GIRISH VITHAL TURKI THR. HIS CA SHARVARI UDAYSHANKAR KESKARversusBHAUSAHEB BHIKANRAO FUKE

                                                                    4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC



               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2016 OF 2024
                                     IN
                      FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 4568 OF 2024

Girish Vithal Turki Thr. His CA
Sharvari Udayshankar Keskar                                              Applicant

          Versus

Bhausaheb Bhikanrao Fuke                                               Respondent
                                    _______
Ms. Harshali R. Gupte, Advocate, for Applicant.
Mr. Namitkumar S. Pansare a/w Mr. Suyash S. Sule, Advocates for the
Respondent.
                                      _______

                             CORAM:         AARTI SATHE, J.

                             DATE:          28th AUGUST 2026.
P.C.


1.            This Interim Application has been filed seeking condonation of delay

of 1469 days in filing the present Appeal. The First Appeal challenges the order of

the Civil Judge, Senior Division, dated 5 th October 2019 allowing the Succession

Certificate application preferred by the Respondent. The delay as sought to be

excluded by learned counsel on behalf of Applicant is that they were pursuing

their proceedings against the order dated 5 th October 2019, passed by the City

Civil Judge, Senior Division before the Hon'ble District Judge-1, Khed-

Rajgurunagar, Dist. Pune in Civil Appeal No. 106 of 2019 wherein District Court

passed the judgment dated 19 October 2023, the certified copy of which was

obtained by them on 6 November 2023 holding that the forum for the Applicant



                                   Page 1 of 4
Bharati
                                                                                   4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC



to raise the grievance which is being challenged in the First Appeal would lie

before this Court.

2.              It is in these circumstances that the Applicant who was bonafidely

pursuing the remedies before the above forum was unable to file the First Appeal

in time. Further it has been submitted in the aforesaid application that the

Applicant is suffering from medical problems, especially knee problems which

create difficulty for him to travel or stand without support. The Applicant also

had to undergo surgery, and on account of this, he was unable to travel to Mumbai

to appoint the local advocate and give necessary instructions.

3.              Learned counsel on behalf of the Applicant has also drawn attention of

this Court to an order dated 24 February 2025, passed by the Co-ordinate Bench

of this Court in a connected First Appeal arising from the same dispute which is

under challenge in the present First Appeal where in a delay of 1469 days had

been condoned in respect of the same Applicant. The order dated 24 February

2025 is reproduced below:



          1. Interim Application has been preferred seeking condonation of delay of 1469 days
          caused in preferring the First Appeal. The First Appeal challenges the order of the
          Civil Judge Senior Division dated 5th October, 2019 rejecting the Appellant's
          Application for Probate of Will executed by one late Shailaja Fuke in favour of the
          Appellant.

          2. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submits that against the order of the
          Civil Judge Senior Division, Khed, First Appeal was preferred before the District
          Court by way of Regular Civil Appeal No.105 of 2019 within time. She submits that
          vide judgment dated 19th October, 2023, the District Court by relying upon the
          decision in the case of Smt.Nola Jonathan Ranbhise vs. The Government of
          Maharashtra, decided on 14th February, 2024 in Writ Petition No.2777 of 2013 has
          returned the Appeal for filing in this Court. She submits that in view thereof,
          Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is available to the Applicant and therefore,
          the period is required to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of
          limitation.



                                           Page 2 of 4
Bharati
                                                                                      4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC




          3. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent would submit that the Respondent
          had filed an Application for succession certificate whereas the Applicant had filed an
          Application for Probate. He submits that his Application came to be allowed and the
          Applicant's Application for probate came to be dismissed. He submits that the
          Respondent has preferred review of the judgment dated 19th October, 2023, as
          according to him, the Appeal would lie before the District Judge. He would further
          submit that the pleadings in the Application do not seek benefit of Section 14 of
          Limitation Act, the application is under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He would
          submit that the delay is sought to be condoned on the ground of medical ailment
          which is not substantiated.

          4. I have considered the submissions and perused the record.

          5. The Application which has been filed seeks condonation of delay of 1469 days
          caused in preferring the First Appeal. Though the Application has not happily
          drafted inasmuch as the appropriate relief to seek is exclusion of the period spent by
          the Applicant in prosecuting the proceedings before the District Court, the
          submissions canvassed as well as the annexures to the Application would indicate
          that the relief which is sought by the Applicant, is in fact, an application under
          Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963.

          6. It cannot be disputed that the Applicant had challenged the impugned judgment
          dated 5th October, 2019 by Filing an Appeal before the District Judge within time.
          By order of 19th October, 2023, the Court had returned the Appeal to the Appellant
          by holding that the Appeal lies before this Court and therefore, the present
          Application came to be filed. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which deals with the
          exclusion of period while computing the period of limitation provides for excluding
          the period where the proceedings for being prosecuted bonafide by the Applicant in
          a Court which for reason of defect of jurisdiction or any cause of a like nature is
          unable to proceed with the hearing. In the present case, what was required to be
          considered is the exclusion of the said period while computing the period of
          limitation. Even if no application would have been filed for while computing the
          period of limitation, the period which was spent by the Applicant prosecuting the
          Appeal before the District Court is liable to be excluded. The application satisfies all
          ingredients of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as it is nobody's case that the Appeal
          proceedings before the District Court were not bonafide or that the same were not
          returned for defect of jurisdiction.

          7. In light of the above, the Interim Application is allowed. The period during which
          the proceedings were pending before the District Court is liable to be excluded while
          computing the period of limitation for the purpose of filing the First Appeal. When
          so computed, the First Appeal is within time.

          8. Interim Application stands disposed of in the above terms.

4.               However, considering the submissions made in the Interim

Application, this Court is of the view that sufficient cause has been made out to

condone the delay in as much as the Applicant was bonafidely pursuing remedies

before another Forum and in view of Section 14 of the Limitations Act, 1963, the


                                             Page 3 of 4
Bharati
                                                                       4 - IA-2016-2024.DOC



period that the Applicant was pursuing the Appeal before the District Court

would be liable to be excluded. Also in the order of 24 th February 2025, passed by

the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a connected First Appeal, the aforesaid

delay has been condoned.

5.            On the Respondent being served, the Respondent is represented by Mr.

Namitkumar S. Pansare, learned counsel. There is no written opposition filed to this

application. Mr. Namitkumar S. Pansare, although has orally opposed this application

vehemently, he would not dispute the well settled position in law in a catena of

judgments of the Supreme Court in regard to the principles to be followed on

condonation of the delay and more particularly he would not dispute that, in the clear

facts and circumstances of the case, as set out in the memo of the application, the

Applicant ought not to suffer or be rendered remediless in pursuing the Appeal.

6.            In the aforesaid circumstances, having perused the memo of the application

and considering that a sufficient cause has been made out, in my opinion, the reasons

as set out certainly provide for an appropriate justification by the applicant in regard to

the delay in filing the appeal. It is hence in the interest of justice that the delay is

condoned.

7.        The Interim Application is hence allowed in terms of prayer clause (a).

8.        The Appeal accordingly be listed for admission, subject to removal of

objections, if any, to be removed within six weeks from today.

9.            Interim application stands disposed of in the above terms. No costs.



                                                   (AARTI SATHE, J.)


                                     Page 4 of 4
Bharati