Bombay High Court

PRINICIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 6 MUMBAIversusNTT INDIA PVT. LTD. - AY 2017-18

Decided: 18 September 2026
Disposal: DISPOSED OFF

Holding

The Court condoned the delay and allowed the interim application for filing the appeal.

Summary

The Revenue (Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai) filed an interim application seeking condonation of an 80‑day delay in filing an appeal under Section 260A of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961 against an ITAT order dated 4 September 2023. The delay arose because the Scrutiny Report was prepared late (26 April 2024) and further procedural steps, including forwarding documents to counsel, took additional time. The Revenue relied on several Supreme Court and High Court precedents emphasizing a liberal, justice‑oriented approach to condoning delay when it is bonafide and not intentional. The assessee opposed the application but offered no affidavit, only oral submissions. The Court, after considering the authorities and the factual explanation, held that the delay was bona‑fide and allowed the interim application, permitting the appeal to be filed.

Issues considered

Whether the 80‑day delay in filing the appeal under Section 260A of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961 can be condoned.
Whether the Revenue’s explanation for the delay constitutes a bona‑fide, non‑intentional cause justifying condonation.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1961 — s. 260A

Subjects

condonation of delay
Section 260A
Income Tax Appeal
limitation period
liberal approach
justice‑oriented discretion
interim application

Judgment

Digitally
signed by
PRAJAKTA
PRAJAKTA SAGAR
SAGAR VARTAK
316-IA 2400-26.DOC
VARTAK Date:
2026.09.23
13:30:59
+0530

Prajakta Vartak
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2400 OF 2026
IN
INCOME TAX APPEAL (L.) NO. 20427 OF 2024

Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 6 Mumbai ...Applicant/Appellant
Vs
NTT India Pvt. Ltd. ...Respondent
__________

Mr. Akhileshwar Sharma for Applicant/Appellant.
Mr. Sagar Syal with Mr. Sameer Dalal for Respondent.
__________

CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI &
Dr. NEELA GOKHALE, JJ.
DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026.

P.C.

1. This interim application is filed praying for condonation of delay of 80 days

in filing the appeal under Section 260Aof the Income-tax Act, 1961.

2. We have perused the averments as made in the interim application,

3. Mr. Syal, learned counsel for the assessee, has opposed the application. He

has fairly stated that the application was served on the respondent two days ago.

No affidavit in opposing the interim application is filed, however, only oral

submissions are made.

4. We find that the appellant/Revenue has sought condonation of the delay in

filing the appeal assailing the order dated 04 September 2023 passed by the

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai Bench. The certified copy of the said

order was received by the appellant on 14 December 2023. It is stated that the

Scrutiny Report was prepared on 26 April 2024, which, according to the assessee,

Page 1 of 6
18 September 2026
316-IA 2400-26.DOC

was itself beyond the prescribed period of limitation. However, we find that the

appellant has stated that, although the Scrutiny Report was prepared on 26 April

2024, it was thereafter forwarded to the competent authority and, upon

obtaining approval for filing the appeal, the requisite documents were forwarded

on 09 May 2024 to the advocate for filing the appeal. The advocate, after

discussions with the Assessing Officer, prepared the draft appeal and emailed the

same on 19 June 2024.

5. The applicant/appellant contended that some additional time was

consumed in preparing the scrutiny report, which consequently delayed the

further steps required for finalizing the appeal. It was stated that the period

immediately following the financial year, i.e., April to June, requires the

preparation of a number of annual reports for submission to the CBDT, and that

this process consequently took some time, resulting in a delay in preparing the

scrutiny report. It is further contended that the Department is still in the process

of adopting the new procedure for mandatory online filing of the proceedings

hence, the delay was bonafide. It is submitted that the delay ought to be

condoned considering that the appellant/ Revenue has a strong case on the merits

of the appeal.

6. In support of the aforesaid contention, the applicant/Revenue, in paragraph

14 of the application, has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in

Collector Land Acquisition vs Mst. Katiji & Ors. 1, wherein the Court laid

1 (1987) 2 SCC 107
Page 2 of 6
18 September 2026
316-IA 2400-26.DOC

down the principles to be borne in mind by Courts while considering

applications for condonation of delay.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on the recent

decision of this Court in The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax

International Taxation-3, Mumbai vs. JS Capital LLC 2, wherein the Court

referring to the position in law as referred in several decisions in paragraphs 8, 9

and 10 of the said judgment, and made the following observations:-

“8. Also, on reading of the decision in case of Sheo Raj Singh
(Deceased) Thr. Lrs. (supra), it is clearly apparent that the Court has taken a
review of the entire law referring to the 16 earlier decisions on the point of
condonation of delay and the well settled principles in that regard. Paragraphs
16 to 28 of the decision are the precedents which are discussed by the Court.
These are the decisions in:
(i) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors.
(supra)
(ii) State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO & Ors. (supra)
(iii) Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors.14
(iv) Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) Thr. Lrs.vs. State of A. P. & Ors.15
(v) Office of The Chief Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.
&
Anr. (supra)
(vi) Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar
Academy & Ors.16
(vii) The State of Manipur & Ors. vs. Koting Lamkang17
(viii) University of Delhi vs. Union of India & Ors.18
(ix) G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Bangalore (supra)
(x) State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors.19
(xi) Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma
(supra)

9. In conclusion, the Supreme Court has observed that the decisions
reflect that there cannot be any quarrel that the Court has stepped in to ensure

2 Interim Application No. 4263 of 2025, decided on 14.08.2026
Page 3 of 6
18 September 2026
316-IA 2400-26.DOC

that substantive rights of the parties and the State are not defeated at the
threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. Although, the
power to condone the delay is a discretionary power, the delay in the said case
is of 479 days in presentation of the appeal. The Supreme Court also observed
on the approach, the Court would be required to adopt in exercising its
discretion. The emphasis has been made that the exercise of discretion by the
High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice-oriented
approach expounded in the decisions. The Court in condoning the delay
made the following significant observations:
“41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we
feel that the High Court's decision to condone the delay on account of
the first respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the
reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting
interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an
exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented
approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the
State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the
State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not
to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an
order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be
ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of
governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view
on balancing of the competing interests.”

10. Also, in a recent decision in Raheem Shah (supra), the Supreme
Court reiterated several principles that what ought to be paramount is to
adopt an approach which is justice-oriented rather than a hyper-technical
approach and thereby set aside the orders which were passed by the High
Court in dealing with the appeal where the delay was not condoned.”

8. The object of limitation rules is not to destroy the substantive rights of the

parties but to curb deliberate dilatory strategies. The Courts are not supposed to

legalize injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the Court to remove

injustice. In Uttar Bhartiya Education Society3, this Court placing reliance on a

decision of the Supreme Court in H Guruswamy & Ors V A Krishnaiah Since

Deceased by LRS.4, has condoned the delay in preferring an appeal under

Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court in H Guruswamy

(supra) has observed as follows:-

3 Income Tax Appeal (L) No. 20375 of 2026 decided on 3 July 2026
rd

4 Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025 dated 8.1.2025.
Page 4 of 6
18 September 2026
316-IA 2400-26.DOC

“13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court
overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the
High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has
reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the
concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the
substantial law of limitation."

9. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh5,

approved a decision of this Court in N L Abhyankar v Union of India 6 wherein it

has been observed as under:-

"22.... The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court
in this regard is not the physical running of time as such, but the test
is whether by reason of delay there is such negligence on the part of
the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or whether
before the petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third
parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be
disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.”

10. In the light of the above discussion, although the application has been

orally opposed, we are not inclined to accept the opposition, particularly

considering that the delay is not intentional, it is bonafide as also it is effectively

explained. This more particularly, the contentions as urged by the applicant are

neither disputed and more particularly, the contentions as urged in paragraph 7

of the memo of the interim application, nor has it been demonstrated that the

position adopted by the Revenue is incorrect.

11. In the wake of the above-mentioned authorities and on an overall

circumspection of the facts of the matter, we are of the opinion that the appeal

52025 SCC OnLine SC 600
6 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574
Page 5 of 6
18 September 2026
316-IA 2400-26.DOC

deserves to be heard and decided on merits. The interim application is

accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clause (a).

12. Office objections, if any, be removed within a period of eight weeks from

today.

13. Disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

(DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)

Page 6 of 6
18 September 2026

Continue reading with your account

Checking your session…

Lawyer court records for this case

Associated through the court’s case reference.