Bombay High Court
Culver Max Entertainment Private LimitedversusCATCH MEDIA INC. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR /AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE YAACOV BEN-YAACOV
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED OFF
Holding
The court held that the 50‑day delay, computed from the date of service of summons, falls within the 120‑day limit and, having been satisfactorily explained, must be condoned.
Summary
The Defendant (Culver Max Entertainment) filed an interim application seeking condonation of a 50‑day delay in filing its written statement in a commercial suit. The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the period for filing should be computed from the date of knowledge of the suit, which would render the delay excessive. The court held that under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, as amended by Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act, the period is calculated from the date of service of summons, making the delay 50 days, well within the 120‑day outer limit. The court found the applicant’s explanation – the need to retrieve and verify extensive records – satisfactory and consistent with precedents that adopt a liberal, justice‑oriented approach to condonation within the statutory window. Consequently, the interim application was allowed and disposed of without costs.
Issues considered
- From which date must the period for filing a written statement in a commercial suit be computed – service of summons or knowledge of the suit?
- Whether a 50‑day delay in filing the written statement, within the 120‑day limit, can be condoned on the basis of sufficient cause.
- Whether the plaintiff’s opposition based on alleged prejudice is sufficient to deny condonation.
- Interpretation of the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
Legislation cited
- Civil Procedure Code (CPC) — s. Order VIII Rule 1 (proviso)
- Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — s. Section 16
- Limitation Act, 1963 — s. Section 5
Subjects
- Commercial Courts Act
- condonation of delay
- written statement
- Order VIII Rule 1
- Limitation Act
- procedural law
- commercial suit
- sufficient cause
- service of summons
Judgment
5-IA-7144-2026
Digitally
signed by
VAIBHAV
VAIBHAV NAMDEV
NAMDEV BARE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BARE Date:
2026.09.16
17:30:08
+0530
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 7144 OF 2025
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT NO. 92 OF 2025
Culver Max Entertainment Pvt. Ltd …Applicant
In the Matter of:
Catch Media Inc. ...Plaintiff
Versus
Culver Max Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. ...Defendant
______
Mr. Achal Gupta a/w Mr. Aditya Joshi h/f Ms. Anubha Rastogi for the Plaintiff.
Mr. Hiren Kamod a/w Ms. Binsy Susan, Ms. Deeksha Pokhriyal, Ms. Shweta Sahu,
Ms. Shreya Jain, Ms. Swagata Ghosh, Ms. Prachi Gupta i/b Shardul Amarchand
Mangaldas for the Defendant.
______
CORAM : ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.
DATE : 11th SEPTEMBER 2026
P.C.
1. The Applicant, who is the Defendant in the captioned Suit has filed the
present Interim Application seeking condonation of a delay of 50 days in
filing the Written Statement. The Plaintiff, has filed an affidavit-in-reply
Vaibhav
1
5-IA-7144-2026
opposing the captioned Interim Application. The parties are hereinafter are
referred to as they appear in the captioned Interim Application.
Submissions on behalf of the Applicant:
2. Mr. Kamod, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicant at the
outset, submitted that in the facts of the present case, given the inertia on the
part of the Respondent, the question of the Respondent opposing any delay
in the filing of the Written Statement and Counter-Claim really did not arise.
He submitted that the present Suit being a Commercial Suit the stringent
timelines that applied would apply with equal rigour to the Plaintiff. He,
however, submitted that the Plaintiff’s conduct in the present case
demonstrated anything but that.
3. Mr. Kamod then submitted that the Respondent had initially, on 22nd
September 2022, instituted a Suit before the Delhi High Court (“Delhi
Suit”) for the same reliefs as sought for in the captioned Suit. The
Applicants had, however, opposed the maintainability of the Delhi Suit inter
alia, on the ground that this Court had exclusive jurisdiction.
Vaibhav
2
5-IA-7144-2026
4. He then pointed out that, on 28th September 2022, the Delhi High Court had
encouraged the parties to explore an amicable resolution of their disputes.
Thereafter, on 19th October 2022, the Delhi Suit was withdrawn, with liberty
granted to the Respondent to pursue its remedies before the appropriate
forum.
5. Mr. Kamod was then at pains to point out that, despite the liberty granted by
the Delhi High Court, the Respondent took no steps for over 13 months to
file the present Suit. He submitted that it was only on 7th December 2023
that the Respondent applied for pre-institution mediation before the
Mediation Centre of this Court. The Mediation Centre thereafter issued a
non-starter report on 2nd February 2024, as the Applicant had not participated
in the mediation proceedings.
6. Mr. Kamod was again at pains to point out that the Respondent then after a
further delay of approximately nine months, on 14th November 2024,
instituted the captioned Suit before this Court, along with an Interim
Application (“First IA”).
Vaibhav
3
5-IA-7144-2026
7. He then submitted that the Suit was thereafter listed for hearing on 27th
January 2025 but was adjourned to 3rd March 2025 for want of time. On 3rd
June 2025, the Respondent withdrew the First IA and thereafter filed a
Second Interim Application i.e., Interim Application 16677 of 2025 seeking
substantially similar reliefs.
8. Mr. Kamod then submitted that the writ of summons was served upon the
Applicant only on 26th August 2025, after which the Applicant filed the
present Application on 14th November 2025, seeking condonation of 50
days’ delay in filing its Written Statement. The Written Statement and
Counter-Claim he pointed out were filed on 15th November 2025. The
Respondent filed its reply to the Application on 20th January 2026.
9. Mr. Kamod then submitted that the dispute between the parties arises out of
the alleged unauthorised continued use, by the Applicant, of certain
proprietary software belonging to the Respondent after the expiry of the
licence periods, namely, 31st March 2022 for the 'Recommendation/CDR'
software and 30th June 2022 for the 'Analytics Software'. He submitted that
Vaibhav
4
5-IA-7144-2026
the delay of 50 days occurred because the dispute, and the record relevant
thereto, extended far back in time, and the process of retrieving, reviewing,
verifying and examining the underlying records and documents required
considerable time and effort. He submitted that certain clarifications were
also required from various departments of the Applicant, resulting in further
delay, and that the delay was neither wilful nor deliberate but wholly
unintentional and beyond the Applicant's control.
10.He then relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in P.R.
Innovations (P) Ltd. v. L.G. Electronics India (P) Ltd.,1 to point out that the
Delhi High Court had set aside the decision of the Trial Court dismissing an
application seeking condonation of delay in filing a Written Statement in a
Commercial Suit by applying the principles laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy2, which inter alia held that an application
1
2024 SCC OnLine Del 9803.
2
(2013) 12 SCC 649.
Vaibhav
5
5-IA-7144-2026
for condonation of delay must be considered by adopting a liberal,
pragmatic, justice-oriented and non-pedantic approach.
11.He then placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji,3 to point out that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that refusal to condone delay could result
in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold and the cause of
justice being defeated. He reiterated that the oft-cited principle that “every
day’s delay must be explained” does not warrant a pedantic approach but is
required to be applied in a rational, common-sense and pragmatic manner.
He submitted that, where substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice ought to be
preferred, since the opposite party cannot claim a vested right in injustice
being done on account of a non-deliberate delay.
12.Applying these principles, Mr. Kamod submitted that the Delhi High Court,
in P.R. Innovations (P) Ltd. had held that, although the Written Statement
3
(1987) 2 SCC 107.
Vaibhav
6
5-IA-7144-2026
had not been filed within the initial period of 30 days, it had been filed
within the extended period of 90 days, and the Delhi High Court accordingly
held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, ought to be construed
liberally so as to ensure that the lis is adjudicated on merits rather than being
decided on technicalities.
13.Mr. Kamod next placed reliance upon the recent judgment of this Court in
Gateway Distriparks Limited v. Tata Steel Limited & Ors.,4 wherein it was
observed:
"A strict rigour which may apply in an ordinary suit for condonation of
delay may not be apposite when the Commercial Court condones the delay
beyond the initial 30 days and up to 120 days. Since the legislature has
designedly used the words 'shall be allowed to file beyond the initial 30
days', ordinarily the Court should lean in favour of the condonation of
delay within the window period of 31st day to 120 days, albeit after
examining the justifiability of the reasons."
He submitted that this Court had further observed, in the same decision, that
the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 were procedural and that procedure was
the handmaid of justice and ought not to be allowed to score a march over
4
Writ Petition No. 11322 of 2025 passed by Bombay High Court on 28th April 2026.
Vaibhav
7
5-IA-7144-2026
substantive justice, especially where there was substantial compliance with
the peremptory procedural requirement. He pointed out that where the
Written Statement was filed within the outer limit of 120 days, as in the
present case, the strictness of technicalities may not be permitted to impede
the cause of justice.
14.Mr. Kamod also then placed reliance upon the decision of Chaitanya
Property Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Kantadevi Rajkumar Gupta & Ors.,5 to
submit that this Court condoned a delay of 84 days in filing a Written
Statement in a Commercial Suit, holding that the delay was satisfactorily
explained by the need to collate information and call for old records, and
that it was not beyond the permissible period of 120 days under the
Commercial Courts Act read with the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the
CPC. He also placed reliance on Kishor Jayantilal Jamnani v. Jehangir
Jeutin Estate Pvt. Ltd.,6 wherein this Court affirmed the Trial Court's
decision condoning delay in filing the Written Statement and recorded in the
5
IA(L) No. 4236 of 2023 in COMS Suit No. 285 of 2022 at the Bombay High Court.
6
Writ Petition No. 13633 of 2018 of the Bombay High Court.
Vaibhav
8
5-IA-7144-2026
application as "210 days", an apparent internal inconsistency in the figure
which this Court has not independently reconciled on the ground that the
need to collect important documents constituted a satisfactory ground for
condonation, observing that denying the defendant the opportunity to file a
Written Statement would seriously prejudice him by precluding him from
leading evidence.
15.Mr. Kamod submitted that the contention raised by the Respondent in the
condonation of delay Reply, namely, that the time for filing the Written
Statement ought to be computed not from the date of service of the writ of
summons, i.e., 26th August 2025, but from the date of service of the Plaint
and documents upon the Applicant in December 2024, was wholly
misconceived and contrary to the express statutory mandate. He then drew
my attention to the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, as substituted
by Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act, to point out that the same
provides as follows:
"Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement
within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the
Vaibhav
9
5-IA-7144-2026
written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the Court,
for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as
the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred
twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one
hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant
shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not
allow the written statement to be taken on record."
16.Mr. Kamod then submitted that the provision unambiguously computes the
period of 120 days from the date of service of summons and not from any
anterior date of knowledge or service of the Plaint. In support of this
contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of
Axis Bank Limited v. Mira Gehani & Ors.,7 wherein this Court held that the
amendments introduced to Order V Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 1 by the
Commercial Courts Act mandate that the period of 120 days be computed
from the date of service of summons and not from the date on which the
defendant enters appearance or the date of service of the Plaint, this being
necessary to ensure uniform implementation of the Commercial Courts Act.
7
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 358.
Vaibhav
10
5-IA-7144-2026
17.He further placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of
Tardeo Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda,8 to point out that this Court
held that service of the writ of summons upon the defendant was a condition
precedent for the commencement of the period for filing the Written
Statement. He therefore submitted that the mere filing of a vakalatnama to
represent the Defendant does not, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the
defendant has been served with the writ of summons. He accordingly
submitted that the Respondent's contention that the period should be
reckoned from an earlier date was contrary to settled law and liable to be
rejected.
18.Mr. Kamod then submitted that no prejudice would be caused to the
Respondent if the condonation of delay Application was allowed. He then
reiterated that the conduct of the Respondent was crucial and must also be
considered.
8
2007 SCC OnLine Bom 614.
Vaibhav
11
5-IA-7144-2026
19.Basis this, Mr. Kamod submitted that the delay of 50 days in filing the
Written Statement be condoned and the Written Statement be taken on
record in the substantive interest of justice.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:
20.Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent, submitted that the
limitation for filing a Written Statement commenced from the point of mere
knowledge of the institution of the Suit and not necessarily from formal
service of the writ of summons.
21.He then submitted that Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, as amended by the
Commercial Courts Act, prescribed a strict and time-bound regime for a
defendant to file its Written Statement. He submitted that the proviso to
Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC expressly mandates that the Written Statement
be filed within 30 days from the date of service of summons, extendable, for
reasons recorded in writing and on payment of costs, up to, but not beyond,
120 days from the date of service of summons, upon expiry whereof the
defendant forfeits the right to file a Written Statement.
Vaibhav
12
5-IA-7144-2026
22.Mr. Gupta submitted that, in the present facts, the Applicant was served with
the Plaint via email on 19th November 2024 and thereby had knowledge of
the Suit from that date. He submitted that on this computation, the maximum
period of 120 days for filing the Written Statement would have expired, at
the latest, by 18th April 2025, and that while the Applicant filed its
Vakalatnama on 19th December 2024, no Written Statement was filed until
13th November 2025.
23.He then submitted that even assuming, without admitting, that the Applicant
was entitled to compute the initial thirty-day period from the date of the
formal service of the writ of summons upon the Applicant, i.e., 26th August
2025, that period would have expired on 26th September 2025. He therefore
submitted that any delay beyond that date had to be considered together with
the time already available to the Applicant before formal service of the writ
of summons. He submitted that, from 19th December 2024, i.e., the date of
filing of the Vakalatnama to 13th November 2025, i.e., the date of filing of
the Written Statement, a total of 329 days had elapsed, nearly thrice the
Vaibhav
13
5-IA-7144-2026
permissible statutory limitation of 120 days. He submitted that accepting the
Applicant's contention would render the statutory timeline nugatory, illusory,
and enable parties to circumvent a mandatory provision through procedural
formalism.
24.Without prejudice to the above, Mr. Gupta further submitted that even on the
assumption that the period of limitation commenced from the date of service
of the writ of summons, the condonation of delay Application lacked
sufficient cause for the delay. Mr. Gupta then placed reliance upon the
decision of this Court in Atlanta Ltd., Mumbai and Ors. v. Dombivli Nagari
Sahakari Bank Ltd.,9 to submit that in the said decision the summons was
served on the defendant on 31st January 2019, returnable on 11th February
2019, and the defendant filed its vakalatnama only on 2nd May 2019,
thereafter moving an application for condonation of delay. He submitted that
this Court had declined to condone the delay, holding that the explanation
offered, namely, that the defendant, being a corporate entity working through
9
Commercial Suit No. 81 of 2019 at the Bombay High Court.
Vaibhav
14
5-IA-7144-2026
various departments and branches, required time to collect information and
obtain internal approvals, could not be accepted as sufficient cause,
particularly where the defendant had also failed to move its application for
condonation with due diligence. He also drew my attention to the following
observations in Atlanta Ltd.:
“The judgment in Axis Bank has already dealt with the reasons why
time limits have been placed in commercial suits. These time limits have
been treated casually by the defendant-bank. In the present case delay
cannot be condoned simply by showing leniency because such discretion
ought not to be exercised and is not contemplated by the stringent
provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. The entire purpose of setting
specific time-lines is to expedite the trial in Commercial Division
matters."
25.Mr. Gupta then also placed reliance upon the decision in Casablanca
Apparels (P) Ltd. v. Polo Lauren Co. L.P.,10 to point out that, the Delhi High
Court, referring to the objects of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam
Ltd. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited,11 observed that once specific
timelines were fixed under the Commercial Courts Act, parties were put to
10
2025 SCC OnLine Del 5191.
11
2025 INSC 533.
Vaibhav
15
5-IA-7144-2026
notice that they must carefully contest Suits filed as Commercial Suits,
failing which adverse consequences may follow for lack of diligence. He
further pointed out that, in that decision, reliance was placed on the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra v.
Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.,12 which held that the
power to condone delay in commercial matters is an exception, exercised
only where the party has acted bona fide and with due diligence, not
negligently or casually. He submitted that the Delhi High Court accordingly
held that the expression "sufficient cause", in the context of the Commercial
Courts Act, must be construed strictly and not liberally, and that the statutory
consequence of forfeiture was automatically attracted where the outer limit
of 120 days was crossed.
26.Mr. Gupta submitted that it is well settled that the Court cannot, in
commercial matters, permit filing of a Written Statement beyond 120 days,
the consequence under Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC being automatic and
12
AIRONLINE 2021 SC 152.
Vaibhav
16
5-IA-7144-2026
absolute, such that the right to file a Written Statement stands forfeited and
the Court is denuded of jurisdiction to take it on record. He submitted that it
was wholly implausible that the Applicant could have required such an
extensive timeline, given that the litigation between the parties had in fact
commenced as far back as September 2022 with the filing of the Suit before
the Delhi High Court, and that no specific ground had been made out by the
Applicant to justify why it did not already have the necessary records at its
disposal or had not already reviewed, verified, compiled, and assessed them.
27.Mr. Gupta also placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran13 and submitted that it was well
settled that while considering a plea for condonation of delay, the first and
foremost duty of the Court was to ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation, rather than to begin with the
merits of the main matter. He pointed out that only where the explanation for
the delay and the opposition were equally balanced could the Court consider
13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093.
Vaibhav
17
5-IA-7144-2026
the merits of the main matter for condoning the delay. He also pointed out
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had further held that delay should not be
condoned merely as an act of generosity and that the pursuit of substantial
justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party.
28.Basis this, Mr. Gupta submitted that the Applicant had failed to furnish any
credible explanation for the delay, notwithstanding that it had more than 249
days at its disposal even prior to formal service of the writ of summons, and
accordingly the condonation of delay Application deserved to be dismissed
with costs.
Reasons and Conclusion:
29.Having heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
contentions, and the case law upon which reliance is placed, I find that the
application deserves to be allowed. I say so for the following reasons:
A.At the outset, the Respondent’s contention that the period for filing the
Written Statement is to be computed either from the date of service of the
Plaint or from the Defendant’s knowledge of the Suit is plainly untenable.
Vaibhav
18
5-IA-7144-2026
The present Suit is a Commercial Suit to which the proviso to Order VIII
Rule 1 of the CPC, as substituted by Section 16 of the Commercial Courts
Act 2015, applies. The said proviso clearly provides that the period of 30
days for filing the Written Statement, extendable up to the outer limit of 120
days, is to be computed “from the date of service of summons”. This is now
no longer res integra in light of the decisions of this Court in Axis Bank and
Tardeo Properties, upon which reliance was placed by the Applicant. Hence,
the Respondent’s contention that the said period is to be reckoned from the
date of service of the Plaint, or from the Applicant’s mere knowledge of the
institution of the Suit, and not from the service of the writ of summons,
needs only to be stated to be rejected.
B. In the present case, there is no dispute that the Writ of Summons was served
on 26th August 2025. Hence, the only question that arises is whether the
Applicant has demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay. Firstly, the delay
in the present case is 50 days when calculated from the date of service of the
Writ of Summons. Secondly, in my view, the delay has, in the facts of this
Vaibhav
19
5-IA-7144-2026
case, been sufficiently explained by the Applicant, particularly with regard
to the time required to retrieve, verify and compile records pertaining to a
long-standing dispute and to obtain the necessary internal clarifications, for
the reasons more particularly set out in the Application.
C. As already noted in (B), the delay is 50 days, which is well within the
120-day period under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC.
Therefore the Applicant’s reliance on Gateway Distriparks, in support of the
contention that the rigour ordinarily applicable to an unexplained delay in
filing a Written Statement need not be applied with the same degree of
stringency where condonation is sought within the window period of the
31st to the 120th day, is apposite and, in my view, applies on all fours to the
facts of the present case. Equally applicable to the facts of the present case
are the decisions in Chaitanya Property Developers and Kishor Jayantilal
Jamnani, which condoned comparable, and in some cases longer, delays for
substantially similar reasons. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Esha Bhattacharjee and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
Vaibhav
20
5-IA-7144-2026
has laid down that the Court, while exercising its discretion in applications
for condonation of delay, must adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach,
particularly where the delay is satisfactorily explained.
D.I find that the decisions relied on by the Respondent do not, in the facts of
the present case, disentitle the Applicant from the relief sought for. In
Atlanta Ltd., the delay had already crossed the statutory outer limit of 120
days, even when reckoned from the date of service of the summons. The
defendant had also failed to move the application for condonation with due
diligence. Neither circumstance arises in the present case. Likewise, the
decisions in Casablanca Apparels and Thirunagalingam caution against
adopting an unduly liberal approach to condonation; neither decision
establishes that a bona fide delay occurring within the statutory outer limit
must invariably be refused. None of these decisions would, therefore, apply
to the facts of the present case.
E. Another aspect which, in my view, must also be considered in the facts of
the present case is that the object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, in
Vaibhav
21
5-IA-7144-2026
prescribing strict timelines is to ensure the expeditious disposal of
commercial disputes. In my view, and having regard to the manner in which
the Court is required to approach such timelines, that objective binds both
parties and cannot be invoked selectively by a litigant whose own conduct
does not demonstrate expedition or diligence. The facts of the present case
show that the Plaintiff allowed the dispute to lie dormant for over thirteen
months after the withdrawal of the Delhi Suit before applying for
pre-institution mediation in December 2023, and after the non-starter report
of February 2024, took a further nine months to institute the captioned Suit
in November 2024, which was registered only in August 2025 . Thus, there
is a lapse of nearly three years in all in the Respondent’s pursuit of the
matter. I must hasten to add that while this would not, by itself, determine
whether the Applicant’s delay ought to be condoned, it is certainly a relevant
factor to be considered in the context of a party who seeks to oppose
condonation on the ground of delay when the record bears out that the party
opposing the delay has itself not proceeded with due diligence or expedition.
Vaibhav
22
5-IA-7144-2026
Also, and crucially, the Respondent has not so much as pleaded what
prejudice, if any, would be caused to the Respondent if the delay is
condoned.
31. Hence, for the reasons stated above in (A) to (E) , I pass the following
Order:
ORDER
(i) The Interim Application is allowed in terms of prayer clause ‘(a)’.
(ii) The Interim Application is accordingly disposed of.
(iii) There shall be no order as to cost.
[ARIF S. DOCTOR, J]
Vaibhav
23
Checking your session…
Lawyer court records for this case
Associated through the court’s case reference.