VIKRANT SHANKAR SABNISversusVAISHALI VINAYAK KELKAR

          Digitally
          signed by
          RUSHIKESH
RUSHIKESH VISHNU
VISHNU    PATIL
PATIL     Date:
          2026.08.25
          11:00:15
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          +0530




                                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                               FAMILY COURT APPEAL (STAMP) NO. 40178 OF 2025
                                                  WITH
                                    INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 314 OF 2026
                                                  WITH
                                    INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 904 OF 2026


                       Vikrant Shankar Sabnis                   .. Appellant/Applicant
                                         Versus
                       Vaishali Vinayak Kelkar & Ors.           .. Respondent
                                                          …
                       Mr. Abhijit Sarwate a/w Ms Sanjana Jadhav, for the
                       Appellant/Applicant.
                       Mr. Abhishek Salian a/w Mr. Mayuresh Ingale, Ms Kinnari
                       Raut and Ms Ayesha Dhorajiwala i/by Nyaaya Legal, for the
                       Respondents in FCA.
                                                  ...

                                           CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE &
                                                  ASHISH S. CHAVAN, JJ.

                                           DATED : 14th AUGUST, 2026

                       P.C:-

                       1.       The Appeal raises a challenge to the order passed by the
                       Judge, Family Court, Pune, on a Miscellaneous Application
                       taken out by the Applicant under Section 25(2) of the Hindu
                       Marriage Act, 1955, for modification of the maintenance order.

                                Worth it to note that, by the Judgment & Decree dated
                       05.09.2022 in P.A. No. 622 of 2017, the marriage between the
                       parties was dissolved and the terms and conditions as regards
                       payment of maintenance for the wife and children were

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worked out. However, the Application came to be filed in the
wake of the change in circumstances, the decree having been
passed 22 months ago.

       Apart from the fact that the Applicant was remarried
and one child is born out of the said relationship, several other
grounds were set out in the Application, including the ground
that the wife has her independent sources of earning and the
daughter is also gaining income from the property which is
given to her, and several other grounds.

       Learned counsel, Mr. Sarwate, by inviting our attention
to the impugned order, would submit that though the learned
Judge formulated the question as to whether the Applicant has
proved a change in the financial circumstances of the party
and answered the same in the negative, the Judge has not
discussed any single circumstance to support his finding and
was rather carried away by the fact that the Applicant was
bound to remain faithful to his words and obey the decree and
then choose his personal obligations, and no other justification
is to be found while rejecting the Application.

2.     We find ourselves in agreement with what Mr. Sarwate
has argued, as, on reading the impugned judgment, we find
that the learned Judge, except recording this finding and
noting that it is Petitioner’s right to start a new inning of life,
but he should have done this after he would have abided by the
consent decree, is something which, according to us, is not the
proper manner of deciding an application which seeks
modification of a decree, as it is very well within the powers of
an Applicant to seek modification of a decree subject to a
change in the circumstances, and this is what the Applicant

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pleaded, which definitely deserve an appropriate consideration
at the instance of the Judge. Having failed to do so, we have no
other alternative than to set aside the said order dated
06.12.2025.

       When the Appeal came up before us, and we considered
the Interim Application, on 27.03.2026, a consensus was
recorded to the effect that the husband shall deposit a sum of
Rs.4,00,000/- in the account of the wife without prejudice to
their rights and contentions, and the wife shall not precipitate
the action for attachment of salary or take any coercive action
for recovery of the same. From the computation placed before
us by learned counsel, Mr. Sarwate, on behalf of the Appellant,
it is to be noted that the Application was filed for modification
before the Family Court on 27.07.2024 and it was decided by
the impugned order passed on 06.12.2025. For the month of
August 2024, the Appellant paid a sum of Rs.86,400/- but did
not pay a sum of Rs.6400/-. According to Mr. Sarwate, from
September 2024 till November 2025, the Appellant reduced
the amount that is payable under the consent decree by 50%
and paid an amount of Rs. 45,000/- per month, thus, according
to his computation, from August 2024 to November 2025, a
sum of Rs.7,61,400/- has been disbursed as per the consent
decree, and what was not paid was a sum of Rs.7,49,000/-,
which, according to Mr. Sarwate, amounts to 50% of the
amount, which was liable to be paid under the consent decree.

       The Appellant has an explanation to offer that because
he had filed an application, which was pending before the
Family Court, seeking modification of the consent decree, he
chose to make payment to the extent of 50%.            We do not

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approve this approach, as without any stay on the payment of
the amount due under the consent decree by the Family Court,
the Appellant could not have unilaterally slashed his burden
under the consent decree, that too by a substantial amount, i.e.
50% of the amount due and payable. In any case, upon the
judgment being delivered on 06.12.2025, for the month of
December 2025 up to March 2026, the Appellant once again
disbursed an amount under the consent decree, i.e. in the sum
of Rs.99,200/-. Once again, from the month of April till date,
we are informed that the Appellant has come back to an
amount of 50%. All the aforesaid exercise, according to the
Appellant, is at his own whims and fancies, without either this
Court directing payment of amount of 50% or the Family Court
giving him leave to reduce the liability under the consent
decree by 50%.

3.     On perusal of the impugned order, since we have
expressed that there is no reasoning by the trial Court which
could be discerned in the backdrop of the application filed for
modification, and if the application is to be rejected, each and
every ground, being treated as a separate ground, ought to
have been dealt with in detail by the learned Judge, with the
pleadings being permitted to be controverted by the other side,
and this exercise having not being undertaken and a
conclusion being straightaway drawn that the application is
rejected, does not appeal to us at all.    For this reason, we
indicated that the matter shall be remanded to the Family
Court for the determination of the application afresh.

       In the meantime, Mr. Sarwate, on behalf of the Appellant,
expressed that the Appellant is ready to deposit 50% of the

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amount of arrears, which, according to him, is computed at
approximately Rs.5,00,000/-, and he is ready to make
payment of Rs.2,50,000/-, i.e. 50% of the said amount.
However, the learned counsel for the Respondent has another
suggestion, which was conceded by Mr. Sarwate, the
suggestion being that upon the matter being remanded to the
Family Court, the Appellant is at liberty to make an
appropriate application for permitting him to deposit 50% of
the amount which he is under an obligation to pay in terms of
the consent decree, and subject to the Court granting such
concession, he shall make the payment to the extent of 50%,
which shall even cover the month of September 2024 to
November 2025 and April 2026 till date, as well as the
current. For this purpose, we direct that if an application is
made by Mr. Sarwate, which would include the prayer for
condoning the payment of 50% of the amount for the previous
months and also a further direction that till the application is
decided, he shall continue to make payment of 50% of the
amount under the consent decree, the learned Judge shall
consider the same expeditiously and pass an order upon the
application not later than six weeks.

4.     As far as the consideration of the Application filed for
modification of the judgment under Section 25 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 is concerned, the learned Judge shall, if
warranted, after permitting the parties to lead evidence,
adjudicate the said application within a period of four months.

       The learned counsel for the Respondent, however,
seriously   contests   the   submission   of   Mr.    Sarwate       by
submitting that this is not the only amount which is due and

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payable, as, in addition to the fixed amount, some amount
towards the educational expenses was also to be borne. We
leave it open for the learned Judge, Family Court, to consider
all these aspects as to what is the amount due and payable.
With the aforesaid observations, the Family Court Appeal is
disposed of.

       Pending Interim Applications also stand disposed of.




(ASHISH S. CHAVAN J.)                  (BHARATI DANGRE, J.)




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