Bombay High Court
THE STATE OF GOA THR. POLICE INSPECTORversusGAURAV LUTHRA
- Disposal
- Allowed
Holding
The High Court held that the bail order was perverse and illegal as it failed to consider the grave nature of the offences, the respondent’s flight risk, and the lack of any genuine change in circumstances, and therefore quashed the order.
Summary
The State of Goa filed a criminal miscellaneous application seeking to quash the order that had enlarged respondent Gaurav Luthra on bail after the charge sheet was filed in connection with a deadly fire at the Birch by Romeo Lane restaurant‑cum‑club in Arpora, Goa, which killed 25 persons. The fire occurred on 6 December 2025 when cold pyrotechnic fireworks were used inside the congested, poorly ventilated premises that lacked fire‑safety equipment and had only a narrow, locked exit. Investigation revealed that the establishment operated without valid licences, used forged documents, and that the partners, including the respondent, knowingly permitted the fireworks despite the combustible roof and absence of safety measures. The Additional Sessions Judge had granted bail on the ground that the filing of the charge sheet constituted a change of circumstance, that the offences were not “heinous,” and that the lengthy trial would cause delay. The High Court held that the bail order was perverse, ignored the gravity of the offence, the risk of witness tampering, the respondent’s flight abroad, and the lack of any substantive change in circumstances. Accordingly, the Court quashed the bail order, directed the respondent to surrender, and refused to stay the judgment.
Issues considered
- The filing of a charge sheet constitutes a sufficient change of circumstance to justify granting bail
- The offences arising from the fire qualify as “heinous” or grave enough to deny bail
- The respondent is a flight risk given his departure to Thailand and subsequent apprehension
- The principle of parity with co‑accused Ajay Gupta can be applied without independent assessment
- The bail order ignored statutory considerations under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and CrPC regarding seriousness of offence, risk of witness tampering, and public interest
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — s. 105, 125, 125(a), 125(b), 238, 241, 287, 336(3), 338, 340(2), 3(5), 3(7), 61(2)
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 439(2)
Subjects
- fire safety negligence
- bail jurisprudence
- criminal negligence
- forgery of documents
- hazardous premises
- flight risk
- parity doctrine
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
- Criminal Procedure Code
- high court intervention
Judgment
CRMAM-10-2026.odt
Andreza
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION (MAIN) NO.10 OF 2026
THE STATE OF GOA
Through Police Inspector,
Anjuna Police Station, Goa. ... Applicant.
Versus
Mr. Gaurav Luthra
Son of Shri. Vijay Luthra,
About 44 years of age, Indian Citizen,
Businessman, having residence
at 1523, Outram Lane, Kingsway Camp
New Delhi - 110009. ... Respondent.
Ms Swati Kamat Wagh, Additional Public Prosecutor for the Applicant-
State.
Mr S.S. Kantak, Senior Advocate, with Mr Parag Rao, Mr Vaibhav Suri, Mr
S. Khan, Ms Neha Kholkar and Ms Dhanashree Korgaonkar, Advocates for
the Respondent.
CORAM: DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.
RESERVED ON: 29th July 2026
PRONOUNCED ON: 18th August 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. By this application, the Applicant-State seeks to quash and set aside the
order dated 1st April 2026, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I,
North Goa, Mapusa, in Bail Application No. 66/2026 in connection with C.R.
No. 154 of 2025, dated 7 th December 2025, registered with Anjuna Police
Station, for offences punishable under Sections 105, 125, 125(a), 125(b), 287
read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 (‘BNS’), under
which the Respondent was enlarged on bail subject to certain conditions. The
charge-sheet No. 12/2026 was filed on 26 th February 2026. Offences
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punishable under Sections 338, 336(3), 340(2), 61(2), 238, 241, 3(7) read
with Section 3(5) of the BNS were added.
2. In brief, the facts of the case are that 'Birch by Romeo Lane', a
restaurant-cum-club (‘the restaurant’) at Arpora Village, Bardez, Goa, was
owned and operated by 'Being GS Hospitality LLP' ('the firm’). The
Respondent is a partner in the firm, along with his brother, Saurabh Luthra
and Ajay Gupta. The restaurant is situated in the middle of a salt pan and
comprises a ground floor and a deck floor. The restaurant itself is on the deck
floor, while the kitchen is on the ground floor. It commenced operations in
February 2024. The restaurant is stated to be bereft of sufficient ventilation,
and the entry and exit comprised one narrow opening. The place was
congested.
3. On 6th December 2025, at about 23.45 hrs, a dance event was in
progress at the restaurant. It is alleged that cold pyro fireworks were being
operated inside the premises near the DJ console. Sparks from the fireworks
touched the roof and deck floor, and the interiors, made of combustible
materials such as wood, plastic, and dry grass, caught fire. Consequently, a
fire broke out and spread rapidly throughout the restaurant. The premises had
no fire safety or firefighting equipment. There was no emergency exit; there
was only one narrow entry and exit, and one door on the door was found
locked. Neither the ground floor nor the deck floor had sufficient ventilation.
Twenty-two men and three women, comprising guests and staff of the
restaurant, were unable to escape and perished. Several others were injured.
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Two of the bodies were found on the staircase leading down to the kitchen,
and twenty-three were found in the kitchen itself on the ground floor.
4. On 7th December 2025, at 09.36 hrs, on the complaint of Mr Navneet
Goltekar, Police Sub-Inspector, Anjuna Police Station, FIR No.154/2025 was
registered at Anjuna Police Station for offences punishable under Sections
105, 125, 125(a), 125(b) and 287 read with Section 3(5) of the BNS. Sections
338, 336(3), 340(2), 238, 241, 3(7) and 61(2) of the BNS were added during
the investigation. The gravamen of the complaint is that the owners, partners
and managing staff of the establishment organised a fire show in the
restaurant, which had a roof made of combustible material, without care and
caution, without fire safety equipment and without an emergency exit. The
establishment was allegedly operating without requisite permissions and
licences from the competent authorities.
5. The investigation further disclosed that the establishment was
operating on the basis of forged and manipulated documents. A No Objection
Certificate (‘NOC’), purportedly issued by the Health Officer, Primary Health
Centre, Candolim, bearing the printed digital signature of that officer, was
forged and submitted to the Excise Department to obtain the excise licence. A
separate FIR No. 154/2025, dated 17th December 2025, was registered at
Mapusa Police Station.
6. The Respondent filed Bail Application No. 7 of 2026 before the
Additional Sessions Judge-I, North Goa, Mapusa. By Order dated 12 th
February 2026, the Additional Sessions Judge-I rejected the bail application
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on the following grounds:
i. The Investigating Officer's findings revealed multiple violations: the
club, located in a salt pan, was built illegally and operated without
valid permits, licences, or NOC’s, including from the Directorate of
Fire and Emergency Services.
ii. The Investigation papers showed staff lacked fire emergency
training, drills, and safety equipment. Witness statements supported
this. The investigation prima facie suggested an offence was
committed.
iii. Management regularly hosted belly dance performances with
indoor fireworks every Friday and Saturday, despite the risk from
combustible roofing, inflammable décor, overcrowding, and lack of
safety measures. This created a clearly hazardous environment,
risking fire and loss of life.
iv. Prima facie, there was material indicating that Fire Safety Norms
were violated.
v. The Respondent allowed a dance event with pyrotechnic fireworks
inside the club, despite knowing the roof was combustible, that it
lacked fire safety measures, and that it had no emergency exits.
Evidence suggests the Respondent was aware and consented to this
danger.
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vi. The Respondent's role differs from that of his subordinate staff. The
Court granted bail to the Gate Manager and Bar Manager but
denied it to the General Manager and Corporate General Manager
because of their supervisory roles. The Court considered the
Respondent’s owner status as placing him in the supervisory
category.
vii. Prima facie, the material indicates that the Respondent is liable, as
he, along with his partners, permitted and facilitated the use of
pyrotechnic fireworks inside the premises without safety norms.
viii. Whether the Respondent, having appointed Operational Managers
to run the day-to-day work of the restaurant, was innocent, is to be
decided during the trial.
ix. The Court rejected the Respondent’s plea that he was not physically
present at the nightclub as misconceived. The Court held that the
Respondent and his partners consciously permitted the use of
pyrotechnic fireworks inside the club premises, as per the
agreement with the event management person.
x. Prima facie, a causal link exists between the permission granted
and the fatal incident. The deaths were not the result of an
unforeseen accident but a natural and foreseeable consequence of
allowing inherently dangerous activity in an unsafe and confined
environment.
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xi. The Court held that the offence was grave and that the prima facie
case for knowledge was made out. It further held that the callous
disregard for public safety left no scope for exercising jurisdiction in
the Respondent’s favour.
xii. The Respondent’s submission that he had not permitted the use of
pyrotechnic fireworks was not accepted, as the material indicated
that the Respondent and his partners were aware of it. His own
visits to the club were sufficient to infer knowledge.
xiii. The application of the principle in the Sushil Ansal v. State1 case
regarding causa causans was rejected.
xiv. The material on record, prima facie, disclosed that the deceased
persons succumbed to death due to asphyxiation from dense smoke
inhalation.
xv. The placement of the décor and the enclosed spaces left no
alternative means of egress. There was only one access to and from
the basement, via a narrow staircase. The catastrophe was, prima
facie, not a mere accident but a foreseeable consequence of the
Respondent’s failure to install essential fire safety measures
mandated by law. There was reckless disregard for the safety of
patrons and staff, which strongly militates against the grant of bail.
xvi. Most of the material witnesses in the trial are staff members and
1 (2014) 6 SCC 173.
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employees of the Respondent, and there is a reasonable
apprehension that the Respondent may influence them.
xvii. The licence instrument was also forged. The allegations of forgery
strengthened the prima facie case against the Respondent and
others.
xviii. Prima facie material shows that the Respondent and his brother
travelled to Phuket soon after the fire, despite having knowledge
that it had occurred. This conduct demonstrates a complete
disregard for the lives of his own employees and patrons.
xix. The Respondent's reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court in the
matter of P. Chidambaram v. CBI 2, Sanjay Chandra v. CBI 3, etc., was
held not applicable.
7. On these grounds, amongst others, the Additional Sessions Judge-I
rejected the bail application by Order dated 12 th February 2026. Thereafter, a
charge sheet was filed on 26 th February 2026, after which the Respondent
immediately filed a second bail application. By the impugned order dated 1 st
April 2026, the Court, holding that filing of the charge sheet itself constituted
a changed circumstance sufficient to grant bail to the Respondent, enlarged
the Respondent and others on bail. It is this Order which is impugned by the
Applicant.
8. Ms Swati Kamat Wagh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appeared
2 (2020) 13 SCC 337.
3 (2012) 1 SCC 40.
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for the State, and Mr S. S. Kantak, learned Senior Advocate, represented the
Respondent.
9. The grounds of challenge by the State are as under: -
i. The Sessions Court failed to appreciate the enormity and gravity of
the offence, in which 25 innocent persons lost their lives due to
gross criminal negligence reckless conduct and deliberate violation
of statutory safety norms on the part of the Respondent and his
partners.
ii. This being a second bail application, the Sessions Court failed to
notice the grounds on which the first application was rejected only
two months ago. The Court failed to record reasons for granting
bail despite the findings in the earlier rejection order.
iii. The finding that the Respondent is not a flight risk is factually
incorrect. The Respondent left the country on the very day the FIR
was registered, was declared absconding, was the subject of a non-
bailable warrant, proclamation proceedings, a Look Out Circular,
and a Blue Corner Notice, and was returned only by deportation.
iv. The Sessions Court failed to appreciate that the filing of a charge
sheet does not dilute the seriousness of the allegations nor confer
any indefeasible right to bail, and erred in treating the charge
sheet's volume and the length of the anticipated trial as grounds for
release.
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v. The Sessions Court failed to appreciate that the material
prosecution witnesses are employees and staff of the establishment
run by the Respondent and are therefore susceptible to influence.
vi. The Sessions Court applied the principle of parity with the co-
accused Ajay Gupta without independently evaluating the conduct
and role of the Respondent. At the time of applying the parity
doctrine, the order granting bail to Ajay Gupta was itself under
challenge before this Court. This fact was brought to the notice of
the Sessions Court.
vii. Ms Kamat relied on the following decisions:
a. Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan4,
b. Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar5,
c. Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P.6,
d. State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan7,
e. Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee8,
f. Kushal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh9
g. Yug Kaushal Pathak v. Senior Inspector of Police10
h. Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Harabhai Bambhania11
i. Ram Naresh v. State of U.P.12
j. Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka13
4 (2004) 7 SCC 528.
5 (2020) 2 SCC 118.
6 (2022) 8 SCC 521.
7 2025 INSC 979 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702.
8 (2010) 14 SCC 496.
9 2026 SCC OnLine HP 964.
10 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 18093.
11 (2017) 5 SCC 609.
12 (2024) 1 SCC 443.
13 (2017) 5 SCC 406.
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k. N. Basurangan v. State of Kerala14
viii. She submitted that the impugned order is perverse and prayed that
the bail granted be cancelled.
10. Mr Kantak, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Respondent,
defended the bail order and submitted as follows:
i. The Sessions Court enlarged the Respondent on bail since the charge
sheet was filed and hence custodial interrogation was not required.
The investigation is complete.
ii. He submitted that the exact cause of the fire remains unknown to date,
even after the filing of a charge sheet running into thousands of pages.
iii. He further submitted that the Investigating Officer has reported no
supervening circumstances indicating a breach of the bail order.
iv. Mr Kantak submitted that the Respondent is not a flight risk because
his passport stands suspended and he has deep roots in society and an
established business in India.
v. He submitted that the earlier rejection of bail was on the ground that
the investigation was then pending, and now the ground no longer
exists.
vi. An order granting bail is not to be interfered with, as the settled
threshold is a serious infirmity. He submitted that there is no serious
14 (2022) 6 SCC 609.
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infirmity in the bail order.
vii. He submitted that the handling and use of cold pyro were wholly
under the control of the owner and employees of K-Dance and Event
Company.
viii. The prosecution has not arrested the individuals who are directly
responsible for the use of cold pyro, which is alleged to have caused
the fire.
ix. He drew my attention to some of the witness statements recorded by
the police, which state that the Respondent was not responsible for the
incident, howsoever unfortunate it was.
x. Mr Kantak placed reliance on the following decisions:
a. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI15,
b. P. Chidambaram v. CBI16,
c. Arvind Kejriwal v. CBI17,
d. Prabhakar Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh18,
e. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh19,
f. Chetan Kisan Patil v. State of Maharashtra20,
g. Puran v. Rambilas21
h. Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v. State of
Maharashtra22
15 (supra at pg. no. 7).
16 (supra at pg. no. 7).
17 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2550.
18 (2020) 11 SCC 648.
19 SLP (Crl) No. 1059 of 2025.
20 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2403.
21 (2001) 6 SCC 338.
22 1964 SCC OnLine SC 162.
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i. State v. Rakesh Goel23
j. Sushil Ansal v. State24
11. Heard both counsel for their respective parties and have perused the
record with their assistance.
ANALYSIS
12. Before delving into the merits of the case, it is necessary to discuss the
law governing the reversal of bail. A distinction must be drawn between an
application to cancel bail on account of supervening circumstances, such as
misuse of the liberty granted, and a challenge to the legality and propriety of
the order granting bail. In Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao
Sonvane and Others25, the Supreme Court observed:
“20. We make it clear that there is a clear distinction between
cancellation of bail on the considerations provided under Section
439(2) CrPC (corresponding Section 483(3) BNSS) and reversal of
an order of bail by the superior Court. While cancellation should
only be resorted to in cases where the accused misuses the liberty of
bail granted to him or tampers with the evidence. On the other
hand, the order granting bail can be interfered with by the superior
Court considering the nature and gravity of the offences; if the order
granting bail ignores the relevant material available on record or
that the same is based on extraneous considerations. The present is a
case in the second category.
21. This court in the case of Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Anr.26, relying upon an earlier judgment in the case of
Ajwar v. Waseem27, observed as follows:
23 Crl. M.C. 3850/2019.
24 (2014) 6 SCC 173.
25 2026 SCC OnLine SC 291: 2026 INSC 181.
26 (2025) 4 SCC 172.
27 (2024) 10 SCC 768.
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“18. A superficial application of bail parameters not only
undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks
weakening public faith in the judiciary's resolve to combat
the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of
justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts
must safeguard, lest we risk normalising a crime that
continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These
observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were
thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem
[Ajwar v. Waseem, (2024) 10 SCC 768 : (2025) 1 SCC (Cri)
320] in the following paras : (SCC pp. 783-84, paras 26-28)
“26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal
offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like
the nature of the accusations made against the
accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to
have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the
role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence,
if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of
the accused being unavailable in the event bail is
granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings
and evading the courts of justice and the overall
desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer :
Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of
U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974];
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] ; Masroor v. State of U.P.
[Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010)
1 SCC (Cri) 1368] ; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] ; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] ; Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar
Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 :
(2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425] ; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar
[Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020)
1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]
27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted,
ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner.
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However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is
always open to interference by the superior court. If
there are serious allegations against the accused, even
if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an
order can be cancelled by the same Court that has
granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior
court if it transpires that the courts below have
ignored the relevant material available on record or
not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact
on the society resulting in such an order……”
[Emphasis supplied]”
13. The Supreme Court, in the case of Victim ‘X’ v. State of Bihar & Anr.28,
while setting aside the order granting bail to a person accused of grave
offences, observed as under:
“24. It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled
ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the
conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on
bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are
not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by
law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice.
The present one is precisely a case of such nature.”
14. The test to be applied was also stated in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar29: -
“16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court
in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a
different footing from an assessment of an application for the
cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is
tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether
the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified.”
15. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present
case, I now proceed to examine whether the reasons assigned by the
Sessions Court for grant of bail can withstand judicial scrutiny.
28 2025 INSC 877.
29 (supra at pg. no. 9).
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16. The learned Sessions Court has assigned the following reasons for
granting bail to the Respondent/Accused, as under:
i. The Sessions Court relied on the principle that ‘bail is the rule and
jail is the exception’ to hold that, since the charge sheet is filed,
continued incarceration is not required. The Court relied on the
decision in Sanjay Chandra30 to justify the grant of bail. The Court
held that, in the absence of any material indicating that the
Respondent is attempting to influence witnesses not to depose
against him, bail cannot be refused. The Court also relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in P. Chidambaram31.
ii. Similarly, citing the decision of the Supreme Court in Maulvi Syed
Shad Kazmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh 32, the Sessions Court held that
considering the alleged offence is not that serious or grave like
murder, dacoity, rape, etc., the Court is loath to deny bail to the
Respondent. Thus, the Sessions Court held that the alleged offence
is not grave and, in the absence of the possibility of the Respondent
absconding or tampering with the evidence, the interest of justice
would be served by enlarging the Respondent on bail.
iii. The Sessions Court took the view that since Section 105(II) and
Section 338 of BNS do not provide for a minimum sentence, the
offence alleged to have been committed by the Respondent does
30 (supra at pg. no. 7).
31 (supra at pg. no. 7).
32 (supra at pg. no. 11).
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not fall in the category of a heinous offence.
iv. Finally, the Sessions Court considers that, in view of the prevailing
docket explosion and the charge sheet being voluminous and
running into more than 4000 pages, with as many as 306 witnesses
and 13 accused arrayed in the trial, it is not likely to conclude the
trial in the near future. On these grounds, the Sessions Court
enlarged the Respondent on bail.
17. Admittedly, the Sessions Court, while rejecting the first bail which
was filed before the charge sheet, had considered the case in detail and
had recorded a finding that the case is heinous; the Respondent and his
partners were involved in manipulating documents to portray that they
had a licence to operate the restaurant; there was no NOC from the fire
department; there were no fire extinguishers in the restaurant, the exit
and entry was only one narrow passage; the basement was congested;
there was no proper ventilation.
18. The Court had specifically found the establishment to be a
manifestly hazardous environment, exposing both patrons and staff to a
foreseeable risk of fire and loss of life. The Court also relied on material
showing that the Respondent and his partners were well aware of the
dangers of operating cold pyrotechnics during belly dance performances,
particularly noting that the material used in the construction of the roof
was easily combustible. While granting bail to the Respondent and his
partners, the Sessions Court treated the filing of the charge sheet merely
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as a changed circumstance, without reference to any substantial material
in the charge sheet to justify the change of stance it had earlier taken.
19. It is important to note that merely holding the charge sheet as a
changed circumstance is not sufficient ground for the grant of bail. The
passages from the Sanjay Chandra33 case cited by the Sessions Court are
relevant, but they cannot be applied in every case for the grant of bail. The
Supreme Court in Virupakshappa Gouda34 has held exactly this. In Sanjay
Chandra35, the accused was facing trial for offences under Sections 120-B,
420, 468, 471, and 109 of the IPC, and Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The factual matrix is quite different. The
nature of the crime and the manner in which it is committed are to be
seen. In Virupakshappa Gouda36, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“13. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, we find
that he has been swayed by the factum that when a charge-sheet is filed it
amounts to change of circumstance. Needless to say, filing of the charge-
sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made by the
prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge-sheet establishes that
after due investigation the investigating agency, having found materials,
has placed the charge-sheet for trial of the accused persons.”
20. The material on record includes statements of various witnesses
recorded by the Police. The statement of electrician Mohammed Ansari
indicates that there was only one rear exit door at the restaurant, which
was always locked. The soundproof glass was installed at the instructions
of the Respondent and his partners, which prevented smoke from
33 (supra at pg. no. 7).
34 (supra at pg. no. 10).
35 (supra at pg. no. 7).
36 (supra at pg. no. 10).
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escaping. The staff was never provided with any training to handle fire
incidents, and there was no fire extinguisher in the restaurant. There was
also no emergency exit to the kitchen. M. D. Juyel Ali, Food and Beverage
Manager; Rahul Verma, Captain in the restaurant; and other staff also said
the same thing. Brian Martins, the Artist in K-Dance events, and Mikhail
Bukin stated that there was no fire extinguisher nor any fire safety plan in
the restaurant; the sparkler machines were used during the belly dance
performances, as per the directions of the Respondent and his partners. Mr
Juda D’Souza, a musician, also stated that the narrow concrete bridge
connecting the restaurant's deck floor from the west side was blocked
during the restaurant's operation by a locked metal gate. As a result,
customers could not exit during the fire. Gavin Lobo, Bhavna Joshi, a
tourist from U.P., and the other 49 tourists who gave statements stated the
same thing. It was repeatedly stated that there were no fire extinguishers
on the premises.
21. Shailesh Gaude, the Fire Officer at the Fire Headquarters,
confirmed that the restaurant did not possess any valid NOC from the Fire
Department. Prathamesh Shankar Das, Block Development Officer, stated
that the appropriate procedure was not followed in procuring the trade
licence and other licences. Dharmendra Govekar, Secretary of the Village
Panchayat, stated that the structure itself was illegal, as it could not be
allotted a house number because it was in the middle of a salt pan.
Pradeep Amonkar, a vendor of the premises, stated that co-accused Mr
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Surendra Khosla, the owner of the premises, prepared a forged letter
stating that the vendors had handed over possession of the entire resort to
him; that Mr Khosla thereafter raised an illegal structure from which the
night club was run. This fact was known to the Respondent and his
partners. Sanjay Metre also confirmed that the Respondent and his brother
used to visit the restaurant and direct Ravi Verma, the supervisor, to carry
out changes in the interior work. Akhtar Ali, Interior Designer, also
confirmed that the Respondent made no fire safety provisions. Mohd Raza,
the Carpenter, affirmed that the ceiling was constructed with bamboo-mat-
like material as per the design given to them by Mr Ravi, and his team was
not directed to install a fire extinguisher or fire safety systems.
22. Most importantly, Akash Shethi, the sound and light provider, stated
that he had informed the Respondent and his brother to remove the tin
sheets from the roof and install two-inch-thick puff panels. However, they
had refused. He also said that water was seeping from the walls and that
there was four inches of stagnant water on the floor. Other witnesses also
stated that the Respondent and his other partners were aware of all this.
23. Dinesh Khera, Manager and co-accused, stated that he received
instructions from the Respondent to collect the necessary documents from
the restaurant and submit them to the Excise Department. The authority
letter was sent to him by the Respondent and his brother on WhatsApp.
Forged documents were also found at Mr Khera’s hotel premises. Material
on record further indicates that the structure was unauthorised, a fact
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known to the Respondent and his partners. They operated the restaurant,
fully aware of the risks of conducting fire displays inside the restaurant
without adequate safety measures. This led to a fire that resulted in the
death of 25 innocent persons, as most of them were unable to exit because
of the structure. Many others were injured.
24. The Sessions Court found that although Section 105, Part II, may
apply, no minimum sentence is prescribed for the offence. As the offence is
not heinous, the Respondent is entitled to be released on bail. From the
material on record, it is clear that, due to the acts attributed to the
Respondent and his partners, a fire broke out in the restaurant, and due to
the absence of fire extinguishers and other safety installations, 25 people
died. The establishment was operating without licences. The Respondent
and his partners failed to procure licences because the structure itself was
unauthorised. Had they procured valid licences to operate the
establishment, they would have been bound to install safety measures and
adhere to regulations. This deliberate omission led to the incident, which
cost 25 people their lives and left many more injured. The Sessions Court,
in its previous Order rejecting bail, had considered this and, while
allowing the second application, failed to record any changed
circumstances that had come to light after the filing of the charge sheet.
Hence, this observation of the Sessions Court is not tenable.
25. In Kushal Singh37, the Supreme Court discussed what constitutes
37 (supra at pg. no. 9).
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changed circumstances and observed that a change must be substantial,
directly affecting the earlier decision, and not merely cosmetic, which is of
little or no consequence. Between the two orders, there was a gap of only
two months, and no one’s case is that drastic changes took place during
these months necessitating the release of the Respondent on bail at this
stage. Further, in Kalyan Chandra38, the Supreme Court held that where an
earlier bail application is rejected, the Court must consider the rejection of
the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail
application should be allowed. It was held as under:
“12. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been
rejected there is a further onus on the court to consider the
subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on
which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such
consideration if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be
granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why
in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent application for bail
should be granted.”
26. The decision in Kalyan Chandra39 is equally relevant on two grounds
on which the impugned order rests, namely the period of custody undergone
and the prospect of a long trial: -
“14. … the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period
of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to being
enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be
concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the
period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the
appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is
severe…”
27. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that while considering as to
38 (supra at pg. no. 9).
39 (supra at pg. no. 9).
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whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal
offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is
alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed
to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event
bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail.
These parameters must be properly applied to the facts of each case while
considering the bail application and must not be merely stated as a checklist.
28. In Yug Kushal Pathak40, the Bombay High Court, in a similar fire case,
held that the material on record clearly indicated that the incident, which
resulted in several deaths, was caused by lapses of the accused, including
unauthorised construction, absence of permissions, lack of firefighting
systems, and no emergency exit routes, and accordingly rejected bail to the
accused. The offence alleged against the Respondent and his partners in the
present case is similar and also serious. The Sessions Court was not justified in
observing that the offence is not as heinous as murder or dacoity.
29. Another ground cited by the Sessions Court for granting bail to the
Respondent and his partners was the voluminous charge sheet, 306 potential
witnesses, and 13 accused in total, which, according to the trial Court, made
40 (supra at pg. no. 9).
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it unlikely that the trial would conclude in the near future. This finding also
cannot be sustained. In Sri Darshan41, the Supreme Court held as under:
“20.4. Filing of charge sheet or lengthy list of witnesses does not
justify grant of bail.
20.4.1. It is well settled that the mere filing of a charge-sheet does not
confer an indefeasible right to bail. Likewise, the mere prospect of a
prolonged trial cannot, by itself, outweigh the gravity of the offence,
the incriminating material gathered during investigation, or the
likelihood of tampering with witnesses.
*****
20.4.6. In the present case, the High Court failed to engage with the
incriminating material collected during investigation, despite the
seriousness of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the allegation of
conspiracy. The mere filing of the charge-sheet, the existence of a
long list of witnesses, or the possibility of delay in trial, cannot, by
themselves, constitute valid reasons to dilute the gravity of the
offence or to disregard the case put forth by the prosecution. As
repeatedly held by this Court, such factors are not standalone
grounds for the grant of bail in heinous offences involving murder.
The reasoning adopted by the High Court to justify the grant of bail
is, therefore, contrary to settled legal principles.”
30. The finding on flight risk is contrary to the record. The Respondent had
fled to Phuket, Thailand, and was apprehended only after the issuance of a
non-bailable warrant, proclamation, and Blue Corner Notice, and was later
deported to India. None of these aspects is considered in the reasons.
31. The Sessions Court held that, since co-accused Ajay Gupta was granted
bail, the Respondent herein also deserves to be enlarged on bail on the
principle of parity. The Sessions Court failed to appreciate that Ajay Gupta's
bail order was under challenge before this Court at the time of hearing the
bail application of the present Respondent. Moreover, the Sessions Court has
41 (supra at pg. no. 9).
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not recorded any finding regarding the roles attributed to Ajay Gupta and the
present Respondent. There is a clear non-application of mind.
32. A plain reading of the impugned order shows that the trial court
overlooked the severity of the offence and did not comment on it. The
seriousness of the crime should not be minimised. At first glance, the
Respondent and his partners intentionally ignored safety standards while
managing the restaurant and allowed cold-pyro fireworks, fully aware of the
flammable materials used in the roof. The house number was altered to obtain
a trade license, which was then used to forge the health NOC, all aimed at
acquiring the Excise licence. The record clearly suggests the Respondent and
his partners had the intent, with each partner denying individual
responsibility and engaging in a blame game. The Respondent argued that he
delegated authority, having operated around twenty restaurants nationwide,
which made it impossible to oversee Birch personally. His flight to Phuket
after the incident also demonstrates neglect of responsibility for the tragedy
that killed twenty-five innocent people. Viewing the offence as 'not that
heinous' reflects an oversimplified understanding by the Sessions Court.
33. The Sessions Court also relied on the submission made on behalf of the
Respondent that the cause of the fire is not yet crystallised. The Sessions
Court overlooked the report of the Directorate of Fire and Emergency
Services, Government of Goa, dated 5th February 2026, which clearly records
that the findings of the demonstration, seen alongside the video of the fire
incident, may have been triggered by fire sparklers used in the club, although
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the final FSL report is awaited.
34. The Supreme Court in M/s Netsity Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. The State Govt.
of NCT of Delhi42 has held that denial of bail does not mean whittling down
pro-liberty principles, but the Courts must be cognisant of applying settled
principles of law to the facts of specific cases. No precedent operates in a
vacuum and must be correlated to the extant facts.
35. In view of the foregoing discussion, the preceding analysis
demonstrates that the case at hand requires deeper scrutiny beyond the
conventional principles governing the subject. The order granting bail to the
Respondent indicates an improper exercise of discretion by the Sessions
Court. There is no application of mind in granting bail to the Respondent.
Surprisingly, the Sessions Court has not even directed periodic attendance
before the Investigating Officer; no direction was given to request the trial
Court’s permission to travel within India.
36. In these circumstances, the impugned Judgment and Order dated 1 st
April 2026, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, North Goa,
Mapusa, releasing the Respondent on bail, deserves to be quashed and set
aside, and it is accordingly quashed and set aside. The application is allowed.
37. The Respondent shall surrender before the Sessions Court within a
period of two weeks from today.
38. It is made clear that the observations made in the present order are
42 2025 INSC 1181 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2079.
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prima facie and confined to the correctness of the impugned Order and shall
not affect the trial.
39. It is made clear that after the surrender, the Respondent is at liberty to
move an appropriate application for bail before the trial Court afresh and the
trial Court may consider it on its own merits and in accordance with law and
after taking into consideration the relevant material collected during the
course of investigation which is part of the charge sheet.
(DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.)
40. After the Judgment and Order was pronounced, Mr Kantak, learned
Senior Advocate for the Respondent, sought a stay of this Judgment and
Order for a period of two weeks from today. However, considering the
findings in the present Judgment and Order, since I have already permitted
and granted liberty to the Respondent to make a fresh bail application before
the Trial Court, I am not inclined to stay the present Judgment and Order. The
prayer is declined.
41. If a fresh bail application is made before the Trial Court, the same be
heard and decided expeditiously and preferably within two weeks from the
date on which the bail application is made.
(DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.)
Andreza ereira Digitally signed by Andreza ereira
Date: 2026.08.18 19:21:13 +05'30'
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