GAUTAM KHANDJUAversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                                                                      Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2



                                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                         REVISION APPLICATION NO. 298 OF 2005

NAVNATH               Mr. Gautam Khandjua,
SITARAM               Age: 33 Yrs., Occ: Business,
WAGHMARE
                      R/at. 71-C, Land Breeze, 52, Pali Hill,
Digitally signed by   Bandra (West), Mumbai - 400 050.                       ...Applicant
NAVNATH SITARAM
WAGHMARE
Date: 2026.09.10
                                  Versus
19:33:21 +0530
                      1. State of Maharashtra,
                      (Inspector of Police, Versova Police Station,
                      Mumbai).

                      2.Nirmal Joseph,
                      (of Banglore, Indian Inhabitant residing at 40
                      Ferns Meadows, Hennur Road, Byrathi, Banglore-
                      562 149.)                                       ...Respondents
                                                        ****
                      Mr. Ashok Mundargi, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Dipesh Mehta, Ms. Rumi
                      Mirza, Mr. Kaushal Thakker & Ms. Sonea Kanal i/b Dipesh Mehta &
                      Associates for the Applicant.
                      Ms. Manisha R. Tidke, APP for Respondent/State.
                      None for the Respondent No.2.
                                                        ****
                                                 CORAM : M.M. SATHAYE, J.
                                                    DATE : 10th SEPTEMBER, 2026
                      JUDGMENT :

                      1.          Invoking Section 397 read with 401 of the Criminal Procedure
                      Code, 1973 ('CrPC' for short), the Applicant-Original Accused is
                      challenging an order dated 24.08.2005 passed by Learned Additional
                      Sessions Judge, Mumbai in Misc. Application No. 625 of 2005, by which
                      his application for discharge has been rejected, refusing to discharge
                      him from the offence punishable under Section 306 of Indian Penal
                      Code, 1860 ('IPC' for short).



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                              BRIEF BACKGROUND

2.          The Applicant met deceased Ms. Nafisa Joseph in 2003 and
became friends. The deceased took Applicant to meet her parents at
Banglore and with the consent of parents, she got engaged with the
Applicant on 23.05.2004 at Banglore. The Applicant had told the
deceased that he has taken divorce from his earlier wife – Ms. Naushin
Khan by executing some kind of document or Memorandum of
Understanding (‘MoU’ for short), however,      the Applicants’ mother
informed the deceased that he was not divorced. Therefore, she asked
the Applicant to show the divorce-papers. But inspite of her request,
divorce papers were not shown. Deceased informed her mother on
telephone that on 28.07.2004 she had a fight with the Applicant. On the
same day, Applicant also called and informed deceased’s mother that he
had fight with the deceased over the divorce papers and requested her
to come Mumbai. On receiving such calls, mother of deceased came to
Mumbai from Banglore on 28.07.2004 and she went to Applicant's
house at Bandra, where the deceased, her mother, the Applicant and his
parents were present. The Applicant refused to marry the deceased on
the ground that she was short tempered and that she did not listen to
anybody. According to deceased, she was only asking for divorce papers
in respect of earlier marriage and that was the only ground of quarrel.
The mother of the deceased also asked Applicant for divorce papers and
questioned him as to why he is not showing such papers, even though
had promised to do so, but Applicant kept quiet. Then deceased and her
mother returned to deceased’s flat at Andheri. On the next day, i.e.
29.07.2004 in the morning, mother of deceased called the Applicant
because she wanted to meet him. He sent his car to fetch mother of the
deceased. In presence of parents and sisters of Applicant, deceased’s



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mother asked the Applicant as to whether he wants to marry the
deceased, when the Applicant said that Nafisa quarrels with him and
that he will not marry her.

3.          The deceased’s mother returned home at Andheri but sent a
message to deceased’s friend Ms. Poonam Damania calling her home. In
the evening, at about 06:00 p.m. Poonam came to the Andheri flat. The
deceased was in a depressed state of mind, due to refusal by Applicant
to marry her. Said Poonam and Mother of deceased requested the
deceased to go to the doctor but she refused saying that she will go to
the doctor, only if Applicant accompanies her. So, Poonam informed the
Applicant on telephone that deceased has not eaten food for two days
and he should come, but he did not come despite repeated calls.
Thereafter, deceased went out of the room, locked the door from
outside, went to another bed room, asked her maid to go out, locked
herself inside and committed suicide by hanging herself to the ceiling
fan with dupatta.

4.          First Information Report ('FIR' for short) was lodged.
Investigation was conducted. Statements of various persons were
recorded. Chargesheet was filed. After committal, case was numbered
as Sessions Case No. 244/2005 in Sessions court.

5.          The Applicant filed Misc. Application No. 625 of 2005 seeking
discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.PC. which is rejected under
impugned order dated 24.08.2005.

6.          In these circumstances, the Applicant filed present revision
Application. This Court admitted the revision on 29.11.2005 and further
proceedings of the trial was stayed. The Applicant was already granted
anticipatory bail on 11.11.2004.


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                                    SUBMISSIONS

7.          Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mundargi appearing for the
Applicant submitted as under:

7.1. That the material collected during investigation, when taken at its
highest, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence u/s.
306 or 107 of IPC nor does it disclose ‘abetment of suicide’ which
requires ‘mens rea’.

7.2. That the chargesheet does not attribute any act of instigation,
threat, coercion, humiliation or intentional aid on the part of the
Applicant. That the Chargesheet also fails to record that the Applicant
and deceased had not spoken with each other for last 2 days prior to the
death.

7.3. That the entire case is based on an erroneous assumption that the
Applicant's decision not to proceed with the proposed marriage on
account of persistent disputes and not to accompany the deceased to the
doctor, is sufficient to attract Section 306 of IPC.

7.4.     That the prosecution case merely alleges that differences arose
between the parties and the Applicant expressed his unwillingness to
proceed with the marriage because of incompatibility. This by itself does
not satisfy the statutory requirements of Sections 306 and 107 of IPC.
Mere failure of a relationship, refusal to marry, emotional distress or
disappointment cannot, by themselves, tantamount to abetment
especially when we consider the social background and previous broken
relationships of both the parties involved.

7.5. That statement of Mr. Nirmal Joseph (Father of Deceased) mentions
about the knowledge of the Applicant's earlier marriage and his divorce


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under a MoU. Rest of the details mentioned speak about information
derived from his wife, Mrs. Usha, after 15-20 days of the incident.

7.6. That statement of Mrs. Usha Joseph (Mother of Deceased)
mentions about the failed past relationships of the Deceased with one
Mr. Sameer Malhotra and one Mr. Sameer Soni. In both these cases, the
Deceased had got engaged, or decided to marry, but the relationships
failed. The statement also finds mention about the Applicant's earlier
marriage and his divorce under a MoU. Further, it also states about the
temperamental issues of the Deceased.

7.7. That statement of Ms. Poonam Damania (Friend of the Deceased)
mentions about the Deceased consuming ‘Restyl’ tablets and ‘Benadryl’
syrup to sleep and further informs that she was called by Mrs. Usha at
the residence and that she was with the Deceased for three hours prior
to the incident. She also informs that she had messaged the Applicant
asking him to accompany the Deceased to the doctor, signifies that the
Applicant was not in contact with the Deceased at the relevant time.
She also confirms that in the diary of the Deceased, there was only
mention about house expenses, addresses and telephone numbers.

7.8. Statement of Ms. Durga Bisai (Maid of the Deceased) mentions that
on the date of the incident, the Deceased was with her mother, Usha
and her friend, Poonam, for about three hours, before death of the
Deceased and there were arguments between the three of them.

7.9. In the impugned Order at paragraph no. 13, the learned Sessions
Judge has observed that there is no evidence about the conspiracy or
intention to aid on the part of the Accused.

7.10. That Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in catena of judgments that



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offence under section 306 requires mens rea and direct instigation.

7.11. That therefore, taking the case of the prosecution at its highest,
there is absolutely no material demonstrating mens rea, instigation,
threat, coercion, humiliation or intentional aid on the part of the
Accused and therefore the essential ingredients of Sections 306 and 107
of IPC are not made out and the Revision Application deserves to be
allowed.

7.12. That in the offence under section 306 of IPC, what is to be seen is
the intention of the Accused in alleged act or statement which led the
Deceased to commit suicide and merely because Deceased committed
suicide, the Accused cannot be held guilty without reference to his
intention or mens rea.

7.13. He relied on following judgments in support of his case :

        (i) Satish Vs. State of Maharashtra 1997 Cri LJ 935.

        (ii) Sanju Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 5 SCC 371.

        (iii)Seema   Ajay   Bhoosreddy    Vs.   State       of      Maharashtra
        MANU/MH/1961/2011.

        (iv) Gangula Mohan Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh. (2010) 1
        SCC 750.

        (v) Kamaruddin Dastagir Sanadi Vs. State of Karnataka AIR 2025
        SC 153.

        (vi) Abhinav Mohan Delkar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2025
        INSC 990.

        (vii) Mahendra Vs. State of Maharashtra. 2025 ALLMR (Cri)
        4559.


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8.          Nobody appeared for Respondent No.2 (father of deceased)
despite name of his advocate appearing on the cause-list.

9.          Learned APP, Ms. Tidke, on the other hand supported the
impugned order contending inter alia that considering material
available on record, there is enough suspicion against the Applicant for
him to face trial. She submitted that in close proximity of the incident in
question, the Applicant was involved in the interaction, in as much as,
there was quarrel between the Applicant and Deceased over non supply
of divorce documents. She further submitted that admittedly, the
Applicant was engaged with the deceased and marriage date was fixed
and invitation cards were distributed. In such circumstances, since the
Applicant refused to marry the deceased, deceased felt so humiliated by
fear of disrepute to her and her family that she committed suicide.
Therefore, the Applicant is directly responsible for suicide and this is
not a fit case for discharge. She emphasized on the limited revisional
jurisdiction of this Court and submitted that mini trial is not permitted
at the stage of discharge. She prayed for dismissal of the revision
application.

                           REASONS AND CONCLUSION

10.         I have considered the rival submissions and perused the
record. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the scope of
discharge application as well as limited revisional jurisdiction being
exercised by this Court.


11.         In Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr (1979) 3
SCC 4, Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the scope of Section
227 of Cr.P.C., where it is held that while deciding discharge application,
the Court should not act as a Trial Court, but should weigh evidence

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and form opinion only on the limited question of whether a prima facie
case is made out. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :


                   “7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus:

                    If, upon consideration of the record of the case and
                    the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing
                    the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in
                    this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not
                    sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused,
                    he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons
                    for so doing.

                    The words 'not sufficient ground for proceeding
                    against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not
                    a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest
                    of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial
                    mind to the facts of the case in order to determine
                    whether a case for trial has been made out by the
                    prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary
                    for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the
                    matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence
                    and probabilities which is really his function after the
                    trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has
                    merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether
                    or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
                    the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take
                    within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by
                    the police or the documents produced before the court
                    which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
                    circumstances against the accused so as to frame a
                    charge against him.




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                   8.   The scope of Section 227 of the Code was
                   considered by a recent decision of this Court in this
                   Court in the case case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh
                   Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 where Untwalia, J., speaking for
                   the Court observed as follows:

                   Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter
                   remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the
                   place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial.
                   But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion
                   which leads the Court to think that there is ground for
                   presuming that the accused has committed an offence
                   then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no
                   sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
                   The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to
                   be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the
                   law governing the trial of criminal cases in France
                   where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the
                   the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of
                   deciding prima facie whether the the Court should
                   proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the
                   Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of
                   the accused even if fully accepted before it is
                   challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the
                   defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the
                   accused committed the offence, then there will be no
                   sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial

                   This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion
                   may not take the place of the proof a the trial stage,
                   yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the
                   Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the
                   accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has


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                   hold that a committing Magistrate had ample powers
                   to weigh the evidence for       the limited purpose of
                   finding out whether or

                   not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has
                   been made out.”

                                                     (emphasis supplied)

12.         In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors (2014) 11
SCC 709, once again while considering the scope of Section 227 of
Cr.P.C., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under.

                   “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
                   submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit
                   Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of
                   consideration of the applications for discharge, the
                   court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution
                   or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order
                   to find out whether or not the allegations made are
                   groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is
                   trite that at the stage of consideration of an
                   application for discharge, the court has to proceed
                   with an assumption that the materials brought on
                   record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the
                   said materials and documents with a view to find out
                   whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their
                   face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients
                   constituting   the   alleged   offence.       At     this       stage,
                   probative value of the materials has to be gone into
                   and the court is not expected to go deep into the
                   matter and hold that the materials would not warrant
                   a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be



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                   considered is whether there is a ground for presuming
                   that the offence has been committed and not whether
                   a ground for convicting the accused has been made
                   out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the
                   accused might have committed the offence on the
                   basis of the materials on record on its probative
                   value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction,
                   the court has to come to the conclusion that the
                   accused has committed the offence. The law does not
                   permit a mini trial at this stage.”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)

13.         In State of Rajasthan V/s Ashok Kumar Kashyap (2021) 11
SCC 191, the Honb’le Supreme Court while considering the scope of
interference at the stage of framing of charges or considering discharge
application, has held as under.

                   “13.   Having considered the reasoning given by the
                   High Court and the grounds which are weighed with
                   the High Court while discharging the accused, we are
                   of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its
                   jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction
                   and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239
                   CrPC. While discharging the accused, the High Court
                   has gone into the merits of the case and has
                   considered whether on the basis of the material on
                   record, the accused is likely to be convicted or not.
                   For the aforesaid, the High Court has considered in
                   detail the transcript of the conversation between the
                   complainant and the accused which exercise at this
                   stage to consider the discharge application and/or
                   framing of the charge is not permissible at all.


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                   xxxx

                   15.    As observed hereinabove, the High Court was
                   required to consider whether a prima facie case has
                   been made out or not and whether the accused is
                   required to be further tried or not. At the stage of
                   framing    of   the    charge     and/or        considering            the
                   discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.
                   At this stage, it is to be noted that even as per Section
                   7 of the PC Act, even an attempt constitutes an
                   offence. Therefore, the High Court has erred and/or
                   exceeded in virtually holding a mini trial at the stage
                   of discharge application.”

                                                     (emphasis supplied)

14.         In State of Gujarat v/s. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao. (2023) 17
SCC 688, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,                 while considering revisional
jurisdicion of this Court while deciding discharge application, in
paragraph nos. 10 and 17 has held that

                   “10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of
                   considering an application for discharge the court
                   must proceed on an assumption that the material
                   which has been brought on record by the prosecution
                   is true and evaluate said material in order to
                   determine whether the facts emerging from the
                   material   taken      on   its   face   value,        disclose         the
                   existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence
                   alleged.

                   xxxx

                   17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate



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                   court and start appreciating the evidence by finding
                   out inconsistency in the statement of witnesses and it
                   is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be
                   cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing
                   with an application for discharge.”

                                                  (emphasis supplied)

15.         In State of Tamil Nadu v/s. R. Soundirarasu & Ors. (2023) 6
SCC 768, once again, while commenting on revisional jurisdcition of
this Court while dealing with discharge application, has held as under :

                   “79. xxxx

                   Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a
                   casual   or   mechanical      manner.      It    can       only     be
                   exercised     to   correct   manifest     error       of     law    or
                   procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not
                   corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated
                   with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot
                   undertake meticulous examination of the material on
                   record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the
                   appellate court. This power can only be exercised if
                   there is any legal bar to the continuance of the
                   proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-
                   sheet are taken to be true on their face value and
                   accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
                   offence for which the accused has been charged. It is
                   conferred to check grave error of law or procedure”.

                                                      (emphasis supplied)

16.         It is therefore clear that while considering the discharge
application, this Court cannot go into the merits of the case. It cannot


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be considered whether on the basis of material on record, the accused is
likely to be convicted or not. What is required to be considered is
whether prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the
accused is required to be further tried or not. The Court is expected to
sift through the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and it is not
necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities. Mini trial is
certainly not permitted.

17.          In the present case, statements of following persons have been
recorded :

        1. Nirmalkumar B. Joseph, Informant – Father of deceased,
        statement recorded during registration of FIR on 30.07.2004
        and 30.09.2004.

        2. Usha Nirmalkumar Joseph, Mother of the deceased,
        statement recorded on 31.07.2004.

        3. Poonam Tejas Damania, Friend of deceased, statement
        recorded        on   30.07.2004   ,04.08.2004,      30.09.2004              and
        11.10.2004

        4. Durga Gopan Bisai, House-help of deceased, statement
        recorded on 30.07.2004 , 09.08.2004 and 30.09.2004.

        5.    Kuljeet    Gurubachan   Singh    Randhva,        Friend         of    the
        deceased,        Statement    recorded    on       05.08.2004               and
        11.10.2004 .

        6. Ramchandra Ojleshwar Mishra, Secretary of building of
        deceased,        statement    recorded    on       30.07.2004               and
        23.10.2004.



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        7.    Harjit   Harbanssingh    Khanduja,   Mother          of     Applicant,
        Statement recorded on 12.08.2004 and 23.10.2004.

        8. Kishor David Rodrigues, Friend of the Applicant, Statement
        recorded on 03.08.2004 and 03.10.2004.

        9.    Parveen    Kenneth     Samuel,   Friend     of     the      Applicant,
        Statement recorded on 31.10.2004.

        10. Chandramohan Amarnath Malhotra, Father of close friend
        (Poonam) of deceased, Statement recorded on 06.10.2004.

        11.    Gautam      Harbans     Khanduja,   Applicant,            Statement
        recorded on 31.07.2004 and 28.11.2004.

        12. Ramnarayan Sitaram Verma, Watchmen of the residence
        building of deceased, Statement recorded on 30.07.2004.

        13. Harbanssingh Khanduja, Father of Applicant, Statement
        recorded on 12.08.2004.

18.          Clear picture emerging from perusal of above statements is
that one day prior to the date of incident i.e. 28.07.2004, the mother of
the deceased had come to Mumbai and met mother of the Applicant at
their house in Bandra and in presence of everybody i.e. Applicant and
his parents, the deceased and her mother, quarrel had taken place about
the Applicant not supplying divorce-papers as promised and the
deceased was very upset about it. It is also clearly emerging that
thereafter deceased and his mother left the Applicant's house and went
to the deceased’s flat at Andheri. On the next day i.e. on the date of
incident (29.07.2004), the mother of the deceased again met the
Applicant in the morning at his residence at Bandra, where he was
asked in the presence of his parents and sister, whether he wants to
marry. He had refused. Thereafter, the mother of deceased left and came
back to the deceased's flat at Andheri and called her friend Poonam to


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come over. It appears clearly that friend Poonam visited the deceased's
house where the deceased, deceased's mother and Poonam were
together and deceased was not well, she had not eaten for couple of
days, she was upset and she was refusing to go to the hospital unless
Applicant comes and accompanies her. It further clearly appears that
not showing divorce-papers despite promise, was the cause for quarrel
and discord resulting in Applicant's refusal to marry. It also clearly
appears that the date of marriage was fixed on 07.08.2004 which was
just a week away and marriage-cards were printed and distributed.
According to the statement of friend Poonam, deceased and her friends
were shopping for marriage. In such circumstances, refusal to marry
had hit the deceased. The deceased had the background of two earlier
engagements broken, for one reason or the other. It appears that the
deceased could not bear the humiliation she felt about the whole
situation and the impending disrepute that would be brought upon the
family and she had taken the extreme step.

19.         Learned Senior Advocate for the Applicant has succinctly
argued that it is not the perception of the person committing suicide but
the intention of the accused that is required to be seen by the Court.
There is no doubt about this proposition. However, whether the
circumstances amount to any such intention and whether the
Applicant's refusal to marry and non-supply of divorce-papers despite
promise, amounts to such intention or immediate cause or indirect
instigation or aid for the suicide, is something that can be decided only
after trial on appreciation of evidence for the acid test of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

20.         The arguments of the learned Senior Advocate, which are
recorded above in detail, are certainly arguments that need to be


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considered at the time of trial on appreciation of evidence. However, on
overall consideration of the statements recorded of various persons,
especially, deceased's        mother and    friends, about the proximate
situation that led to the suicide, in my view, it cannot be conclusively
said, at this stage, that ingredients of Section 306 r/w 107 of IPC are
not made out. It is neither possible nor permissible to conduct ‘mini
trial’ by considering the material in chargesheet for proof of guilt. It is
also not possible to comment upon the evidentiary value and proof
about guilt, at this stage.

21.         Suffice it to observe, that there are sufficient grounds to
proceed against the Applicant and there are circumstances requiring the
trial to proceed. It it true that strong suspicion cannot take place of the
proof, but that can only be decided at the stage of trial.

22.         Also, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the scope of
interference in revision, at the stage of discharge, does not permit this
Court to sit as an Appellate Court and start appreciating evidence. It is
settled principle of law that at the stage of considering discharge
application, the Court must proceed on the assumption that material
which has been brought on record is true and evaluate such material to
determine whether the ingredients of the alleged offence exists. The
revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only to correct manifest error of
law or procedures which would cause injustice, if not corrected. In the
facts and circumstances narrated above and on perusal of various
statements, in my considered view, the learned Session's Judge has not
committed any manifest error of law/procedure, causing injustice.

23.         It does not appear from the statements that Applicant and
deceased had not spoken with each other for last two days prior to the



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death, as argued by learned Senior Advocate for the Applicant. The
argument that ‘considering the social background and previous broken
relationships of the parties, mere refusal to marry or emotional distress
or disappointment cannot amount to abetment’ is a matter that can only
be conclusively decided on appreciation of evidence at the time of trial.

24.         It appears from the material available that parties knew each
other's past including the past broken relationships of the deceased
thereby making her sensitive and vulnerable to one more such incident.
Whether the Applicant’s refusal to marry and non-supply of divorce
papers proved to be the ‘last straw on the back of the camel’ that broke
it, will have to be decided at the time of trial. Similarly, the argument
about temperamental issues and about deceased’s habit of consuming
‘Restyl’ tablets and ‘Benadryl’ syrup to sleep and its effect will have to be
considered at the time of trial.

25.         The argument about the observations of the learned Single
Judge in paragraph no.13 that there is no evidence about the conspiracy
or intention to aid on the part of the Accused, must be read with what is
stated by the learned Sessions Judge thereafter. The learned Sessions
Judge has clearly held that the Court has to consider conduct on the
part of the Applicant as to whether it amounts to instigation.

26.         Now, let us consider the judgments relied upon by the learned
Senior counsel for the Applicant one by one.

27.         In Satish Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra) and Mahendra Vs.
State of Maharashtra (Supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court
was considering an appeal over conviction for the offence under Section
306 of IPC. Therefore, it is clear that the consideration in the said




Navnath Waghmare                                                            18
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judgment was after appreciation of evidence on the record at the time
of trial, and not at the time of discharge. Hence, the said judgments will
not help the Applicant.

28.         In Abhinav Mohan Delkar Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, was considering the exercise of powers
under Section 482 of CrPC. In this respect, it is necessary to note that
recently in Mukesh and Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors
(Hon’ble Supreme Court, SLP (Crl.) No. 12354 of 2024) the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has observed as under. Therefore above judgments will
not help the Applicant.

                   "8. It is true that the appellants can apply for
                   discharge. However, the scope of application for
                   discharge is completely different from the scope of a
                   petition for quashing the criminal proceedings. While
                   arguing a case for discharge, the appellants will not
                   be in a position to rely upon any document which is
                   not the part of charge-sheet. The ground of abuse of
                   process of law will not be available while arguing
                   discharge application. However, in a petition for
                   quashing either under section 482 of the Code of
                   Criminal Procedure, 1973 or under Article 226 of the
                   Constitution of India, a wider challenge is available
                   including a challenge on the ground of abuse of
                   process of law. In such proceedings, the accused can
                   rely upon documents which are not the part of the
                   charge-sheet.

                   xxxx"

                                                     (emphasis supplied)




Navnath Waghmare                                                           19
                                                   Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2



29.         Similarly, in the case in respect of Sanju Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh (Supra).

30.         In Seema Ajay Bhoosreddy (Supra) the learned Single Judge
of this Court was considering the rejection of discharge application in
revision. Facts in that case were that a medical student for the last year
of B.D.S. course had committed suicide, allegedly due to ‘scolding by
one professor’ and the ‘other professor asking the student by way of
punishment to repeat the college assignment’. In such peculiar factual
backdrop,      this   Court   found   that   the   deceased          student         was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which was
part of day-to-day life. It was found that the student had lost confidence
and she felt that she only spent parent's money. Having found such facts
to exist, this Court had allowed the discharge application.

        The facts of the present case are completely different and
distinguishable. It cannot be disputed that the caselaw applies only in
principle and that principle has to be applied to the facts and
circumstances of individual case, on case to case basis.

31.         In Gangula Mohan Reddy (Supra) and in Kamaruddin Dastagir
Sanadi (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the case
of suicide however the consideration was after the conviction in trial
and after appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the said judgments will
also not help the Applicant.

32.         In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and reasons indicated
above, in my considered view, this is not a fit case to interfere in the
order passed by the learned Sessions Judge refusing to discharge the
Applicant.




Navnath Waghmare                                                             20
                                                  Cri.Revn Appln- 298-2005 (J) C2



33.         Criminal Revision Application is accordingly dismissed. Rule is
discharged. Interim stay to trial, is vacated. Trial to proceed. No order
as to costs.

34.         At this stage, learned counsel for the Revision Applicant seeks
continuation of interim stay for a period of 8 weeks. Considering that
revision was pending for a long time with interim stay in favor of the
Revision Applicant, interim stay to the Trial is continued only for a
period of 6 weeks from today.



                                              (M.M. SATHAYE, J.)




Navnath Waghmare                                                            21