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Bombay High Court

DHULE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, DHULEversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

Disposal
DISPOSED OFF

Holding

The prohibition on levying market fees on cotton seeds, as directed by the Director of Marketing and upheld by the Minister, is valid and does not contravene the APMC Act.

Summary

The Dhule Agricultural Produce Market Committee challenged a notice issued by the Director of Marketing that barred it from levying market fees on cotton seeds that had already been subject to fees on the raw cotton. The Committee argued that Section 29 of the APMC Act empowered it to levy such fees, while the State contended that this would constitute a prohibited multi‑point levy under the second proviso to Section 31. The High Court examined the earlier Division Bench decision in Chaware Oil Industries v. State of Maharashtra, which held that levying fees again on a product separated from the original commodity amounts to a double levy and is barred. The Court affirmed that the Director’s direction and the Minister’s confirmation were legally sound and did not violate the Act. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issues considered

  • Whether the market committee may levy market fees and supervision charges on cotton seeds after fees have already been levied on the raw cotton.
  • Whether the second proviso to Section 31 of the APMC Act prohibits such a multi‑point levy.
  • Whether the Director of Marketing’s notice and the Minister’s order are legally valid.

Legislation cited

  • Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Market Committee Act — s. 29, 31, 52-B

Subjects

  • APMC Act
  • market fees
  • multi-point levy
  • cotton seeds
  • Section 31 proviso
  • agricultural marketing
  • writ petition

Judgment

2026:BHC-AUG:35736
                                                           Writ Petition No.10891/2014
                                             :: 1 ::




                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
                                 BENCH AT AURANGABAD


                              WRIT PETITION NO.10891 OF 2014



            Dhule Agricultural Produce Market
            Committee                                       … PETITIONER

                     VERSUS

            The State of Maharashtra & ors.                 … RESPONDENTS

                                             .......
            Mr. A.G. Chavhan, Advocate h/f
            Mr. N.B. Khandare, for petitioner
            Mrs. Chaitali Chaudhari Kutti, A.G.P. for respondents No.1 & 2
            Mr. S.P. Shah, Advocate for respondent No.3
                                             ....…


                                     CORAM : SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.

                                     DATE     : 6th AUGUST, 2026

            PER COURT :


            1.          The petitioner, Agricultural Produce Market Committee

            has assailed the order dated 10/9/2014, rendered by the Hon’ble

            Minister,   Marketing,    in    Appeal     No.APP-0213/C.No.65/11/S,

            confirming the notice issued by the Director of Marketing, Pune in
                                                Writ Petition No.10891/2014
                                 :: 2 ::


File No.Marketing-5/APMC/Dhule/3386/2009, prohibiting the market

committee from levy of fees on the cotton and the seeds ginned and

unginned.


2.          The     respondent   No.3      presented    application     on

17/11/2009 before the respondent no.3, contending that the market

committee is charging market fees and supervision charges on raw

cotton vis-a-vis cotton seeds those are ginned from cotton marketed

in the market area. Consequently, the respondent No.2 issued letter,

purporting to be an order dated 29/10/2009, addressed to the

Secretary of the petitioner to forbear from collecting market fee on

cotton seeds derived from the cotton that has already been

assessed to levy.


3.          In its response to the respondent No.2, the petitioner

submitted that it is entitled to levy and charge fees on cotton seeds

which the respondent association is liable to pay. By virtue of the

notification dated 8/11/1976 (effective from 28/11/1977), cotton

seeds were explicitly included in the schedule to the Act.


4.          As the respondent No.2 did not consider the said

notification and request, the petitioner again presented detailed

representation on 20/12/2010 requesting to issue directions to the
                                               Writ Petition No.10891/2014
                                 :: 3 ::


association to pay market fees and supervision charges. As the

grievance of the petitioner was not addressed by the respondent

No.2, the petitioner presented an appeal under Section 52-B of the

APMC Act before the Hon’ble Minister. The Hon’ble Minister, vide

order dated 10/9/2014, rejected the appeal and confirmed the order

issued by the respondent No.2.


5.         Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, the

notice vis-a-vis the eventual order rendered by the Hon’ble Minister

are unsustainable in law. The APMC Act more particularly Section

29 confers powers upon the market committee to levy and collect

fees on agricultural produce marketed within the market area.

Therefore, it is permissible for the market committee to levy the

fees.


6.         Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has

supported the impugned order, submitting that the attempt of the

market committee is to levy the fees has to be regarded as multi-

point imposition of levy which is not permissible, and that the said

issue is dealt in detail by the Division Bench of this Court in case of

Chaware Oil Industries, Karanja & ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra

& ors. [ AIR 1985 Bom 160 ]. As such, prayed for dismissal of the
                                               Writ Petition No.10891/2014
                                  :: 4 ::


petition.


7.            Upon hearing learned counsel for the respective parties

and perusal of the material on record, admittedly the notice issued

by the Director of Marketing is concerned, it forbeared the market

committee from imposing the market fees on the cotton seeds those

are separated from the cotton, on which already the market fees

has been levied.       While endorsing the said order, the Hon’ble

Minister has dismissed the appeal.


8.            The contention of the petitioner that the inclusion of

cotton and the seeds in the schedule would ipso facto entail the

market committee to assess the cotton and its seeds to levy the

market fees, cannot be countenanced for the reason that, allowing

such an assessment would lead to multi-point imposition of levy,

which is forbidden in law.


9.            The said issue is no more res integra in view of the

judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Chaware Oil

Industries (supra) more particularly paragraph Nos.12 and 14,

which read as under :



            “12. Now, we turn to the last point relating to the
            second proviso to S.31 which mandates against multi
                                                 Writ Petition No.10891/2014
                                 :: 5 ::


        point imposition of levy in the same market area "in
        relation to agricultural produce in respect of which fees
        under this section have already been levied and collected
        therein." We must confess at the outset that this point has
        presented some difficulty in arriving at a conclusion. The
        argument is somewhat on the following lines: Levy of
        market fees and supervision charges is on ad valorem
        basis. The sale of Kapas was subjected to this levy. The
        price of Kapas included price of cottonseed. In the
        process of separation of cottonseed from Kapas by
        ginning, the identity of the cotton seed or its essential
        character is not changed in any manner whatsoever and
        under the circumstances subjecting the cottonseed again
        to the levy of market fees amounts to double levy "in
        relation to" the same agricultural produce which is
        prohibited by this proviso.


        14. . . . . . . Indeed Supreme Court has gone to the extent of
        observing that if transaction of any commodity subjected to levy,
        even the transaction of its product will not be subject to levy over
        again. The term "in relation to" used in the second proviso to
        S.31 is significant. There has been levy "in relation to" cotton
        seed though when it was a part of Kapas and only because it is
        physically separated from Kapas transaction relating to it cannot
        be subjected to second levy specially when it has not undergone
        any change. After all we are interpreting an impost legislation
        which always has to be construed in favour of a subject in case of
        doubt. Our attention was invited to certain decisions under the
        Sales Tax Act in which it has been held that unginned cotton and
        ginned cotton are two different commodities. There can be no
        doubt about this proposition. But nothing has turned on this
        consideration in the two Supreme Court decisions referred to
        above. Under the circumstances it seems to us that petitions must
        succeed on this last point.”



10.        Thus, direction issued by the Director of Marketing,

forbearing the petitioner from enforcing multi-point imposition of
                                                Writ Petition No.10891/2014
                                 :: 6 ::


levy, suffers from no illegality and cannot be faulted.


11.         In view of the aforesaid aspect, the order of the Hon’ble

Minister does not warrant any interference. Resultantly, the petition

is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.         No order as to

costs.




                               (SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.)




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