Bombay High Court
SHRI ISHWARSING RAJENDRASING RAJPUTversusTHE COMMISSIONER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GR. MUMBAI
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The writ petition is dismissed; the termination of the petitioner’s services stands.
Summary
The petitioner, a teacher employed on probation by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, was terminated on 14 July 2014 following a departmental inquiry that found him guilty of grave misconduct arising from a criminal case in which he was convicted under Sections 506(II), 323, 354 and 363 of the IPC. The petitioner challenged the termination by filing a writ petition, arguing that the inquiry was based on oral information, that the criminal case was pending revision, and that the delay in filing the writ amounted to laches. The respondents contended that the conviction was final for the purposes of service discipline, that the petitioner was afforded a fair hearing, and that the High Court cannot act as an appellate body over the factual findings of a properly conducted departmental inquiry. The Court examined the principles governing writ jurisdiction under Article 226, emphasizing that the High Court may intervene only where the inquiry violated natural justice or statutory procedure, not to re‑evaluate the evidence. Relying on precedents, the Court held that the petitioner’s delay and the adequacy of the departmental process precluded interference, and dismissed the writ petition.
Issues considered
- The legality of the departmental inquiry and termination in view of the petitioner’s criminal conviction.
- Whether the High Court can review the factual findings of a departmental inquiry under Article 226.
- Whether the petitioner’s delay in filing the writ petition amounts to laches and bars relief.
- Effect of a pending criminal revision on the disciplinary proceedings.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code — s. 323, 354, 363, 506(II)
Subjects
- termination of service
- departmental inquiry
- natural justice
- writ petition
- Article 226
- delay
- laches
- criminal conviction
- public servant discipline
Judgment
903-WP-11241-2022.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 11241 OF 2022
Shri. Ishwarsing Rajendrasing Rajput ]
Age : 34 years, Occupation : Service ]
R/o. Room No.1312, Hanuman Colony, ]
Gali No.1, AasheleGaon, Ulhasnagar, ]
District-Thane 421004. ].....Petitioner
Versus
1. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of ]
Greater Mumbai ]
Near CST Railway Station, Mumbai-400001. ]
]
1a. The Office of Dy. Commissioner ]
(Education) ]
F/South ward, Office of B.M.C. Building, ]
Dr. Ambedkar Road & Jagannath Bhatnakar ]
Junction, Parel, Mumbai 400012. ].....Respondents
.....
Mr. Chadrashekhar S. Patil, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Santosh Parad, for the Respondent No.1-MCGM.
Ms. Veena Sonawane, Admin Officer, ‘N Ward, present in Court.
..…
CORAM : M. S. KARNIK &
SANDESH D. PATIL, JJ.
DATE : 17th SEPTEMBER 2026
JUDGMENT [PER SANDESH D. PATIL, J.] :-
1. By the present Writ Petition, the Petitioner is seeking quashing
and setting aside of the impugned order dated 14th July 2014.
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Digitally signed by
MANISHA MANISHA
BALKRISHNA
BALKRISHNA TALEKAR
TALEKAR Date: 2026.09.24
11:00:54 +0530
903-WP-11241-2022.doc
2. By the impugned order dated 14 July 2014 passed by the
Respondent-Corporation the Petitioner was terminated from the
services. The Petitioner in this case was a teacher appointed in the
BMC school managed by Respondent No. 1-Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai. The Petitioner was appointed on 24 th June, 2009 in
Nehru Nagar Municipal Corporation Hindi School, ‘S Ward’,
Kanjurmarg, vide an Appointment Order dated 23 rd June, 2009. The
said order indicates that the order was for a period of 3 years. The
order is at ‘Exhibit A’ to the Petition.
3. It is the case of the Petitioner that during the period of
probation, one Mr. Govind Kanojia, who was the father of the student
studying in his school, filed an F.I.R against the Petitioner under the
provisions of Sections 506(II), 323 and 354 of Indian Penal Code
(IPC) on 9th November, 2009. During pendency of the criminal case,
the Respondent commenced the preliminary inquiry against the
Petitioner on 2nd September 2011 and the charge sheet was served on
the given date upon the Petitioner. The Petitioner was suspended
from work on 1st July, 2011. The Petitioner therefore had filed a Writ
Petition in this court bearing No. 10804 of 2013, seeking revocation
of his suspension. During pendency of this Writ Petition, the
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departmental inquiry concluded. The Inquiry Officer had found that
the Petitioner had committed grave misconduct, and therefore the
services of the Petitioner were terminated.
4. The Petitioner had, on 4th January, 2022, withdrawn the Writ
Petition No. 10804 of 2013, which was filed by him. The Petitioner
thereafter filed the present Writ Petition.
5. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the action
taken on the basis of the oral information received by the
Headmistress is per se illegal. He submitted that there is
inconsistency between the version stated in the F.I.R., the version
stated by the victim, and the version stated by the other witnesses.
He argued that no Complaint was filed or produced on record to
show that the offence has been committed by the Petitioner at the
residence, he argued that the story was concocted and that the victim
was not cross-examined. He argued that there is a Criminal Revision
Application No.62 of 2016, which is filed by the Petitioner against
the order of conviction. He contended that the Petitioner had
challenged the Show Cause Notice in Writ Petition No. 10804 of
2013, during pendency of the said Writ Petition, the impugned order
was passed, and the departmental proceedings ought not to have
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been conducted, especially in light of the fact that the Petitioner's
Writ Petition was pending in this court.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
other hand, strenuously objected the Petition. He submitted that the
offence is very serious in nature and that the victim was the student
of Petitioner and was studying in the 7 th standard in school. He
tendered across the Bar the judgment and order passed by the 53rd
Metropolitan Magistrates Court, Mumbai, on 7th October, 2014,
whereby the Petitioner was convicted of the offence punishable
under the provisions of Section 354, 323, 363, 506(II) of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC). He submitted that only because a revision against
the said sentence is pending would not ipso facto mean that the
conviction is stayed. He submitted that, the Petitioner was appointed
on probation basis vide order dated 23 rd June, 2009 in the school and
he had committed the offence immediately within 6 months thereof
i.e. on 8th November, 2009. He submitted that the Petitioner was
granted due opportunity of being heard. A full-fledged departmental
inquiry was conducted and upon conclusion of the said inquiry, the
Petitioner was terminated from the service.
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7. He laid much stress on the order of termination, which was
passed on 14th July, 2014 and that the present Writ Petition filed on
26th August, 2022. He submitted that there was a gross delay in filing
the Writ Petition and this Petition deserves to be quashed and set
aside only on this ground.
8. Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties
and perused the documents on record. The Petitioner was appointed
as a teacher in a Municipal School run by Respondent No.1. The
appointment was made on 23rd June, 2009 and immediately within a
period of 6 months, the Petitioner committed the offence on 8 th
November, 2009. The Petitioner was appointed on probation basis.
The allegations were very serious in nature, inasmuch as the offence
is alleged to have been committed against the victim who happened
to be his student. We have perused the order passed by the Trial
Court in proceedings bearing No. 654/PW/2009 dated 7 th October,
2014. The observations made in the said judgment while convicting
the Petitioner shows how serious the offence is. We are however not
swayed away by the findings of the Criminal Court.
9. The Petitioner was granted a full-fledged hearing while the
departmental inquiry was conducted. It is not the case of the
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Petitioner that there was any breach of Principles of Natural Justice.
The Petitioner was given a Show Cause Notice, which was challenged
by him by filing a Writ Petition No. 10804 of 2013. The Petitioner
could not obtain any relief till the year 2022 and later withdrew the
Petition on the ground that, during the pendency of the Petition, the
services of the Petitioner were terminated. The impugned order
terminating the services of the Petitioner was passed on 14 th July,
2014. The Petitioner, however, preferred the present Petition on 26 th
August, 2022.
10. The reasons assigned by the Petitioner namely that, he was a
layman and was under a wrong impression that the Petition
challenging the Show Cause Notice is pending and until the same is
decided, no further or separate proceedings were required to
challenge the impugned order dated 14th July, 2014. This explanation
of the Petitioner only highlights the proposition that the Petitioner
was ignorant about the law. It is a well settled position of law that
‘Ignorantia juris non excusat’- ignorance of law is not an excuse. It is
not the contention of the Petitioner that he had no knowledge of the
passing of the order dated 14th July, 2014, which is impugned in the
present Petition. The contention that the Petitioner was having no
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knowledge that a fresh Petition was required to be filed challenging
the impugned order dated 14 th July, 2014 cannot be accepted in law.
The Supreme Court in the Judgment of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co.
Ltd. Vs. Government of U.P. and Ors.1 held as under:
“…..Every individual is deemed to know the law of the
land. The courts merely interpret the law and do not
make law. Ignorance of law is not an excuse for not taking
appropriate steps within limitation. Therefore the
argument that the appellant did not know the true legal
position is not one that can be accepted in law…..”.
11. The Petition deserves to be dismissed on the grounds of delays
and laches itself. We have also gone through the impugned order.
The reasons which are assigned in the impugned order cannot be
termed as perverse. It is the case of the Petitioner that the reasons
assigned in the Order of Departmental Inquiry were inadequate and
that the punishment imposed was shockingly disproportionate.
12. Fair opportunity was given to the Petitioner. It is settled law
that this Court while exercising the Writ Jurisdiction, cannot sit in
appeal over the findings of the departmental inquiry. Unless and until
it is shown that the said findings were perverse or shocking to the
conscience, this court would not substitute its view to that of the
1 (1975) 4 Supreme Court Cases 378
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Inquiry Committee.The Supreme Court in the Judgment of State of
Andhra Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Sree Rama Rao2 held as under:
“…..The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal
over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty
of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the
evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere
where the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation
of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous
to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or
where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar
grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the
enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts
and if there be some legal evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that
evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ
under Article 226 of the Constitution…..”.
2 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6
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13. In this view of the matter, this Court does not find it fit to
exercise its jurisdiction in favor of the Petitioner. For the reasons
mentioned above, the Writ Petition No.11241 of 2022 is dismissed.
(SANDESH D. PATIL, J.) (M. S. KARNIK, J.)
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