SHREE SAMARTH SHRIPATI BABA SHIKSHAN SANSTHAversusTHE ESTATE OFFICER CENTRAL RAILWAY AND ORS

2026:BHC-AS:38937
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                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 12308 OF 2026


               Shree Samarth Shripati Baba Shikshan Sanstha,
               A Public Trust registered under the Bombay
               Public Trusts Act, 1950 (now the Maharashtra
               Public Trusts Act, 1950) under Registration No.
               E-359 (Poona), founded on 07/03/1955,
               conducting the school known as “Shree Samarth
               Shripati Baba Janta Vidyalaya (Primary)” at
               Railway Quarter Nos. D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4,
               near Railway Community Hall, Tadiwala Road,
               Pune – 411 001.

               Through its Secretary Mrs Rupali Vikram
               Bhalerao, aged about 45 years, Occupation:
               Teacher, residing at S. No. 27/1, Munjaba Vasti,
               Near Dhaneshwar School, Dhanori, Pune.                 ...Petitioner

                     Versus

               1. The Estate Officer, Central Railway, Pune,
               having office at the Office of the Divisional
               Railway Manager, Central Railway, Railway
               Station Road, Pune – 411 001.

               2. The Divisional Railway Manager, Central
               Railway, Pune having office at Railway Station
               Road, Pune – 411 001.

               3. Union of India, through the General Manager,
               Central Railway, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj
               Terminus, Mumbai – 400 001.

               4. The State of Maharashtra, through the            …Respondents
               Government Pleader, High Court, Appellate Side,
               Bombay.


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Mr. Sumant Deshpande, with Rahul Kulkarni, for the Petitioner.
Ms. Nisha Valani, for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
Ms. Sulbha Chipade, AGP, for Respondent No.4-State.

                              CORAM :        N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                       RESERVED ON :         18th SEPTEMBER 2026
                  PRONOUNCED ON :            22nd SEPTEMBER 2026


JUDGMENT:

1.     Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and, with the consent of

the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2.     By this Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the

Petitioner takes exception to a judgment and order dated 2 nd September

2026 passed by the learned District Judge, Pune, in Civil PPE Appeal

No. 1 of 2024, whereby the Appeal preferred by the Petitioner against

an order dated 5th December 2023 passed by the Estate Officer, Central

Railway, Pune, directing the eviction of the Petitioner under the

provisions of Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized

Occupants) Act, 1971 (“the PPE Act, 1971”), came to be dismissed.

3.    The background facts leading to this Petition can be stated in

brief as under:

3.1   The Petitioner is a Public Charitable Trust registered under the

Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. The Petitioner runs, “Shree

Samarth Shripati Baba Janata Vidyalaya”, a Marathi medium, primary

school with a pre-primary English Section at Tadiwala Road, Pune.

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3.2   The Petitioner claims the Divisional Railway Manager, Central

Railway (R2), had put the Petitioner into possession of Railway Quarter

Nos. D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4 at Tadiwala Road Colony, Pune, (“the public

premises”) for the purpose of running the said school. Initially,

Respondent No.2 had rendered assistance to the Petitioner to run the

school by providing grant-in-aid

3.3   Respondent No.2 contends that, an Agreement was executed on

1st October 1974 with the Petitioner, allowing the Petitioner to use and

occupy the public premises for running the school for a period of two

years only.

3.4   It appears, under a communication dated 26 th April 1989,

Respondent No.2 professed to terminate the said Agreement dated 1 st

October 1974. It was, inter alia, contended that the Railway Board has

revised the rates of the licence fees and called upon the Petitioner to

pay the arrears of the licence fees at the revised rate from 1 st August

1980 to 31st July 1989 and execute a fresh Agreement. Under the cover

of the said letter dated 26th April 1989 copies of the new Agreement

incorporating new revised fixed rates were enclosed for the acceptance

of the Petitioner and return of one copy thereof for the record of

Respondent No.2.

3.5   It seems, Respondent No.2, thereafter, decided to terminate the

Agreement and regain the possession of the public premises. As is


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evident from the record, the Estate Officer had initiated proceedings

under the PPE Act, 1971, being PPE Case No. 1 of 2011, seeking to evict

the Petitioner who was stated to be in unauthorised occupation. Upon a

statement being made by the Secretary of the Petitioner that the public

premises would be vacated in two to three months, the said proceeding

was purportedly dropped.

3.6   On 21st September 2021, a fresh notice under Section 4 of the

PPE Act, 1971 was issued to the Petitioner. The proceeding commenced

before the Eviction Officer (R1). It appears that, after causing

appearance through an Advocate, the Petitioner did not participate in

the proceeding before the Estate Officer despite ample opportunities.

3.7   Eventually, after appraisal of the material on record including the

events that had transpired in the earlier proceeding No. 1 of 2011, the

Estate Officer returned a finding that the Petitioner-trust was in

unauthorised occupation of the public premises. Resultantly, by an order

dated 5th December 2023, the Petitioner-trust was directed to vacate the

public premises.

3.8   Being aggrieved, the Petitioner preferred an Appeal before the

District Judge, Pune. Two principal grounds were raised in the Appeal.

First, there was a fresh Agreement in the year 1989 and, thus, the

notice under Section 4, dated 21st September 2021 was invalid as it

proceeded on the premise that the 1974 Agreement was terminated by


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Respondent No.2. Consequently, the Petitioner-trust cannot be said to

be in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. Second, as the

Petitioner-trust has been in open, continuous and hostile possession of

the public premises, since the date of the termination of the Agreement,

it had perfected its title by way of adverse possession.

3.9   By the impugned judgment and order, the learned District Judge

repelled both the contentions. It was held that, inter alia, there was no

material to show that a fresh Agreement was executed in the year 1989

and the reliance on the letter dated 26th April 1989 , whereby the

Petitioner was informed that rates of licence fees were revised and the

Petitioner was called upon to return one copy of the Agreement after

acceptance thereof, was at best an offer and no concluded contract

between the parties came in force.

3.11 Being further aggrieved, the Petitioner has preferred this Petition.

4.     I have heard, Mr. Sumant Deshpande, the learned Counsel for

the Petitioner, Ms. Nisha Valani, the learned Counsel for Respondent

Nos. 2 and 3 and Ms. Sulbha Chipade, the learned AGP, for Respondent

No.4-State. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I

have also perused the material on record.

5.    Mr. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that

the notice under Section 4 of the PPE Act, 1971, which was based on

the purported termination of the Agreement dated 1 st October 1974,


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was itself illegal. Since there was renewal of the agreement in the year

1989, as evidenced by the letter dated 26 th April 1989, the occupation

of the Petitioner’s Trust cannot be said to have become unauthorized

within the meaning of clause (g) of Section 2 of the PPE Act, 1971.

Once the foundational fact of the occupation of the Petitioner having

been rendered unauthorized was not proved, the entire proceeding for

the eviction of the Petitioner under Section 5 of the PPE Act, 1971,

stood vitiated.

6.    As a second limb of the submission, Mr. Deshpande would urge

that, the rent was accepted from the Petitioner even after the said letter

dated 26th April 1989. It was only since the year 2010, Respondent

No.2 stopped raising the bills and accepting the rent. The learned

District Judge, according to Mr. Deshpande, failed to appreciate that,

both the parties had acted under an impression that the agreement

stood renewed in the year 1989. Thus, there was a renewal of the

agreement by the conduct of the parties. In these circumstances, the

fact that the Petitioner could not place on record a copy of the

agreement, which came to be executed pursuant to the aforesaid

renewal letter, could not have been arrayed against the Petitioner.

7.    In contrast to this, Ms. Nisha Valani, learned Counsel for

Respondent Nos.2 and 3, would submit that the contentions now sought

to be urged on behalf of the Petitioner are not only demonstrably


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incorrect but also malafide. In the year 2014 itself, the Secretary of the

Petitioner had appeared in the proceedings initiated earlier and sought

2 to 3 months time to vacate the public premises. Believing the

undertaking of the then Secretary of the Petitioner, the said proceedings

was dropped. At that time, the defence of renewal of agreement was

not at all raised. Even in the instant eviction proceedings before the

Estate Officer, the Petitioner did not appear despite multiple

opportunities. There is not an iota of material to indicate that, a fresh

agreement was executed pursuant to the communication dated 26 April

1989. Nor any office bearer of the Petitioner Trust has affirmed an

affidavit before the authorities below that there was such a renewal of

the agreement. A bald and vague stand was taken that the documents

were lost in the incidents of burglary at the school premises.        The

learned District Judge was, thus, fully justified in negating such

contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner.

8.    Ms. Valani further urged with a degree of vehemence that, the

petitioner who had come in occupation of the public premises had the

audacity to raise a defence of acquisition of title by adverse possession.

Therefore, this Petition does not deserve to be entertained in exercise of

the discretionary jurisdiction.

9.    In Rejoinder, Mr. Deshpande attempted to salvage the position by

canvassing a submission that, in this Petition, the Petitioner is not


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pursuing the ground of adverse possession which was inadvisedly taken

by the Petitioner before the authorities below.

10.   At the outset, it must be recorded that, the contentions on behalf

of the Petitioner raised before the authorities below premised on the

acquisition of title by adverse possession do not deserve any

countenance. Having came in the occupation of the subject premises

under the terms of an express grant, the possession of the Petitioner

would never become adverse until all the classical requirements of nec

vi nec clam nec precario were satisfied. In any event, the plea of

renewal of the agreement is inherently incongruous with the acquisition

of title by way of adverse possession.

11.   This takes me to the pivotal question whether the occupation of

the Petitioner of the public premises could be termed “unauthorized”.

Clause (g) of Section 2 of the PPE Act, 1971, defines the term

“unauthorized occupation”, as under :

           “(g) “unauthorized occupation”, in relation to any public
           premises, means the occupation by any person of the
           public premises without authority for such occupation,
           and includes the continuance in occupation by any person
           of the public premises after the authority (whether by way
           of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he
           was allowed to occupy the premises, has expired or has
           been determined for any reason whatsoever.”
12.   The phraseology of clause (g) of Section 2 indicates that the

Parliament has used the words ‘means’ and ‘includes’ to define

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unauthorized occupation. The definition is thus in two parts. The first

part covers in its fold the occupation by any person of the public

premises without authority. The second part includes the continuance

in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority

under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has

been determined. The authority to occupy the premises may be by way

of grant or any other mode of transfer. The expression “any other mode

of transfer” further expands the nature of the authority under which the

person in occupation came in the occupation of the public premises. It

includes a lease, which is one of the mode of the transfer of the

property.   Consequently, even a person who is in occupation of the

public premises after the term of lease has expired, or the lease is

otherwise determined, can be said to be in unauthorized occupation of

the public premises.

13.   A profitable reference in this context can be made to the

Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of

Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Anr. V/s. Punjab National Bank and Ors. 1

wherein the import of the definition of unauthorized occupation was

expounded, as under :

            “30.     The definition of the expression 'unauthorised
            occupation' contained in Section 2(g) of the Public
            Premises Act is in two parts. In the first part the said
            expression has been defined to mean the occupation

1 (1990) 4 SCC 406
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           by any person of the Public premises without authority
           for such occupation. It implies occupation by a person
           who has entered into occupation of any public
           premises   without   lawful    authority    as   well   as
           occupation which was permissive at the inception but
           has ceased to be so. The second part of the definition
           is inclusive in nature and it expressly covers
           continuance in occupation by any person of the public
           premises after the authority (whether by way of grant
           or any other mode of transfer) under which he was
           allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has
           been determined for any reason whatsoever. This part
           covers a case where a person had entered into
           occupation legally under valid authority but who
           continues in occupation after the authority under
           which he was put in occupation has expired or has
           been determined. The words "whether by way of grant
           or any other mode of transfer" in this part of the
           definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a
           lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the
           Transfer   of   Property   Act.    The     definition   of
           unauthorised occupation contained in Section 2(g) of
           the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case
           where a person has entered into occupation of the
           public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but
           whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in

           accordance with law.”         (emphasis supplied)



14.   In the said case, after adverting to the decision in the case of

Brigadier K.K.Verma V/s. Union of India2, the Supreme Court clarified

2 AIR 1954 Bom 358
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that after the decision in the said case, the legislature intervened and

introduced the definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation' in

the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1958,

which definition has been reproduced in Section 2(e) of the Public

Premises Act and in the said definition the legislature has taken care to

make an express provision indicating that the expression 'unauthorised

occupation' includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the

public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any

other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the

premises has expired or has been determined for any reason

whatsoever.

15.   The core controversy that thus wrenches to the fore is, whether

the occupation of the Petitioner became unauthorized on account of the

revocation of the authority granted to the Petitioner to occupy the

public premises. The defence of the Petitioner entirely rests on the

purported renewal of the agreement as evidenced by the letter dated

26th April 1989.

16.   At this stage, it is necessary to note that no material could be

placed on the record of the Estate Officer or the Appellate Authority to

show that in pursuance of the letter dated 26 th April 1989, a fresh

agreement was executed by and between the parties to renew the lease.




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17.   Mr. Deshpande made a valiant attempt to wriggle out of the

situation by forcibly canvassing a submission that both the parties have

acted under an impression that the agreement was renewed and, thus,

the conduct of Respondent No.2 of acceptance of the rent even after the

purported termination of 1st October 1974 agreement vide the said

letter dated 26th April 1989 by the Respondent No.2, constituted an

assent for the creation of new tenancy.

18.   The aforesaid submission brings to the fore the legal implications

of the tenant continuing in possession of the leased premises after the

expiry of the term of the lease and/or the consequences that emanate

from the acceptance of the rent after the expiry of the term of the lease,

under the provisions of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.

19.   The legal position is well settled. The act of holding over after

the expiration of the term does not, by itself, create a new tenancy. Nor

mere acceptance of the amount equivalent to rent by a landlord from

the tenant in possession after the determination of the lease, per se

constitutes the evidence of a new agreement of tenancy. The creation of

a new tenancy has to be a bilateral act. There ought to be consent of

both the lessor or lessee for the creation of new tenancy; express or

implied by conduct.

20.   A profitable reference can be made to the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Bhawanji Lakhamhi & Ors. V/s. Himatlal


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Jamnadas Dani and Ors.3, wherein it was enunciated that the act of

holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy

of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of

the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A

distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession

after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and

a tenant doing so without his consent.         The observations in para No.9

read as under :

          “9. The act of holding over after the expiration of the term
          does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains
          in possession after the determination of the lease, the
          common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A
          distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing
          in possession after the determination of the term with the
          consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his
          consent. The former is a tenant at sufferance in English
          Law and the latter a tenant holding over or a tenant at
          will. In view of the concluding words of section 116 of the
          Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a
          better position than a tenant at will. The assent of the
          landlord to the continuance of possession after the
          determination of the tenancy will create a new tenancy.
          What the section contemplates is that on one side there
          should be an offer of taking a new lease evidenced by the
          lessee or sub-lessee remaining in possession of the
          property after his term was over and on the other side
          there must be a definite consent to the continuance of
          possession by the landlord expressed by acceptance of
3(1972) 1 SCC 388
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          rent or otherwise. In Kai Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia v.
          Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden and another 4, the Federal
          Court had occasion to consider the question of the nature
          of the tenancy created under section 116 of the Transfer
          of Property Act and Mukberiea J. speaking for the
          majority said, that the tenancy which is created by the
          "holding over" of a lessee or under-lessee is a new tenancy
          in law even though many of the terms of the old lease
          might be continued in it, by implication; and that to brine
          a new tenancy into existence, there must be a bilateral
          act. It was further held that the assent of the landlord
          which is founded on acceptance of rent must be
          acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the
          tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it……”


21.   In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court did not approve the

submission, like the one sought to be canvassed by Mr. Deshpande in

this case, that the absence of a formal agreement manifesting consent of

the lessee to accept the lease at the revised rent was of no significance.

The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph No.13 are

material, and, hence, extracted below :

        “13. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that whenever
        rent is accepted by a landlord from a tenant whose tenancy
        has been determined, but who continues in possession, a
        tenancy by holding over is created. The argument was that
        the assent of the lessor alone and not that of the lessee was
        material for the purposes of section 116. We are not inclined
        to accept this contention. We have already shown that the


4 1949-50 FCR 262
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        basis of the, section is a bilateral contract between the
        erstwhile landlord and the erstwhile tenant. If the tenant has
        the statutory right to remain in possession, and if he pays the
        rent, that will not normally be referable to an offer for his
        continuing in possession which can be converted into a
        contract by acceptance thereof by the landlord. We do not say
        that the operation of section 116 is always excluded whatever
        might be the circumstances under which the tenant pays the
        rent and the landlord accepts it. We have earlier referred to
        the observations of this Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka V/s.
        Kartik Chandra Das5 regarding some of the circumstances in
        which a fresh contract of tenancy may be inferred. We have
        already held the whole basis of section 116 of the Transfer of
        Property Act is that, in case of normal tenancy, a landlord is
        entitled, where he does not accept the rent after the notice to
        quit, to file a suit in ejectment and obtain a decree for
        possession, and so his acceptance of rent is an unequivocal
        act referable only to his desire to assent to the tenant
        continuing in possession. That is not so where Rent Act exists;
        and if the tenant says that landlord accepted the rent not as
        statutory tenant but only as legal rent indicating his assent to
        the tenant's continuing in possession, it is for the tenant to
        establish it. No attempt has been made to establish it in this
        case and there is no evidence, apart from the acceptance of
        the rent by the landlord, to indicate even remotely that he
        desired the appellants to continue in possession after the
        termination of the tenancy. Besides, as we have already
        indicated, the animus of the tenant in tendering the rent is
        also material. If he tenders the rent as the rent payable under
        the statutory tenancy, the landlord cannot, by accepting it as
        rent, create a tenancy by holding over. In such a case the

5 (1961) 3 SCR 813
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        parties would not be id idem and there will be no consensus.
        The decision in Ganga Dutt (supra), which followed the
        principles laid down by the Federal Court in Kai Khushrao
        Bezonjee Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden and another

        (supra) is correct and does not require reconsideration.”



22.   The aforesaid decision was followed by the Supreme Court in the

case of C. Albert Morris V/s. K. Chandrasekaran and Ors. 6 In that case

also, an argument was advanced on behalf of the occupant premised on

the receipt of rent by the landlord after the cancellation of the lease.

The Supreme Court observed that, the consensus of judicial opinion in

this country was that a mere continuance in occupation of the demised

premises after the expiry of the lease, notwithstanding the receipt of an

amount by the quondam landlord would not create a tenancy so as to

confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of tenant or a right to be in

possession.

23.   After adverting to a number of judgments including the decision

in the case of Bhawanji Lakhamshi and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court

concluded that, mere acceptance of rent by the landlord respondent

herein from the tenant in possession after the lease has been

determined either by efflux of time or by notice to quit would not create

a tenancy so as to confer the erstwhile tenant the status of a tenant or a

right to be in possession.


6 (2006) 1 SCC 228
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24.   In the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, the submission on

behalf of the Petitioner that, notwithstanding the absence of any

document to evidence creation of lease after the termination of the

earlier agreement dated 1st October 1974, the subsistence of the lease

can be inferred from the conduct of the parties or the purported

acceptance of the rent, cannot be accepted unreservedly. Even if one

were to assume that a copy of the agreement was forwarded by the

Respondent No.2 to the Petitioner to convey its acceptance by executing

the same, yet, in the absence of such acceptance on the part of the

Petitioner, no bilateral agreement to create a new tenancy can be said to

have come in force. The consent of the lessee cannot be presumed.

25.   Nor the fact that the Respondent No.2 accepted some amount

even after the aforesaid letter dated 26th April 1989 terminating the

earlier agreement, by itself, justifies an inescapable inference that a

fresh lease was created and the occupation of the public premises by the

Petitioner was reckoned by the Respondent No.2 as authorized.

26.   Moreover, upon perusal of the material on record this Court finds

that there was no clinching evidence to demonstrate that the Petitioner-

trust even paid the rent at the revised rate beyond the year 1990. Thus,

even if the case of the Petitioner that it had paid rent at the revised rate

for about a year, after the letter dated 26th April 1989, is accepted at par,

that would not lead to an inescapable inference that the authority to


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occupy the public premises was granted for an indefinite period of time

or in perpetuity, much less the lease became indeterminable.

27.   On the contrary, the material on record indicates that Respondent

No.2 reckoned the jural relationship between the Respondent No.2 and

Petitioner trust as that of licensor and licensee and what was professed

to be revised was the licence fee and the bills were also raised towards

the revised nominal licence fee.

28.   Thus, looked at from any perspective the termination of the

authority to occupy the public premises cannot be faulted at as the

Petitioner-trust failed to establish that after the agreement dated 1 st

October 1974, was terminated, the authority to occupy the public

premises was granted for a particular term or that the lease was

otherwise indeterminable.

29.   The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that, the

challenge to the impugned order is devoid of substance. The Petition,

therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

30.   Hence, the following order:

                                       ORDER

      (i)    The Writ Petition stands dismissed.

      (ii)   Rule discharged.

             No costs.

                                               [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]


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                           31.        At this stage, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner seeks stay to

                           the execution and operation of the order passed by the Estate Officer.

                           32.        The learned Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 and 3 strongly

                           opposed the prayer. The Court is informed that the school is running in

                           the public premises. Around 200 students are pursuing education in the

                           school run in the public premises. An abrupt eviction of the Petitioner-

                           trust from the public premises will adversely affect the educational

                           prospects of the students.

                           33.        In these circumstances, this Court considers it expedient in the

                           interest of justice to grant a reasonable time to the Petitioner to vacate

                           the public premises. Thus, time is granted to the Petitioner – trust till

                           31st December 2026, to vacate the public premises.



                                                                         [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




Signed by: S.S.Phadke       ARS                                     19/19
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 23/09/2026 17:54:31