SHRI. MAHIPATI BHIVA POWAR (DECEASED THR.LRS) SHRI. SARJERAO MAHIPATI POWAR ANDORSversusSMT. DAGADUBAI VISHNU PATIL AND ORS

                                                               ia-17701-2022 .doc


            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                     CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
                   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  INTERIM APPLICATION NO.17701 OF 2022
                                   IN
                 SECOND APPEAL STAMP NO. 14734 OF 2022

Shri. Mahipati Bhiva PowaR
(Deceased Thr.Lrs) Shri
Sarjerao Mahipati Powar And ors                              ...Applicants

                Vs

Smt. Dagadubai Vishnu Patil And Ors                          ...Respondents
                             ——————

Mr. Dheeraj Patil, learned counsel for the applicants.

                                  ——————

                                     Coram :      MEHROZ K. PATHAN, J.,

                                     Date     :   JULY 02, 2026.

P. C. :

          Heard Shri. Patil, learned counsel for the appellants/applicants.

1.        The present application seeks condonation of delay of 5 years and

40 days in filing the present Second Appeal against the judgment and

order dated 10th February 2017 passed by the learned First Appellate

Court.

2.        Perusal of the application would show that absolutely no

satisfactory explanation has been offered by the applicants for


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condonation of the inordinate delay of 5 years and 40 days in filing the

present Second Appeal. One of the grounds stated in the application is

that the original plaintiff, Mahipati Powar, expired on 18th June 2016

and that the applicants, being his legal heirs, were not aware of the

pendency of the litigation. The said contention, however, appears to be

wholly incorrect. A perusal of the record of the First Appeal shows that

the present applicants were already brought on record as the legal heirs

of the original plaintiff during the pendency of the First Appeal itself, and

the appeal thereafter came to be finally decided by judgment and decree

dated 10th February 2017. The applicants, therefore, cannot take

advantage of the death of the original plaintiff, which had occurred prior

to the disposal of the First Appeal.

3.    The further contention of the applicants that they had no

knowledge of the litigation also appears to be false and is not

substantiated by any material on record. The applicants have also sought

to explain the delay by contending that they could not file the Second

Appeal during the period of lockdown on account of the COVID-19

pandemic. The Covid-19 lockdown started in March 2020 however, there

is no explanation as to why the appeal could not be filed from 10 th

February 2017 till March 2020 t is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court,

by its order dated 10th January 2022 passed in the Suo Motu Writ


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Petition (Civil) relating to limitation, directed that the period from 15th

March 2020 to 28th February 2022 shall stand excluded while computing

the period of limitation. However, even after excluding the said period,

there still remains an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 5 years

and 40 days in filing the present Second Appeal. The reasons assigned by

the applicants are flimsy in nature and do not constitute sufficient cause

for condonation of such an inordinate delay.

4.    The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Shivamma (dead) By

Lrd V/s. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors reported in 2025 INSC 1104

September 2025, has deprecated the practice of condoning inordinate

delay, particularly in Second Appeals, and has observed as under:

          “262………………………………………………………..
          We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and
          put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen
          matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause
          exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the
          injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100
          of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited
          to questions of law.
          263.     Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain
          a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
          than the importance of judicial time, what worries us
          is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
          contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate
          and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations


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          deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold,
          because, say if a party litigating against the State, for
          whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation
          of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens
          the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
          litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is
          our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent
          from pillar to post to seek justice.
          264. No litigant should be permitted to be so
          lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by
          the courts to misuse the process of law.”


5.    Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, I

do not find any sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 5 years and 40

days in filing the present Second Appeal. The delay is inordinate and

remains wholly unexplained.

6.    If such an inordinate delay is condoned in the absence of any

satisfactory explanation, the same would amount to defeating the

valuable rights which have accrued in favour of the respondent over a

period of time. Thus, even on merits, the applicants have failed to make

out any case for condonation of the inordinate delay. The application

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is, therefore, devoid of merits

and is accordingly rejected.

7.    In view of the disposal of the Interim Application, Second Appeal




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(ST) No.14734 of 2022 and all pending Interim Applications, if any, also

stand disposed of.

                                               [MEHROZ K. PATHAN, J]




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