

due to alleged assault. It is seen that said report corroborates the

prosecution case which is crucial evidence against Applicant.


12. There is not even a single piece of prima facie material evidence

placed on record to show that family relationship between Applicant’s

family and that of the First Informant’s family were strained which is

the defence taken by Applicant’s Advocate. Hence the defence of false

implication owing to strained family relations adopted by Applicant

cannot be accepted by me at this juncture in absence of any

corroborative material though it is merely argued by Mr. Mulawar.


13. It is trite law that successive Bail Application is permissible only

in the event if there is a material change in circumstances which is the

sine qua non for filing subsequent Bail Application. A material change

in circumstances settled by law is a change in the facts, situation or

law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the



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earlier finding has become obsolete. However as can be seen from the

present case apart from the period of incarceration suffered by the

Applicant, there is no change in circumstance placed on record which

would impel me to otherwise take a divergent view from the view

taken by the learned Single Judge who has dismissed the earlier Bail

Application filed by the Applicant upon considering the merits of the

matter.


14. The Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Ranjan Yadav Vs. CBI

through its Director1 has observed that there is no absolute and

unconditional rule about when bail should be granted by the Court

and when it should not and that it all depends on the facts and

circumstances of each case and it cannot be said there is any absolute

rule that because a long period of imprisonment has expired bail must

necessarily be granted.


15.     In cases of sexual offences, medical evidence, if available, is of

vital importance however even if such evidence is not available or

cannot be made available, it is held in a plethora of judgements that

Courts should not discard the case and can rely upon the testimony of

the victim alone. In this regard reference is made to the decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Madan Gopal Kakkad Vs. Naval Dubey &




1 (2007) 1 SCC 70


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Anr.2 wherein the Supreme Court has observed that rape is a crime

and not a medical condition and that it is a legal term and not a

diagnosis to be made by the medical officer treating the victim. In any

event, Section 29 of the POCSO Act casts reverse burden of proof on

the Accused to prove his innocence. Though the said presumption is

rebuttable, at this prima facie stage there is absolutely nothing placed

before me or emanating from the record to discard the prosecution

case.


16. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Pradum Singh Vs. State

of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko and 3 Ors. 3 has while referring to

various judgments passed by the Supreme Court discussed the facet of

solitary evidence of prosecutrix in cases of sexual assault. The relevant

paragraph Nos.18 to 21 are reproduced below:-

            “18. The Apex Court in re; State of H.P. Vs. Asha Ram, (2005) 13
            SCC 766, has observed in para-5, which reads as under:-

                     "5. We record our displeasure and dismay, the way the
                     High Court dealt casually with an offence so grave, as in
                     the case at hand, overlooking the alarming and shocking
                     increase of sexual assault on minor girls. The High Court
                     was swayed by the sheer insensitivity, totally oblivious of
                     the growing menace of sexual violence against minors
                     much less by the father. The High Court also totally
                     overlooked the prosecution evidence, which inspired
                     confidence and merited acceptance. It is now a well-
                     settled principle of law that conviction can be founded on
                     the testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are
                     compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The
                     evidence of a prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an
                     injured witness. The testimony of the victim of sexual

2 (1992) 3 SCC 204

3 2024:AHC-LKO:41454

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                assault is vital, unless there are compelling reasons which
                necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the
                courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony
                of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused
                where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to
                be reliable. It is also a well-settled principle of law that
                corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the
                testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law
                but a guidance of prudence under the given
                circumstances. The evidence of the prosecutrix is more
                reliable than that of an injured witness. Even minor
                contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the
                statement of the prosecutrix should not be a ground for
                throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case."

          19. The Apex Court in re; Ganesan Vs. State represented by its
          Inspector of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573, while considering the
          judgments of Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191, State of
          Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC
          550, State of U.P. Vs. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594, State of Punjab
          v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, State of Orissa v. Thakara
          Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 and Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of
          Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 has observed that to hold an
          accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary
          evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same
          inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy,
          unblemished and should be of sterling quality.

          20. In the case of Pappu (supra), the Apex Court has held that
          even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy
          virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a
          ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to
          be established that there was consent by her for that particular
          occasion and that consent should be free consent.

          21. The Apex Court in re; Phool Singh v. State of Madhya
          Pradesh, (2022) 2 SCC 74, has considered the judgment of
          Sham Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34, wherein
          the Apex Court has observed that the testimony of the victim is
          vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate
          looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should
          find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual
          assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires
          confidence and is found to be reliable.”

17. Attention is drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the

case of Bhagwan Singh Vs. Dilip Kumar4 wherein the Supreme Court



4 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1059

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has discussed and summarized the principles for granting bail. The

relevant paragraph Nos.11, 12 and 19 are reproduced herein under:-

         “Discussion and findings

         11. The grant of bail is a discretionary relief which necessarily
         means that such discretion would have to be exercised in a
         judicious manner and not as a matter of course. The grant of
         bail is dependent upon contextual facts of the matter being dealt
         with by the Court and may vary from case to case. There cannot
         be any exhaustive parameters set out for considering the
         application for grant of bail. However, it can be noted that:

         11.1. While granting bail the court has to keep in mind factors
         such as the nature of accusations, severity of the punishment, if
         the accusations entail a conviction and the nature of evidence in
         support of the accusations.

         11.2. Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being
         tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for
         the complainant should also weigh with the Court in the matter
         of grant of bail.

         11.3. While it is not accepted to have the entire evidence
         establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
         but there ought to be always a prima facie satisfaction of the
         Court in support of the charge.

         11.4. Frivolity of prosecution should always be considered and it
         is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be
         considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there
         being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in
         the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to have an
         order of bail.

         12. We may also profitably refer to a decision of this Court in
         Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar
         v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]
         where the parameters to be taken into consideration for grant of
         bail by the courts have been explained in the following words :
         (SCC pp. 535-36, para 11)
               “11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very
               well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its
               discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of
               course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed
               examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of
               the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a
               need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie
               concluding why bail was being granted particularly where
               the accused is charged of having committed a serious

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     offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer
     from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the
     court granting bail to consider among other circumstances,
     the following factors also before granting bail; they are:
          (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of
     punishment in case of conviction and the nature of
     supporting evidence.
          (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the
     witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.
          (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of
     the charge.
13. …..
14. …..
15. …..
16. …..
17. …..
18. …..

19. Similar is the opinion of this Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar
v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v.Ashis Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] which has held as
under : (SCC p. 499, para 9)
      “9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order [Ashish
      Chatterjee v.State of W.B., CRM No. 272 of 2010, order
      dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] is clearly unsustainable. It is trite
      that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order
      [Ashish Chatterjee v. State of W.B., CRM No. 272 of 2010,
      order dated 11-1-2010 (Cal)] passed by the High Court
      granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
      equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
      discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance
      with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of
      decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that,
      among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in
      mind while considering an application for bail are:
      (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
      to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
      (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
      (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
      (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
      released on bail;
      (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
      the accused;
      (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
      (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
      influenced; and
      (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
      of bail.”




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17.1. In the above matter the Supreme Court relying on the gravity of

allegations levelled by victim in the FIR which were corroborated by

the Section 164 statement of victim, cancelled the bail granted to the

Accused therein by the High Court.


18.   Similar is the present case where allegations are so serious that

it shocks the conscience of the Court. Applicant and victim were

neighbours. Their neighbourly relations were spoken highly even by

First Informant - mother of victim due to the trust established between

their families as seen from First Informant’s statement. Victim is

merely 6 years old, whereas Applicant is 40 years old. Such relations

led to the victim spending her time in the Applicant’s household. The

trust shown by her family in the Applicant was about setting an

example for neighbourly brotherhood relations in today’s times. Sadly,

the Applicant’s behaviour eroded the trust between the families.


19.   Prima facie there is material on record to show that Applicant

committed the offence as per prosecution case. Prosecution case is that

Applicant who was a fatherly figure to victim committed the assault

which in the opinion of this Court would have scarred the tender mind

of the victim which is clearly exhibited by her behaviour as stated by

the First Informant - mother. Rather such an act is an act against the

Society at large as one of the principal object of the POCSO Act is to




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ensure that the tender age of the child is not abused and their

childhood is protected against exploitation.


20.   Reference is made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the

case of Subhan Ali Vs. State NCT of Delhi and Anr. 5 wherein in an

identical case, the Delhi High Court refused bail to the Applicant

therein while observing as follows:-


          “9. This case reflects the profound trauma suffered by the
          victim, a minor, at the hands of a person she trusted - her
          neighbour, in whose house she had gone to play, and whom she
          addressed as chacha. It is a stark reminder of an unfortunate
          reality frequently observed by courts, where acts of sexual
          assault against children are often committed by individuals who
          occupy positions of trust or confidence in the child's life. Such
          relationships of familiarity and trust not only provide
          perpetrators access to the child but also magnify the betrayal
          and lasting impact of the crime. The victim in this case, despite
          her young age, demonstrated commendable courage by
          confiding in her school teacher, as she was unable to bear the
          trauma caused by the violation of her body and dignity. The
          Principal and teacher, instead of silencing or ignoring the child's
          plight, acted responsibly and informed the parents, which led to
          the registration of the present FIR. Their actions serve as a
          commendable example of the importance of supporting victims
          in such situations.

          10. It is the duty of the Courts to recognize the broader
          implications of such heinous acts. One must always remember
          that crimes of sexual assault against minors are not just
          violations of their physical integrity but also attacks on their
          innocence and sense of safety, and often leave permanent
          psychological scars. When such offences are committed by
          individuals the victim trusts, the impact is even more severe,
          both for the victim and society at large. Therefore, in cases like
          the present, the Courts must send a strong and clear message,
          through its orders and judgments, that such acts will not be
          condoned and that the justice system will act decisively to
          protect the most vulnerable members of society.”
                                                       (emphasis supplied)




5 2025 SCC OnLine Del 297

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21. In the case of Eera Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)6 the Supreme Court

has made observations regarding the Statement of Objects and

Reasons of POCSO Act in paragraph No.20 which reads as under:-

           “20. The purpose of referring to the Statement of Objects and
           Reasons and the Preamble of the POCSO Act is to appreciate
           that the very purpose of bringing a legislation of the present
           nature is to protect the children from the sexual assault,
           harassment and exploitation, and to secure the best interest of
           the child. On an avid and diligent discernment of the Preamble,
           it is manifest that it recognizes the necessity of the right to
           privacy and confidentiality of a child to be protected and
           respected by every person by all means and through all stages of
           a judicial process involving the child. Best interest and well-
           being are regarded as being of paramount importance at every
           stage to ensure the healthy physical, emotional, intellectual and
           social development of the child. There is also a stipulation that
           sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are heinous offences and
           need to be effectively addressed. The Statement of Objects and
           Reasons provides regard being had to the constitutional
           mandate, to direct its policy towards securing that the tender
           age of children is not abused and their childhood is protected
           against exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a
           healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. There
           is also a mention which is quite significant that interest of the
           child, both as a victim as well as a witness, needs to be
           protected. The stress is on providing child friendly procedure.
           Dignity of the child has been laid immense emphasis in the
           scheme of legislation. Protection and interest occupy the seminal
           place in the text of the POCSO Act.”


22.    Considering the principles laid down by the Supreme Court for

grant of bail and the citations as delineated herein above vis-a-vis the

gravity of the offence and more particularly the nexus between the

parties, no case for grant of bail is made out by the Applicant.


23.    Though this Court has in numerous cases taken cognizance of

the fundamental right to speedy trial and personal liberty granted to

6(2017) 15 SCC 133

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undertrial – accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in

view of the long incarceration suffered by the undertrial – accused and

released them on bail owing to no possibility of completion of trial in

the near foreseeable future, the case at hand carves out an exception

in my opinion. The trust and faith reposed in the Applicant is

completely eroded and shattered by him. The allegations of offence in

the present case is of such a serious nature that grant of bail would

amount to sending a wrong message or signal to the Society at large as

the sanctity of pure and innocent relationship as delineated is

decimated by the Applicant before me by sexually assaulting the victim

aged 6 years old who adored him and called him “Atul Nana” which

literally means a father figure.


24. In view of my above prima facie observations, no case for grant

of bail is made out by the Applicant.


25. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are limited

for the purpose of adjudication of the Bail Application and the trial

shall be adjudicated on the strength of the evidence led and strictly on

its own merits being uninfluenced by any of the prima facie

observations made herein above in this order.


26. This Court appreciates the assistance rendered by Ms. Raut,

learned Advocate appointed through the Legal Aid to espouse the



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                  cause of Respondent No. 2 (prosecutrix). Her fees be paid by the High

                  Court Legal Aid Services Authority as per rules on production of a

                  server copy of this order and other compliances in accordance with the

                  decision of this Court in the case of Sanjyot Nitin Telharkar v. The

                  State of Maharashtra & Anr.7 and the Schedule under Regulation 18(1)

                  of the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority Rules, 1998.


                  27.            Bail Application is dismissed.


 Amberkar                                                         [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]


              Digitally signed
              by AJAY
AJAY       TRAMBAK
TRAMBAK    UGALMUGALE
UGALMUGALE Date: 2026.09.28
              12:21:06 +0530




                  7     Judgment dated 25.09.2024 passed in Misc. Civil Application No. 134 of
                        2024

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