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Bombay High Court

DASHRATH GANPAT PATILversusBALARAM BABU SANTE AND ORS

Decided
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The appeal is dismissed as it does not raise any substantial question of law and the lower courts' findings on limitation, possession, forgery, and joinder are upheld.

Summary

The appellant, Swapnil Dashrath Ganpat Patil, appealed a lower court judgment that dismissed his 2004 suit seeking declaration that a 1972 conveyance deed was forged, cancellation of the deed, and an injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing him. The lower courts held the suit barred by limitation, found the plaintiffs had not proved possession, and noted non‑joinder of co‑sharers who executed the deed. The appellant argued that limitation should be measured from his knowledge of the deed, invoking Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and contended that evidence of possession and the alleged forgery warranted a re‑examination. The respondent countered that the plaintiffs admitted non‑possession, that the deed’s validity was not contested by its signatory, and that the limitation period had indeed expired. The High Court, after considering the submissions, concluded that the appeal raised no substantial question of law and that the findings of fact and law of the lower courts were correct, thereby dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

  • Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Whether the plaintiffs proved possession of the suit property.
  • Whether the alleged forgery of the 1972 conveyance deed can be established.
  • Whether the non‑joinder of co‑sharers who executed the conveyance deed defeats the declaration of title.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • limitation
  • forgery
  • conveyance deed
  • non‑joinder of parties
  • declaration of title
  • injunction
  • property possession
  • appellate jurisdiction

Judgment

                                                     31-SA-569-2022.docx


               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                         SECOND APPEAL NO. 569 OF 2022
Swapnil
          Dashrath Ganpat Patil                           …Appellant
               Vs.
          Balaram Babu Sante and Ors.                     …Respondents
                                        WITH
                       INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1368 OF 2021

                                        WITH
                       INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 6945 OF 2025


          Mr. Kaustubh Thipsay a/w. Mr. Aditya Shirke for the
          applicant.
          Mr. R. D. Soni i/b. Mr. R. P. Lote for the respondent.

                                  CORAM : GAURI GODSE, J.

                                  DATE :       28th AUGUST 2026

          ORDER :

          APPLICATION NO. 6945 OF 2025

          1.    This application is for bringing on record the heirs and

          legal representatives of the sole appellant. The application is

          within time.


          2.    The application is allowed in terms of prayer clause ‘a’.


          3.    Amendment to be carried out forthwith in the court.


          SECOND APPEAL NO. 569 OF 2022
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1.    This second appeal is preferred by the original plaintiff

no. 1 to challenge the concurrent judgments and decree

dismissing his suit for a declaration and injunction. The suit

was filed on 2nd July 2004 for a declaration that the registered

conveyance deed dated 19th June 1972 is forged and illegal.

The plaintiffs further prayed for a declaration that they are the

owners (landlords) of the suit land and a declaration that the

defendants have no right, title, or interest in the suit property.

The plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for cancellation of the

conveyance      deed    and    an      injunction   restraining      the

defendants from dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit

property.


2.    Both courts have dismissed the suit on the ground that

it is barred by limitation, that the plaintiffs failed to prove their

possession of the suit property, and that the conveyance

deed was forged as alleged. The suit was also dismissed on

the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. The

impugned conveyance deed was executed by the plaintiffs'

father and the other co-sharers, i.e., the plaintiffs’ father's

brothers, who were not added as parties to the suit.


3.    Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the suit

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is erroneously dismissed as barred by limitation. He relies

upon Article 56 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963.

According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the

plaintiffs were always in possession of the suit property, and,

since there was an apprehension of dispossession, they

issued a notice dated 25 th May 2004. In response, the

defendants relied upon the conveyance deed dated 19 th June

1972. Hence, the plaintiffs’ knowledge about the conveyance

deed was only when the suit notice was replied. Hence,

when there was allegation that the conveyance deed was a

forged document. The limitation period would be three years

from the plaintiffs’ knowledge. Hence, in view of Article 56,

the suit could not have been dismissed on the ground of

limitation.


4.     Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that

the plaintiffs’ names were entered into the revenue record

after their father’s death and even the receipts regarding the

payment of taxes supported the plaintiffs’ contention that they

were in possession of the suit property. He, therefore,

submits that the second appeal raises substantial questions

of law on the point of limitation and the substantive evidence


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produced to support the theory of possession.


5.    He submits that when the conveyance deed was

challenged on the ground that it is a forged document, the

contents of the said document could not have been relied

upon to record the finding of possession. He, therefore,

submits that the second appeal would also raise a

substantial question of law on misappreciation of the

evidence. Hence, the impugned judgments and decrees

would warrant interference.


6.    I have perused the papers of the second appeal.

Learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out the

plaintiffs’ admissions that the suit property was never

cultivated by them and that the defendants were in

possession of the suit property. Even if the issue of limitation

is to be considered, the suit is held to be within limitation in

view of Article 56 of the Limitation Act; the second appeal

would not warrant any interference on merits. Both the courts

have concurrently held that the defendants are in possession

of the suit property. The allegation of forgery has not been

proved by the plaintiffs. Ganpat Patil, who had signed the

conveyance document, had never raised any dispute

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regarding its validity. Admittedly, the suit property was not

exclusively owned by Ganpat Patil. Hence, in the absence of

the   other   co-sharers   who       executed   the   conveyance

document along with Ganpat Patil, a declaration of title

cannot be entertained. The issue regarding the allegation of

forgery would not warrant any interference in view of the

concurrent findings recorded by both the courts.


7.    There is no valid ground raised in the second appeal

for challenging the conveyance on the ground of forgery.

Hence, even if the suit is held to be within limitation, both the

courts have recorded the findings of fact and the merits of

the prayers by framing issues on the grounds of forgery, non-

joinder, and the plaintiffs’ entitlement to a declaration on the

ground of ownership and possession. Hence, even if the suit

is held to be within limitation, the concurrent findings of fact

recorded by both courts would not warrant any interference.

Hence, no purpose would be served by admitting the second

appeal on the point of limitation.


8.    The second appeal, therefore, does not warrant

interference, as it does not raise any substantial question of

law. The second appeal is therefore dismissed.

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9.    Pending interim application, if any, is disposed of as

infructous.

                                       [GAURI GODSE, J.]




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