SMT. MONILA AMAR KOTHARI AND OTHERSversusMR. SARDARMAL CHUNILAL CHAVAN AND OTHERS

2026:BHC-AS:36454

                                                                        9 sa 276 of 2026.doc

                            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                 SECOND APPEAL NO.276 OF 2026

            Monila Amar Kothari and Ors.             ...   Appellants
                  versus
            Sardarmal Chunilal Chavan and Ors.       …     Respondents
                                             WITH
                            INTERIM APPLICATION NO.4311 OF 2026

            Mr. Aditya S. Desai, for Appellants.


                                CORAM:      N.J.JAMADAR, J.

                                DATE :      2 SEPTEMBER 2026

            ORAL ORDER :

            1.      Heard the learned Counsel for the Appellants.

            2.      The challenge in this appeal is to a judgment and order dated 28

            November 2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Panvel, in Regular

            Civil Appeal No.486 of 2019, whereby the order passed by the Executing

            Court dated 10 April 2017 in Regular Darkhast No.30 of 2012 came to be set

            aside and the obstruction proceedings taken out by the Appellants came to be

            dismissed. By the said judgment and order dated 10 April 2017, the learned

            Civil Judge has set aside the consent decree dated 28 February 1995 as bad

            in law.

            3.      Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the Appellants, submitted that, the

            Appellants were claiming title over the suit property on the basis of a pre-



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existing right to purchase the suit property, pursuant to an agreement for sale

executed on 28 March 1979.

4.    On 18 December 1980, the holders of the suit property i.e. Defendant

Nos.1 and 2, had executed an agreement for sale in favour of the Plaintiffs in

Suit No.93 of 1989. On the basis of the said agreement for sale, the Plaintiffs

had instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract.            By a

compromise decree dated 28 February 1995, the original holders agreed to

execute the sale deed in favour of the Plaintiffs. Subsequently, on 31 August

1995, Judgment Debtor No.2 executed a registered deed in favour of the

Appellants.   Since the said sale deed was executed in pursuance of the

agreement for sale dated 28 March 1979, the compromise decree did not bind

the appellants.

5.    Mr. Desai, further submitted that, the learned District Judge erred in

holding that the said sale deed dated 31 August 1995 was affected by the

principle of lis pendence.

6.    I find it rather difficult to accede to the submission of the learned

Counsel for the Appellants.     A compromise decree was passed on 28

February 1995.     Thereafter, on 31 August 1995, Judgment Debtor No.2

executed the sale deed in favour of Defendant No.3. The explanation

appended to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, makes it clear

the duration for which the principle of lis pendence applies. It, inter alia,


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provides that the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to

commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of

the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the

suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and

complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained,

or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of

limitation prescribed for the execution thereof, by any law for the time being

in force.

7.     Evidently, in the case at hand, the execution proceedings was filed on 1

March 2006, before the expiration of period prescribed for the execution of the

decree. The transfer in question in favour of Judgment Debtor No.2 was

under a month and half of the passing of the compromise decree on 28

February 1995. In the face of the aforesaid time lag, the Trial Court erred in

delving into the merits of the compromise decree and in the process, travelled

beyond the compromise decree.

8.     In any event, the compromise decree could not have been assailed by

filing obstruction proceedings, as the proper course available to the

Appellants was to approach the Court which had passed the compromise

decree; the legality and validity of which was sought to be put in contest. A

profitable reference in this context can be made to the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Nath Singh V/s. Anirudh Singh (D)


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                      through legal heirs and Ors.1

                      9.       The learned District Judge has correctly appreciated the legal position.

                      No question of law, much less, a substantial question of law arises for

                      consideration.

                      10.      The Second Appeal, thus, stands dismissed.

                      11.      Interim Application No.4311 of 2026 also stands disposed.




                                                                          ( N.J.JAMADAR, J. )




                      1    AIR 2020 SC 2111

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Signed by: S.S.Phadke
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 07/09/2026 10:34:43