Bombay High Court
M/S. RIYAN PAPER MILLS THROUGH SOHIL BARKATALI LAKHANI,PARTNER)versusSHARADCHANDRA P. SHAH AGENCY PVT.LTD.
- Decided
- Disposal
- Rejected
Holding
The court held that the applicant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay and therefore the condonation of delay application was dismissed.
Summary
The applicant, M/s Riyan Paper Mills, sought condonation of a 1‑year‑88‑day delay in filing a Commercial First Appeal against an ex‑parte decree ordering payment of Rs. 39,73,131. The applicant claimed it never received summons in the original suit and only learned of the decree when it appeared in execution proceedings, arguing the delay was not willful. The respondent countered that summons were duly served on 23‑Nov‑2023 at the applicant’s declared principal address, which the applicant later used to appear in execution proceedings, undermining its claim of ignorance. The court examined the requirement under Section 5 of the Limitation Act that the entire period of delay must be explained with sufficient cause. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the court found the applicant’s explanation vague, unsupported, and inconsistent with its conduct, and therefore not sufficient to merit condonation. Consequently, the interim application for condonation of delay was dismissed without costs.
Issues considered
- Whether the 1 year and 88 days delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the applicant’s claim of lack of knowledge of service of summons is credible in view of its acceptance of service in execution proceedings.
- Whether the applicant has provided sufficient cause for the entire period of delay as required by law.
Legislation cited
- Limitation Act, 1963 — s. 5
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- Limitation Act
- service of summons
- ex‑parte decree
- execution proceedings
- sufficient cause
- commercial summary suit
- appeal filing
Judgment
902-IA-4776-2026.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 4776 OF 2026
IN
COMMERCIAL FIRST APPEAL NO. 29 OF 2026
IN
COMMERCIAL SUMMARY SUIT NO. 426 OF 2023
M/s Riyan Paper Mills ...Applicant/Appellant
Versus
Sharadchandra P Shah Agency Private Limited ...Respondent
_______
Mr Taranjit Singh Sukhvinder Singh, for Applicant/Appellant.
Mr Rishabh Jadhav i/b Parinam Law Associates, for Respondent.
_______
CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI &
DR. NEELA GOKHALE, JJ.
RESERVED ON: 10th SEPTEMBER 2026
PRONOUNCED ON: 29th SEPTEMBER 2026
P.C.
1. This Interim Application seeks condonation of delay of 1 year and 88 days
in filing the accompanying Commercial First Appeal challenging the ex-
parte Judgment and Decree dated 06.11.2024 passed by the City Civil
Court, Bombay, in Commercial Summary Suit No. 426 of 2023, whereby
the Applicant was directed to pay Rs. 39,73,131/- with interest.
2. The Applicant's case, in brief, is that no summons in the suit was ever
served upon it at its registered or principal place of business; that it had no
knowledge whatsoever of the pendency of the suit or the passing of the
decree; and that it acquired knowledge of the decree only on 03.03.2026,
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upon appearing pursuant to summons in Execution Proceedings bearing
COMM EX/2/2025 before the Learned Court at Kathor, Surat. On this
basis, it is contended that the delay is neither willful nor deliberate but
attributable solely to want of knowledge and deserves to be condoned in the
interest of justice.
3. The Respondent has opposed the Application by filing an Affidavit in
Reply. It is contended therein that the Writ of Summons in the suit was duly
served upon the Applicant on 23.11.2023, as recorded in the Joint Affidavit
of Service dated 18.12.2023 and the accompanying postal tracking report, at
the address “Block No. 35, Revenue Survey No. 28, Near Dastan Railway
Crossing, Dastan, Surat.” It is further contended that this very address is
reflected on the Applicant’s own letterhead, in the
Authorization/Resolution filed with the Appeal, and as the Applicant’s
principal place of business as per GST records.
4. Crucially, the Respondent has placed on record, as Exhibit “J” to the
Affidavit in Reply, the Notice/Summons issued in the very Execution
Proceedings on which the Applicant claims to have first gained knowledge
of the decree. The said Summons was addressed to the Applicant at the
same address, and the postal tracking report annexed thereto confirms
delivery on 27.02.2026, pursuant to which the Applicant duly entered
appearance. The Applicant does not dispute receipt of this summons.
5. It is thus evident that the Applicant has accepted service at the same address
for the purpose of appearing in execution proceedings, while disputing
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service at the same address for the purpose of resisting the decree. This
conduct, taken with the fact that the address in question is the Applicant’s
own declared address across its letterhead, authorisation documents and
statutory (GST) records, does not inspire confidence in the plea of want of
knowledge. It reflects, rather, a selective and convenient stand adopted to
defeat the execution of a decree already passed, rather than a genuine case of
non-service.
6. It is further relevant to note that for the purpose of condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Applicant is required to explain
the delay for the entire period, from the date on which limitation began to
run till the actual date of filing, and not merely for a part thereof.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) By LRs v. Karnataka
Housing Board & Ors1 has held that:
“115. However, as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for
the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the
existence of "sufficient cause" for the entirety of the period from
when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other
words, if the period of limitation is 90 days, and the appeal is filed
belatedly on the 100th day, then an explanation has to be given
for the entire 100 days”.
8. In the present case, the Applicant has failed to offer any day-to-day
explanation for the delay of 1 year and 88 days and has furnished only a
vague and general narrative unsupported by particulars for each period of
default. Such omnibus explanation, unsupported by cogent material
1 2025 INSC 1104
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accounting for the delay period-wise, does not satisfy the threshold of
“sufficient cause” as mandated in law.
9. In a recent case in the matter of Thirunagalingam vs Lingeswaran and
Another,2 the Supreme Court, renoticing its earlier decisions, held as below:
“5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High
Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay
has not been properly explained, and even if there are no merits in
the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should
rest there, and the condonation of delay application should have been
dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that,
even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence, it cannot
be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits
in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a
premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty
of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the
case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer,
reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765, is required to be referred to. In the
said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party,
but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same.
10. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai,3 in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under:
“The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation
Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the
rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for
vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea
underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should
remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature.
2 2025 INSC 672
3 (2012) 5 SCC 157
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At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay
provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not
availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.”
11. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the facts of the present case and
the settled legal position, we are not satisfied that sufficient cause has been
shown for condoning the delay of 1 year and 88 days. The explanation
offered is neither bona fide nor consistent with the Applicant’s own conduct
in accepting service at the same address for other purposes connected with
the same proceedings. We find no reason to condone the delay.
12. Thus, the Interim Application No. 4776 of 2026 is dismissed. No costs.
(DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)
Digitally
signed by
SHAMBHAVI
SHAMBHAVI NILESH
NILESH SHIVGAN
SHIVGAN Date:
2026.09.29
17:25:49
+0530
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