SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIAversusSATISH KUMAR JAIN AND ANR.

                                                                       WP_1664_09 & ors.doc



                              IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                  ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
                                      WRIT PETITION NO. 1664 OF 2009

                      Securities and Exchange Board of India   …        Petitioner
                                   vs.
                      1.    Yogesh Babulal Mehta
                      2.    Central Information Commission
                      3.    The Bombay Stock Exchange          …        Respondents

                                                  WITH
                                      WRIT PETITION NO. 1033 OF 2010

                      Securities and Exchange Board of India   …        Petitioner
                                   vs.
                      1.    Dhirendra Kumar
                      2.    Central Information Commission     …        Respondents

                                                  WITH
                                      WRIT PETITION NO. 1034 OF 2010

                      Securities and Exchange Board of India   …        Petitioner
                                   vs.
                      1.    Satish Kumar Jain
                      2.    Central Information Commission     …        Respondents

                                                  WITH
                                      WRIT PETITION NO. 1032 OF 2010

                      Securities and Exchange Board of India   …        Petitioner
                                   vs.
                      1.    Dushyant Vyas
                      2.    Central Information Commission     …        Respondents

                                                  WITH
                                      WRIT PETITION NO. 1710 OF 2009

                      Securities and Exchange Board of India   …        Petitioner
                                   vs.
                      1.    Shri Bhoj Raj Sahu
                      2.    Central Information Commission
                      3.    The Bombay Stock Exchange          …        Respondents
         Digitally
         signed by
PRIYA PRIYA
       Date:
             KAMBLI

KAMBLI 2026.08.18
       14:54:28                                                                       1/18
         +0530
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                             WITH
                 WRIT PETITION NO. 1693 OF 2009

Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd.                   …             Petitioner
           vs.
1.  Central Information Commission
2.  Securities Exchange Board of India
3.  Bhoj Raj Sahu                            …             Respondents

                             WITH
                 WRIT PETITION NO. 1694 OF 2009
                             WITH
                 WRIT PETITION NO. 1695 OF 2009
                             WITH
                 WRIT PETITION NO. 2210 OF 2009

Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd.                   …             Petitioner
           vs.
1.  Central Information Commission
2.  Securities Exchange Board of India
3.  Yogesh Mehta                             …             Respondents


Mr. J. J. Bhatt, Senior Advocate a/w. Ms. Misha Patel, Mr. Omprakash Jha,
Ms. Shivani Kumbhojkar and Ms. Mugdha Narkar, i/b. The Law Point for
petitioners in WP/1664/2009 and WP/1710/2009.

Mr. Prathamesh Kamat a/w. Mr. Omprakash Jha, Ms. Shivani Kumbhojkar
and Ms. Mugdha Narkar, i/b. The Law Point for petitioners in
WP/1033/2010, WP/1034/2010, WP/1032/2010 and respondent No.2 in
WP/1693/2009, WP/1694/2009, WP/1695/2009 and WP/2210/2009.

Mr. Pesi Modi, Senior Advocate, a/w. Ms. Kalpana Desai, Mr. Kingshuk
Banerjee, Mr. Arnav Mohanty, Mr. Ritvik Kulkarni, Mr. Arnab Ray and Mr.
Surya Ravikumar, i/b. Khaitan and Co. for petitioner in WP/1693/2009,
WP/1694/2009, WP/1695/2009 and WP/2210/2009 and respondent No.3
in WP/1664/2009.




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                               CORAM :      MANISH PITALE &
                                            SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ
                         Reserved on    :   10th AUGUST, 2026
                      Pronounced on     :   18th AUGUST, 2026


JUDGEMENT: (Per Manish Pitale, J):


.     A common question arises for consideration in these petitions,
as to whether under the provisions of the Right to Information Act,
2005 (RTI Act), a public authority is obliged to collect or obtain
information from a private body, to furnish the same to an applicant
seeking information under the provisions of the RTI Act. In the
impugned orders passed by the Central Information Commission
(CIC), it is held that Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) is
obliged to obtain information from a third party, in this case, Bombay
Stock Exchange (BSE) and to provide the same to the applicant
seeking the same. The CIC has issued the said direction on its
interpretation of the provisions of the RTI Act, particularly Section
2(f) thereof, which defines the term ‘information’.


2.    There are nine writ petitions in this group, of which five writ
petitions have been filed by SEBI and four by BSE. Writ Petition
No.1710 of 2009, which is filed by SEBI, is treated as the lead
petition, for the reason that the order dated 25.05.2009 impugned
therein, is the basic order passed by the CIC, based upon which the
orders impugned in the other writ petitions have been passed.


3.    In all the said writ petitions, SEBI and BSE are represented by
counsel. The original applicants, who sought information from SEBI
as a regulator, were served. But, they have chosen not to appear in
these writ petitions before this Court. In all the writ petitions, Rule


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was granted and they were all tagged together, in the light of the
aforesaid common question arising for consideration. In all the writ
petitions, the impugned orders were stayed.


4.    The question has arisen in the backdrop of the original
applicants (respondents herein) seeking information under the RTI
Act from SEBI with regard to certain aspects, requiring SEBI to
obtain such information from BSE and to provide the same to the
applicants. The CIC has held in the impugned orders that as per the
provisions of the RTI Act, SEBI is under an obligation, not only to
provide information available with it as a public authority, but it is
also under an obligation to collect such information from third
parties like BSE and to provide it to the applicants.


5.    Mr. Bhatt, learned senior counsel appearing for SEBI in the
lead Writ Petition No.1710 of 2009 and also in Writ Petition No.1664
of 2009, led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners. Mr. Pesi
Modi, learned senior counsel appeared for BSE in the writ petitions
filed by the BSE, raised identical arguments. Mr. Prathamesh Kamat,
learned counsel appeared for SEBI in the remaining writ petitions,
also supported the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioners.


6.    The learned counsel for the petitioners invited attention of this
Court to the provisions of the RTI Act, including Sections 2(f), 2(h),
2(j), 6, 8, 11 and 18 thereof. On a conjoint reading of the said
provisions, it was submitted that the decision of CIC in the impugned
orders and the direction issued to SEBI, is unsustainable. It was
submitted that as a public authority and a regulator, SEBI would be
under obligation to provide information available with it at the time


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when an application seeking information is submitted, subject to the
provisions of the RTI Act, including Section 8 thereof. But, it is not
under obligation to collect information from third parties such as
BSE to provide the same to the applicants.


7.    Attention of this Court was invited to the judgements of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Central Board of Secondary Education
(CBSE) and another vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and others , (2011) 8
SCC 497, Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India
(CPIO) vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481 and
judgement of Delhi High Court in the case of Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India (TRAI) vs. Akshay Kumar Malhotra , 2025 SCC
OnLine Del 10.


8.    It was submitted that the position of law laid down in the case
of CBSE and another vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and others (supra),
has been approved in the Constitution Bench judgement of the
Supreme Court in the case of CPIO vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal
(supra), which is followed by the aforesaid judgement of the Delhi
High Court in the case of TRAI vs. Akshay Kumar Malhotra (supra).
It was further brought to the notice of this Court that even the CIC,
in the light of the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court, has
held in subsequent orders that SEBI is not under an obligation to
collect or obtain information from third parties to provide the same
to the applicants under the provisions of the RTI Act.


9.    On the basis of the aforesaid judgements, it was submitted on
behalf of the petitioners that the question arising in these petitions, is
covered in their favour and that therefore, this Court may consider
allowing the petitions.


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10.    As   noted   hereinabove,    the   original   applicants    seeking
information, in whose favour the CIC had passed the impugned
orders, chose not to appear before this Court, despite service of
notice. Hence, the petitions were taken up for hearing and disposal,
upon considering the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners.


11.    In order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the
petitioners and to appreciate the context in which the Supreme Court
has made observations in the aforementioned judgements, it would
be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of the RTI Act. The
said provisions are as follows:


      “2. Definitions:
          In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--
                   xxx xxx xxx

      (f) ‘information’ means any material in any form,
           including records, documents, memos, e-mails,
           opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders,
           logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples,
           models, data material held in any electronic form
           and information relating to any private body which
           can be accessed by a public authority under any
           other law for the time being in force;

                    xxx   xxx     xxx

      (h) ‘public authority’ means any authority or body or
           institution of self- government established or
           constituted--
           (a) by or under the Constitution;
           (b) by any other law made by Parliament;
           (c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
           (d) by notification issued or order made by the
                 appropriate Government,

            and includes any--


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      (i)  body owned, controlled or           substantially
           financed;
      (ii) non-Government organisation         substantially
           financed,

      directly or indirectly by funds provided by the
      appropriate Government;

              xxx    xxx   xxx

(j)   ‘right to information’ means the right to information
      accessible under this Act which is held by or under
      the control of any public authority and includes the
      right to--

      (i) inspection of work, documents, records;
      (ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of
            documents or records;
      (iii) taking certified samples of material;
      (iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes,
            floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any other
            electronic mode or through printouts where
            such information is stored in a computer or in
            any other device;

8.    Exemption from disclosure of information.

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
    there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,--
    (a) information, disclosure of which would
         prejudicially affect the sovereignty and
         integrity of India, the security, strategic,
         scientific or economic interests of the State,
         relation with foreign State or lead to
         incitement of an offence;
    (b) information which has been expressly
         forbidden to be published by any court of law
         or tribunal or the disclosure of which may
         constitute contempt of court;
    (c) information, the disclosure of which would
         cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the
         State Legislature;
    (d) information including commercial confidence,
         trade secrets or intellectual property, the
         disclosure of which would harm the

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    competitive position of a third party, unless the
    competent authority is satisfied that larger
    public interest warrants the disclosure of such
    information;
(e) information available to a person in his
    fiduciary relationship, unless the competent
    authority is satisfied that the larger public
    interest warrants the disclosure of such
    information;
(f) information received in confidence from
    foreign Government;
(g) information, the disclosure of which would
    endanger the life or physical safety of any
    person or identify the source of information or
    assistance given in confidence for law
    enforcement or security purposes;
(h) information which would impede the process
    of investigation or apprehension or prosecution
    of offenders;
(i) cabinet     papers    including    records     of
    deliberations of the Council of Ministers,
    Secretaries and other officers:

      Provided that the decisions of Council of
      Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material
      on the basis of which the decisions were taken
      shall be made public after the decision has
      been taken, and the matter is complete, or
      over:

      Provided further that those matters which
      come under the exemptions specified in this
      section shall not be disclosed;
(j)   information which relates to personal
      information the disclosure of which has no
      relationship to any public activity or interest,
      or which would cause unwarranted invasion of
      the privacy of the individual unless the Central
      Public Information Officer or the State Public
      Information Officer or the appellate authority,
      as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger
      public interest justifies the disclosure of such
      information:

      Provided that the information which cannot be

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          denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature
          shall not be denied to any person.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets
    Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) nor any of the exemptions
    permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a
    public authority may allow access to information, if
    public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to
    the protected interests.

(3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i)
    of sub-section (1), any information relating to any
    occurrence, event or matter which has taken place,
    occurred or happened twenty years before the date
    on which any request is made under section 6 shall
    be provided to any person making a request under
    that section:

     Provided that where any question arises as to the
     date from which the said period of twenty years has
     to be computed, the decision of the Central
     Government shall be final, subject to the usual
     appeals provided for in this Act.

11. Third Party Information:
(1) Where a Central Public Information Officer or a
    State Public Information Officer, as the case may be,
    intends to disclose any information or record, or
    part thereof on a request made under this Act,
    which relates to or has been supplied by a third
    party and has been treated as confidential by that
    third party, the Central Public Information Officer or
    State Public Information Officer, as the case may be,
    shall, within five days from the receipt of the
    request, give a written notice to such third party of
    the request and of the fact that the Central Public
    Information Officer or State Public Information
    Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose the
    information or record, or part thereof, and invite the
    third party to make a submission in writing or
    orally, regarding whether the information should be
    disclosed, and such submission of the third party
    shall be kept in view while taking a decision about
    disclosure of information:



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           Provided that except in the case of trade or
           commercial secrets protected by law, disclosure may
           be allowed if the public interest in disclosure
           outweighs in importance any possible harm or
           injury to the interests of such third party.

      (2) Where a notice is served by the Central Public
          Information Officer or State Public Information
          Officer, as the case may be, under sub-section (1) to
          a third party in respect of any information or record
          or part thereof, the third party shall, within ten days
          from the date of receipt of such notice, be given the
          opportunity to make representation against the
          proposed disclosure.

      (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7,
          the Central Public Information Officer or State
          Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall,
          within forty days after receipt of the request under
          section 6, if the third party has been given an
          opportunity to make representation under sub-
          section (2), make a decision as to whether or not to
          disclose the information or record or part thereof
          and give in writing the notice of his decision to the
          third party.

      (4) A notice given under sub-section (3) shall include a
          statement that the third party to whom the notice is
          given is entitled to prefer an appeal under section
          19 against the decision.”

12.    It is to be noted that Section 6 of the RTI Act pertains to the
manner in which request can be made for obtaining information and
Section 19 thereof pertains to appeals that can be filed thereunder.


13.    A perusal of definition of the term ‘information’, as given in the
above-quoted Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, shows that a public
authority is required to furnish information to an applicant in the
forms specified therein, which is held by the public authority relating
to any private body. The said provision indeed indicates its wide


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sweep. But, obviously it is subject to the other provisions of the Act,
including Sections 8 and 11 thereof, quoted hereinabove.


14.    A bare reading of the said provisions clearly shows that the
public authority would be under obligation to provide information to
an applicant applying under Section 6 of the RTI Act and that it shall
be such information as held by it at the point in time the request for
such information is made. The provisions do not indicate that a
public authority, like SEBI in the present case, which is a regulatory
body empowered to call upon third parties to provide information in
terms of its own governing statute, is under an obligation to obtain
information from third parties to satisfy persons applying for such
information.


15.    In the case of CBSE and another vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and
others (supra), the Supreme Court observed as follows:

      “61. Some High Courts have held that Section 8 of the
           RTI Act is in the nature of an exception to Section 3
           which empowers the citizens with the right to
           information, which is a derivative from the freedom
           of speech; and that, therefore, Section 8 should be
           construed strictly, literally and narrowly. This may
           not be the correct approach. The Act seeks to bring
           about a balance between two conflicting interests,
           as harmony between them is essential for preserving
           democracy. One is to bring about transparency and
           accountability by providing access to information
           under the control of public authorities. The other is
           to ensure that the revelation of information, in
           actual practice, does not conflict with other public
           interests which include efficient operation of the
           Governments, optimum use of limited fiscal
           resources and preservation of confidentiality of
           sensitive information. The Preamble to the Act
           specifically states that the object of the Act is to
           harmonise these two conflicting interests. While


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     Sections 3 and 4 seek to achieve the first objective,
     Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 seek to achieve the second
     objective. Therefore, when Section 8 exempts
     certain information from being disclosed, it should
     not be considered to be a fetter on the right to
     information, but as an equally important provision
     protecting other public interests essential for the
     fulfilment and preservation of democratic ideals.

62. When trying to ensure that the right to information
    does not conflict with several other public interests
    (which includes efficient operations of the
    Governments, preservation of confidentiality of
    sensitive information, optimum use of limited fiscal
    resources, etc.), it is difficult to visualise and
    enumerate all types of information which require to
    be exempted from disclosure in public interest. The
    legislature has however made an attempt to do so.
    The enumeration of exemptions is more exhaustive
    than the enumeration of exemptions attempted in
    the earlier Act, that is, Section 8 of the Freedom to
    Information Act, 2002. The courts and Information
    Commissions enforcing the provisions of the RTI Act
    have to adopt a purposive construction, involving a
    reasonable     and     balanced     approach    which
    harmonises the two objects of the Act, while
    interpreting Section 8 and the other provisions of
    the Act.

63. At this juncture, it is necessary to clear some
    misconceptions about the RTI Act. The RTI Act
    provides access to all information that is available
    and existing. This is clear from a combined reading
    of Section 3 and the definitions of “information”
    and “right to information” under clauses (f) and (j)
    of Section 2 of the Act. If a public authority has any
    information in the form of data or analysed data, or
    abstracts, or statistics, an applicant may access such
    information, subject to the exemptions in Section 8
    of the Act. But where the information sought is not
    a part of the record of a public authority, and where
    such information is not required to be maintained
    under any law or the rules or regulations of the
    public authority, the Act does not cast an obligation
    upon the public authority, to collect or collate such

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           non-available information and then furnish it to an
           applicant. A public authority is also not required to
           furnish information which require drawing of
           inferences and/or making of assumptions. It is also
           not required to provide “advice” or “opinion” to an
           applicant, nor required to obtain and furnish any
           “opinion” or “advice” to an applicant. The reference
           to “opinion” or “advice” in the definition of
           “information” in Section 2(f) of the Act, only refers
           to such material available in the records of the
           public authority. Many public authorities have, as a
           public relation exercise, provide advice, guidance
           and opinion to the citizens. But that is purely
           voluntary and should not be confused with any
           obligation under the RTI Act.”
                                            (Emphasis supplied)


16.    The specific observation made in the above-quoted paragraph
No.63 of the said judgement clearly lays down the position of law to
the effect that the RTI Act does not place an obligation upon a public
authority like SEBI to collect or collate information not available with
it and then to furnish the same to the applicants. The said position
has been clarified in no uncertain terms.


17.    Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in
the case of CPIO vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra), while
dealing with various questions under the RTI Act, also considered the
said aspect of the matter. In the said judgement, while referring to
the definition of the term ‘information’ under Section 2(f) of the RTI
Act, the Supreme Court observed as follows:


      “20. “Information” as per the definition clause is broad
           and wide, as it is defined to mean “material in any
           form” with amplifying words including records [a
           term again defined in widest terms vide clause (i) to
           Section 2 of the RTI Act], documents, emails,
           memos, advices, logbooks, contracts, reports,
           papers, samples, models, data, material held in

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     electronic form, etc. The last portion of the
     definition clause which states that the term
     “information” would include “information relating
     to any private body which can be accessed by a
     public authority under any other law for the time
     being in force” has to be read as reference to
     “information” not presently available or held by the
     public authority but which can be accessed by the
     public authority from a private body under any
     other law for the time being in force. The term —
     “private body” in the clause has been used to
     distinguish and is in contradistinction to the term —
     “public authority” as defined in Section 2(h) of the
     RTI Act. It follows that any requirement in the
     nature of precondition and restrictions prescribed
     by any other law would continue to apply and are to
     be satisfied before information can be accessed and
     asked to be furnished by a private body.

21. What is explicit as well as implicit from the
    definition of “information” in clause (f) to Section 2
    follows and gets affirmation from the definition of
    “right to information” that the information should
    be accessible by the public authority and “held by or
    under the control of any public authority”. The
    word “hold” as defined in Wharton's Law Lexicon,
    15th Edn., means to have the ownership or use of;
    keep as one's own, but in the context of the present
    legislation, we would prefer to adopt a broader
    definition of the word “hold” in Black's Law
    Dictionary, 6th Edn., as meaning; to keep, to retain,
    to maintain possession of or authority over. The
    words “under the control of any public authority” as
    per their natural meaning would mean the right and
    power of the public authority to get access to the
    information. It refers to dominion over the
    information or the right to any material, document,
    etc. The words “under the control of any public
    authority” would include within their ambit and
    scope information relating to a private body which
    can be accessed by a public authority under any
    other law for the time being in force subject to the
    pre-imposed conditions and restrictions as
    applicable to access the information.



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22. When information is accessible by a public
    authority, that is, held or under its control, then the
    information must be furnished to the information
    seeker under the RTI Act even if there are
    conditions or prohibitions under another statute
    already in force or under the Official Secrets Act,
    1923, that restricts or prohibits access to
    information by the public. In view of the non
    obstante clause in Section 22 [ Section 22 of the RTI
    Act reads: “22. Act to have overriding effect.—The
    provisions of this Act shall have effect
    notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
    contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of
    1923), and any other law for the time being in force
    or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any
    law other than this Act.”] of the RTI Act, any
    prohibition or condition which prevents a citizen
    from having access to information would not apply.
    Restriction on the right of citizens is erased.
    However, when access to information by a public
    authority itself is prohibited or is accessible subject
    to conditions, then the prohibition is not obliterated
    and the preconditions are not erased. Section 2(f)
    read with Section 22 of the RTI Act does not bring
    any modification or amendment in any other
    enactment, which bars or prohibits or imposes
    precondition for accessing information of the
    private bodies. Rather, clause (f) to Section 2
    upholds and accepts the said position when it uses
    the expression — “which can be accessed”, that is,
    the public authority should be in a position and be
    entitled to ask for the said information. Section 22
    of the RTI Act, an overriding provision, does not
    militate against the interpretation as there is no
    contradiction or conflict between the provisions of
    Section 2(f) of the RTI Act and other statutory
    enactments/law. Section 22 of the RTI Act is a key
    that unlocks prohibitions/limitations in any prior
    enactment on the right of a citizen to access
    information which is accessible by a public
    authority. It is not a key with the public authority
    that can be used to undo and erase
    prohibitions/limitations on the right of the public
    authority to access information. In other words, a
    private body will be entitled to the same protection

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           as is available to them under the laws of this
           country.

                   xxx    xxx   xxx

      28. The expressions “held by or under the control of any
          public authority” and “information accessible under
          this Act” are restrictive [CBSE v. Aditya
          Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497 : 6 SCEC 25] and
          reflect the limits to the “right to information”
          conferred vide Section 3 of the RTI Act, which states
          that subject to the provisions of the RTI Act, all
          citizens shall have the right to information. The
          right to information is not absolute and is subject to
          the conditions and exemptions under the RTI Act.”

18.    Thereupon, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in
the case of CPIO vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra), quoted the
abovementioned paragraph Nos.61 to 63 of its judgement in the case
of CBSE and another vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and others (supra)
and thereafter, approved the said observations in the following
manner:


      “41. Para 63 quoted above has to be read with our
           observations on the last portion of clause (f) to
           Section 2 defining the word ‘information’, albeit, on
           the observations and findings recorded, we
           respectfully concur. For the present decision, we are
           required to primarily examine clauses (e) and (j) of
           sub-section (1) to Section 8 and Section 11 of the
           RTI Act.”


19.    The said position of law was subsequently followed by a
learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the case of TRAI vs.
Akshay     Kumar    Malhotra    (supra).   After     referring    to     the
aforementioned judgements of the Supreme Court, the Delhi High
Court, in its said judgement, observed as follows:



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      “13. The Supreme Court in the case of CBSE and
           another vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and others
           (supra) held that a public authority is obligated to
           disclose only the information it possesses or
           controls. It is neither required to collect information
           from a private entity, nor to compile or create
           information to satisfy an RTI applicant. Applying
           this principle, the petitioner is under no legal
           obligation to collect, compile, or generate the
           information sought by the respondent, which is
           neither a part of their records nor statutory
           functions.”

20.    We also find that the CIC itself, in various orders brought to
our notice after the Supreme Court clarified the said position of law,
passed orders in line with the said position of law and declined to
issue any direction to the public authorities like SEBI, to obtain
information from third parties like BSE, to provide information to the
applicants under the provisions of the RTI Act.


21.    We are of the opinion that in the light of the Supreme Court
having deliberated upon the common question that has arisen for
consideration in these writ petitions, there is no alternative but to
hold that the impugned orders passed by the CIC in these cases,
cannot be sustained and that they deserve to be set aside.


22.    A perusal of the main order dated 25.05.2009 passed by CIC,
in the case of Shri Bhoj Raj Sahu vs SEBI, impugned in Writ Petition
No.1710 of 2009, shows that according to CIC, any information in
the hands of a private body, accessible under law by a public
authority, is rendered accessible to an applicant under the provisions
of the RTI Act. It is upon the said conclusion reached by the CIC that
directions have been issued in the impugned orders to SEBI for
obtaining information from a third party like BSE and to provide the
same to the applicants within stipulated period of time.

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               23.   We find that the said reasoning of the CIC is in the teeth of the
               position of law clarified by the Supreme Court and therefore, it
               cannot be sustained and the impugned orders deserve to be quashed
               and set aside. Although the applicants under the RTI Act, who are
               respondents in these petitions, despite service of notice, have not
               appeared to contest these petitions, we find that since the position of
               law is clarified by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
               the aforementioned judgement in the case of CPIO vs. Subhash
               Chandra Agarwal (supra), the writ petitions deserve to be allowed
               and the orders impugned in these writ petitions deserve to be
               quashed and set aside.


               24.   In view of the above, all the writ petitions are allowed and the
               orders passed by the CIC, impugned in these writ petitions, are all
               quashed and set aside.


               25.   Rule is made absolute in above terms.


               26.   Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.




               (SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.)                        (MANISH PITALE, J.)



Priya Kambli




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