LATIF IBRAHIM PATHAN, I.E. RETURNING OFFICERversusMAHESH SHANKARLAL SHANKARPELLI AND ANOTHER

2026:BHC-AUG:45815


                                                                          EPAP-18-2026
                                                   -1-

                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                    BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                        APPLICATION IN ELECTION PETITION NO. 18 OF 2026
                                              IN
                               ELECTION PETITION NO. 16 OF 2025

                 Latif Ibrahim Pathan,
                 i.e. Returning Officer,
                 Age : 52 years,
                 Occupation : Service as Sub Divisional Officer,
                 R/o. Sillod,
                 District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.               … Applicant

                       Versus

                 1.    Mahesh Shankarlal Shankarpelli,
                       Age : 52 years, Occupation : Business,
                       R/o Maa Durga Nivas, Shastri Nagar/Colony,
                       Sillod, Taluka Sillod,
                       District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.

                 2.    Ganesh Shankarlal Shankarpelli,
                       Age : 47 years, Occupation : Social Worker,
                       R/o 109/1, First Lane Near Vithal Temple,
                       Shastri Nagar, Sillod, Taluka Sillod,
                       District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.         … Ori. Petitioners

                 3.    Abdul Sattar Abdul Nabi,
                       Age : 54 years, Occupation : Business,
                       R/o H. No. 786, Sneha Nagar,
                       Sillod Municipal Council, Sillod,
                       Taluka Sillod,
                       District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar.         … Respondents

                                                  …..
                 Mr. Alok Sharma, Advocate for the Applicant.
                 Mr. R. L. Kute, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (Original
                 Petitioners)
                 Mr. D. R. Kale, Advocate for Respondent No.3
                                                  .....
                                                          EPAP-18-2026
                                 -2-

                         CORAM :       ABHAY S. WAGHWASE, J.
                         Reserved on       : 17.08.2026
                         Pronounced on     : 01.10.2026

ORDER :


1.    Original respondent no.2 in Election Petition has pressed into

service the instant application by raising a prayer that he be deleted

from the array of respondents in the Election Petition. The relevant

prayer clause (B) reads as under :


     “B) That, the applicants be deleted as respondent to the
         election petition.”


2.    In support of such prayer, Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel for

the applicant/original respondent no.2 seeks reliance on the judgment

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Michael B. Fernandes v. C. K.

Jaffer Sharief and others, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1041, and in view

of the provisions laid down in Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act, he

seeks deletion of applicant/original respondent no.2 Returning Officer

as, according to him, the Returning Officer is neither a proper party,

nor a necessary party.



3.    Learned counsel for the original Election Petitioners opposes

primarily on the ground that, in the Election Petition, there is

challenge to the very election of respondent/returned candidate and
                                                             EPAP-18-2026
                                   -3-

the process that has been conducted by the Election Commission. The

respondent/returning officer was throughout in picture in the election

process and certain lapses on his part are under consideration. He

therefore opposes deletion.


4.    Heard both sides.


5.    In the case of Midhael B. Fernandes (supra) relied by learned

counsel for the applicant/original respondent no.2, the Hon’ble Apex

Court had an occasion to deal with a similar appeal arising out of the

order of Karnataka High Court deleting the Election Commissioner,

Returning Officer and the Chief Electoral Officer from the array of

respondents to the election petition. Said appeal was dismissed by the

Hon’ble Apex Court by observing that, parties to an election petition

are limited strictly to those specified in Sections 82 and 86(4) of the

Act and as per Section 82, Returning Officer and Chief Electoral

Officer are not proper parties. It has been further held that the

concept of ‘proper parties’ as understood in the Civil Procedure Code

is not applicable to the election petitions under the Act.



6.    Similarly, this Court derives strength from the judgment of the

Hon’ble Apex Court in Jyoti Basu and others v. Debi Ghosal and

others, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 691, wherein it has been observed
                                                          EPAP-18-2026
                                  -4-

that, in the election petitions alleging corrupt practice, only the

‘candidates’ expressly mentioned in Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act

can be joined as respondents by the election petitioner and the non-

candidates, even though against them corruption charges are made in

the petition, cannot be so joined. In para 10 of the said decision in

Jyoti Basu (supra), it has been further observed as under :


     “The question is not whether the Civil Procedure Code
     applies, because it undoubtedly does, but only ‘as far as
     may be’ and subject to the provisions of the Representation
     of the People Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereunder.
     Section 87(1) expressly says so. The question is whether the
     provisions of the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked to
     permit that, which the Representation of the People Act
     does not. Quite obviously the provisions of the Code cannot
     be so invoked.”

      Further, paragraphs 11 to 13 of the decision in Jyoti Basu

(supra) read as under :


    “11. The matter may be looked at from another angle. The
    Parliament has expressly provided that an opportunity
    should be given to a person who is not a candidate to show
    cause against being 'named' as one guilty of a corrupt
    practice. Parliament, however, has not thought fit to
    expressly provide for his being joined as a party to the
    election petition either by the election-petitioner or at the
    instance of the very person against whom the allegations of
    a corrupt practice are made. The right given to the latter is
    limited to show cause against being 'named' and that right
    opens up for exercise when, at the end of the trial of the
    election petition notice is given to him to show cause why
                                                       EPAP-18-2026
                              -5-

he should not be 'named'. The right does not extend to
participation at all stages and in all matters, a right which
he would have if he is joined as a party at the
commencement. Conversely the election petitioner cannot
by joining as a respondent a person who is not a candidate
at the election subject him to a prolonged trial of an election
petition with all its intricacies and ramifications. One may
well imagine how mischievous minded persons may harass
public personages like the Prime Minister of the country, the
Chief Minister of a State or a political leader of a national
dimension by impleading him as a party to election
petitions, all the country over. All that would be necessary is
a seemingly plausible allegation, casually or spitefully made,
with but a facade of truth. Everyone is familiar with such
allegations. To permit such a public personage to be
impleaded as a party to an election petition on the basis of a
mere allegation, without even prime facie proof, an
allegation which may ultimately be found to be unfounded,
can cause needless vexation to such personage and prevent
him from the effective discharge of his public duties. It
would be against the public interest to do so. The ultimate
award of costs would be no panacea in such cases, since the
public mischief cannot be repaired. That is why public
Policy and legislative wisdom both seem to point to an
interpretation of the provisions of the Representation of the
People Act which does not permit the joining, as parties, of
persons other than those mentioned in Sections 82 and 86
(4). It is not as if a person guilty of a corrupt practice can
get away with it. Where at the concluding stage of the trial
of an election petition, after evidence has been given, the
Court finds that there is sufficient material to hold a person
guilty of a corrupt practice, the Court may then issue a
notice to him to show cause under Section 99 and proceed
with further action. In our view the legislative provision
contained in Section 99 which enables the Court, towards
the end of the trial of an election petition, to issue a notice
to a person not a party to the proceeding to show cause why
                                                      EPAP-18-2026
                             -6-

he should not be 'named' is sufficient clarification of the
legislative intent that such person may not be permitted to
be joined as a party to the election petition.

12. There is yet another viewpoint. When in an election
petition in addition to the declaration that the election of
the returned candidate is void a further declaration is
sought that any candidate other than the returned candidate
has been duly elected, Section 97 enables the returned
candidate or any other party to 'recriminate' i.e. to give
evidence to prove that the election of such candidate would
have been void if he had been a returned candidate and a
petition had been presented to question his election. If a
person who is not a candidate but against whom allegations
of any corrupt practice are made is joined as a party to the
petition then, by virtue of his position as a party, he would
also be entitled to 'recriminate' under sec. 97. Surely such a
construction of the statute would throw the doors of an
election petition wide open and convert the petition into a
‘free for all’ fight. A necessary consequence would be an
unending, disorderly election dispute with no hope of
achieving the goal contemplated by Sec. 86(6) of the Act
that the trial of the election petition should be concluded in
six months. It is just as well to remember that ‘corrupt
practice’ as at present defined by Sec. 123 of the Act is not
confined to the giving of a bribe but extends to the taking of
a bribe too and, therefore, the number of persons who may
be alleged to be guilty of a corrupt practice may indeed be
very large, with the consequence that all of them may
possibly be joined as respondents.

13. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the
opinion that no one may be joined as a party to an election
petition otherwise than as provided by Sections 82 and
86(4) of the Act. It follows that a person who is not a
candidate may not be joined as a respondent to the election
petition. The appeal is therefore, allowed with costs and the
names of the appellants and the seventh respondent in the
                                                           EPAP-18-2026
                                  -7-

     appeal are directed to be struck out from the array of parties
     in the election petition. We may mention that in arriving at
     our conclusion we have also considered the following
     decisions cited before us : S.B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami,
     AIR 1958 Mad 171; Dwijendra Lal Sen Gupta v. Harekrishna
     Konar, AIR 1963 Cal 218, H.R. Gokhale v Bharucha Noshir
     C. AIR 1969 Bom 177 and S. Iqbal Singh v. S. Gurdas Singh
     Badal AIR 1973 P&H 163 (FB)”


7.    Likewise, this Court also derives strength from the judgment of

the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B. Sundara Rami Reddy v.

Election Commission of India and others , reported in 1991 Supp (2)

SCC 624, wherein, in paragraphs 3 and 4, the following observations

are made :


      “3. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner we do
     not find any merit in the petition. Section 82 of the
     Representation of the People Act, 1951 specifies the
     persons who are required to be joined as respondents to an
     election petition. Under this provision the returned
     candidate is a necessary party as a respondent and where
     relief for a declaration is claimed that the election
     petitioner, or any other candidate be duly elected, all the
     contesting candidates are necessary to be impleaded as
     respondents to the petition. No other person or authority
     except as aforesaid is required to be impleaded as a
     respondent to an election petition under the Act. The
     Election Commission of India is therefore not a necessary
     party to an election petition.

     4.    Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that even if
     the Election Commission may not be a necessary party, it
     was a proper party since its orders have been challenged in
                                                      EPAP-18-2026
                              -8-

the election petition. He further urged that since Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 is applicable to trial of an election
petition the concept of proper party is applicable to the trial
of election petition. We find no merit in the contention.
Section 87 of the Act lays down that subject to the
provisions of the Act and any rules made thereunder, every
election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly
as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits.
Provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have thus been made
applicable to the trial of an election petition to a limited
extent as would appear from the expression “subject to the
provisions of this Act”. Since Section 82 designates the
persons who are to be joined as respondents to the petition,
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 relating to the
joinder of parties stands excluded. Under the Code even if a
party is not necessary party, he is required to be joined as a
party to a suit or proceedings if such person is a proper
party, but the Representation of the People Act, 1951 does
not provide for joinder of a proper party to an election
petition. The concept of joining a proper party to an
election petition is ruled out by the provisions of the Act.
The concept of joinder of a proper party to a suit or
proceeding underlying Order I of the Civil Procedure Code
cannot be imported to the trial of election petition, in view
of the express provisions of Sections 82 and 87 of the Act.
The Act is a self-contained Code which does not
contemplate joinder of a person or authority to an election
petition on the ground of proper party. In K. Venkateswara
Rao v. Bekkam Narasinha Reddi, AIR 1969 SC 872 this
Court while discussing the application of Order I Rule 10 of
the Civil Procedure Code to an election petition held that
there could not be any addition of parties in the case of an
election petition except under the provisions of sub-section
(4) of Section 86 of the Act. Again in Jyoti Basu v Debi
Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 691 this Court held that the concept
of ‘proper party’ is and must remain alien to an election
                                                           EPAP-18-2026
                                    -9-

      dispute under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
      Only those may be joined as respondents to an election
      petition who are mentioned in Section 82 and Section 86
      (4) and no others. However, desirable and expedient it may
      appear to be, none else shall be joined as respondents.”


8.     Here, no relief whatsoever is claimed against the present

applicant/original respondent no.2 Returning Officer, and therefore,

he is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. In view of the ratio

as culled out in the above discussed rulings, the applicant succeeds.

Hence, the following order :

                                ORDER

I.    The application is allowed.

II.   The petitioner is directed to effect necessary amendment in the
      Petition, thereby deleting the name of Respondent No.2 - The
      Returning Officer from the array of the respondents, with
      consequential amendments in the body and prayer of the
      Petition.

III. The amendment shall be carried out within a period of six weeks
      from the date of pronouncement of this order.

IV. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.

V.    The application is accordingly disposed off.



                                           [ABHAY S. WAGHWASE, J.]

vre