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Bombay High Court

M/S. RIYAN PAPER MILLS THROUGH SOHIL BARKATALI LAKHANI,PARTNER)versusSHARADCHANDRA P. SHAH AGENCY PVT.LTD.

Decided
Disposal
Rejected

Holding

The court held that the applicant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay and therefore the condonation of delay application was dismissed.

Summary

The applicant, M/s Riyan Paper Mills, sought condonation of a 1‑year‑88‑day delay in filing a Commercial First Appeal against an ex‑parte decree ordering payment of Rs. 39,73,131. The applicant claimed it never received summons in the original suit and only learned of the decree when it appeared in execution proceedings, arguing the delay was not willful. The respondent countered that summons were duly served on 23‑Nov‑2023 at the applicant’s declared principal address, which the applicant later used to appear in execution proceedings, undermining its claim of ignorance. The court examined the requirement under Section 5 of the Limitation Act that the entire period of delay must be explained with sufficient cause. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the court found the applicant’s explanation vague, unsupported, and inconsistent with its conduct, and therefore not sufficient to merit condonation. Consequently, the interim application for condonation of delay was dismissed without costs.

Issues considered

  • Whether the 1 year and 88 days delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Whether the applicant’s claim of lack of knowledge of service of summons is credible in view of its acceptance of service in execution proceedings.
  • Whether the applicant has provided sufficient cause for the entire period of delay as required by law.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • condonation of delay
  • Limitation Act
  • service of summons
  • ex‑parte decree
  • execution proceedings
  • sufficient cause
  • commercial summary suit
  • appeal filing

Judgment

                                                                        902-IA-4776-2026.DOC



             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 4776 OF 2026
                                 IN
                COMMERCIAL FIRST APPEAL NO. 29 OF 2026
                                 IN
               COMMERCIAL SUMMARY SUIT NO. 426 OF 2023

M/s Riyan Paper Mills                                     ...Applicant/Appellant
        Versus
Sharadchandra P Shah Agency Private Limited                        ...Respondent

                                   _______
Mr Taranjit Singh Sukhvinder Singh, for Applicant/Appellant.
Mr Rishabh Jadhav i/b Parinam Law Associates, for Respondent.
                                         _______

                            CORAM:            G. S. KULKARNI &
                                              DR. NEELA GOKHALE, JJ.

                  RESERVED ON:                      10th SEPTEMBER 2026
               PRONOUNCED ON:                       29th SEPTEMBER 2026


P.C.

    1. This Interim Application seeks condonation of delay of 1 year and 88 days

          in filing the accompanying Commercial First Appeal challenging the ex-

          parte Judgment and Decree dated 06.11.2024 passed by the City Civil

          Court, Bombay, in Commercial Summary Suit No. 426 of 2023, whereby

          the Applicant was directed to pay Rs. 39,73,131/- with interest.

    2. The Applicant's case, in brief, is that no summons in the suit was ever

          served upon it at its registered or principal place of business; that it had no

          knowledge whatsoever of the pendency of the suit or the passing of the

          decree; and that it acquired knowledge of the decree only on 03.03.2026,


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          upon appearing pursuant to summons in Execution Proceedings bearing

          COMM EX/2/2025 before the Learned Court at Kathor, Surat. On this

          basis, it is contended that the delay is neither willful nor deliberate but

          attributable solely to want of knowledge and deserves to be condoned in the

          interest of justice.

    3. The Respondent has opposed the Application by filing an Affidavit in

          Reply. It is contended therein that the Writ of Summons in the suit was duly

          served upon the Applicant on 23.11.2023, as recorded in the Joint Affidavit

          of Service dated 18.12.2023 and the accompanying postal tracking report, at

          the address “Block No. 35, Revenue Survey No. 28, Near Dastan Railway

          Crossing, Dastan, Surat.” It is further contended that this very address is

          reflected     on       the   Applicant’s   own     letterhead,     in      the

          Authorization/Resolution filed with the Appeal, and as the Applicant’s

          principal place of business as per GST records.

    4. Crucially, the Respondent has placed on record, as Exhibit “J” to the

          Affidavit in Reply, the Notice/Summons issued in the very Execution

          Proceedings on which the Applicant claims to have first gained knowledge

          of the decree. The said Summons was addressed to the Applicant at the

          same address, and the postal tracking report annexed thereto confirms

          delivery on 27.02.2026, pursuant to which the Applicant duly entered

          appearance. The Applicant does not dispute receipt of this summons.

    5. It is thus evident that the Applicant has accepted service at the same address

          for the purpose of appearing in execution proceedings, while disputing



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          service at the same address for the purpose of resisting the decree. This

          conduct, taken with the fact that the address in question is the Applicant’s

          own declared address across its letterhead, authorisation documents and

          statutory (GST) records, does not inspire confidence in the plea of want of

          knowledge. It reflects, rather, a selective and convenient stand adopted to

          defeat the execution of a decree already passed, rather than a genuine case of

          non-service.

    6. It is further relevant to note that for the purpose of condonation of delay

          under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Applicant is required to explain

          the delay for the entire period, from the date on which limitation began to

          run till the actual date of filing, and not merely for a part thereof.

    7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) By LRs v. Karnataka

          Housing Board & Ors1 has held that:

              “115. However, as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for
              the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the
              Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the
              existence of "sufficient cause" for the entirety of the period from
              when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other
              words, if the period of limitation is 90 days, and the appeal is filed
              belatedly on the 100th day, then an explanation has to be given
              for the entire 100 days”.



    8. In the present case, the Applicant has failed to offer any day-to-day

          explanation for the delay of 1 year and 88 days and has furnished only a

          vague and general narrative unsupported by particulars for each period of

          default. Such omnibus explanation, unsupported by cogent material

1 2025 INSC 1104


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          accounting for the delay period-wise, does not satisfy the threshold of

          “sufficient cause” as mandated in law.

    9. In a recent case in the matter of Thirunagalingam vs Lingeswaran and

          Another,2 the Supreme Court, renoticing its earlier decisions, held as below:

          “5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High
          Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay
          has not been properly explained, and even if there are no merits in
          the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should
          rest there, and the condonation of delay application should have been
          dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that,
          even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence, it cannot
          be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits
          in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a
          premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty
          of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the
          case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer,
          reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765, is required to be referred to. In the
          said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may
          harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its
          rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
          extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory
          provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party,
          but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
          same.

    10. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan

          Mumbai,3 in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under:

          “The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation
          Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the
          rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for
          vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea
          underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should
          remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature.

2 2025 INSC 672
3 (2012) 5 SCC 157


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           At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay
           provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not
           availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.”

     11. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the facts of the present case and

           the settled legal position, we are not satisfied that sufficient cause has been

           shown for condoning the delay of 1 year and 88 days. The explanation

           offered is neither bona fide nor consistent with the Applicant’s own conduct

           in accepting service at the same address for other purposes connected with

           the same proceedings. We find no reason to condone the delay.

     12. Thus, the Interim Application No. 4776 of 2026 is dismissed. No costs.




(DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J)                                      (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)


          Digitally
          signed by
          SHAMBHAVI
SHAMBHAVI NILESH
NILESH    SHIVGAN
SHIVGAN   Date:
          2026.09.29
          17:25:49
          +0530




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