Bombay High Court
MODI RUBBER LIMITEDversusMAULIK GIRISH DAMANIA AND ORS.
- Decided
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The applicant does not possess an independent right or interest in the suit property and therefore is not a ‘person aggrieved’; leave to appeal is not warranted and the civil revision is dismissed.
Summary
The applicant, Modi Rubber Ltd., occupied a leased building except for the third floor, which was held by a third party, and claimed ownership based on an unregistered 1982 agreement with the original lessee. The original owners obtained a possession decree against the lessee, and the applicant sought leave to appeal the decree, arguing that the Court Receiver’s failure to protect his rights prejudiced him. The High Court examined whether the applicant qualified as a “person aggrieved” under the Supreme Court’s criteria and whether the unregistered agreement conferred any enforceable right, title, or interest. It held that the applicant had no independent legal right in the property, the agreement did not create a transferable lease or sub‑lease, and the applicant’s rights would be decided in separate obstruction proceedings. Consequently, the court found no basis to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the civil revision application.
Issues considered
- Whether a non‑party to a possession decree who claims rights based on an unregistered agreement qualifies as a ‘person aggrieved’ entitled to leave to appeal.
- Whether directions to the Court Receiver to protect the applicant’s rights create a substantive right to appeal the decree.
- Whether the pending specific‑performance suit confers any enforceable interest that would justify granting leave to appeal.
- Whether a civil revision under Section 115 of the CPC is maintainable in the absence of a demonstrable independent right.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. 115
Subjects
- lease termination
- possession decree
- specific performance
- court receiver
- person aggrieved
- leave to appeal
- civil revision
- section 115 CPC
Judgment
2026:BHC-AS:40250
15-CRA-380-2018.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 380 OF 2018
Swapnil
Modi Rubber Limited. …Applicant
Vs.
Maulik Girish Damania and Ors. …Respondents
Mr. Harsh Moorjani a/w. Ms. Diya Chordia i/b. Mr. Sujit Lahoti
and Associates for the applicant.
Ms. Ranjana Parikh for respondent nos. 1 to 3.
CORAM : GAURI GODSE, J.
DATE : 30th SEPTEMBER 2026
ORDER :
1. This civil revision application is filed by an occupant of
the suit premises, challenging the order refusing leave to file
an appeal against the eviction decree passed against the
lessee. Respondent nos. 1 to 3 are the original owners of the
land who had executed the lease agreement in favour of the
predecessor of respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6. The suit for
possession filed on the ground of termination of the lease
was decreed on 25th March 2013. The applicant filed an
application on 5th July 2013 seeking leave to file an appeal.
By the order impugned in this civil revision, the said leave
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application is rejected.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the
original lessee executed an agreement dated 6 th May 1982 to
transfer the right, title, and interest in the suit property in
favour of the applicant. The applicant has filed Suit No. 2144
of 1989 seeking specific performance of the said agreement.
The applicant is in possession of the land and the structure
thereon, except for the third floor that is occupied by one
Satishkumar Choksi. The applicant, Satishkumar Choksi, and
Bhattad Commercial Corporation claimed rights in the suit
property through the original lessee.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that
Satishkumar Choksi has filed a separate Suit No. 171 of
1982 in which the present application is arrayed as
defendant no.4. By order dated 25 th October 1982 passed in
Choksi’s suit, the Court Receiver was appointed, and the
applicant was put in possession as an agent of the Court
Receiver in respect of the suit property except the third floor
occupied by Choksi. By an order dated 16 th August 2013 in
the suit filed by Choksi, the Court Receiver was directed to
engage an advocate to challenge the possession decree
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passed in favour of the landlord. Despite the said order, the
Court Receiver failed to take any steps to defend the
execution of the decree or file an appeal. By order dated 21 st
August 2013, the Court clarified that the directions issued to
the Court Receiver to defend the execution of the decree
would also apply to the present applicant, who is defendant
no.4 in Choksi’s suit.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant, therefore, submits
that despite the directions issued to the Court Receiver, the
applicant’s rights were not protected by taking appropriate
steps. Once the Court Receiver was appointed, the suit
property became custodia legis; therefore, it was the Court
Receiver's duty to protect the applicant’s rights. He thus
submits that in the absence of any appropriate steps taken
by the Court Receiver, the applicant’s rights have been
prejudiced. Hence, the applicant is entitled to file an appeal
to challenge the decree of possession passed in the suit filed
by the landlord.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant refers to the reasons
recorded in the impugned order and submits that the
appellate court has dealt with the merits of the applicant’s
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rights based on the agreement in his favour and recorded
findings beyond the scope of the application for leave to file
an appeal. He submits that the orders passed in Choksi’s suit
and the directions issued to the Court Receiver are not
correctly appreciated while hearing the application for leave.
He therefore submits that the applicant, who is in possession
of the suit premises except the third floor, which is in
Choksi’s possession, would be entitled to protect his rights.
He, therefore, submits that the applicant, who claims through
the lessee, would be entitled to challenge the possession
decree against the lessee. He submits that the possession
decree would directly affect the applicant, as he is occupying
the premises, and thus he is entitled to file an appeal. Since
the applicant is not a party to the proceedings, he would be
entitled to leave to file an appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant, to support his
submissions, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in H.
Anjana Appa and this Court’s decision in H. Anjanappa Vs
A. Prabhakar1 and this Court’s decision in Vinay Ambadas
Kaikini Vs Court Receiver, High Court Bombay 2. He relied
on the legal principles summarised in the Apex Court’s
1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 183
2 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1340
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decisions to support his submissions that if a person is
prejudiced and his rights are affected by the judgment, the
party would be entitled to file an appeal. He therefore
submits that, since the applicant falls within the expression
“person aggrieved”, it is entitled to leave to file an appeal.
Learned counsel for the applicant relies on this Court's
decision to support his submission that the party should not
suffer because of the mistakes committed by the Court
Receiver. In the present case, despite directions issued to
the Court Receiver, no steps were taken to protect the
applicant’s interest. Learned counsel for the applicant
therefore submits that the applicant is entitled to file an
appeal to challenge the possession decree, as the
applicant’s rights are directly affected.
7. Learned counsel for respondents nos. 1 to 3
(“respondents”) submits that the applicant and the third party,
i.e., Satishkumar Choksi, have made every effort to delay the
execution. When this court passed an order on 16 th August
2013 in Choksi’s suit, the present applicant had already filed
an application for leave to file an appeal. However, the
applicant suppressed this fact from this Court. Based on the
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submissions that no appeal had been filed against the
possession decree, this court had directed the Court
Receiver to take appropriate steps to defend the execution.
She submits that despite filing an application for leave to file
an appeal, the applicant secured an order of liberty to remain
personally present or through an advocate.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the
bailiff’s report, which forms part of the present proceedings.
She submits that the applicant had already obstructed the
possession warrant on 12th August 2013. However, the
present applicant suppressed all these facts in the
application filed in Choksi’s suit when the order dated 16 th
August 2013 was passed. She submits that in view of the
obstruction, the respondents have applied for removal of the
obstruction, and proceedings are still pending.
9. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
present applicant is making all efforts to delay execution.
Except for filing the suit, the applicant has never proceeded
with the suit with due diligence and has made every effort to
delay execution of the possession decree. She submits that,
in view of the conduct of the other third parties claiming
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through the lessee and the present applicant, this court, in its
order dated 7th June 2011 in Choksi’s suit, observed that the
applicant and the third parties have taken out all proceedings
only to delay execution.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
application to implead the present applicant as the necessary
party in the suit was dismissed and the revision filed before
the Division Bench of the Small Causes Court was also
dismissed. The applicant took no steps to challenge the
order refusing to implead it as a necessary party. Hence, at
this stage on the same grounds, the applicant would be
entitled to seek leave to file an appeal, which would further
delay the execution of the decree in favour of the original
owners. She, therefore, submits that the appeal bench of the
Small Causes Court has rightly refused to grant leave to file
appeal.
11. I have carefully perused the papers of the civil revision
application. The application for leave to file an appeal is
based on the specific pleadings that the applicant is the
owner of the suit property. The applicant claims ownership
based on an unregistered agreement dated 6 th May 1982.
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Although the suit for specific performance was filed in 1989,
no interim orders protecting the applicant’s rights have been
passed in the said suit. So far as the orders passed in
Choksi’s suit are concerned, the present applicant is an
added party defendant. The third party, i.e. Choksi, who has
filed the suit, seeks rights in respect of the entire suit
property through the lessee. Thus, the present applicant,
Satishkumar Choksi and Bhattad Commercial Corporation,
claimed the right, title, and interest in the entire suit property
based on the alleged independent agreements executed by
the lessee. By order dated 25 th October 1982, the applicant
was directed to be put in possession as an agent of the Court
Receiver, as the applicant was occupying the ground plus
mezzanine and the upper floor, except the third floor
occupied by Choksi, in whose suit the Court Receiver has
appointed.
12. While appointing the applicant as an agent of the Court
Receiver, necessary directions are issued in paragraph 49 of
the order dated 25th October 1982, which reads as under :
“49. In view of this, it would be necessary to protect the rights of
the parties as far as possible until the final disposal of the suit and
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this can only be done by appointing Court Receiver as receiver of
the suit premises (i.e. other than the third floor). However, as stated
earlier, it appears at least prima facie that defendants No.4 are in
possession of the rest of the building other than third floor. Hence,
the Court Receiver is appointed receiver of the suit premises other
than the 3rd Floor as also the air conditioning plant. The Court
Receiver is directed to hand over the said premises (i.e. other than
the 3rd floor) to defendants No.4 as his agents, without security,
and/or payment of any royalty, but subject to defendants No.4
giving an undertaking that they will not put up or carry out any
structural alterations of a permanent character in the premises or
any part thereof and subject to their paying all the rates, taxes and
outgoings in respect of the suit property, and subject to their
undertaking to keep and maintain the air-conditioning plant in a
working order and on such other terms and conditions as the Court
Receiver may think fit.”
13. A perusal of the said directions clearly shows that the
applicant was appointed as an agent of the Court Receiver
only on the ground that he was occupying the suit premises.
Hence, the applicant was appointed as an agent subject to
an undertaking. Hence, the order appointing the Court
Receiver and the applicant to be put in possession as an
agent of the Court Receiver was limited because the
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applicant was in possession and Choksi claimed the right,
title, and interest in the suit property. Thus, if Choksi
succeeds or fails in his suit, the applicant, as defendant no.
4, would not benefit from any of the orders in the suit.
14. So far as the applicant’s suit is concerned, no orders
are passed to protect any of his rights. The second order
relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, passed
in Choksi’s suit on 16th August 2013, directs the learned
Court Receiver to take all possible steps to defend the
execution of the decree, including filing an appeal or other
proceeding by engaging an advocate. By the said order, the
plaintiff, i.e. Choksi, was appointed as an agent of the Court
Receiver. While issuing the operative directions this court
directed that the Court Receiver shall remain present before
the Small Causes Court on 20th August 2013 and convey the
order to the Small Causes Court to the effect that the plaintiff
in that suit, i.e. Choksi, has been appointed as an agent of
the Court Receiver for the purpose of defending the suit and
to take all necessary steps for filing appropriate proceedings.
By the said order, the present applicant, i.e. defendant no.4
therein, was also permitted to appear in person or through
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their advocate.
15. By another order dated 20 th August 2013, further
clarification was issued that in view of the order appointing
Choksi as an agent of the Court Receiver for the purpose of
defending the execution proceedings as well as for filing an
appeal, the Court Receiver was further directed to make
appropriate application to enable Choksi to take appropriate
steps to seek stay of the decree passed by the Small Causes
Court. Further clarifications were issued by order dated 21 st
August 2013 permitting the plaintiff, i.e. Choksi, to sign all the
pleadings and Vakalatnama on behalf of the Court Receiver,
with a further clarification that Choksi would furnish the copy
of all such pleadings and Vakalatnama to the office of the
Court Receiver. It was further clarified that the said order
would also apply to defendant no.4, i.e. the present
applicant. Thus, the said directions were issued on the
pretext that the present applicant had not taken any
independent steps to challenge the possession decree.
Hence, the orders passed issuing directions to the Court
Receiver in Choksi’s Suit cannot be accepted as any valid
grounds to consider the application for leave to file appeal.
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16. The applicant seeks leave to file appeal on the ground
that the applicant is the owner of the suit property. However,
the applicant’s suit for specific performance based on an
unregistered agreement to transfer the right title interest in
the suit property against the lessee is still pending.
Admittedly, the original defendant, i.e., the lessee, is not the
owner of the suit property. Hence, the agreement relied upon
by the applicant prima facie does not reveal any right, title, or
interest in favour of the applicant based on the said
agreement. A perusal of the agreement nowhere records that
the original owners are a party to it or have consented to it.
The agreement is neither for transferring the lease rights nor
for creating any sublease. In any event, the applicant's rights,
if any, would be decided in his independent suit, which is still
pending.
17. In the present suit, the applicant’s application to be
impleaded as a necessary party was dismissed. The
impleadment was also prayed for on the same grounds, as
the applicant is in possession under the agreement executed
by the lessee; the suit for specific performance is still
pending. However, in the absence of any prima facie rights in
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favour of the applicant, the applicant is not entitled to leave to
file an appeal as a matter of right. In any event, proceedings
for removal of obstruction by the applicant are pending in the
execution proceedings. In the execution proceedings, the
applicant has filed his evidence, and the proceedings for
removal of obstruction are still pending. Hence, the
applicant’s rights, if any, would be adjudicated in the
obstructionist proceedings. If the applicant is able to plead
and prove any right, title, or interest in the suit property,
appropriate reliefs would be granted in the execution
proceedings. Hence, I do not find any reason to grant leave
to file an appeal to challenge the decree for possession
passed against the original lessee.
18. The Apex Court, in summarising the legal principles for
granting leave to file an appeal, observed that only where the
judgment and decree prejudicially affect a person who is not
a party can he prefer an appeal with the leave of the court. It
is further clarified that an aggrieved person must be one
whose rights are affected by the judgment and decree sought
to be impugned. In the present case, the applicant seeks
interest in the suit property based on an agreement allegedly
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executed by the lessee in respect of which the suit for
specific performance is still pending. The possessory rights
claimed by the applicant would be adjudicated in the
obstructionist proceedings. The decree for possession is on
the ground of the termination of the lease of the original
lessee through whom the present applicant claims right.
Hence, the applicant does not claim any independent right.
Hence, none of the legal principles settled by the Apex Court
would assist the applicant’s arguments in the present case.
There is no scope for debate on the legal principles settled
by this Court regarding the duty of the Court Receiver.
However, this is not a ground to grant leave to file an appeal.
19. Nothing is shown on record that the applicant made
any efforts through the Court Receiver’s officer to protect its
rights. The grounds raised by the applicant are inconsistent,
as the applicant has independently taken steps in the
proceedings initiated by Choksi and in the present
proceedings to protect its rights. However, in the substantive
suit filed by the applicant, no steps have been taken seeking
any protection in respect of the applicant’s alleged rights. The
applicant is claiming through the lessee; hence, the applicant
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would not fall within the expression “person aggrieved” for
granting leave to file an appeal. As observed in the aforesaid
paragraphs, the applicant’s rights, if any, would be
adjudicated on their own merits in the obstructionist
proceedings. Hence, the Small Causes Court's appeal bench
has rightly refused to grant leave. The Appeal Court has
exhaustively considered all the arguments raised by the
applicant. I do not find any jurisdictional or other manifest
error in the reasons recorded in the impugned order
warranting any interference under Section 115 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908.
20. The civil revision application is devoid of any merit.
Hence, the civil revision application is dismissed.
21. It is clarified that since the execution proceedings have
been delayed for almost 13 years, the parties shall cooperate
for early disposal of the obstructionist proceedings and shall
not seek necessary adjournments.
[GAURI GODSE, J.]
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