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Bombay High Court

THE STATE OF GOA THR. POLICE INSPECTORversusAJAY GUPTA

Disposal
Allowed

Holding

The High Court held that the bail order was perverse, illegal and unjustified and therefore set it aside.

Summary

The State of Goa sought to quash a bail order granted to Ajay Gupta, a partner in a restaurant‑cum‑club that caught fire on 6 December 2025, killing 25 people. The fire was caused by cold pyrotechnics igniting combustible materials in a venue lacking fire‑safety equipment, emergency exits, and proper licences, with forged documents used to obtain permits. The prosecution alleged gross criminal negligence, forgery, and the possibility of evidence tampering, while also contending that the accused fled to Delhi and destroyed his mobile phone. The Sessions Court had released the accused on bail, reasoning that the offences were not the “most heinous,” that the charge‑sheet’s filing removed the need for custody, and that there was no flight risk or witness‑tampering threat. The High Court examined precedents on bail, held that the lower court ignored material evidence, mis‑applied the “bail is the rule” principle, and failed to consider the gravity of the mass‑fatality offence, thereby deeming the bail order perverse and illegal. Consequently, the bail order was set aside and the accused was directed to surrender.

Issues considered

  • The appropriateness of granting bail in a case involving mass fatalities and alleged criminal negligence.
  • Whether the accused poses a flight risk and likelihood of tampering with evidence or witnesses.
  • The relevance of the charge‑sheet filing and the length of trial to bail decisions.
  • The applicability of statutory safety and licensing violations to the gravity of the offence.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • bail
  • bail revocation
  • criminal negligence
  • mass fatality
  • fire safety violations
  • forgery
  • flight risk
  • perverse order
  • Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
  • Criminal Procedure Code

Judgment

                                                                              CRMAM-9-2026 .odt



Jose
                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
          CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION (MAIN) NO.9 OF 2026

 State of Goa
 Through Police Inspector/
 Investigating Officer,
 Anjuna Police Station, Goa.                                ... Applicant.
         Versus
 Ajay Gupta
 S/o Ram Swaroop Gupta, aged 55
 R/o 12A, Tatvam Villa, Z Block, Sector-48
 South City-II, Gurugram
 Haryana -122018.                                           ... Respondent.

Ms Swati Kamat Wagh, Additional Public Prosecutor for the Applicant.
Mr Madhav Khurana, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rohan Desai, Advocate
for the Respondent.

            CORAM:                         DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.
            RESERVED ON:                   29th July 2026
            PRONOUNCED ON:                 18th August 2026


JUDGMENT:


1.      By this application, the Applicant-State seeks to quash and set aside the

order dated 23rd March 2026, passed by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge-I, North Goa, Mapusa, in Bail Application No. 337/2025, in connection

with C.R. No. 154 of 2025, dated 7 th December 2025, registered with Anjuna

Police Station, under which the Respondent was enlarged on bail subject to

certain conditions. The charge-sheet No. 12/2026 was filed on 26 th February

2026.


2.      In brief, the facts of the case are that 'Birch by Romeo Lane', a



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restaurant-cum-club (‘the restaurant’) at Arpora Village, Bardez, Goa, was

owned and operated by 'Being GS Hospitality LLP' ('the firm’). The

Respondent is a partner in the firm, along with Mr Gaurav Luthra and Mr

Saurabh Luthra. The restaurant is situated in the middle of a salt pan and

comprises a ground floor and a deck floor. The restaurant itself is on the deck

floor, while the kitchen is on the ground floor. It commenced operations in

February 2024. The restaurant is stated to be bereft of sufficient ventilation,

and there was no separate entry and exit. Entry and exit of guests, patrons,

staff, etc. was facilitated through a narrow opening. The place was congested.


3.     On 6th December, 2025, at about 23.45 hrs, a dance event was in

progress at the restaurant. It is alleged that cold pyro fireworks were being let

off inside the premises near the DJ console. The roof and the deck floor

interiors were made of combustible materials such as wood, plastic, and dry

grass; consequently, the roof caught fire, and the flames spread rapidly

throughout the restaurant. There was no fire safety or fire-fighting equipment

on the premises. There was no emergency exit; there was only one narrow

entry and exit; and one door on the ground floor was found locked. Neither

the ground floor nor the deck floor had sufficient ventilation. Twenty-two

men and three women, comprising guests and staff of the restaurant, were

unable to escape and perished. Several others were injured. Two bodies were

found on the staircase leading down to the kitchen and twenty-three in the

kitchen itself on the ground floor.


4.     On 7th December 2025, at 09.36 hrs, on the complaint of Mr Navneet

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Goltekar, Police Sub-Inspector, Anjuna Police Station, FIR No.154/2025 was

registered at Anjuna Police Station for offences punishable under Sections

105, 125, 125(a), 125(b) and 287 read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya

Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’). Sections 338, 336(3), 340(2), 238, 241, 3(7)

and 61(2) of the BNS were added during the course of the investigation. The

gravamen of the complaint is that the owners, partners, manager, event

organiser and managing staff of the establishment organised a fire show in a

restaurant with a roof of combustible material, without care and caution,

without fire safety equipment and without an emergency exit. The

establishment was allegedly operating without requisite permissions and

licences of the competent authorities.


5.    The investigation further disclosed that the establishment was

operating on the strength of forged and manipulated documents. A No

Objection Certificate (‘NOC’), purportedly issued by the Health Officer,

Primary Health Centre, Candolim, bearing the printed digital signature of that

officer, was forged and submitted to the Excise Department to obtain the

excise licence. A separate FIR No. 154/2025, dated 17 th December, 2025, was

registered at Mapusa Police Station.


6.    Ms Swati Kamat Wagh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appeared

for the Applicant-State and Mr Madhav Khurana, learned Senior Advocate,

represented the Respondent.


7.    The grounds of challenge by the State are as under: -


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  i.   The Sessions Court failed to appreciate the enormity and gravity of

       the offence, in which 25 innocent people lost their lives due to gross

       criminal negligence, reckless conduct and deliberate violations of

       statutory safety norms by the Respondent and his partners.


ii.    The finding that the Respondent is not a flight risk is factually

       incorrect. The material demonstrates that the Respondent had

       absconded to Delhi immediately after the incident, met his lawyer

       and got himself admitted to a hospital, which shows a strong

       likelihood of evasion of trial.


iii.   The Sessions Court failed to appreciate that the filing of a charge

       sheet does not dilute the seriousness of the allegations nor confer

       any indefeasible right to bail, and erred in treating the charge

       sheet's volume and the length of the anticipated trial as grounds for

       release.


iv.    The Sessions Court failed to appreciate that the material

       prosecution witnesses are employees and staff of the restaurant run

       by the Respondent and are therefore susceptible to influence.


 v.    The Sessions Court erroneously observed that the offences do not

       fall within the category of the most heinous crimes. The offences

       under Sections 105 and 338 of the BNS carry punishment

       extending to imprisonment for life and involve culpable acts leading



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        to mass fatalities.


 vi.    The Sessions Court mechanically applied the principle that bail is

        the rule without balancing societal interest and the magnitude of

        the crime.


vii.    The Sessions Court granted bail without independently evaluating

        the specific conduct and role of the Respondent, and without

        appreciating that the Respondent is also accused of forgery,

        manipulation of trade licences and illegal procurement of

        permissions in connivance with his partners.


viii.   The Sessions Court disregarded the prosecution's case that the

        applicant destroyed his mobile phone, holding the allegation ‘vague

        and unsubstantiated’ because the prosecution failed to establish, on

        a prima facie basis, that the device contained any material evidence

        crucial to the present case. This requires proof of the contents of a

        destroyed device.


 ix.    That the music and fireworks were being organised at the

        establishment every Friday and Saturday and that the Respondent

        and his partners were fully aware of this. The material indicates

        that the interior designers and architects engaged for construction

        and design of the premises held regular meetings with the

        Respondent and his partners and requested the use of fire-safe

        structures and materials, which the Respondent and his partners

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                   ignored.


          x.       Ms. Kamat relied on the following decisions:


                       a. Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan1,
                       b. Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar2,
                       c. Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P.3,
                       d. State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan4,
                       e. Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee5,
                       f. Kushal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh6
                       g. Yug Kaushal Pathak v. Senior Inspector of Police7
                       h. Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Harabhai Bambhania8
                       i. Ram Naresh v. State of U.P.9
                       j. Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka10
                       k. N. Basurangan v. State of Kerala11

          xi.      Ms Kamat submitted that the impugned order is perverse and

                   prayed that the order be reversed.


8.              Mr Khurana, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Respondent,

defended the bail order as under:


     i.         The Respondent is a sleeping partner holding only a 10% share in the

                firm; the partners responsible for the firm's operations and
1               (2004) 7 SCC 528.
2               (2020) 2 SCC 118.
3               (2022) 8 SCC 521.
4               2025 INSC 979 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702.
5               (2010) 14 SCC 496.
6               2026 SCC OnLine HP 964.
7               2018 SCC OnLine Bom 18093.
8               (2017) 5 SCC 609.
9               (2024) 1 SCC 443.
10              (2017) 5 SCC 406.
11              (2022) 6 SCC 609.

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          management are the co-accused, Mr Saurabh and Mr Gaurav Luthra.


  ii.     He submitted that the Respondent is a resident of Gurugram who had

          booked his return tickets before the incident and travelled to Delhi to

          receive treatment for a pre-existing medical condition. This act cannot

          be considered to be an act of flight with intent to abscond.


 iii.     The Sessions Court enlarged the Respondent on bail since the charge

          sheet was filed and hence custodial interrogation was not required.


  iv.     There is no allegation of influencing any witness; there is no possibility

          of tampering with evidence.


     v.   He further submitted that the Investigating Officer reported no

          supervening circumstances warranting a breach of the bail order.


 vi.      He submitted that interference with an order granting bail is

          permissible only where there is a serious infirmity, and that no such

          infirmity is made out.


vii.      That the alleged offences do not fall in the gravest category, such as

          murder.


viii.     He placed reliance on the following:


          a. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI12
          b. Manish Sisodia v. CBI13


12        (2012) 1 SCC 40.
13        (2024) 12 SCC 691.

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      c. Sushil Ansal v. State14
      d. Kailash Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh15
      e. Bhaigirathsing v. State of Gujarat16
      f. Totaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh17
      g. Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement18
      h. Ravi Surajmal Bhandari v. State of Maharashtra 19
      i. P. Chidambaram v. CBI20
      j. Sanjay Jain v. Enforcement Directorate21

ANALYSIS


9.    Before delving into the merits of the case, it is necessary to discuss the

law governing the reversal of bail. A distinction must be drawn between an

application to cancel bail on account of supervening circumstances, such as

misuse of the liberty granted, and a challenge to the legality and propriety of

the order granting bail. In Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao

Sonvane and Others22, the Supreme Court observed:


       “20. We make it clear that there is a clear distinction between
      cancellation of bail on the considerations provided under Section
      439(2) CrPC (corresponding Section 483(3) BNSS) and reversal of
      an order of bail by the superior Court. While cancellation should
      only be resorted to in cases where the accused misuses the liberty of
      bail granted to him or tempers with the evidence. On the other
      hand, the order granting bail can be interfered with by the superior
      Court considering the nature and gravity of the offences; if the order

14     (2014) 6 SCC 173.
15     2025 SCC OnLine SC 3055.
16     (1984) 1 SCC 284.
17     2023 SCC OnLine SC 1349.
18     2026 SCC OnLine SC 30.
19     B.A. No. 995 of 2018, Bombay High Court.
20     (2020) 13 SCC 337.
21     2024 SCC OnLine Del 1656.
22     2026 SCC OnLine SC 291: 2026 INSC 181.

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     granting bail ignores the relevant material available on record or
     that the same is based on extraneous considerations. The present is a
     case in the second category.

     21. This court in the case of Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar
      Pradesh & Anr.23, relying upon an earlier judgment in the case of
      Ajwar v. Waseem24, observed as follows:

        “18. A superficial application of bail parameters not only
         undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks
         weakening public faith in the judiciary's resolve to combat
         the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of
         justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts
         must safeguard, lest we risk normalising a crime that
         continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These
         observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were
         thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem
         [Ajwar v. Waseem, (2024) 10 SCC 768 : (2025) 1 SCC (Cri)
         320] in the following paras : (SCC pp. 783-84, paras 26-28)

            “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
            granted in a matter involving a serious criminal
            offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like
            the nature of the accusations made against the
            accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to
            have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the
            role attributed to the accused, the criminal
            antecedents of the accused, the probability of
            tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence,
            if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of
            the accused being unavailable in the event bail is
            granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings
            and evading the courts of justice and the overall
            desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer :
            Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of
            U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974];
            Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
            Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 :
            2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] ; Masroor v. State of U.P.
            [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010)
            1 SCC (Cri) 1368] ; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
            Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
            (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] ; Neeru

23   (2025) 4 SCC 172.
24   (2024) 10 SCC 768.

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               Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.,
               (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] ; Anil
               Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar
               Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 :
               (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425] ; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar
               [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020)
               1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]

               27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted,
               ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner.
               However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is
               always open to interference by the superior court. If
               there are serious allegations against the accused, even
               if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an
               order can be cancelled by the same Court that has
               granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior
               court if it transpires that the courts below have
               ignored the relevant material available on record or
               not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact
               on the society resulting in such an order……”

                                                       [Emphasis supplied]”

10.    The Supreme Court in the case of Victim ‘X’ v. State of Bihar & Anr .25,

while setting aside the order of granting bail to a person accused of

committing grave offences, inter alia, under the SC & ST (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act 1989, observed as under:


        “24. It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled
      ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the
      conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on
      bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are
      not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by
      law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice.
      The present one is precisely a case of such nature.”

11.    The test to be applied was also stated in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar26:


       “16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate

25      2025 INSC 877
26      (supra at pg. no. 6).

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           court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand
           on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the
           cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is
           tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
           exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether
           the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified.”

12.        In Puran vs. Rambilas27, the Supreme Court held:


           “10. … One such ground for cancellation of bail would be where
           ignoring material and evidence on record a perverse order
           granting bail is passed in a heinous crime of this nature and that
           too without giving any reasons. Such an order would be against
           principles of law. Interest of justice would also require that such a
           perverse order be set aside and bail be cancelled. It must be
           remembered that such offences are on the rise and have a very
           serious impact on the society. Therefore, an arbitrary and wrong
           exercise of discretion by the trial court has to be corrected.

           11. Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of setting
           aside the unjustified illegal or perverse order is totally different
           from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that the
           accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts
           requiring such cancellation.”

13.        Applying the settled principles to the facts of the present case, I now

proceed to examine whether the reasons assigned by the Sessions Court for

the grant of bail can withstand judicial scrutiny.


14.        The learned Sessions Court has assigned the following reasons for

granting bail to the Respondent/Accused, as under:


      i.      The Sessions Court relied on the principle that ‘bail is the rule and

              jail is the exception’ to hold that, because the charge sheet has been

              filed, continued incarceration is not required. The Court relied on



27         (2001) 6 SCC 338.

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             the     Supreme          Court's   decisions    in   Sanjay   Chandra28,   P.

             Chidambaram29 and other decisions to justify granting bail. The

             Court held that, in the absence of any material indicating that the

             Respondent is attempting to influence witnesses not to depose

             against him, bail cannot be refused.


     ii.     Among the alleged offences, only Sections 105 (Part II) and 338 of

             the    BNS         are   non-bailable.    The   maximum       punishment   is

             imprisonment for ten years or life imprisonment; however, no

             minimum sentence is prescribed. Therefore, the offences do not fall

             within the category of the most heinous crimes, such as murder.


     iii.    Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, where knowledge

             rather than intention is attributed under Part II of Section 105, is of

             a comparatively lesser degree, and the allegations, at the highest,

             do not attribute any intention to cause death. Hence, the trial Court

             held that the offence alleged against the Respondent does not fall

             into the category of heinous offences.


     iv.     There are no allegations that the Respondent threatened or

             influenced witnesses, and evidence is unlikely to be tampered with

             since it is mainly documentary and secured.


      v.     The prosecution has not furnished any compelling justification to


28      (supra at pg. no. 7).
29      (supra at pg. no. 8).

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                warrant continued detention and has failed to adequately address

                how the Respondent's right to a speedy trial will be secured.


      vi.       The allegation that the Respondent destroyed his mobile phone is

                vague and unsubstantiated, as the prosecution has not prima facie

                established that the device contained any material evidence.


      vii.      Considering the prevailing docket explosion, the number of old

                cases, custody cases, and direction matters, and the voluminous

                charge sheet, which arraigns 14 accused, the trial is not likely to

                conclude in the near future.


     viii.      The decisions in Virupakshappa Gouda30 and Sri Darshan31, relied

                upon by the prosecution, were rendered in cases of the heinous

                crime of murder and are therefore not applicable to the present

                case.


15.          Admittedly, the charge sheet is on record. The Investigating Officer

recorded witness statements. A plain reading of the bail order shows that

the allegations and material collected during the investigation were not

even taken into account by the trial Court. Bail has been granted simply on

the basis that the offence does not fall within the category of heinous

offence, that no minimum sentence is prescribed for the said offence, and

that, as the charge sheet has been filed, custodial interrogation of the



30       (supra at pg. no. 6)
31       (supra at pg. no. 6)

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Respondent is not required.


16.    The material on record includes statements of various witnesses

recorded by the Police. The statement of electrician Mohammed Ansari

indicates that the restaurant had only one rear exit door, which was always

kept locked. The soundproof glass was installed at the Respondent’s and

his partners' instructions, which prevented smoke from escaping. The staff

were   never trained to handle fire incidents, and there were no fire

extinguishers in the restaurant. There was also no emergency exit to the

kitchen. M. D. Juvel Ali, Food and Beverage Manager; Rahul Verma,

Captain in the restaurant; and other staff also said the same thing. Brian

Martins, the Artist in K-Dance events, and Mikhail Bukin stated that there

was no fire extinguisher nor any fire safety plan in the restaurant; the

sparkler machines were used during the belly dance performances, as per

the directions of the Respondent and his partners. Mr Judah D’Souza,

musician, also stated that the narrow concrete bridge connecting the deck

floor of the restaurant from the west side was blocked during the

operation of the restaurant by locking the metal gate. As a result,

customers could not exit during the fire. Gavin Lobo, Bhavna Joshi, a

tourist from U.P., and the other 49 tourists who gave statements said the

same thing. It was repeatedly stated that there were no fire extinguishers

in the premises.


17.    Shailesh Gawade, Station Fire Officer at the Fire Headquarters,

confirmed that the restaurant did not possess a valid NOC from the Fire

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Department. Prathamesh Shankardas, Block Development Officer, stated

that the appropriate procedure was not followed in obtaining the trade

licence and other licences. Dharmendra Govekar, Panchayat Secretary,

stated that the structure itself was illegal, as it could not be allotted a

house number because it was in the middle of a salt pan. One Pradeep

Amonkar stated that co-accused Mr Surendra Khosla, the owner of the

premises, prepared a forged letter stating that the vendors had handed

over possession of the entire resort to him; that Mr Khosla thereafter

raised an illegal structure from which the night club was run. The

Respondent and his partners knew this. Mohd Amir Raza, the Carpenter,

affirmed that the ceiling was constructed with bamboo-mat-like material

as per the design given to them by Mr Ravi and his team, and that he was

not directed to install a fire extinguisher or fire safety systems.


18.    Most importantly, Akash Sethi, the sound and light provider, stated

that water was seeping from the walls and that there were four inches of

stagnant water on the floor. Other witnesses have also stated that all this

was within the knowledge of the Respondent and his other partners.


19.    Dinesh Khera, Manager, stated that he received the authority letter

from Respondent’s partners via WhatsApp. The present Respondent was

also part of this group, and all of them were discussing the modus

operandi for procuring the required licences. A stack of forged documents

was also found at Mr Khera’s hotel premises. Material on record also

indicates that the structure was unauthorised, a fact known to the

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Respondent and his partners. They operated the restaurant, fully aware of

the risks of conducting fire displays inside the restaurant without adequate

safety measures. This led to a fire that killed 25 innocent people, as most

were unable to exit because of the structure. Many others were injured.


20.     It is important to note that the passages from the Sanjay Chandra32

case cited by the Sessions Court have relevance, but they cannot be

applied in every case for grant of bail. The accused in that case were facing

trial for economic offences. The factual matrix is quite different. The

nature of the crime and the manner in which it is committed are to be

seen.


21.     The Sessions Court reasoned that the offences are not among the most

heinous because 'no minimum sentence is mandated,' noting that the gravity

of a case is indicated by the maximum punishment and the nature of the

accusation. Sections 105 and 338 of the BNS carry up to ten years or life

imprisonment. The record shows that the Respondent and partners caused a

fire at the restaurant due to lack of safety measures and licences, resulting in

25 deaths and injuries. Operating without licences and safety measures, they

ignored regulations, leading to the tragedy. The Court's observation is thus

invalid.


22.     The Sessions Court’s finding that the Respondent does not pose a flight

risk is contrary to the record set out. Admittedly, the Respondent fled from

Goa on 7th December 2025, immediately on the day after twenty-five people
32      (supra at pg. no. 7).

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died in his establishment due to the fire and on the very day the FIR was

registered; he kept his mobile phone switched off; he communicated through

his driver's phone (statement of the driver is on record); and that he

thereafter got himself admitted to a hospital in Gurugram, from which he was

discharged the following morning upon the duty doctor certifying his fitness.

Not one of these circumstances is adverted to in the reasons assigned by the

Sessions Court. The Sessions Court treated a Look Out Circular already in

force as a source of reassurance. It is, on the contrary, a measure of the

apprehension that the authorities had found necessary to act upon - a finding

recorded by the Court which cannot be sustained.


23.    The Sessions Court's finding on the possibility of influencing witnesses

is without substance. The absence of allegations during a period of continuous

incarceration establishes nothing. It was necessary to consider that many of

the 306 cited witnesses are staff, employees, managers, accountants, and

suppliers of the Respondent's own establishment. The charge sheet also

indicates that the Respondent has gone to the extent of furnishing a police

verification/clearance for the purpose of procuring certain licences. A letter

from the Delhi Police to the concerned Goa Police reveals that the Delhi Police

have never conducted any verification of the Respondent. Hence, even the

said certificate is suspect. Considering the Respondent’s ability to misrepresent

his own police verification, where none exists, is sufficient to believe in his

ability to tamper with evidence. Moreover, there is a separate FIR against the

Respondent alleging forgery of an NOC from the Health Department; these


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allegations go directly to the propensity to tamper. The Sessions Court has

ignored the same while releasing the Respondent on bail.


24.   The Supreme Court in Centrum Financial Services33 held as under:


      "27. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, while cancelling
      the bail and quashing and setting aside the order passed by the High
      Court granting the bail to the accused it is observed in paras 9 to 12
      as under: (SCC pp. 499-500)

      '9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly
      unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
      with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to
      the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to
      exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
      compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of
      decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among
      other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
      considering an application for bail are:

      (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe
      that the accused had committed the offence;
      (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
      (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;(iv) danger
      of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
      (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
      (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
      (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
      (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

      [See State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi34 (SCC p. 31, para 18),
      Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)35, and Ram Govind
      Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh36.]

      10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to these
      relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said order
      would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it to
33     (2022) 13 SCC 286.
34     (2005) 8 SCC 21.
35     (2001) 4 SCC 280.
36     (2002) 3 SCC 598.

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       be illegal. In Masroor [37], a Division Bench of this Court, of which one
       of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, observed as follows: (SCC p. 290,
       para 13)
          ‘13. … Though at the stage of granting bail an elaborate
          examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the
          merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be
          avoided, but there is a need to indicate in such order reasons
          for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted
          particularly where the accused is charged of having
          committed a serious offence.”

25.    I am constrained to observe that in the instant case, the Sessions Court

has completely lost sight of the basic principles enumerated above, while

dealing with the application for grant of bail.


26.    The Sessions Court has erred in holding that the investigating agency is

not aware of the contents of the Respondent’s mobile phone; hence, the

Respondent destroying his own mobile phone is of no consequence. The

Sessions Court ought to have weighed this conduct of the Respondent as his

propensity to destroy evidence instead of placing this undue burden on the

prosecution, a burden it cannot discharge. Requiring the prosecution to prove

the contents of a device that has been destroyed is an impossible task; this

impossibility is the consequence of the very act complained of.


27.    Another justification for the grant of bail is the prevailing docket

explosion, the number of old cases, custody cases, direction matters and the

nature of the proceedings. However, a Court's docket status is not one of the

considerations that govern the grant of bail. It has no bearing on the accused,

the offence, or the evidence against him. A principle of this kind, if accepted,


37     Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286.

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would entitle every accused on the file of that Court to be enlarged on bail

irrespective of the charges, turning the Court's procedural limitations into a

vested right in a person accused of serious crimes. Such a consideration is

fundamentally irrelevant. It is true that delay in trial violates a fundamental

right of the accused person, but delay in trial by itself is not the sole

consideration for grant of bail.


28.    In Sri Darshan38, the Supreme Court held as under:


       “20.4. Filing of charge sheet or lengthy list of witnesses does not justify
       grant of bail.

       20.4.1. It is well settled that the mere filing of a charge-sheet does not
       confer an indefeasible right to bail. Likewise, the mere prospect of a
       prolonged trial cannot, by itself, outweigh the gravity of the offence, the
       incriminating material gathered during investigation, or the likelihood of
       tampering with witnesses.

       *****

       20.4.6. In the present case, the High Court failed to engage with the
       incriminating material collected during investigation, despite the
       seriousness of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the allegation of
       conspiracy. The mere filing of the charge-sheet, the existence of a long list
       of witnesses, or the possibility of delay in trial, cannot, by themselves,
       constitute valid reasons to dilute the gravity of the offence or to disregard
       the case put forth by the prosecution. As repeatedly held by this Court,
       such factors are not standalone grounds for the grant of bail in heinous
       offences involving murder. The reasoning adopted by the High Court to
       justify the grant of bail is, therefore, contrary to settled legal principles.”

29.    A plain reading of the impugned order reveals absence of consideration

on the enormity of the offence, on the fact that twenty-five persons were

burnt to death, on the public safety dimension of an allegedly unlicensed club

operating in the middle of a salt pan without emergency exits and without an

38     (supra at pg. no. 6)

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NOC from the fire department, on the impact of the release upon public

confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The Sessions Court

observed that the adjudication of bail 'cannot be swayed by emotions,

sentiments, or sympathetic considerations arising from the tragedy'. That is

unexceptionable as a statement of judicial discipline. It has been, however,

used to exclude the gravity of the offence and its societal impact from

consideration altogether, rather than to weigh them dispassionately. The

direction of the Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem39 is that these matters be

weighed, not disregarded as sentiment.


30.    Finally, even on its own conclusion, the conditions imposed by the

Sessions Court do not answer the apprehensions it acknowledged. In the case

of a Respondent resident in Gurugram with no fixed place of stay in Goa,

there is no direction of periodic attendance before the Investigating Officer;

no restraint upon entering the vicinity of the establishment; no direction to

request the trial Court’s permission to travel within India.


31.    The test is whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of

discretion; whether the order is perverse, illegal or unjustified; whether

relevant material was ignored and extraneous material acted upon. Applying

that test, the impugned order proceeds upon an extraneous consideration

made operative on its face; treats the scale of the crime and the length of the

anticipated trial as reasons for release; reverses the burden upon the filing of

the charge sheet; records a finding on flight risk contrary to the material

39     (supra at pg. no. 9).

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before it; decides the gravest question in the case at the bail stage in the

Respondent's favour while declining to examine it at the prosecution's

instance; and is silent from beginning to end on the gravity of the offence, its

societal impact and the interests of the victims. Considering the overwhelming

circumstances, I am of the view that the order suffers from serious infirmity

and is susceptible to interference by this Court.


32.    In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 23 rd

March 2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, North Goa,

Mapusa is quashed and set aside.


33.    The Respondent shall surrender before the Sessions Court within a

period of two weeks from the date of uploading this order. The application is

allowed.


34.    It is made clear that the observations made in the present order are

prima facie and confined to the correctness of the impugned Order and shall

not affect the trial.


35.    It is made clear that after the surrender, the Respondent is at liberty to

move an appropriate application for bail before the trial Court afresh and the

trial Court may consider it on its own merits and in accordance with law and

after taking into consideration the relevant material collected during the

course of investigation which is part of the charge sheet.


                                                (DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.)



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             36.         After the Judgment and Order was pronounced, Mr Shreyansh Chopra,

             learned counsel for the Respondent, sought a stay of this Judgment and Order

             for a period of two weeks from today. However, considering the findings in the

             present Judgment and Order and since I have already permitted and granted

             liberty to the Respondent to make a fresh bail application before the Trial

             Court, I am not inclined to stay the present Judgment and Order. The prayer

             is declined.


             37.         If a fresh bail application is made before the Trial Court, the same be

             heard and decided expeditiously and preferably within two weeks from the

             date on which the bail application is made.


                                                                       (DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.)




Andreza ereira Digitally signed by Andreza ereira
               Date: 2026.08.18 19:15:00 +05'30'




                                                     Page 23 of 23
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