Bombay High Court
PRATAPSINGH NARSINGRAO PUPALAversusSAMAR VIJAY PUPALA AND ORS.
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The Court declined to recall the order and affirmed the dismissal of the suit as infructuous.
Summary
The applicant, Pratapsingh Narsingrao Pupala, sought recall of the High Court's order dated 25 July 2019 which had disposed a civil revision application concerning an eviction suit. The suit was filed by plaintiffs against a tenant, but the tenant surrendered the premises to a co‑owner, rendering the suit infructuous. The Court had held that the matter should be decided in a separate civil proceeding for the inter‑se dispute and dismissed the suit under its inherent jurisdiction (Section 151 CPC). The applicant argued that Order VII Rule 11 could not be used to dismiss the suit and that the order should be recalled due to his absence at the hearing. The Court rejected the recall, noting the applicant’s delay, lack of merit, and affirmed that the suit was correctly dismissed as infructuous. Consequently, the application for recall was disposed of.
Issues considered
- Whether the order dated 25 July 2019 disposing the civil revision application can be recalled or reviewed.
- Whether a suit becomes infructuous upon surrender of the premises and can be dismissed under inherent jurisdiction of the court.
- Whether Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC permits a plaintiff to seek dismissal of a suit after the cause of action has become extinguished.
- Whether inter‑se disputes between co‑owners can be adjudicated within an eviction proceeding.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. Order 12 Rule 6, Order 15 Rules 1 and 3, Order 23 Rule 1, Order VII Rule 11, Section 151
Subjects
- recall of order
- infructuous suit
- eviction
- civil procedure
- inherent jurisdiction
- Order VII Rule 11
- Section 151 CPC
- inter se dispute
- tenancy
- partition
Judgment
2026:BHC-AS:37112
Diksha Rane 14 I A 3368 2019.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.3368/2019
IN
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.800/2013
PRATAPSINGH NARSINGRAO PUPALA ..APPLICANT
(ORG. REPS.NO.1)
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
SAMAR VIJAY PUPALA AND ANR. ..APPLICANTS
VS.
PRATAPSINGH NARSINGRAO PUPALA & ORS...RESPONDENTS
Adv. Prathmesh Bhargude i/b. Adv. Kavita A. Shah for
applicant.
Adv. R. L. Nichani for respondent nos. 1 and 2.
CORAM : ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.
DATE : 3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026.
Per Court :
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant seeks recall of the order
dated 25th July, 2019. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that
he was the respondent in the matter and engaged an advocate,
however, the advocate was not present on the date when the order
Page 1 of 7
3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
Diksha Rane 14 I A 3368 2019.docx
was passed. It is also stated in the affidavit that the Registry had
informed the advocate, however, the advocate was unable to place
the matter for listing before the Court and failed to remain present.
Thereafter, the present application is filed for recall of the order
dated 25th July, 2019, whereby this Court after hearing the
applicant, disposed of the Civil Revision Application. In essence, the
present application seeks recall or review of the order dated 25 th July
2019.
3. Perused the order dated 25th July, 2019 and also the
application for recall of order.
4. This Court is not satisfied with the explanation offered in
application for seeking condonation of 99 days delay in filing the
application for recall. As per the affidavit filed by the applicant, they
were informed by the Registry about the listing of the matter on the
given date. However, they failed to appear. Although the applicant
earlier appeared in the matter, the vakalatnama was not filed on
record. Even if the applicant had failed to notice the matter on the
cause list when the advocate was informed of the matter by the
Registry it was incumbant upon the advocate to ascertain the status
of the case. Be that as it may, I shall consider the matter on merits as
well.
5. The brief facts of the matter are that the plaintiff nos.1 to 4
filed the suit for eviction against the tenant. During the pendency of
Page 2 of 7
3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
Diksha Rane 14 I A 3368 2019.docx
the proceedings, the tenant surrendered the licensed premises to
plaintiff no.2. As such a prayer is made by plaintiff no.2 for dismissal
of the suit as nothing survived in the proceedings, since the tenant
had surrendered the premises. This Court, by order dated 25 th July,
2019, has noticed that the tenant has surrendered the premises to a
co-owner and that nothing would survive in a suit for ejectment
against the tenant. If there is any inter se dispute between the co-
owners, the same was required to be resolved in the proper civil
proceeding. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Application was disposed
of by holding that the adjudication of the suit has been rendered
infructuous and accordingly, the suit was disposed of.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that an
application under Order VII, Rule 11 cannot be filed by one of the
plaintiffs for rejection of the suit and that this Court, in the earlier
round of proceedings, had particularly formulated an issue by order
dated 7th October, 2006 inter se between the parties as under:-
“Whether plaintiff no.2 proves that he had taken possession
of the suit premises from the defendants for himself and on
behalf of other plaintiffs and that the suit has become
infructuous as alleged?”
7. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that an
application under Order VII Rule 11 cannot be filed by the plaintiff
for dismissal of the suit. One of the plaintiffs have taken possession
of the suit premises from the tenant and since it was not possible for
Page 3 of 7
3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
Diksha Rane 14 I A 3368 2019.docx
plaintiff no.2 to withdraw the suit, an application under Order VII
Rule 11 was filed by him for dismissal of the plaint.
8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the plaint can
be dismissed only upon examination of the plaint and the documents
supporting the plaint, and no subsequent fact or order could have
been looked into by the Court. He submits that, in view of his
absence on 25th July, 2019, he was not able to apprise this Court of
the legal position, and accordingly, the order came to be passed on
25th July, 2019. He, thus, prays to recall the order dated 25 th July,
2019 and list the matter for hearing on merits.
9. The Supreme Court in various judgments, particularly in the
case of Shipping Corporation of India vs. Machado Brothers and Ors. 1
has held that if the proceedings are rendered infructuous then the
Civil Court has a power to put an end to the litigation. Particularly
paragraph no.13 is noted below of the judgment of the Supreme
Court:
“13. The learned counsel relied on Order 7 Rule 11,
Order 12 Rule 6, Order 15 Rules 1 and 3 and Order 23 Rule
1 of CPC to point out that apart from Section 151, of CPC
even under those provisions of the Code there is a duty cast
on the trial court to put an end to a litigation if the same
had become infructuous. In the instant case, the learned
Counsel pointed out that there was only one agency
agreement and in exercise of the right conferred by the
termination clause in the said agreement the appellant had
terminated the contract of agency of the respondent as far
1
MANU/SC/0276/2004
Page 4 of 7
3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
Diksha Rane 14 I A 3368 2019.docx
back as on 23.2.1995, but by virtue of the interim order
granted by the courts below the appellant had to continue
the same much against the interest of the appellant. Be that
as it may, the learned counsel submits that a fresh cause of
action had arisen which required the said agency agreement
again to be terminated. Hence a notice of termination dated
23.8.2001 was issued nearly six years after the first letter of
termination which in fact and in law substituted the first
letter of termination. Consequent to which the first letter of
termination became non existent and consequently the suit
filed on that basis became infructuous because the cause of
action, if any, which gave rise to the first suit disappeared.
Hence, the courts below ought to have accepted the
application of the appellant for the dismissal of the suit. The
learned counsel also contended both the courts below have
not given any finding as to the effect of the second
termination notice vis-a-vis the existence of cause of action
to continue the first suit and proceeded erroneously on the
ground that dismissal of said suit would make the injunction
ineffective, as if the interim order in a proceeding can
survive after the disposal of the main matter or that the
main matter can be kept pending to continue the interim
order.
10. Similarly, in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs.
Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia2 this Court has particularly
observed in paragraph no.19. Paragraph no.19 is noted below for
ready reference:
“19. In the present case, however it cannot be
contended that the Applicants have any other alternate
remedy for seeking dismissal of the suit, which has been
rendered infructuous. As observed above, provisions of
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code do not provide any remedy
for the Applicants to seek dismissal of the suit on account of
happening of a supervening event. Order VII Rule 11 of the
2
MANU/MH/2564/2026
Page 5 of 7
3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
Diksha Rane 14 I A 3368 2019.docx
Code contemplates rejection of plaint when the same does
not disclose cause of action. The provision does not apply
when the plaint discloses cause of action when lodged but
the said cause of action comes to an end during pendency of
the suit. Therefore, power of the Court to throw out such
infructuous litigation must necessarily be traced to inherent
jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code. As observed
above, I am supported in my view by the judgment of the
Apex Court in Shipping Corporation of India Limited
(supra).”
11. This Court in Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia (supra)
has also relied upon the judgment in the case of Shipping
Corporation of India Limited (supra) and held that if the cause of
action has expired and the suit has become infructuous, the same has
to be disposed of accordingly. This Court similarly has exercised its
power and disposed of this suit by holding that the suit is rendered
infructuous. The suit is against the tenant for eviction and the tenant
having surrendered the premises, the inter se dispute between the
co-owners cannot be adjudicated in a tenancy proceedings and
accordingly, this Court has disposed the suit with liberty to the
parties to take such steps as are available in law to adjudicate their
inter se rights. It is brought to my notice that the Civil Suit for
partition is pending between the parties. However, learned counsel
appearing for the applicant submits that the present property is not
one of the property mentioned in the suit property. This Court has
not found any merit in recalling the order dated 25th July, 2019.
12. The present application stands disposed of.
Page 6 of 7
3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
Diksha Rane 14 I A 3368 2019.docx
13. If such proceedings are filed to decide inter se rights
between the parties qua the suit property, the same to be decided in
accordance with law. I have not expressed anything on merits of such
proceedings.
[ ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.]
Page 7 of 7
3rd SEPTEMBER, 2026
Signed by: Diksha Rane
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 09/09/2026 13:41:15
Checking your session…