SURESH AMBARNATH LONDHEversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

2026:BHC-AUG:47003


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                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                      CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.245 OF 2018


                 Suresh Ambarnath Londhe                          ….APPLICANT

                       VERSUS

                 1.    The State of Maharashtra
                 2.    Bhaskar Nimba Amrutsagar                   ….RESPONDENTS
                                                 …..
                 Mr P. S. Paranjape, Advocate for Applicant
                 Mr M. A. Aher, APP for Respondent No.1/State
                 Mr S. S. Patil, Advocate h/f Ms Nima R. Suryawanshi, Advocate for
                 Respondent No.2
                                                  …..
                                            CORAM : SUSHIL M. GHODESWAR, J.

                                  RESERVED ON : 21st AUGUST, 2026

                              PRONOUNCED ON : 07th OCTOBER, 2026
                 ORDER:-


                 1.          The applicant is challenging the judgment and order dated

                 13/07/2018, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhule in

                 Criminal Appeal No.41/2015, whereby the judgment and order dated

                 24/04/2015, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class

                 (JMFC), Court No. 5, Dhule in S.T.C. No.760/2011 came to be

                 confirmed and the order of conviction and sentence of the

                 applicant/accused for the offence punishable under section 500 of

                 Indian Penal Code (IPC) came to be maintained.
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2.            Respondent No.2 is the complainant, who had filed S.T.C.

No. 760/2011 before the JMFC, Dhule. As per the complainant, he

and his wife established a society under the name of Dr. Babasaheb

Ambedkar Rural Development Foundation. The purpose of the society

was to provide education, health and to work for other social causes,

such as plantation of trees etc. On 20/02/2010 and 21/02/2010, the

complainant and his wife had organized an international Buddhist

conference.     The applicant/accused was elected as the Chief

Coordinator for the arrangement of the said conference. However,

there started dispute between the applicant/accused and respondent

No.2/complainant.         It    is   the     allegation    of   the   respondent

No.2/complainant that the applicant/accused started defaming him by

saying that respondent No.2/complainant was trying to deceive the

people. The applicant/accused was the District Level President of the

Buddhist Society of India.           After the conference took place, the

accused started sending letters to various authorities, stating therein

that respondent No.2/complainant had committed fraud to the tune of

Rs. Twenty Five Crores Seventy Five lakhs. Such letters were issued

to Chief Executive Officer Zilla Parishad, Education Officer, Collector,

Police Inspector of City Police Station and others. From 10/02/2011,

the   applicant/accused        allegedly     started      defaming    respondent
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No.2/complainant by putting a tent on the public way of the entrance

of Zilla Parishad. He had put boards stating that the complainant and

his wife had committed fraud of rupees 25.75 crores. He also defamed

respondent/complainant by distributing pamphlets to the people and

spreading the news in newspapers, TV channels etc. According to

respondent No.2, such action on the part of the applicant/accused

resulted in defamation, and therefore, he and his wife suffered

immense mental trauma for the same.        On 15/3/2010, respondent

No.2/complainant sent a notice to the accused through his Advocate.

The accused had duly replied to the said notice. Thereafter, respondent

No.2/complainant had filed complaint before the learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class. After hearing the parties and examining the

learned Advocates for the parties, the Trial Court allowed the

complaint, thereby convicting the applicant for the offence punishable

under section 500 of the IPC.



3.          Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of

the learned JMFC, the applicant/accused preferred appeal before the

learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhule, bearing Criminal Appeal

No. 41/2015, which also came to be dismissed by the impugned order

dated 13/07/2018 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhule.
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4.           Being aggrieved with the aforesaid impugned judgment

and orders, the applicant has approached to this Court by filing the

present criminal revision application under Section 397 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).


5.           At the outset, it is to be stated here that this Court is aware

about the scope and jurisdictional powers under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

for entertaining the revision application. It is in order to prevent

miscarriage of justice or if the orders passed by the learned Trial

Courts are perverse or illegal, then this Court is having jurisdiction to

entertain this revision application.


6.           In pursuance of the aforesaid backgrounds, the learned

Advocate for the applicant has raised certain questions which are

necessary for the purpose of deciding instant criminal revision

application. According to him, the orders passed by the learned Trial

Court as well as the learned Appellate Court are totally perverse and

illegal, and therefore, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. He

submits that the Trial Court had conducted the trial as a summary trial,

though there was an option to try it as a regular criminal case. As the

case was conducted as a summary trial, the evidence recorded by the

learned JMFC represents the substance of the evidence, rather than the
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verbatim record, as contemplated in summary proceedings. According

to him, the essence of a summary trial is that the learned Trial Court

Judge records, only the substance of the evidence rather than a

complete evidence. He takes this Court through the provisions of

Section 264 of the Cr.P.C. which are reproduced as under:-



      “264. Judgment in cases tried summarily.- In very case tried
      summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the
      Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a
      judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the
      finding.”



7.          In view of aforesaid provisions, in cases tried summarily,

the Magistrate is required to record the substance of evidence

alongwith a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for

the finding. However, a combined reading impact of Sections 263 and

264 of the Cr.P.C., makes it obvious that, if the accused does not plead

guilty, the learned Magistrate is only required to record the substance

of the evidence, and the judgment must provide a brief statement of the

reasons for the finding. It is further submitted by the learned Advocate

for the applicant that the evidence was recorded by the learned Trial

Court when Mr. S. A. Deshpande was the Presiding as the Judicial
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Magistrate First Class. According to learned Advocate for applicant

Mr. Paranjape, the said Presiding Officer had recorded the evidence in

substance and thereafter the summary trial proceedings came to be

decided by another Presiding Officer, namely, Shri S.G. Duble,

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhule.        Thus, according to Mr.

Paranjpe, the trial in fact was required to be made de novo, however, it

has been decided by the learned Judge before whom the substance of

the evidence was not recorded. According to Mr. Paranjape, when the

learned Trial Court judge has not recorded the substance of the

evidence, how he came to the conclusion as to what was recorded by

the previous Presiding Officer.      Since only the substance of the

evidence is recorded in a summary trial, critical aspect of the

witnesses’ demeanor and testimonies remain solely in the memory of

the presiding Judge. When that Judge is transferred, that memory

departs with him. Consequently, the successor Judge cannot rely on

such an abbreviated record and must conduct a de novo trial by

recording the evidence afresh, if the case is to proceed as a summary

trial. Therefore, he submits that the learned Appellate Court did not

consider the aforesaid aspect and passed the illegal judgment and order

thereby dismissing his appeal. He, therefore, submits that this Court

under its revisional jurisdiction can entertain the instant application, as
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there is procedure of law and the learned Trial Court has not delivered

the judgment after following the correct procedure of law.


8.            In support of his submissions, learned Advocate for the

applicant relies upon the following judgments :-

      (I)     Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah and anr. Vs. Manubhai

      Manjibhai Panchal and anr., 211 SCC CIV 4 805;

      (II)    Ulhas Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2016 ALL MR (Cri.)

      3041;

      (III) Shivaji Sampat Jagtap Vs. Rajan Hiralal Arora and the

      State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cri.L.J. 122;

      (IV) Samadhan Motiram Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra,

      MANU/MH/1942/2014;

      (V)     Mehsana Nagrik Sahkari Bank Limited Vs. Shreeji Cab

      Company and others, 2014 Cri. L.J. 1953.



9.            Learned Advocate for the applicant, therefore, submits

that the judgment and orders passed by the learned Trial Court as well

as the learned Appellate Court are totally illegal, and therefore, the

instant criminal revision application deserves to be allowed by

quashing and setting aside both the impugned orders.
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10.          Per contra, learned Advocate for respondent No.2 submits

that the impugned judgment and orders passed by the learned Trial

Court as well as the learned Appellate Court are correct and proper and

requires no interference by this court. He relies upon the following

cases :-

      (I)    J. V. Baharuni and Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat and anr.

      (Criminal Appeal No.2221/2014, dated 16/10/2014;

      (II)   A. Krishna Reddy Vs. State and anr. 1999 SCC ONLINE

      APP 546;

      (III) Mahendra s/o Sukhdeorao Pethe Vs. Vivek @ Raju s/o

      Ramrao Deshmukh & anr. 2014 ALL MR (Cri.) 2402;

      (IV) Pravin      Vs.     State     of    Maharashtra      &     ors.

      MANU/MH/2257/2022.




11.          According to learned Advocate for respondent No.2, the

evidence came to be recorded in full-fledged manner. According to

him, if the copies of evidence depositions are perused, it would reveal

that the Trial Court has recorded the evidence of the witnesses as a

full-fledged trial, and therefore, the successor Presiding Officer, on the

basis of said evidence, has committed no mistake by deciding the
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criminal complaint, thereby convicting the applicant for the offence

punishable under Section 500 of the IPC.


12 .        For the purpose of academic discussion, assistance of the

learned APP was also sought. Mr. Aher learned APP thereby working

hard on the matter, has addressed to this Court by relying upon various

judgments and relevant provisions of law. He drew attention of this

Court not only to the provisions of Section 264 but also to Section 326

of the Cr.P.C. He relies upon various judgments to point out that the

Courts have observed that when the evidence is recorded in detailed

and lengthy manner and when accused has cross-examined the

complainant and witnesses in detailed, in such a case, it cannot be said

that the evidence is recorded in substance. Therefore, the Trial Court,

even if the Presiding Officer before whom the evidence was recorded

gets transferred, the successor Presiding Officer can, by relying upon

same evidence, can proceed further with the trial. Mr. Aher also drew

attention of this Court, by submitting that on numerous occasions, this

Court has relied upon and followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex

Court in J. V. Baharuni and anr. Vs State of Gujarat and anr.,

(2014) 10 Supreme Court Cases 494.           Drawing support from

the said judgment, Mr. Aher submits that although Sub-Section (3)
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of Section 326 of the Cr.P.C. provides bars a successor Magistrate

from acting on evidence recorded by his predecessor, this bar does not

apply when the case is tried in substance as a regular summons case

rather than in a summary way. According to him, where a case which

was tried summarily and when the Court records evidence elaborately

and in verbatim and gives full scope to cross-examine the witnesses,

and if such procedure is adopted, then all this procedure which is

adopted by the Trial Court indicates that the said Trial Court has not

followed the summary procedure. Thus, he submits that where in a

case which is tried summarily and the Court records the evidence

elaborately and in verbatim, where the defence was given full scope to

cross-examine the witnesses, such procedure adopted is indicative of

the fact that it was not summary procedure. Therefore, the succeeding

Magistrate can rely upon the evidence on record and de novo inquiry

need not be conducted.     Learned APP and learned Advocate for

respondent No.2, thus, pray for dismissal of the instant criminal

revision application.


13.          After hearing the submissions advanced by the learned

Advocates for the respective parties, I have gone through the

impugned judgment and orders of both the lower Courts, as well as the

judgments relied upon by both the parties. After going through the
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material provisions relating to the instant matter, it is found that, in this

case the predecessor Magistrate recorded the evidence and thereafter

he got transferred and the new Presiding Officer, relying upon the

evidence on record, proceeded further to convict the applicant. I have

also gone through the deposition copies of the witnesses.             In the

present case, the depositions of the witnesses have been recorded in

full, the witnesses were subjected to detailed cross-examination, and

the record does not indicate that the evidence was recorded merely in

the form of the 'substance of the evidence' as contemplated by Section

264 of the Cr.P.C.      When the witnesses have been examined in

detailed, then the said evidence cannot be said to be the evidence

recorded in substance. The procedure actually followed by the learned

Magistrate, therefore, demonstrates that the case was conducted as a

regular summons trial and not as a summary trial. It is also well

settled position of law that, once the evidence is recorded by the Court,

having jurisdiction to do so, the depositions made by the witnesses do

not lose their character as evidence in judicial proceedings, and the

same can be validly used for the adjudication of the rights of the

parties. Therefore, if the Magistrate records the evidence as is done in

regular summons case, the succeeding Magistrate can act on the

evidence so recorded by his predecessor or partly recorded by his
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predecessor and partly recorded by himself, as provided in sub-section

(1) of Section 326 of the Cr.P.C.


14.          A summary trial is an abridged form of the regular trial

and is resorted to in order to save time in trying petty cases. It is

essentially a speedy trial dispensing with unnecessary formalities or

delays and giving discretion to the Magistrate to try or not to try an

offence, triable in summary manner. I find that the issue involved in

the instant matter is no more res integra.


15.          In Ullas vs. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Writ Petition

No.216/2014), vide judgment dated 17/06/2016, the Aurangabad

Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with the similar issue. In

the said case, this Court, by relying upon the judgment delivered in

Shivaji Sampat Jagtap vs. Rajan Hiralal Arora and State, 2007

CRI. LJ 122, held that, if the case in substance was not tried in

summary way, though was triable summarily, and was tried as a

regular summons case, it need not be heard de novo and the succeeding

Magistrate can follow the procedure contemplated under Section

326(1) of the Cr.P.C. However, where a case is tried in a summary

way by following the procedure contemplated by the provisions of

Chapter XXI of the Cr.P.C. and in particular Sections 263 and 264
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therein, alone is intended to be excluded from the purview of Section

326(1) of the Cr.P.C. It appears that, after the evidence of the parties

was closed, the disposal of the same discloses that the applicant that is

defence side was given full scope to cross-examine the witnesses. The

evidence recorded by the learned Magistrate is a full-fledged evidence

led by the parties. It was not in the form indicated in Section 264 of

the Cr.P.C. The evidence recorded in the present case clearly indicates

that the case was not tried in a summary way. The case was in fact

tried as a regular summons case though it was triable summarily.

Under the circumstances, the submissions of learned Advocate for the

applicant deserve to be rejected.


16.          For the reasons stated hereinabove, it       can safely be

concluded that case was not being tried as a summary case, but was

being tried as a regular case and since this Court has already held that

the proceedings need not be conducted, there is no requirement to

direct the Court to try the matter as a de novo trial. Hence, the only

point which was raised by the learned Advocate for the applicant,

having been answered in negative, and there is no other illegality or

irregularity pointed out in the judgments passed by the learned

Subordinate Courts, I decline to exercise jurisdictional powers under
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section 397 of the Cr.P.C.   Hence, the instant criminal revision

application is dismissed




                                [SUSHIL M. GHODESWAR, J.]

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