Bombay High Court
OMKAR ASHOK ASHTEKARversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
Bail was granted to the applicant, Deendayal Pawan Kumar Jora, subject to prescribed conditions.
Summary
The High Court considered a bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 filed by 23‑year‑old Deendayal Pawan Kumar Jora, accused No.4 in a case involving alleged jewellery fraud and offences under Sections 316(2), 316(5), 61(2) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The applicant argued he had no nexus to the transaction, being a student and independent businessman, and highlighted his young age and lack of prior record. The Court examined the constitutional presumption of innocence, the principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception, and cited extensive jurisprudence on bail, including the need to consider the likelihood of appearance, risk of tampering, and rehabilitative interests of youthful offenders. Relying on precedents such as Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, the Court held that the applicant satisfied the criteria for bail. Accordingly, bail was granted on a personal bond of Rs 15,000 with a surety, subject to standard conditions, and the interim application was also disposed.
Issues considered
- Whether bail should be granted to Accused No.4 despite the alleged offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
- Whether the applicant’s lack of nexus to the alleged transaction and his youthful status justify bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
- How the principles of presumption of innocence, bail as a rule, and the risk of witness tampering apply in this case.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s. 483
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — s. 316(2), 316(5), 3(5), 61(2)
Subjects
- bail
- presumption of innocence
- youth offender
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
- Section 483
- criminal procedure
- Article 21
- rehabilitation
Judgment
501.BA.3177.2026.doc
HARSHADA H. SAWANT
(P.A.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BAIL APPLICATION NO.3177 OF 2026
Deendayal Pawan Kumar Jora .. Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra .. Respondent
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2879 OF 2026
IN
BAIL APPLICATION NO.3177 OF 2026
....................
Mr. D. Banerjee a/w. Mr. Arshad Nehal, Mr. Anshuman Deshmukh
and Mr. Prathamesh Paithankar, Advocates for Applicant.
Ms. Sangeeta E. Phad, APP for Respondent.
...................
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : AUGUST 25, 2026
P.C.:
1. Heard Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for Applicant and Ms.
Phad, learned APP for Respondent.
2. This is an Application under Section 483 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking Bail in connection with C.R.
No.183 of 2025 registered with Vishrambaug Police Station for
offences punishable under Sections 316(2), 316(5), 61(2) read with
Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
3. The Applicant before me is a 23 year old young offender. He
is arraigned as Accused No.4. His name is Deendayal Pawan Kumar
Jora.
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4. In so far as the complaint of the Complainant is concerned,
he had a transaction with regard to delivery of goods (jewellery) with
the Accused No.1 - Vishal Punamiya for which he had paid him Rs.2.8
Crores. Mr. Vishal Punamiya, Accused No.1 after receiving the monies,
delivered the said goods to Accused No.2, his younger brother Hitesh
Punamiya. There is a longstanding business relationship between
Complainant and Accused Nos.1 and 2. However, through Hitesh
Punamiya the goods were required to be delivered to Mr. Ashtekar but
Accused No.2 merely gave Mr. Ashtekar a delivery order on the
letterhead of Accused No.3 - Pawankumar Jora.
5. There are business relations between Accused Nos.1 and 2
on the one hand and Complainant Mr. Ashtekar on the other hand,
whereby they are dealing with manufacture and sale / purchase of
jewellery. Pawankumar Jora is also a jeweller who manufactures
jewellery and supplies manufactured jewellery / goods. The
indictment of the Accused No.4 namely, Deendayal Pawan Kumar Jora
is solely on the basis that he is the son of Pawankumar Jora. Mr.
Banerjee would submit that Accused No.4 though he was a student and
has infact started his own business in Pune and has no nexus with the
transaction between Complaint and Accused Nos.1 and 2 or for that
matter Accused No.3 who is his father.
6. It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail Application
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has to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain
whether the Accused is likely to appear before the court for trial. There
are other broad parameters also like gravity of offence, likelihood of
Accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would
influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his antecedents
which are required to be considered in such cases.
7. In the case of Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson1, the Allahabad
High Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting
bail conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It
held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session
discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls
all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must
be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that
accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to
defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is
the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut
Conspiracy case. Justice Mukherjea writing for the Bench in paragraph
No.9 held as under:-
“9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an
attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the
High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason
for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek.
The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it
goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of
justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the
1 AIR 1931 ALL 356
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defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time
cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an
attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
a bail may be granted but not in other classes.”
8. In the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation2, in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered
the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail,
principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well
recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail
jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the judgment reads as under:-
“Prevailing situation
6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The
statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd
of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of
this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to
be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being
charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They
are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women.
Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of
them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the
mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the
investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a
draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus
to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an
impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually
opposite to each other.
Definition of trial
7. The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the
Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the
purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of
investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would
obviously be different between these two stages. In the former
stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted
for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters
substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a
trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence
2 (2022) 10 SCC 51
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to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards
enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among
other factors.
8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as
a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on
suspension of sentence.
Definition of bail
9. The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though
is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a
personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an
accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police
or by the investigating agency.
10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect
while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it
is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the
suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and
the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as:
“A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required
by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in
court at a future time.”
11. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as:
“to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on
security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a
place certain, which security is called bail, because the
party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of
those who bind themselves or become bail for his due
appearance when required, in order that he may be safely
protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his
escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.”
Bail is the rule
12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception
has been well recognised through the repetitive
pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh
Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v.
Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] ,
held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24)
“19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab
[Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is
set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88,
paras 27-30)
‘27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
deal with the right to ordinary bail because that
right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right
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to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that
as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High
Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In
re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC
OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 479-
80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance
of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be
applied in the solution of the question whether bail
should be granted or refused is whether it is
probable that the party will appear to take his trial
and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which,
significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases”
observations are to be found regarding the right to
bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N.
Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor,
1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was
observed, while dealing with Section 498 which
corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code,
that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the
High Court wide powers to grant bail which were
not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding
Section 497 which corresponds to the present
Section 437. It was observed by the court that there
was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle
governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by
Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be
exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson
[Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All
14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that
it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down
any particular rules which will bind the High Court,
having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the court unfettered. According
to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise
from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases
and to say that in particular classes a bail may be
granted but not in other classes. It was observed that
the principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that
grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.
An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much
better position to look after his case and to properly
defend himself than if he were in custody. As a
presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his
own case. A presumably innocent person must have
his freedom to enable him to establish his
innocence.
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28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by
Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115]
that : (SCC p. 242, para 1)
“1. … the issue [of bail] is one of liberty,
justice, public safety and burden of the public
treasury, all of which insist that a developed
jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially
sensitised judicial process. … After all, personal
liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental,
suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of
“procedure established by law”. The last four
words of Article 21 are the life of that human
right.”
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)
[Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1
SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by
Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p.
129, para 29)
“29. … There cannot be an inexorable formula
in the matter of granting bail. The facts and
circumstances of each case will govern the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting or
cancelling bail.”
30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8,
p. 806, para 39), it is stated:
“Where the granting of bail lies within the
discretion of the court, the granting or denial
is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Since
the object of the detention or imprisonment of
the accused is to secure his appearance and
submission to the jurisdiction and the
judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is
whether a recognizance or bond would effect
that end.”
It is thus clear that the question whether to
grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a
variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect
of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
Any one single circumstance cannot be treated
as of universal validity or as necessarily
justifying the grant or refusal of bail.’
* * *
24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the
Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is
concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the
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rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India
and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental
Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be
suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the
Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a
vast number of substantive and procedural rights post
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] .”
13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay
Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras
21-23)
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down
from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure
the appearance of the accused person at his trial by
reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither
punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure
that an accused person will stand his trial when called
upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the
principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that
every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and
duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that
detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a
cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity
demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in
custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial
but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this
country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of
personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any
person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon
which, he has not been convicted or that in any
circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon
only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left
at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of prevention being the
object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact
that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial
punitive content and it would be improper for any court to
refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct
whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to
refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of
giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”
Presumption of innocence
14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed
through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to
prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to
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satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and
enlargement on bail is to be denied.
15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged
throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge
the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law,
until the individual is proven guilty.”
9. Considering Applicant’s age, if he is enlarged on bail Court is
hopeful that Applicants’ family will undoubtedly do their duty to make
every effort and attempt to reform and aid the Applicant in leading a
reformed life while on bail rather than keep them in prison and expose
them to criminal outlook and life in prison. However on the flip side, if
a chance is given to the Applicant because of their young ages by
enlarging them on bail, there is a possibility that they will be
remorseful and repent in retrospect. This is a chance required to be
taken by the Court because punishment has to be believed to be
inflicted for a reformative result rather than being punitive in nature.
10. Undoubtedly the trial will determine the complicity of
Applicant in the offence. While considering Bail Applications in such
facts, Court feels that reform and rehabilitation of the under trial
accused needs to be considered especially when age of the accused
persons are young so that the accused persons gets an opportunity / or
is given an opportunity to reform, rehabilitate and earn his livelihood
honorably from the perspective of social integration. This is a chance
which the Court must take considering the young age of accused
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persons. The age of the Applicant are very young. If the Applicant is
incarcerated in prison further, there is every possibility that he might
lose faith in the institution and society at large and may tread the path
of criminality or would waste his life. Incarceration in prison exposes
many youth to abuse as is shown statistically.
11. In so far as the present transaction is concerned, even
otherwise, according to the complainant’s First Information Report (for
short ‘FIR’) he has specifically indicted Accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 on the
basis of the aforesaid facts. In that view of the matter, arguable case is
made out by Mr. Banerjee for grant of bail to accused No.4, the
Applicant before me on the basis of the role attributed to him, rather
having no nexus with the others or the transaction in question in the
present case.
12. There are several harms of incarceration which are inflicted
disproportionately on the youth. This is the reason why Court feels that
any / every semblance of a chance towards a reformative approach in
punishment should be adopted, especially in the case of young
offenders. Hence every opportunity or to that extent risk should be
constructively taken by the Court in the case of young offenders –
accused before committing such accused to further custody and give
such accused an opportunity to become a good citizen in the Society.
These observations are only in the view of the young age of the
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Applicant before me and it is only a means to explore an alternative to
incarceration so that the Applicant can become a good citizen.
13. Considering the aforesaid, Applicant has made out case for
grant of bail. He is granted bail subject to following conditions:-
(i) Applicant is directed to be immediately released from
prison in connection with Crime No.183 of 2025;
(ii) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on
furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs. 15,000/- (Rs. Fifteen
Thousand only) with one surety of the like amount;
(iii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at the
concerned Police Station, once every month on the first
Monday of the month between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m.;
(iv) Applicant shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and
attend the Trial Court on all dates, unless specifically
exempted and will not take any unnecessary
adjournments, if he does so it will entitle the
prosecution to apply for revocation of this order;
(v) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra
without prior permission of the Trial Court;
(vi) Applicant shall not influence with any of the witnesses
or tamper with the evidence in any manner;
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(vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed
of his current address and mobile contact number and /
or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from
time to time, as applicable; and
(viii)Any infraction of the conditions shall entail cancellation
of bail granted to the Applicant.
14. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are
limited for the purpose of granting Bail only and I have not made any
observations on merits of the case. The trial shall be adjudicated on
the strength of the evidence led and strictly on its own merits being
uninfluenced with any of the prima facie observations made
hereinabove in this order.
15. Bail Application is allowed and disposed of in the above
terms. In view of disposal of Bail Application, pending Interim
Application is also disposed.
H. H. SAWANT [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
Digitally
signed by
HARSHADA
HARSHADA HANUMANT
HANUMANT SAWANT
SAWANT Date:
2026.08.25
21:28:52
+0530
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