BANK OF MAHARASHTRAversusSHRI. A. B. SATARDEKAR AND ORS

Neeta Sawant                                               WP-10765 OF 2012


               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        WRIT PETITION NO. 10765 OF 2012

Bank of Maharashtra                                        …..Petitioner
           : Versus :
1. Mrs. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar
(deceased through legal heirs)
1A. Purushottam Kashinath Zarkar
2. Estate Officer, Bank of Maharashtra                     ….Respondents


                                    WITH
                        WRIT PETITION NO. 10766 OF 2012
Bank of Maharashtra                                        …..Petitioner
           : Versus :
1. Shri. A. B. Satardekar
(deceased through legal heirs)
1A. Smt. Suhita Arjun Satardekar
1B. Shri. Parashar Arjun Satardekar
2. Estate Officer, Bank of Maharashtra                    ....Respondents



Mr. Amandeep Singh with Mr. Abhijit Ranjan, Ms. Ritika Yerra i/by
Chittaranjan Shah, Kay Legal and Associates LLP for the Petitioner.

Mr. Rajesh Parab for the Respondent No.1.




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                                 CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

                                 JUDG. RESD. ON : 31 August 2026

                                 JUDG. PRON. ON : 16 September 2026.

JUDGMENT:


1)             The Petitioner-Bank has filed these Petitions challenging the
judgment dated 1 September 2012 passed by the Learned Judge, City Civil
Court, Mumbai allowing Misc. Appeal Nos. 74 of 2012 and 75 of 2012 and
setting aside the eviction orders dated 16 May 2012 passed by Respondent
No.2-Estate Officer in Eviction Case Nos.3 of 2007 and 7 of 2008.


Facts in Writ Petition No. 10766 of 2012:


2)             Petitioner is a nationalized Bank incorporated under the
Bombay Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.
There was a old structure located at Gadkari Chowk, Gokhale Road, Dadar
(West) Mumbai-400 028. One Mr. Arjun Satardekar was the monthly
tenant in respect of Room No.3 in the said chawl structure. It appears that
the Bank of Maharashtra acquired the said chawl structure and became
the owner thereof. The Petitioner-Bank a filed Suit against the tenant-
Arjun Satardekar before the Small Causes Court under the Bombay Rent,
Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bombay Rent Act) for
eviction of the tenant. The suit was apparently dismissed and tenancy and
possession of the tenanted premises continued with Mr. Arjun Satardekar.
The Bank thereafter decided to redevelop the chawl by construction of a
building and accordingly an agreement was executed on 18 December

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Neeta Sawant                                               WP-10765 OF 2012




1982 between the bank and the tenant-Arjun Satardekar in which the
Bank agreed to provide premises in the new building and to accommodate
the tenant temporarily during the redevelopment process. Accordingly,
the old structure was demolished, and a new building was constructed
and new premises were allotted to Mr. Arjun Satardekar being Room No.1
on the first-floor, admeasuring 240 sq.ft comprising of one room and a
kitchen, bathroom, WC and loft (tenanted premises). After death of Mr.
Arjun Satardekar, his legal heirs are occupying the tenanted premises.



3)             The Bank terminated the tenancy by serving notice on the
legal heirs of Arjun Satardekar and thereafter initiated eviction
proceedings before the Estate Officer under the provisions of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act). The
Estate Officer allowed the application by order dated 16 May 2012 and
directed the Respondents to vacate possession of the tenanted premises.



4)             Aggrieved by the order passed by the Estate Officer,
Respondents filed Misc. Appeal No. 74 of 2012 in the City Civil Court at
Mumbai. By judgment and order dated 1 September 2012, the City Civil
Court has allowed the Misc. Appeal and has set aside the eviction order
passed by the Estate Officer. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1
September 2012 passed by the City Civil Court in Misc. Appeal No.74 of
2012, the Petitioner-bank has filed Writ Petition No. 10766 of 2012.




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Facts in Writ Petition No. 10765 of 2012:


5)             This Petition also involves creation of tenancy in the same
building in which Shri. Dattatray Raut was the original tenant in respect
of Room No.2A. The Bank had filed the suit for eviction of the tenant
under the Bombay Rent Act on the ground of bonafide requirement before
the Small Causes Court, which was dismissed. Since Bank desired to
redevelop the chawl structure by constructing a building thereat, an
Agreement dated 19 March 1981 was executed between the Bank and the
wife of the original tenant-Smt. Janabai Raut. Under the agreement, the
tenant agreed to handover possession of the old, tenanted premises for
the purpose of reconstruction of the building and the Bank agreed to re-
induct the tenant into the new premises admeasuring 200 sq.ft BUA
comprising of one room, kitchen, bathroom and WC (tenanted
premises). After reconstructing the building, the tenant was re-inducted
into the tenanted premises on monthly rent of Rs.30/-.


6)             The Bank terminated the tenancy by serving notice dated 3
December 2007. The Bank thereafter initiated eviction proceedings under
the PP Act before the Estate Officer. By order dated 16 May 2012, the
Estate Officer allowed the application filed by the Bank and directed the
Respondents to vacate the tenanted premises. Aggrieved by the order
dated 16 May 2012, the original respondent filed Misc. Appeal No.75 of
2012 before the City Civil Court at Mumbai. By judgment and order dated
1 September 2012, the City Civil Court allowed the Appeal and set aside
the eviction order dated 16 May 2012 passed by the Estate Officer. The
Petitioner-Bank has filed Writ Petition No. 10765 of 2012 challenging the
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Neeta Sawant                                                WP-10765 OF 2012


judgment and order dated 1 September 2012 passed by the Learned Judge,
City Civil Court in Misc. Appeal No.75 of 2012 by which the eviction order
dated 16 May 2012 passed by the Eviction Officer is set aside.


Submissions


7)               Mr. Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner-
Bank submits that the City Civil Court has erred in allowing the Appeals
preferred by the Respondents and in setting aside the eviction orders. He
submits that Respondents do not enjoy the benefit of protected tenancy
either under the Bombay Rent Act or under the Maharashtra Rent Control
Act, 1999 (MRC Act). That they are mere monthly tenants whose tenancy
can be validly terminated by issuing notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act). He submits that the issue of non-
application of provisions of the Rent Act and permissibility to evict
tenants under the provisions of the PP Act is now well settled by the
judgment of the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India
                     1
Versus. Vita          . He relies on judgments of this Court in Vishwas
Krishnarao Gangurde since deceased through his legal representatives
Versus. Bank of India2 and Life Insurance Corporation of India Versus.
Abhishek Vasant Chavan3. Mr. Singh further submits that in Writ
Petition No. 10765 of 2012, the City Civil Court has grossly erred in
holding that the agreement executed with the tenant contemplated grant
of any permanent alternative accommodation. He submits that the tenant
in that case is merely inducted as a monthly tenant and there was no
1      2025 SCC Online SC 2772
2     WP NO. 6715 of 2021 decided on 26 February 2026
3     CRA No. 24 of 2022 decided on 3 July 2026.
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Neeta Sawant                                               WP-10765 OF 2012


creation of perpetual lease. That the City Civil Court has also erred in
assuming that permanent tenancy was created through a registered
agreement. That the concerned agreement has not been registered.


8)             Mr. Singh further submits that in both the cases, the Bank
never intended to create perpetual tenancy/lease. That since protection
under Rent Act is not available to the tenants, Bank is entitled to
terminate the tenancy. That upon termination of tenancy, the occupation
of Respondents is rendered unauthorized and therefore the Estate Officer
has rightly exercised the jurisdiction under the provisions of the PP Act.


9)             Mr. Singh further submits that the City Civil Court has
erroneously recorded a finding of res judicata. He submits that mere
dismissal of earlier suit by the Small Causes Court on assumption of
protected tenancy on bonafide grounds cannot be a bar on Estate Officer
exercising jurisdiction under the PP Act. That under the PP Act,
Petitioner-Bank is not even required to establish bonafide requirement
once the occupation is proved to be unauthorized. He therefore prays for
setting aside the impugned orders passed by the City Civil Court.


10)            Per contra, Mr. Parab, the learned counsel appearing for the
Respondents in both the petitions, opposes them. He submits that the
City Civil Court has rightly set aside the impugned eviction orders. That
Respondents are not trespassers or unauthorized occupants of the
premises. That they are lawful tenants way before the old structure/chawl
was purchased by the Bank. That Banks suits for bonafide requirement

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were dismissed. The Bank has acknowledged and accepted the right of the
Respondents to occupy the premises and has executed specific
agreements with the Respondents. That the Agreements are in the form
of allotment of PAAs while redeveloping the building. That the Bank has
clearly represented to the Respondents that they are entitled to
permanently occupy the premises in the new building which are virtually
like ownership. He submits that, by adopting a shortcut method under the
PP Act, the Bank is seeking to evict the Respondents from the premises.
Thus, the Respondents are lawful tenants and not merely unauthorized
occupants. He relies on judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Nusli
Neville Wadia Versus. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 4 to contend that
lawful tenants cannot be evicted by having recourse to the provisions of
the PP Act. He also relies on Circular issued by the Government of India
on 30 May 2022 directing that the provisions of PP Act cannot be enforced
for the purpose of eviction of lawful tenants. Mr. Parab accordingly prays
for dismissal of the petitions.


Reasons and Analysis


11)               Respondents/original tenants were inducted in the premises
in the old structure/chawl. The Bank had apparently initiated eviction
proceedings against the tenants of both the premises in the year 1965. In
respect of the tenant-Arjun Satardekar, R.A.E. Suit No. 8017 of 1965 was
filed in the Small Causes Court at Mumbai- seeking recovery of possession
of the premises on the ground of bonafide requirement. The suit was
dismissed by judgment and decree dated 25 August 1970. The decree has

4       2006 3 MH.L.J. 713
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Neeta Sawant                                                        WP-10765 OF 2012


attained finality as the Petitioner-Bank did not challenge the same.
Similarly, qua the tenant-Dattatray Vishnu Raut, R.A.E. Suit No. 4432 of
1965 was filed, which was also dismissed on 25 August 1970 and the
decree passed in that Suit has also attained finality.


12)            The    Petitioner-Bank        wanted      to    redevelop      the    old
structure/chawl and accepted the right of the tenants to occupy their
respective premises, it therefore decided to make an arrangement for re-
induction of the tenants in the new building. Accordingly, two
agreements were executed with the tenants of both the premises. The
agreement dated 19 March 1981 was executed with Janabai Vishnu Raut
which is an unregistered agreement. Under that agreement, the
Petitioner-Bank agreed to induct the said tenant in new premises in the
building on the rent of Rs.30/- per month. Clause 8 of the agreement
dated 19 March 1981 reads thus:


               8. The party of the One Part shall charge the rent at Rs. 30/- per month
               for an area of 200 Square Feet inclusive of all permitted increases during
               the material time when the party of the One Part will put the party of
               the Other Part in possession of the new flat. In the event, the rateable
               value of the new flat is assessed in excess of Rs. 30/- per month as rent
               for the purpose of assessing the same under Section 162(2) and 167 of
               the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the party of the One Part shall
               not be entitled to claim any taxes or increases of taxes on account of the
               rateable value so determined and fixed in excess of Rs. 30/- per month,
               as the party of the One Part shall charge the rent in respect of the new
               flat at Rs. 30/- per month inclusive of all permitted increases on the day
               when they hand over the possession to the party of the Other Part.
               However, the Tenant shall bear the electricity charges of the new flat as
               per the individual electric meter and water charges on prorata. The party
               of the One Part shall provide the separate water meter for the new flat to
               be allotted by them to the party of the Other Part.



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Neeta Sawant                                                         WP-10765 OF 2012


13)            So far as the tenant-Arjun Satardekar is concerned, a
registered agreement was executed with him by the Bank on 18 December
1982. In the agreement executed with Arjun Satardekar, the Bank
somehow used the expression ‘permanent alternative accommodation’ at
several places throughout the agreement. Clause 1 of the Agreement
reads thus :


               1. That the Landlords shall construct at their own costs a new building
               on the Plot of land bearing Cadastral Survey No. 1549 in Town Planning
               Scheme No. IV of Mahim Division situated at Gokhale Road (North),
               Gadkari Chowk, Dadar, Bombay-400 028 as per the Plans sanctioned by
               the Bombay Municipal Corporation under their sanction No. EB/4378/A
               of 3- 7- 82 by demolishing the existing structure after first providing
               temporary alternative accommodation to the Tenant till the completion
               of the new building and then shall provide and allot the permanent
               alternative accommodation as mentioned in clause No. 2 below to the
               Tenant in the newly constructed building.



14)            However, though the expression ‘permanent alternative
accommodation’ has been repeatedly used in the agreement, the same
ultimately creates tenancy in respect of the new premises. This is clear
from Clauses 2 and 3 of the Agreement which read thus:


               2. The Landlords shall provide to the Tenant aroom by way of permanent
               alternative accommodation admeasuring 240 sq.ft. of built up area at the
               monthly rent of Rs. 30/- (Rupees Thirty only) in the new building on the
               rear side of the first Floor

               3. The Tenant shall shift within eight days of receipt of the intimation
               from the Landlords to the temporary alternative accommodation bearing
               Room No. 8 provided by the Landlords in the existing structure near the
               chawl to be demolished on the same terms of tenancy and on the same
               amount of rent charged for the premises in his occupation at present. It
               is agreed that the tenancy rights of the Tenant shall continue to exist till
               the room by way of permanent alternative accommodation as agreed is
               allotted to the Tenant as stated in Clause 2 above.

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15)            While deciding Misc. Appeal No.75 of 2012 in the case of
Smt. J.V. Raut (Smt. Gunvati K. Zarkar), the learned Judge has
inadvertently copied the observations made in the judgment rendered in
Misc. Appeal No. 74 of 2012 in the case of Arjun Satardekar relating to
existence of a registered agreement and use of the words ‘permanent
alternative accommodation’. However, this inadvertent error while
deciding Misc. Appeal No. 75 of 2012 need not be over emphasized for
setting aside the order passed in Misc. Appeal No. 75 of 2012 on that
count alone. There are better reasons to set aside both the judgments and
orders passed by the City Civil Court.


16)            One of the issues involved before the City Civil Court was
about applicability of provisions of PP Act to the premises in the light of
provisions of MRC Act. In both the judgments, the issue has been
answered in favour of the Bank by holding as under:



               24. The fourth issue is regarding whether the Public Premises Act will
               apply or the Maharashtra Rent Control Act to the present case.

               It is correctly held by the Estate Officer that the Public Premises Act will
               override the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. Hence, it has been rightly
               held that the Public Premises Act applies to the present case.


17)            Thus, the City Civil Court has held that the provisions of PP
Act would prevail over the provisions of MRC Act. Under Section 2(g) of
the PP Act, the term ‘unauthorised occupation’ has been defined as
under:

               “unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any public premises, means
               the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority
               for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any

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Neeta Sawant                                                    WP-10765 OF 2012


               person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of
               grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to
               occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason
               whatsoever.


18)            Thus, occupation by a person of the public premises (i)
without authority for such occupation and (ii) upon expiry or
determination of such authorization, becomes unauthorized occupation.
In the present case, it cannot be contended that occupation of the
premises by the Respondents is without authority. However, it is the
contention of the Bank that the authority has been terminated by
issuance of notices dated 3 December 2007 and that therefore occupation
of the premises is unauthorised. The City Civil Court has however not
considered this aspect while setting aside the eviction orders. Once it is
held by the City Civil Court that the provisions of Maharashtra Rent
Control Act do not apply to the Respondents, the authority to terminate
the lease/tenancy by issuance of notice under Section 106 of the TP Act
must be recognised.


19)            On the issue of non-applicability of provisions of the MRC
Act and provisions of PP Act prevailing over the MRC Act, the law is now
well settled by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India
Versus. Vita in which it is held that the judgment in Suhas H. Pophale
vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its Estate Officer 5 is in
conflict with the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment in Ashoka
Marketing Ltd. And Another vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors. 6 and of
Three Judge bench decision in M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs.
5    2014 4 SCC 657

6    1990 4 SCC 406
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Neeta Sawant                                                        WP-10765 OF 2012


Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. 7. The Apex Court held in
paragraphs 12 and 13 in Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Vita as
under:


               12. In view of the foregoing discussion, reasons and analysis, the
               following positions of law emerges,

               (a) In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ashoka
               Marketing and the three-Judge Bench decision in M/s. Jain Ink, the view
               taken in Suhas H. Pophale which is a two-Judge Bench decision, is
               palpably incorrect and unjustified. Suhas H. Pophale cannot and does
               not hold the field.

               (b) Since, the propositions laid down in Suhas H. Pophale runs contrary
               to the decisions laid down by the Benches of larger strength in Ashoka
               Marketing and M/s. Jain Ink , the same is bad in law.

               (c) The ratio decidendi by the Bench of larger strength is binding on the
               Bench of the smaller strength, irrespective of the fact whether the
               judgment by the Bench of the larger strength is apriori or posterior, in
               point of time.

               (d) A Bench of the smaller strength cannot mark a departure from the
               decision of the Bench of larger strength, so as to vary the ratio of the
               Bench of larger strength, in guise of explaining the decision of the larger
               Bench.

               (e) It was not permissible for the two Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale to
               interpret the statutes and lay down propositions in conflict with what
               was laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing and by a
               three-Judge Bench in M/s. Jain Ink, when the set of material facts in the
               background of the controversy dealt with, were similar.

               (f) In laying down the propositions incongruent to and contrary to the
               law laid down in Ashoka Marketing, the Bench in Suhas H. Pophale
               disregarded the principle of stare decisis and violated the well settled
               law of precedent.

               13. As a sequitur, this Court reiterates the propositions of law laid in
               Ashoka Marketing

               (i) Both categories of statutes namely, the PP Act 1971 on one hand, and
               the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947, Maharashtra Rent Control Act,

7    1980 4 SCC 435
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               1999, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and similar Rent Control
               Legislations, on the other hand, are special laws. Therefore, in order to
               determine as to which Act will apply in case of conflict, reference has to
               be made to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and
               the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant
               provisions therein. Keeping in view the object and purpose underlying
               both the enactments, that is, the PP Act 1971 and the Rent Control Acts,
               the provisions of the PP Act 1971 shall override the provisions in the
               Rent Control Legislations.

               (ii) The PP Act 1971 and the State Rent Control Acts are special
               enactments in themselves. Rule generalia specialibus non derogant will
               not apply. Having regard to the purpose, policy and legislative intent of
               the PP Act 1971, the same would prevail over the State Rent Control
               Acts in respect of eviction of ‘unauthorised occupants’ of ‘public
               premises’ as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act.

               (iii) The provisions of PP Act 1971, to the extent they cover the premises
               falling within the ambit of Rent Control Act, override the provisions of
               the Rent Control Act.

               (iv) A person in unauthorised occupation of ‘Public Premises’ under
               Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control
               Act.

               (v) In cases where the tenanted premises are claimed to be governed by
               the State Rent Control Act and the same have also become ‘Public
               Premises’ within the meaning in Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971, for
               their unauthorised occupation, the PP Act 1971 will have the
               application.

               (vi) The statutory machinery envisaged under the PP Act 1971, could be
               activated for recovery of possession of public premises by any
               Government or public entity mentioned in the definition.

               (vii) The PP Act 1971 will apply to the tenancies which may have been
               created and in existence either before coming into force of the Act or
               which may have been created subsequent to coming into the force of the
               Act.

               (viii) Two conditions must be satisfied for the applicability as above.
               Firstly, the tenanted premises must fall within the purview of definition
               under Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971. Secondly, the premises should
               have been in unauthorised occupation.

             (ix) Termination of tenancy of ‘Pubic Premises’ by issuing notice under
             Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is one of the modes
             which would render the occupation of the tenant unauthorised, post the
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Neeta Sawant                                                       WP-10765 OF 2012


               date specified in such notice. This would hold true in respect of
               tenancies created before or after coming into force of the PP Act 1971.

               (x) Invocation and applicability of the provisions of the PP Act 1971 is
               not dependent upon the aspect of possession. What is material is the
               occupation of the premises which has become unauthorised occupation.
               The occupation is a continuous concept.

               (xi) The propositions enunciated in Suhas H. Pophale2 , as noticed in
               paragraph 3.3.6 of this judgment, do not, in our considered view, state
               the correct position of law. The observations made therein, with great
               respect, are not in consonance with the settled legal principles and runs
               contrary to the principle of stare decisis and stand overruled to that
               extent.


20)            Thus, it is no more res-integra that a person in unauthorized
occupation of public premises cannot invoke the protection of either the
Bombay Rent Act or the MRC Act.


21)            The learned Judge of the City Civil Court has apparently got
swayed by the fact that the words ‘Permanent Alternate Accommodation’
are used in one out of the two agreements, which is also registered (Arjun
Satardekar). However, the agreement executed in favour of the tenant-
Arjun Satardekar did not contemplate conversion of tenancy rights into
ownership rights. The relationship between the parties continued to
remain that of landlord and tenant. Even after being put in possession of
the tenanted premises in the new building, Mr. Satardekar continued to
be a monthly tenant and remained liable to pay rent of Rs. 30/- per
month. There is no dispute that the rent is paid after execution of the
agreement and is being paid even today. Thus, mere use of the word
‘permanent alternative accommodation’ in the registered agreement
executed in favour of Mr. Satardekar did not put him in a better position
than that of Janabai Raut. In both cases, the occupants continued to
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Neeta Sawant                                                       WP-10765 OF 2012


remain mere tenants. Once they ceased to enjoy protection under the
MRC Act, their monthly tenancies became terminable by issuing a notice
under Section 106 of the TP Act. In my view, therefore, the tenants have
been lawfully terminated by the Petitioner-Bank in absence of any
protection under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.


22)            Dismissal of earlier eviction suits filed under the provisions
of the Bombay Rent Act cannot have any effect on the eviction orders.
Therefore, the findings recorded by the Learned Judge of the City Civil
Court about applicability of principle of res-judicata are clearly faulty. The
Estate Officer has rightly held that bonafide requirement is a continuous
cause. Multiple suits are filed on bonafide requirement and mere
dismissal of an earlier suit filed on the basis of bonafide requirement at
that time cannot preclude landlord from bringing fresh suit based on
subsequent bonafide requirement. This position is recognized by this
Court in Vishwas Krishnarao Gangurde in which it is held in paragraph
17 of the judgment as under:


               17. So far as the last ground of bonafide requirement of Bank of India is
               concerned, I am unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the
               Petitioner that the finding recorded by the Small Causes Court on the
               issue of bonafide requirement of Bank of Karad would operate as res-
               judicata for the Estate Officer while deciding the requirement of Bank of
               India. No doubt, the Small Causes Court rejected the ground of bonafide
               requirement of Bank of Karad. However, bonafide requirement is a
               continuous phenomenon and even if requirement at a particular point of
               time is rejected, the same does not mean that bonafide requirement can
               never arise again in future. Therefore, the principle of res-judicata
               would not apply to a case involving continuous injury within the
               meaning of Section 22 of the Limitation Act.




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23)            As a matter of fact, the inquiry into existence of any bonafide
requirement is not even required in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. The PP Act does not envisage any protection to the
occupants of public premises unlike the provisions of Section 13 of the
Bombay Rent Act or Section 16 of the MRC Act. It is not necessary for the
owner of the premises to establish any ground for seeking eviction of the
occupant from the public premises. Occupation of public premises can
only be under express authority and only for so long as such authority
continues to subsist. The moment the authority comes to an end, the
occupation is automatically rendered unauthorised. In that sense, it was
not even required for the Petitioner to establish any bonafide
requirement. The authority to occupy the premises is terminated by
issuance of notices by the Bank. The moment the authority is terminated,
the occupation becomes unauthorised. In my view, therefore an inquiry
into the aspect of bonafide requirement was quite unnecessary and it is
not necessary to delve any further into that aspect.


24)            Here, the short issue is whether Respondents are entitled to
protection of their tenancy under the Bombay Rent Act or the MRC Act
and if the answer to the question is in the negative, whether their
occupation becomes unlawful upon termination of the tenancy? The City
Civil Court has held that the notice terminating the tenancy issued under
Section 106 of the TP Act is invalid and that agreements executed with
the tenants need to be canceled before taking steps against them. These
findings are recorded in paragraph 16 of the judgment as under:




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Neeta Sawant                                                        WP-10765 OF 2012


               16. It is pertinent to note that the said agreement was entered into
               between the bank and the mother of this appellant on 19.03.1981 and
               have agreed that the parties will be governed by the provisions of
               Bombay Rent Act. Of course the Public Premises Act came into picture in
               the year 1971. However, the said agreement is still in existence due to
               which, mere notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for
               terminating the tenancy of this appellant would not be valid. It has to be
               observed here that the said agreement dated 19.03.1981 will have to be
               cancelled before taking steps against this appellant. Hence, I hold that
               the tenancy of this appellant has not been validly terminated. Hence, I
               answer point no. 1 in the Negative.


25)            Thus, the City Civil Court has proceeded on a footing that
because agreement dated 18 December 1982 provides for protection
under Bombay Rent Act, so long as the agreement subsists, the Bombay
Rent Act protection would also continue. As observed above, the issue is
no longer res-integra and the judgment of the Apex Court in Life
Insurance Corporation of India Versus. Vita puts to rest the entire
controversy about protection of Rent Control Legislation in relation to
premises governed by the provisions of the PP Act. The learned Judge of
the City Civil Court did not have the benefit of the law declared by the
Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India Versus. Vita when the
impugned judgments were delivered. Now it is clear that tenancies
created in favour of the two premises cannot enjoy protection under the
MRC Act. Therefore, the tenancies could be validly terminated by issuing
notices under Section 106 of the TP Act. Here the authority to occupy the
premises is validly terminated and occupation is rendered unauthorised.


26)            In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment and
orders passed by the City Civil Court are clearly unsustainable and are



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                                  16 September 2026
               Neeta Sawant                                                  WP-10765 OF 2012


              liable to be set aside. Respondents can be granted time of 6 months to
              vacate the premises and make alternate arrangements for their residence.


              27)             I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:


                              (i)     Judgment and orders dated 1 September 2012 passed
                                      by the City Civil Court in Misc. Appeal Nos. 74 of 2012
                                      and 75 of 2012 are set aside.


                              (ii)    Eviction orders dated 16 May 2012 are confirmed.


                              (iii)   Respondents shall have time of 6 months to vacate and
                                      handover possession of the premises to the Petitioner.


                              (iv)    In the facts and circumstances of the case however, the
                                      Respondents shall not be liable to pay any damage rent
                                      for occupation of the premises post termination of
                                      their tenancies upto the period of 6 month henceforth
                                      or vacation of the premises, whichever is earlier.


               28)            With the above directions, both the petitions are allowed.
               There shall be no order as to costs.


NEETA
SHAILESH
SAWANT
Digitally signed by
NEETA SHAILESH
SAWANT
Date: 2026.09.16
19:30:33 +0530
                                                                [SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]



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                                                16 September 2026