Bombay High Court
HANUMANT ESHWAR PIRANKAR.versusDEVIDAS NILKANTH KALANGUTKAR.
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ASHISH S CHAVAN
Holding
The High Court upheld the acquittal, holding that the complainant failed to prove a specific liability for the cheques, so the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 did not arise.
Summary
The appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleging that two cheques of Rs.50,000 each were dishonoured and were issued as part payment for the sale of an Eicher tipper. The trial court acquitted the accused, holding that the complainant failed to establish a specific liability linking the cheques to the vehicle sale and therefore the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 could not be invoked. On appeal, the High Court examined the agreement, bank records, the statutory notice and the reply, and found that the alleged sale agreement did not expressly relate to the vehicle, and the transport department records showed the vehicle was sold to a third party. Consequently, the court concluded that the complainant did not discharge the burden of proving the existence of a debt enforceable against the cheques. The High Court affirmed the trial court’s acquittal, dismissing the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the complainant established a specific liability for the dishonoured cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
- Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act can be applied in the absence of a factual foundation of liability.
- Whether the alleged vehicle sale transaction is relevant to the liability for the cheques.
- Whether an appellate court can set aside an acquittal on a different appreciation of the evidence.
Legislation cited
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — s. 118, 138, 139
Subjects
- Section 138
- Negotiable Instruments Act
- Cheque dishonour
- Statutory presumption
- Acquittal
- Vehicle sale
- Burden of proof
- Criminal appeal
Judgment
CRIA-34-2016
2026:BHC-GOA:1050
Niti
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.34 OF 2016
Sri Hanumant Eshwar Pirankar
Son of late Eshwar Pirankar,
Aged 55 years, Business, married,
Resident of H.No.74,
Naibag, Pernem. ...Appellant
Versus
Shri Devidas Nilkanth Kalangutkar
Son of Nilkanth Kalangutkar,
Major, Businessman,
Residing at Sateli, Sawantwadi,
Sindhudurg, Maharashtra. ... Respondent
Mr Parimal Redkar, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr Shivan Desai with Ms M. Viegas, Ms. Riya Amonkar and Ms
A. Thorat, Advocates for the Respondent.
CORAM : ASHISH S. CHAVAN, J.
Reserved on : 4th MAY 2026
Pronounced on : 18th MAY 2026
JUDGMENT :
1. By way of the present Appeal, the Appellant (original Complainant)
has challenged the acquittal of the Respondent (original Accused) arising out
of proceedings under the Negotiable I stru e ts A t ( NI A t , for short)
vide order dated 15.07.2015 passed by the learned JMFC, Pernem (hereinafter
referred to as the learned Trial Court). The parties are hereinafter referred to
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as Complainant and Accused, respectively, as per their nomenclature in the
complaint.
2. On 27.06.2013, the Complainant filed a complaint under Section 138
of NI Act before the learned Trial Court against the Accused for the offence
punishable under Section 138 of NI Act arising out of the dishonour of
cheques dated 15.02.2013 for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) and
15.04.2013 for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only), both drawn on
HDFC Bank, Pernem Branch. Upon dishonour of the said cheques, the
Complainant issued a legal notice calling upon the Accused to make the
payment of the amount equivalent to the amount of the dishonoured cheques.
The Accused replied to the legal notice, however, failed to make the payment
and hence the Complainant filed a complaint bearing No.108 of 2013 before
the learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court, after issuing process, stated the substance of
the accusation to the Accused, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
After recording evidence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the Accused vide
impugned judgment dated 15.07.2015. Aggrieved by the acquittal, the
Complainant has preferred the present Appeal against acquittal.
4. This Court granted the Complainant leave to Appeal vide order dated
16.06.2016.
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5. Heard Mr Parimal Redkar, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr
Shivan Desai, learned Counsel for the Respondent. With the assistance of the
learned Counsel for the parties, perused the records.
6. On behalf of the Complainant, the impugned order was assailed on
several grounds.
Firstly, that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the
Agreement at Exhibit C-29 re ords outstanding Rs.7,00,000/- a d refers to
the cheques in question. The Accused has identified his signature on the said
Agreement.
Secondly, that Bank records and cross-examination of the
Complainant show that three other cheques of the same series were honoured,
corroborating the case of the Complainant that the subject cheques were
issued towards the sale consideration of the vehicle, i.e. Tipper.
Thirdly, that the reply to the statutory notice sent on behalf of the
Accused does not deny the demand of the Complainant and requests for three
o ths time to pay the amount of Rs.1,00,0000/- (Rupees One Lakh only).
There is no allegation of issuance of blank cheques or denial of liability in the
reply.
Fourthly, the factual foundation has been laid by the Complainant to
invoke the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act.
The signature on the subject cheques is admitted by the Accused and hence
the onus to rebut the aforesaid statutory presumption was on the shoulders of
the Accused. However, the Accused has failed to rebut the presumption.
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Fifthly, that the RTO records, which are treated as conclusive proof
by the learned Trial Court that there was never any transaction between the
Complainant and the Accused, only show the legal owner of the vehicle. Even
though the RTO record shows that the vehicle was registered in someone else's
name, that by itself does not negate the fact that the Accused owed money to
the Complainant and subject cheques were issued by him towards that
liability. The question as to whether the cheques in question were issued by
the Accused in discharge of a legally enforceable liability has nothing to do
with the ownership of the vehicle.
7. On behalf of the Accused (Respondent), supporting the impugned
judgment of acquittal, it is submitted that the fulcrum of the dispute in respect
of which the cheques in question were allegedly issued is the Agreement for
Transfer of Vehicle. No such Agreement has been placed on record by the
Accused. The only purported Agreement, which is on record, is at Exhibit C-
29 and this document does not even remotely make a reference to the transfer
of any vehicle. Exhibit C-40, which is the information received from the
Directorate of Transport, Government of Goa, clearly indicates that the
transfer of the vehicle was in favour of one Sanjay Arolkar and not the
Accused, which is indicated from the material on record. Thus, the case of the
Complainant that the cheques were issued by the Accused towards
consideration for the sale of a vehicle, i.e. Tipper, by the Complainant to the
Accused, is demolished by the documents, which clearly show that the vehicle
was not sold by the Complainant to the Accused. Respondent further argued
that even considering the reply given by the Accused to the statutory legal
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notice wherein an assurance of payment of Rs1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh
only) was given, at the highest, indicates that there is some liability that the
Accused owed to the Complainant and the same cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be linked to the transaction as claimed by the Complainant.
Lastly, it was sought to be argued that insofar as the parameters of interference
with the appeal against acquittal are concerned, it is a settled position of law
that the Appellate Court cannot reverse the order of acquittal only because
another view could have been possibly taken based on the evidence on record.
Reliance is placed on the judgments o the Ho le Supre e Court i the
matter of Susheela Yogish Bungle and Anr. V/s. M/s. V.T. Impex Ltd.
and Anr.1, K. Prakashan V/s. P.K. Surenderan2 and M/s. Narayana
Menon V/s. State of Kerala3.
8. Appreciating the rival submissions at the Bar, the following facts
emerge distinctly. It is the case of the Complainant, as borne out by the
complaint and evidence on record, that he had sold a vehicle, namely, Eicher
Tipper, bearing registration No.GA-07-F-0540 to the Accused. Towards part
payment of the consideration of the said sale, the Accused had voluntarily
issued the subject cheques, both drawn on HDFC Bank, Pernem Branch. The
Complainant presented the subject cheques for encashment, however, they
were retur ed y the Ba ker o the A used with the reaso insufficient
funds . The Complainant, thereafter, issued statutory notice dated
1
SLP No.12862-12863/2022
2
(2008) 1 SCC 258
3
(2006) 6 SCC 39
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21.05.2013. The Accused replied to the aforesaid notice on 30.05.2013,
however, he failed to make the payment equivalent to the cheque amount
within the statutory period. Hence, the Complainant filed the complaint and
initiated proceedings against the Accused for offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act. It is pertinent to note that the Complainant did
not examine any other witness except himself. The Accused examined himself
in support of his defence.
9. In support of his case, the Complainant proved the subject cheques,
the Bank Memos, the statutory notice, reply thereto and a document
purportedly e titled A ree e t . During the defence evidence, the Accused
produced certain information obtained by him under RTI from the Office of
the Assistant Director of Transport pertaining to the aforesaid vehicle. The
information is in the form of the vehicle NOC details and registration details
pertaining to the aforesaid vehicle issued by the Department of Transport.
The said NOC details clearly mention the name of one Sanjay Arolkar as the
buyer of the vehicle and not the name of the Accused, although the owner of
the vehicle is shown to be the Complainant. This fact is further corroborated
by the vehicle registration details, which also form part of the information
sought under RTI, which clearly indicate that the name of the owner of the
vehicle is Sanjay Arolkar and not the Accused. In other words, the
information obtained from the Department of Transport under RTI clearly
shows that the vehicle was never sold to the Accused, as falsely claimed by the
Complainant. In this context, Exhibit C-29 has been relied upon as an
Agreement of Sale of the vehicle by the Complainant. However, even a bare
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perusal of the aforesaid document would be sufficient to reveal that it nowhere
states that it is executed in respect of the sale of the vehicle of the Complainant.
Dealing with the argument of the learned Advocate for the Accused
(Respondent) that the document refers to the subject cheques and also the
name of the Complainant and the Accused are reflected therein, it must be
noted that the case set up by the Complainant in his complaint and affidavit
of evidence is not of any debt or liability but of a specific debt against the
sale of vehicle by the Complainant to the Accused. The aforesaid document
purporting to be an Agreement is the only document that the Complainant
has relied upon to demonstrate the aforesaid liability. However, as the
aforesaid document nowhere states that it is executed in respect of the sale of
the vehicle of the Complainant. Thus, the purported Agreement does not
establish any enforceable liability against the subject cheques and, therefore,
does not take the case of the Complainant any further. The Complainant thus
has not been able to establish that the cheques were issued towards the
consideration of the sale of the vehicle. Therefore, the Complainant has failed
in laying the factual foundation necessary to invoke the statutory presumption
under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act.
10. In his defence evidence, the Accused has examined himself and has
categorically deposed that the Complainant has never sold his vehicle to him
and further deposed that the said vehicle was sold to one Korgaonkar.
Although, there may be a discrepancy between the RTO records, which
indicate the name of the buyer of the vehicle as one Sanjay Arolkar, and the
deposition of the Accused that the Complainant sold the vehicle to Prajyot
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Korgaonkar, it is crystal clear that in any event the vehicle was not sold to the
Accused by the Complainant. The issue before the learned Trial Court was
whether there was any enforceable liability against the subject cheques and not
to undertake an exercise to find out who was the ultimate purchaser of the
vehicle. Insofar as the contention of the Complainant that the Accused has
admitted his liability in the reply to the statutory notice, I find force in the
submission of the learned Counsel for the Accused (Respondent) that, at the
highest, the assurance in the reply can be construed to mean that there is some
liability that the Accused (Respondent) owed to the Complainant. However,
the same cannot be linked to the transaction claimed by the Complainant in
respect of the subject cheques. The statutory presumptions under Sections
118 and 139 are raised in favour of the Complainant only when the
Complainant lays the factual foundation to establish the liability against the
subject cheques. However, in this case, the Complainant has failed to establish
the liability as pleaded in the complaint and hence the presumptions under
Sections 118 and 139 do not arise in the favour of the Complainant. In the
absence of the statutory presumptions in favour of the Complainant, the
edifice of his entire case fails and the defence of the Accused that the subject
cheques were not towards the liability in respect of transfer of the vehicle is
probabilised.
11. At this stage, a profitable reference can be made to the
pronouncements of the Apex Court in the matter of
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12. Examining the impugned judgment in the light of the aforesaid
parameters, the learned Sessions Judge has observed that in the light of the fact
that the case of the Complainant was that he had sold a vehicle to the Accused
and the subject cheques were towards the part payment of the consideration
of the same, the documents produced by the Accused during his defence
4
(2003) 1 SCC 1
5
(2008) 1 SCC 258
6
(2007) 3 SCC 755
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evidence obtained by him under RTI from the Department of Transport need
to be examined meticulously. Observing that the vehicle registration details
and the NOC details, which form part of the information under RTI, clearly
show the name of the owner as one Sanjay Arolkar and not the Accused, the
learned Trial Court proceeds to hold that the specific case of the Complainant
that the subject cheques were issued towards repayment of the consideration
of the vehicle stands disproved. He further holds that since the foundation of
the Co plai a t s ase alls, the entire case must fail.
13. Dealing with the argument of the Complainant that the Accused has
admitted his liability in the reply to the legal notice, the learned Trial Court
observes that by examining himself, the Accused has indirectly withdrawn the
admission made by him in the reply. At the highest, such an assurance by the
Accused would indicate that there is some liability that the Accused owes to
the Complainant, but the same cannot be linked to the specific case of the
Complainant regarding the sale of the vehicle. Observing that even if it is
assumed that the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the
NI Act have been raised by the Complainant, the Accused has certainly
rebutted these presumptions on the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities, the learned Trial Court proceeds to acquit the Accused.
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14.
15.
ASHISH S. CHAVAN, J.
Signed by: NITI K HALDANKAR 11 11
Designation: Private Secretary
Date: 18/05/2026 14:08:32
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