CERAFLUX INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED, THR. ITS DIRECTOR.versusSUNIL DIPAK PATIL

                                                            3-WP-12730-2025 (C).doc


              IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                       CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                     WRIT PETITION NO. 12730 OF 2025
        Ceraflux India Private Limited
        F-59, 60, MIDC Gokul Sihrgaon,
        Kolhapur 416 234                                 ….Petitioner

        VERSUS

        Sunil Dipak Patil
        Age: 37 years, Occu: Nil,
        R/p. Plot No. 7B, Shahu Mill Colony,             …..Respondent
        Rajarampuri, Kolhapur.

        Mr. M. S. Topkar i/by Ms. Bhargavi Patil, Mr. Neev Patil, B. D.
        Manolkar, Mr. Mark Dhanwade, advocate for the petitioner.
        Mr. Dheeraj D. Patil a/w Mr. Vidyasagar Chavan, advocate for
        respondent.

                                CORAM :      SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.
                                DATED:      18th APRIL 2026.

        JUDGMENT:

        1.    Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of the

        parties, Petition is finally decided at the admission stage.

        2.    Petitioner raises an exception to the order rendered by the

        Industrial Court, Kolhapur in Revision Application (ULP) No.

        29/2024, allowing the application presented by the employee and

        directing the petitioner herein to allow the employee to resume

        duties and pay due (wages) salary till final adjudication of the



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        complaint.

        3.    The Respondent employee was appointed by the Petitioner in

        the year 2008 and eventually became permanent employee. Upon

        attaining permanency, an employee is conferred with statutory

        protections and before imposing any penalty or initiating action,

        predominantly and essentially, the employer has to take recourse to

        the statutory provisions. Those are aimed to confer protection to the

        employees.

        4.    However, the initiation of prosecution against the respondent,

        the petitioner herein issued a show cause notice calling upon the

        explanation from the respondent. The employee replied by stating

        the false implication for ulterior motive.

        5.    Dehors the statutory provisions, the petitioner issued a letter

        of termination with an assertion that the employee remained absent

        and also suppressed registration of F.I.R. in relation to the alleged

        incident. In the wake of aforesaid aspect having lost the confidence

        of the petitioner, as such order of dismissal was served.

        6.    Raising an exception to the order of dismissal, the employee

        presented Complaint (ULP) No. 04/2023 under Section 28(1) r/w

        Schedule IV item 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 1(d), 1(f) and (g) of The



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        Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair

        Labour Practices Act, 1971 (Hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’)

        contending that the petitioner herein has indulged in unfair labour

        practice while dismissing employee, which entails reinstatement

        with continuity of service along with other service benefits. Coupled

        with the same, the application seeking reinstatement was also

        presented.

        7.    The Petitioner resisted the claim presenting its written

        statement. The Labour Court by its order dated 10/07/2024 decided

        the application under Section 30(2) of the said Act. It is thereafter,

        the employee approached the Industrial Court presenting Revision

        Application No. 29/2024. The Industrial Court while regarding the

        order of termination as illegal, perverse and resultantly, allowed the

        Revision directing the petitioner herein to allow the complainant to

        join the duty and pay due salary till final adjudication of the

        complaint pending before the Labour Court.

        8.    In the aforesaid backdrop, Learned counsel for the petitioner

        submits that the Industrial Court is not justified in rendering the

        order directing the reinstatement of the employee as an

        interlocutory measure, since the employer has every right to justify


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        the termination before the Tribunal and the interim relief of final

        nature, at an interim stage ought not to have been granted.


        9.      In the process, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed

        reliance on the following Judgments in support of his contentions:


             i. Zilla Parishad V. Maya Tukaram Sonawane1,


             ii. Executive Engineer, M.S.E.B. Morshi and Anr V. Industrial
                 Court, Amravati2,

             iii. Air India Corp., Bombay v. V. A. Rebellow3,


             iv. Uttarakhand and Others V. Sureshwati4


             v. Maruti Krishna Naik V. Advani Oerlikon Ltd. And Ors5.



        10.     Per contra learned counsel for the Respondent has supported

        the order submitting that in the wake of the fact that the employee

        who has attained permanency is entitled to statutory protections

        and those cannot be rendered redundant by the employer while

        terminating the services of the employee in an unprecedented

        manner. The termination of the employee is in gross violation of the


        1    2016(7) All M.R. 652
        2    2001(3) Mh.L.J.
        3    1972 SCC Online SC 128
        4    SCC Online SC 3
        5    2025 II CLR 455


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        provisions of the standing orders. Therefore, the Industrial Court is

        justified in rendering the order of reinstatement as such prayed for

        dismissal of petition and to buttress the same, placed reliance on the

        following Judgments:

            i. Hrishikesh Vasantrao Kumbhar, Sangli V. Zilla Parishad, Sangli,

                through its Chief Executive Officer and ors6

            ii. M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour

                Court, Meerut and Ors7.

        11.     Upon considering the rival submissions and material on record

        undoubtedly, the respondent-employee was appointed in the year

        2008 and as such, has attained permanency. Resultantly statutory

        protections are conferred upon the permanent employee. On the

        anvil of permanency of the employee, in the event the employer

        proposes to initiate any action and impose penalty, either minor or

        major, essentially the employer has to take recourse to the statutory

        provisions since imposition of penalty is regulated and controlled by

        the standing orders.


        12.     Being a permanent employee, necessary recourse ought to

        have been taken to the standing orders, more particularly Sub Rule

        6   2016 III CLR 354
        7   (1984) 1 Supreme Court Cases 1


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        (4) of Order 23 of The Maharashtra Industrial Employment

        (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959 which reads as under:

                “23 (4) The employment of a permanent workman
                employed on the monthly rates wage period of wages
                may be terminated by giving him one month's notice or
                on payment of one month's wages (including all
                admissible allowances) in lieu of notice.”


        13.    Although the term ‘may’ is used in Sub Rule (4) of Order 23,

        same is to be construed as mandatory, as the legislative intent

        behind the expression carries mandatory force. In interpreting the

        legal import of ‘may,’ this Court must consider factors such as the

        object and scheme of the Act, the context of its usage, and the

        purpose and the mischief sought to be addressed. These stipulations

        suggest that the expression mandates strict compliance. If the term

        were interpreted as merely directory, the significance of the

        statutory mandate would be frustrated. Therefore, to uphold the

        object of the Act, 'may' has to be read as conveying mandatory force.

        This principle is no more res integra, in the wake of verdict of the

        Hon’ble Apex Court in Bachahan Devi & Anr. vs. Nagar Nigam,

        Gorakhpur and Anr8.


        8 2008 (12) SCC 372


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        14.   A bare perusal of the Sub-Rule (4) of Order 23 of the said

        Rules, unequivocally indicates the recourse to issue notice was

        essential, in lieu of salary or one month salary in advance before

        serving the order of dismissal, which is a major penalty. Imposition

        of penalty is controlled and regulated by the standing orders.


        15.   If the Statute requires an act to be done in a particular

        manner, that can be achieved only through a prescribed manner or

        not at all. The said issue is no more res integra in the light of the

        Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Municipal

        Corporation Of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) Vs. Abhilash Lal & Ors.9

        16.   Similarly, in the case of State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh10 the

        Hon’ble Apex Court has held that where the statutory provisions has

        a very serious repercussions, it implicitly makes it imperative and

        obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to

        the statutory provisions. All the safeguards and protections provided

        under the statute have to be kept in mind while exercising such

        power. The statutory mandate in any eventuality cannot be

        annihilated by the petitioner while dismissing the employee.


        17.   When confronted with the same, learned counsel for the
        9 (2020) 13 SCC 2341
        10 (1999) 6 SCC 172


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        petitioner Mr. Topkar in fairness has conceded the fact that the Sub

        Rule (4) of Order 23 of the said Rules is not complied with,

        however, the order of dismissal does not preclude the petitioner

        from justifying its action of dismissal before the Tribunal.


        18.   The submission of the petitioner that once it is found that no

        domestic inquiry has been held or the inquiry is found to be

        defective, the case of defective inquiry stands at par as that of no

        inquiry which entitles the petitioner to extend the opportunity to the

        employer and to adduce the evidence before it, and it is always

        open for the employer to adduce evidence justifying its action.

        There is no debate in that regard, however, the issue which falls for

        consideration is in relation to the entitlement of employee to

        statutory protection and the effect of departure of same while

        initiating drastic action of dismissal would entail reinstatement.


        19.   So far as the submissions of the learned counsel for the

        petitioner that the employer has every right to defend its action

        before the Tribunal justifying the termination. There is no debate in

        regard to the said principles, however, the same cannot be pressed

        into service when an interlocutory order of reinstatement is

        rendered by the Industrial Court after taking into account the


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        entitlement of employee for reinstatement.


        20.   Nevertheless, the abrupt discontinuance of such long standing

        engagement solely on the basis of alleged incident, veracity of the

        same is subject matter of trial.


        21.   At this juncture, it would be appropriate to make reference to

        the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Abhilash Lal

        (Supra) which reiterates the principle that if a statute requires a

        thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that

        manner or not at all. As such, in absence of strict compliance with

        the statutory mandate on the part of the petitioner while passing the

        order of dismissal which is drastic in nature, the employee has made

        out a prima facie case and the same is appreciated in the letter and

        spirit by the Industrial Court while allowing the Revision.


        22.   In any case, the Petitioner is not absolved from complying

        with the safeguards and protection available to employee under the

        Statute to the employee, while exercising the power of initiating

        inquiry including dismissal. However, under no eventuality,

        departure with the statutory protection is permitted. The statutory

        rules and regulations are aimed to confer the protection to the




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        employee and those cannot be rendered redundant in the manner

        which the petitioner has taken.


        23.    Further, reliance can be placed upon the case of Deoraj Vs.

        State of Maharashtra and ors11 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court

        underscored the necessity of preventing irreparable hardship and

        ensuring that the ultimate relief is not rendered nugatory upon

        satisfaction that there exists prima facie case. Applying those

        principles in the instant case, the Industrial Court rightly exercised

        its discretion to safeguard and ensure the ends of justice were met

        during the pendency of the proceedings.


        24.    Thus, in my considered view, the decisions on which the

        reliance is placed by the petitioner are rendered in peculiar facts

        and circumstances of each individual case. As stated herein above,

        respective employer in the aforesaid judgments has conducted an

        inquiry which eventually culminated into the order of dismissal.

        Therefore, in view of the distinguishing fact, the judgments in cases

        upon which the reliance is placed would be of no assistance to

        advance the case of the petitioner, having considered the peculiar



        11 2004 (4) SCC 697



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        facts of the present case.


        25.   So far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the

        respondent on the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in

        the case of Hrishikesh Kumbhar (Supra) wherein the Division Bench

        of this Court has held that taking into consideration the private

        dispute, prima facie would have no foundation regarding any

        misconduct in discharge of official duty of the employee and

        secondly, even the employee is sought to be dismissed on the basis

        of sexual assault, there was no material available at the time when

        the impugned order of dismissal was issued, except the bald

        assertion of the complainant in that case. In view of above, the

        order of Industrial Court of reinstatement does not warrant

        consideration.


        26.   In the light of aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, I am

        of the considered view that the order rendered by the Industrial

        Court does not warrant interference by this Court in its

        extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution

        of India.


        27.   Resultantly, the petition sans merits. Accordingly, the same




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        stands dismissed.


        28.   Rule is discharged.



                                                 [SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]




                        IRESH  Digitally signed by
                               IRESH MASHAL

                        MASHAL Date: 2026.04.18
                               19:29:53 +0530




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