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Bombay High Court

M/S. AHMED CURRIM CORPORATION, THRU. MR ALIM SULTAN AHMED KARIM, PARTNERversusMRS NASIMA ZULKERNAIN MERCHANT, THRU. POA MRS. ZULEKERNAIN MERCHANT

Decided
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The court held that the landlady's bona fide requirement for the first‑floor premises remained genuine and was not eclipsed by subsequent acquisitions, so the eviction decree stands.

Summary

The original defendant appealed an eviction decree granted by the Small Causes Court on the ground that the landlady had a bona fide requirement for the first‑floor premises as her residence due to chronic diabetes and the need to accommodate her son. The appellate court upheld the decree, finding the landlady’s need genuine and that no suitable alternative premises were available. The defendant argued that the landlady later acquired other residential and commercial premises, contending that these subsequent events satisfied her requirement and should defeat the decree. The court examined the legal principle that subsequent developments can only overturn a decree if they completely eclipse the landlord’s need, and held that the acquired premises were either commercial or unsuitable (a second‑floor flat) and did not satisfy the landlady’s specific requirement for a first‑floor residence. Consequently, the court found no error in the appellate judgment and dismissed the civil revision application, confirming the eviction decree.

Issues considered

  • The existence and continuity of the landlord's bona fide requirement for residential premises despite subsequent acquisition of other premises
  • Whether subsequent events can defeat an eviction decree based on personal requirement
  • Whether the landlord’s non‑disclosure of alternative premises affects the decree
  • Balancing hardship to the landlord against hardship to the tenant

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • eviction
  • bona fide requirement
  • landlord
  • subsequent events
  • hardship
  • Civil Revision
  • CPC Section 115
  • mesne profits

Judgment

                                                     23-CRA-110-2017.docx


               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                 CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 110 OF 2017
Swapnil

          M/s. Ahmed Currim Corporation,
          Thru. Mr Alim Sultan Ahmed Karim, Partner. …Applicant
               Vs.
          Nasima Zulkernain Merchant,
          Thru. Poa Mrs. Zulekernain Merchant.            …Respondent
                                         WITH
                       INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2434 OF 2022

          Mr. Shreeganesh Khaire a/w. Ms. Gayatri Shenvi for the
          applicant.
          Mr. Kunal Bhange a/w. Mr. Akshay Pawar, Mr. Faiz Ali Khan
          for the respondent.

                                  CORAM : GAURI GODSE, J.

                                  DATE :       27th AUGUST 2026

          ORDER :


          1.    This civil revision application is filed by the original

          defendant to challenge the eviction decree passed by the

          appellate bench of the Small Causes Court. The decree is

          passed on the ground of bona fide requirement of the

          landlady for her residential use. The suit was filed for eviction

          on the grounds of change in user, nuisance and annoyance

          created by the defendant, and alteration of a permanent


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nature carried out without prior permission and bona fide

requirement of the landlady.


2.   The trial court had dismissed the suit. However, the

appeal preferred by the landlady is partly allowed, and the

decree is passed on the ground of bona fide requirement.

The remaining grounds are disbelieved. Hence, the landlady

has preferred a separate civil revision application. For the

ground of bona fide requirement, the landlady pleaded that

she required the suit premises for her bona fide use, as her

present place of residence was not suitable. She led the

evidence in support of her pleadings and contended that she

is residing in rented premises on the third floor; she is 55

years of age and is suffering from chronic diabetes and finds

it difficult to climb up and down the staircase. She has

contended in her oral evidence that her family consists of

four members; her son is 20 years of age and of

marriageable age, and thus she required the suit premises

for her residence. She contended that her son is also

suffering as he has no separate place for his studies. She

also contended that she had no other source of funds to

purchase residential premises for her family. Hence, the



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plaintiff supported her pleadings for want of the suit premises

for a convenient residence for herself and her family

members. With reference to the pleadings and supporting

evidence regarding her requirement for residential premises,

the plaintiff pleaded that the first floor premises, i.e. the suit

premises, were suitable for her and her family members.


3.    The defendant opposed the requirement on the ground

that the other premises were available. As per the written

statement filed by the defendant, it is pleaded that the

plaintiff has adequate premises for her residence and does

not require the suit premises. The appellate court has

considered the evidence on record with reference to the

bona fide requirement and held that, considering the

requirement for herself and her family, she would be entitled

to possession of the suit premises, which are situated on the

first floor. With reference to the defendant’s contentions that

other premises were available, the first appellate court held

that the court cannot dictate to the landlord to continue and

occupy the premises that she was occupying. The landlady

occupying the third-floor premises on rent was considered an

important factor in accepting the ground of bona fide



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requirement for her residence. The accommodation available

with the landlady and her requirement of the suit premises on

her medical grounds and for her son are accepted based on

the evidence led by the plaintiff.


4.    The defendant’s evidence on the availability of

adequate premises is also considered by the appellate court

while accepting the landlady’s contention that the suit

premises are required by the landlady for her bona fide use

of residence. While granting a decree for eviction on the

ground of bona fide requirement, the appellate court has also

considered the issue of hardship. It is held that the defendant

has not pleaded that any attempts were made to search for

any alternate accommodation and that the defendant was

capable of obtaining any other suitable premises. Hence, the

ground of hardship was accepted in favour of the landlady by

considering the status of the defendant. The nature of the

business carried out by the defendant, dealing with the

business in gems and stones, exchange of foreign currency

and frequent visits of the defendant to foreign countries was

also considered as an important aspect to hold that no

hardship would be caused to the defendant compared to the



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hardship to the landlady, if the eviction decree on the ground

of bona fide requirement was refused.


5.    Learned counsel for the applicant (defendant) submits

that during the pendency of the suit, the landlady has

acquired sufficient premises which are let out to another

tenant. He relied upon Civil Application No. 57 of 2017 filed

for bringing on record the subsequent events regarding the

premises acquired by the landlady during the pendency of

the proceedings. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon

the relevant averments and supporting documents to

contend that four separate commercial premises have been

acquired in the same building by the landlady during the

pendency of the proceedings. He submits that one residential

flat, i.e. flat no.4 on the second floor of the same building

admeasuring 750 Sq.Ft., which was occupied by the earlier

tenant, was available for the landlady. However, instead of

occupying and possessing the said flat on the second floor,

she inducted a new tenant by creating a new tenancy by

executing an agreement. He has relied upon the tenancy

agreement dated 26th December 2007 annexed to the civil

application.



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6.         He submits that the landlady suppressed the fact that

No. 4 was available with her for her requirement of

residence. Learned counsel for the applicant, therefore,

submits that when the landlady suppressed the acquiring of

the premises for her residence, the subsequent events need

to be considered while determining the prayer for eviction on

the ground of bona fide requirement.


7.         To support his submissions, learned counsel for the

applicant relied upon the following decisions:-

I.        Sitaram Narayan Shinde & Ors. Vs. Ibrabhim

          IsmailRais and Ors.1

II.       Tarachand              Hassaram     Shamdasani       Vs.

          Durgashankar G. Shroff and Ors.2

III.      Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta.3

IV.       Vivek Trimbakrao Paturkar Vs. Sulochanabai.4

V.        Vasant Mahadeo Gujar Vs. Baitulla Ismail Shaikh

          and Anr.5

VI.       Gulabbi Vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra and Ors.6

VII.      Gaya Prasad Vs. Pradeep Srivastava7
1     2005 (2) Bom.C.R. 427
2     Writ Petition No. 2933 of 1991
3     (1999) 6 SCC 222
4     CRA/91/2021 Dt. 04/03/2022.
5     2016 (4) ALL MR 174
6     1988 Bom RC 410
7     (2001) 2 SCC 604

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8.   Learned counsel for the applicant submits that it is a

well-established legal principle that the landlord has to plead

the available premises for the residence and the particulars

regarding the insufficiency of the premises for claiming

eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. In the

present case, except for a single sentence that the suit

premises are required for her bona fide requirement, no

particulars have been pleaded by the landlady. He relies on

the decision of the Apex Court in Gulabbai to support his

submissions that the court may consider subsequent events

when determining the landlord's bona fide requirement. He

submits that the Apex Court had set aside the decision of the

High Court on the ground that the acquisition of the premises

by the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings was

an important aspect to be considered while determining the

plea of bona fide requirement.


9.     He submits that even in the present case, the

subsequent events brought on record by the applicant clearly

show that the landlady has sufficient premises for her

requirements, and that the suit for eviction filed by the

present plaintiff on the ground of bona fide requirement is not



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genuine. He submits that even otherwise, in view of the well-

settled legal principles, the subsequent events of acquiring

the residential premises on the second floor need to be

considered by this court for determining the ground of

eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the

landlady. Once her requirement is satisfied by acquiring

another premises, the landlady would not be entitled to

eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement in respect of

the suit premises.


10.   Learned counsel for the applicant referred to the

decision of the Apex Court in Gaya Prasad and submits that

it is held by the Apex Court that if the subsequent events

wholly satisfy the requirement of the landlord, the eviction

decree on the ground of personal bona fide requirement

need not be confirmed. He, therefore, submits that in view of

the acquisition of the premises by the landlady, the

subsequent events would show that the landlady is not

entitled to a decree of eviction on the ground of bona fide

requirement. He, therefore, submits that the impugned

judgment and decree would warrant interference by this

Court.



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11.   Learned counsel for the respondents supports the

impugned decree. He submits that the suit for eviction on the

ground of bona fide requirement was filed on 2nd March 2000.

He submits that during the pendency of the civil revision

application, the landlady expired sometime in 2022 and her

heirs and legal representatives were brought on record. He

submits that the specific pleadings for bona fide requirement

for her personal use for residence are substantially

supported by leading evidence. All the premises shown to

have been acquired by the landlady are commercial

premises on the ground floor. So far as the second floor

premises, i.e. flat no.4 is concerned, he submits that it is not

750 Sq.Ft., as contended by the applicant, but it is only 650

Sq. Ft. Even otherwise, flat no.4 is situated on the second

floor, and the suit premises are situated on the first floor,

which is Adm. 700 Sq.Ft. He submits that the medical ground

and the requirement for her son's residence were specific

contentions raised by the landlady in seeking eviction on the

ground of bona fide requirement. The suit premises on the

second floor, i.e. flat no.4 is not suitable for the landlady.


12.   Accordingly, an affidavit-in-reply has been filed on



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behalf of the landlady, stating that her requirement was

always for the first-floor premises due to her ill health and her

son's needs. He, therefore, submits that the flat on the

second floor and the commercial premises would be no

ground to contend that the landlady’s requirement for

residence is satisfied.


13.   Learned counsel for the landlady, therefore, submits

that none of the premises acquired during the pendency of

the proceedings is suitable for the landlady’s requirement for

residence on the ground of medical issues and the

requirement for her son. With reference to flat no.4, there

was no ground in respect of the said premises for seeking

eviction. However, the suit premises situated on the first floor

is suitable for the landlady and so far as the hardship is

concerned, the facts clearly would support the landlady’s

contention that more hardship would be caused to the

landlady, if the decree for eviction on the first floor premises

is refused and there would not be any hardship to the

defendant if the eviction decree is passed in respect of the

suit premises. None of the subsequent events pleaded in the

civil application would show that the landlady's requirement is



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satisfied.


14.   To support his submissions, the learned counsel for the

landlady has relied upon the decision of this court in Anil

Bhausaheb Patil and Ors. Vs. Sangli Urban Cooperative

Bank Ltd.8 By referring to the well-settled legal principles in

the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Gaya Prasad, this court has taken a view that the

cognisance in respect of the subsequent events can be

considered provided such subsequent events are of such a

nature that the requirement of the landlord is completely

eclipsed. He, thus, submits that if the requirement as pleaded

and proved by way of evidence is not fully satisfied by the

subsequent developments, it cannot be a ground to interfere

with the eviction decree. He submits that this court held that

the subsequent developments, if they overshadow the

genuineness of the need, can be considered. He, therefore,

submits that in the present case the landlady’s requirement

of bona fide use of the suit premises on the ground of her

medical issues and the requirement for her son cannot be

said to be satisfied for interfering with the eviction decree on

the ground of subsequent developments.

8 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2966

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15.   He also relies upon the relevant observations of the

Apex Court in Gaya Prasad to support his submission that

the subsequent development during the pendency of the

eviction proceedings, occurring because of the slowness of

the process of the litigation itself and made use by the sitting

tenants, cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord

relief when the litigation is at the final stage. He submits that

the Apex Court has taken a view that the subsequent events

may be considered in some cases only if it overshadows the

genuineness of the landlord’s requirement. He, therefore,

submits that in the present case the landlady’s bona fide

requirement is not satisfied in view of the subsequent

developments warranting any interference in the eviction

decree.


16.   I have carefully perused the papers of the civil revision

application and the civil application filed by the applicant

regarding the subsequent developments. The suit was filed

in March 2000, seeking a decree of eviction on the ground of

bona fide requirement, as the landlady was suffering from

chronic diabetes and was unable to climb the stairs to her

existing rented premises, which were situated on the third



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floor. There is no dispute that the landlady's premises were

on the third floor of the building without a lift. The suit

premises is admeasuring 700 Sq. Ft. on the first floor.

Although the suit premises are used for commercial

purposes, there is no dispute that they are residential

premises. It was also sought to be contended on behalf of

the applicant that the suit premises were acquired in 1999

and immediately within a few months the present suit was

filed. It was also argued on behalf of the applicant that the

plaintiff’s husband was acting as rent collector of the original

landlord. However, the plaintiff made no attempt to acquire

any other premises before filing this suit for eviction. It is one

of the arguments on behalf of the applicant that on the date

of the purchase of the building where the suit premises are

situated, the plaintiff was well aware that the suit premises

were occupied by the present applicant and were being used

as commercial premises.


17.   In view of the objections raised to the decree for

eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, it is

necessary to refer to the specific pleading and evidence led

on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded



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that she requires the suit premises for her own use for

residence. It is pleaded that the current premises occupied

by her for residence are not suitable. In the oral evidence,

the landlady has specifically contended that she is 55 years

of age and is suffering from chronic diabetes, and it is difficult

for her to climb up and down the staircase. She has stated

that there are four members in her family and her son is 20

years of age. She has stated that she is finding it difficult to

accommodate her son in the smaller premises and to

arrange his marriage for want of sufficient accommodation.


18.   There is no dispute that the landlady has pleaded and

proved such a requirement in evidence. The main objection

raised by the defendant is that the landlady has adequate

premises available for her residence. As specifically referred

to in the aforesaid paragraphs, the alternate premises are

sought to be brought on record by way of civil application on

the ground of subsequent developments. However, an

important   aspect cannot      be ignored:      the   bona fide

requirement pleaded as on the date of filing of the suit still

existed, as the suit premises are suitable as pleaded by the

plaintiff, being on the first floor. Hence, the basic requirement



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pleaded and proved is that the first-floor premises are more

suitable for the landlady, considering her medical issues. The

ground of medical issues is not in dispute. The requirement

for her son is also not in dispute. Hence, if the premises

available in view of the subsequent development is viewed

with reference to the ground of bona fide requirement, none

of the premises brought on record can be accepted as

suitable for the requirement pleaded by the plaintiff.


19.   Unfortunately, the landlady has expired during the

pendency of this civil application. However, the requirement

pleaded and supported by her evidence in the suit is

reiterated in her reply to the civil application. She has

specifically pleaded in her reply that she requires the suit

premises, which are situated on the first floor. In view of her

family’s needs and her ailing health, her current residence on

the third floor is unsuitable. She has also stated in her

affidavit-in-reply that the building in which her existing

premises are situated is very old and has no lift facility.

Hence, she has reiterated that, considering her ailing health,

the suit premises situated on the first floor are more

convenient and that her bona fide requirement still exists.



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20.   I have perused the documents annexed to the civil

application for the four premises, brought on record, as the

subsequent developments acquired by the plaintiff are

commercial premises. The residential premises to be

considered is flat no.4 on the second floor. The dispute is

sought to be raised that the flat has not been transferred as

contended by the landlady, but a new tenancy is created in

view of the monetary transaction. The monetary transaction

is not on record. Even if the contention is accepted that it is

not an internal transfer of tenancy between the family of the

original tenant and that it is a creation of a new tenancy, the

factual aspect cannot be ignored that the plaintiff’s

requirement of the suit premises was on the ground that it is

situated on the first floor and would be convenient for the

landlady considering her ailing health. Thus, none of the

subsequent developments can be considered as satisfying

the landlady’s bona fide requirement of residence on the first

floor on the ground of her ailing health and requirement for

her son.


21.   In view of the different facts of the present case the

decision of this court in Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani



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and Sitaram Narayan Shinde relied upon by the learned

counsel for the applicant would not assist the arguments

raised on behalf of the applicant. In Shiv Sarup Gupta the

Apex Court held that on the facts substantiated by the

landlord to occupy the tenanted premises can be said to be

natural, real, sincere and honest. The need, if found to be

reasonable, the landlord would be entitled to a decree for

eviction. Thus, it is held that the alternative accommodation if

available for the landlord, should be reasonably suitable and

only then the court can ask the landlord why he is not willing

to occupy such accommodation to satisfy the needs. It is also

held that the convenience and the comfort of the landlord

and his family members would be relevant factor for

considering the need pleaded by the landlord. The need

pleaded by the plaintiff (landlady) is for a convenient

premises on the first floor for her comfort considering her ill

health and the extra premises for the need of her son.

Hence, the said decisions would also not be of any

assistance to the arguments raised on behalf of the

applicant.


22.   In the decision of this court in Vivek Trimbakrao



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Paturkar, it is held that when the landlord pleads and proves

all the material facts, then the court would be able to

adjudicate fully, completely and effectively, as to whether the

requirement pressed into service of the landlord is bona fide.

In the present case the landlady’s need is pleaded and

proved by way of evidence. The applicant (defendant) has

not raised any grounds to disprove the genuineness of the

need pleaded and proved by the landlady. In              Vasant

Mahadeo Gujar this court held that when some of the

premises if acquired post institution of the suit and the

premises subsequently acquired and left out of consideration

there was a duty upon the landlord to disclose the

acquisition. It held that such a non disclosure would be

relevant consideration in the context of determining the

reasonability and as well as bona fide need.


23.   In the present case the subsequent acquisition which is

brought on record by the applicant is in regard to the

commercial premises and so far as the residential flat on the

second floor is concerned, the same is not acquired by the

landlady, but is occupied by the tenant. Even otherwise the

same does not satisfy the need pleaded and proved by the



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landlady. Hence, non disclosure of the said flat would not be

relevant in deciding the the eviction decree which is

challenged by the defendant in the present civil revision

application.


24.    In the decision of the Apex court in Gulabbai, it is held

that   the     words   “reasonable        requirement”    undoubtedly

postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed

to mere desire. It is held that the distinction between the

desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind, but not so

as to make even the genuine need as nothing but desire.

Hence, in the present case when there is no doubt raised on

the genuineness of the bona fide requirement of the landlady

pleaded and proved, mere bringing on record subsequent

development would not be a relevant ground to interfere with

the eviction decree. The subsequent development which

does not satisfy the need pleaded and proved, cannot be a

ground to non-suit the landlady in whose favour an eviction

decree is passed. Hence, none of the decisions relied upon

by the learned counsel for the            applicant   would     be     of

any    assistance      to   the   arguments      raised    on   behalf

applicant       and     thus      would       not     warrant        any



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interference with the decree for eviction on the ground of

bona fide requirement.


25.   There is no dispute that the eviction decree was sought

on the ground of bona fide requirement, considering her

medical   issues;    hence,     none   of      the    subsequent

developments can be considered to satisfy the requirement

pleaded and proved by the landlady. Even in the decision

relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, the view

taken by the court on considering the bona fide requirement

of the landlord would support the landlady’s contention in the

present case. The Apex Court in the decision of Gaya

Prasad has referred to the consideration of the subsequent

events in paragraphs 13 and 14 which read as under :-


“13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow
the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of

such a dimension that the need propounded by the

petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by

such subsequent events. A three-Judge Bench of this Court

in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders³

which pointed to the need for remoulding the reliefs on the

strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action

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in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that

cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very

cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the Bench said

then: (SCC pp. 772-73, para 4)


           "We affirm the proposition that for making the

     right or remedy claimed by the party just and

     meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with

     the current realities, the court can, and in many cases

     must, take cautious cognizance of events and

     developments subsequent to the institution of the

     proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides

     are scrupulously obeyed."


14. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which

approved and followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai v.

Raghunath Prasad has taken care to emphasise that the

subsequent events should have "wholly satisfied" the

requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the

ground of personal requirement. The relevant passage is

extracted below: (SCC pp. 113-14, para 14)


           “Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where

     possession is sought for personal requirement it would

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      be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the

      landlord must not only exist on the date of the action

      but must subsist till the final decree or an order for

      eviction is made. If in the meantime events have

      cropped up which would show that the landlord's

      requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his

      action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to

      say that as decree or order for eviction is passed

      against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take

      into consideration subsequent events.” ”


26.   This court in the decision of Anil Bhausaheb Patil has

followed the legal principles settled by the Apex Court as

observed in paragraph 30 and 31, which reads as under:-


“30. It is trite that the requirement of the landlord has to be
judged in the context of the facts as they obtained on the

date of the institution of the Suit. That remains the basic rule.

However, the Court is required to take a cautious cognizance

of the subsequent events. In cases were the subsequent

developments are such that the requirement of the landlord

is completely eclipsed, the Court may be justified in

modifying the decree.
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31. A useful reference in this context can be made to a

decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gaya Prasad v.

Pradeep Srivastava, wherein it was enunciated that, the

crucial date for deciding as to the bona fide of the

requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for

eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for

him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every

subsequent development during the post-petition period is to

be taken into account for judging the bona fide of the

requirement pleaded by landlord there would perhaps be no

end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-

process system subsists. The subsequent events to

overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such

nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by

the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed

by such subsequent events.”


27.   Considering the facts of the present case, where the

landlady has prayed for a decree of eviction on the ground of

bona fide requirement owing to her ailing health, the

applicant’s contentions on the ground of subsequent

developments are no ground to interfere with the eviction


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decree. The subsequent developments would not show that

the landlady’s requirement is satisfied and she would not be

entitled to a decree of eviction. So far as the hardship is

concerned, nothing is shown that any hardship would be

caused to the defendant if the decree for eviction is passed.


28.   I see no reason to disbelieve the findings on the

grounds of the landlady that the hardship would be caused to

the landlady and her family if the decree of eviction is not

granted. Unfortunately, in the present case, the landlady has

expired without getting the benefit of the decree in her favour.

Even in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the landlady in this court,

she had contended that she required the suit premises

situated at the first floor due to her ailing health. Even

otherwise, the landlady’s need pleaded is for convenient

premises on the first floor for her residence. The subsequent

developments pertain to the commercial premises. The

residential premises brought on record are on the second

floor and do not satisfy the need pleaded and proved by the

landlady for the first-floor premises, owing to her ill health.


29.   With reference to these facts, the observations of the

Apex Court in Gaya Prasad become crucial, where it is


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clarified that subsequent events can be considered only

when they overshadow the genuineness of the landlord’s

need. It is held that at the end of the litigation, the

subsequent events cannot be considered if they are

insufficient to overshadow the bona fide need found by the

court. In the present case, the affidavit-in-reply filed by the

landlady shows that her bona fide requirement continued

even on the date of the filing of the reply. Hence, none of the

subsequent developments brought          on record by the

defendant is sufficient to hold that the landlady’s requirement

is satisfied. Similarly, none of the subsequent developments

would indicate that the bona fide requirement pleaded and

proved by the landlady was not genuine. Hence, the findings

recorded by the appellate court would not warrant any

interference on the grounds argued on behalf of the applicant

or on the ground of the subsequent developments.


30.   I do not find any jurisdictional error or any other

manifest error warranting any interference in the impugned

judgment and decree in the exercise of the powers under

Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“CPC”).


31.   The subsequent developments are considered by this


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Court. Hence, Civil Application No. 57 of 2017 is allowed in

the aforesaid terms.


32.   For the reasons recorded above, Civil Revision

Application No. 110 of 2017 is dismissed.


INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2434 OF 2022

1.    This application is filed by the original plaintiff seeking

mesne    profits   and    compensation.     The      civil   revision

application is dismissed, and the decree for possession is

confirmed. In view of Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil

Procedure,    1908,      the   applicants   (heirs      and     legal

representatives of the plaintiff) are permitted to file an

appropriate application for an inquiry into mesne profits

before the trial court. All rival contentions of the parties in

respect thereof are kept open.


2.    The interim application is disposed of in the aforesaid

terms.


                                            [GAURI GODSE, J.]




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