KUMAR HOUSING CORPORATION PRIVATE LIMITEDversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

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                      Sayali
                                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                        WRIT PETITION NO.13655 OF 2017

                      Kumar Housing Corporation Private Limited         … Petitioner

                                               Vs.

                           1. The State of Maharashtra
                           2. Inspector General of Registration and
                              Chief Controllers of Stamps
                           3. The Deputy Inspector General of
SAYALI                        Registration and Deputy Controller of
DEEPAK
UPASANI                       Stamps
Digitally signed by
SAYALI DEEPAK
UPASANI
                           4. Joint District Registrar and Collector
Date: 2026.08.20
11:26:32 +0530                of Stamps                                 … Respondents


                      Mr. Girish S. Godbole, Senior Advocate with Mr.
                      Murlidhar Kumar and Mr. Kaustubh Thipsay for the
                      Petitioner.
                      Ms. Sulbha D. Chipade, AGP for respondent Nos.1 to 4-
                      State.

                                           CORAM                   : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                           RESERVED ON             : AUGUST 17, 2026.

                                           PRONOUNCED ON           : AUGUST 20, 2026

                      JUDGMENT:

                      1.       By this Writ Petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
                      Constitution of India, the Petitioner has challenged the legality,
                      validity, and correctness of the Judgment and Order dated 19 July
                      2014 passed by the Collector of Stamps, as well as the Order dated



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16 March 2015 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of
Registration and Deputy Controller of Stamps.

2.    The facts which, according to the Petitioner, have resulted in
filing of the present Writ Petition may be stated as follows. On 9
June 1995, the Petitioner, which was then known as Sukumar
Estates Limited, entered into an Agreement with (1) Prakash
Pashankar and (2) Namdev Pashankar. Under the said Agreement,
the Petitioner agreed to acquire all rights, title and interest in the
land bearing Survey No. 138/5, admeasuring 4 H 83 A, situated at
Pashan, Pune, for a total consideration of Rs. 3,12,00,000/-. A
Certificate of True Value was issued in respect of the said
Agreement. At that time, stamp duty of Rs. 100/- was paid. Clause
8 of the Agreement provided that possession of the property was to
be handed over to the Petitioner after measurement of the
property was carried out. However, according to the Petitioner, the
subsequent Supplementary Agreement confirms that actual and
physical possession of the property had been handed over even
before execution of the Agreement dated 9 June 1995. Thereafter,
on 31 December 1999, the Petitioner entered into another
Agreement with (1) Prakash Pashankar, (2) Namdev Pashankar,
(3) Vadanbai Prakash Pashankar, (4) Santosh Prakash Pashankar
and (5) Sandesh Prakash Pashankar. Under the said Agreement,
rights, title and interest in land bearing Survey No. 138/5,
admeasuring 2 H 10 A, situated at Pashan, Pune, were agreed to
be conveyed in favour of the Petitioner along with Development
Rights, for a consideration of Rs. 1,88,00,000/-. This Agreement
was described as a Development Agreement. A Certificate of True



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Value was issued in respect of this Agreement and stamp duty of
Rs. 100/- was paid at that time. Clause 3 provided that possession
of the property would be handed over to the Petitioner after
measurement.    However,     according   to   the   Petitioner,    the
subsequent Supplementary Agreement shows that actual physical
possession had been handed over before execution of the
Agreement dated 31 December 1999.

3.   The documents dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999
were thereafter submitted before the Collector of Stamps under
Section 31 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act for adjudication. The
documents were impounded under Section 33. According to the
Petitioner, stamp duty was thereafter paid on both the Agreements
as follows: (i) Rs. 3,12,000/- was paid on the Agreement dated 9
June 1995, under which the total consideration was Rs.
3,12,00,000/-; and (ii) Rs. 1,88,000/- was paid on the Agreement
dated 31 December 1999, under which the total consideration was
Rs. 1,88,00,000/-. Thus, according to the Petitioner, a total amount
of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid towards stamp duty on the two
Agreements.

4.   On 4 September 2003, Mr. Prakash Pashankar executed two
separate Supplementary Agreements in favour of the Petitioner,
confirming the earlier Agreements. The Supplementary Agreement
bearing Registration No. 7689 confirmed the contents of the
Agreement dated 9 June 1995 and recorded that possession of the
property had been handed over before execution of the Agreement
dated 9 June 1995. The other Supplementary Agreement, bearing
Registration No. 7690, confirmed the contents of the Agreement



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dated 31 December 1999 and recorded that possession of the
property had been handed over before execution of that
Agreement. It is the case of the Petitioner that no fresh or
additional   consideration   was       paid   under   either   of   these
Supplementary Agreements. On 19 March 2012, a Deed of
Conveyance was executed between Mr. Prakash Pashankar and the
Petitioner. According to the Petitioner, no consideration was paid
under this Deed of Conveyance. The details of the amounts which
had been paid under the earlier Agreements were recorded in the
Conveyance Deed. The Deed referred, in its recital, to a suit which
was pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune and
which was settled on 28 July 2004. The Conveyance Deed stated
that it was being executed “in full and final settlement” of all
rights, title, and claims of the Vendor. The Second Schedule to the
Conveyance Deed referred to an area of 57,964 sq. metres out of
the total land area of 69,300 sq. metres referred to in the earlier
Agreements. According to the Petitioner, the reduction in the area
was because 10,750 sq. metres of land had been acquired by the
Pune Municipal Corporation for road widening. The recital in the
Conveyance Deed referred to the fact that possession had been
handed over to the Petitioner and that the Petitioner had started
development of the property. The Petitioner states that since an
aggregate stamp duty of Rs. 5,00,000/- had been paid on the
earlier Agreements having an aggregate consideration of Rs.
5,00,00,000/-, the Petitioner paid the balance stamp duty of Rs.
45,00,000/- at the time of execution of the Conveyance Deed. The
document was thereafter duly stamped and registered.




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5.   On 7 November 2013, the Sub-Registrar, Haveli issued a
Notice to the Petitioner stating that the market value of the
property covered by the Conveyance Deed was Rs. 61,09,89,500/-.
On that basis, it was alleged that the Petitioner was liable to pay
deficient stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/-. Thereafter, on 19 July
2014, Respondent No. 4 passed an Order directing the Petitioner to
pay the alleged deficient stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- together
with penalty at the rate of 2% per month. It was held that, in the
beginning, stamp duty at the rate of 1% had been paid by giving
the document the name “Development Agreement”. It was held
that the later attempt to refer to the Agreements of 2003 as part of
a conveyance was only an afterthought. It was held that, in the
year 2012, after realizing that a substantial amount of stamp duty
would become payable, the Petitioner paid the remaining 9%
stamp duty, amounting to Rs. 45,00,000/-. The authority held that
the transactions under the earlier Agreements were different in
nature and, therefore, the benefit under Section 4 could not be
given to the Petitioner. The authority held that though possession
of the property had been handed over to the Petitioner, such
possession was only for the purpose of development of the
property and was in the nature of a licence. According to the
authority, possession after execution of the Conveyance Deed
would stand on a different footing.

6.   On 1 December 2014, the Sub-Registrar, Haveli No. 13
issued a Final Notice once again calling upon the Petitioner to pay
the alleged deficient stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/-. In the year
2014, the Petitioner filed an Appeal under Section 32B of the



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Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, being Appeal No. 22 of 2014,
before Respondent No. 3. The submission of the Petitioner before
the Appellate Authority was that the Agreements of 1995 and 1999
were, in substance, Agreements for Sale and that, since possession
had been handed over under those Agreements, they were
required to be treated as deemed conveyances. The Petitioner
pointed out that, in the year 1997, a Notice had been issued
calling upon the Petitioner to pay stamp duty under Article 25, but
the demand made under that Notice was not accepted by the
Petitioner.

7.    By the Order dated 16 March 2015, Respondent No. 3
dismissed the Appeal filed by the Petitioner. It was held that, after
obtaining a Certificate of True Value, it was the duty of the
Petitioner to pay proper stamp duty on the concerned documents.
The Appellate Authority held that since the Petitioner was
contending that the Agreements dated 1995 and 1999 were
Agreements for Sale which were liable to be treated as deemed
conveyances because possession had been handed over, stamp duty
ought to have been paid on those documents under Article 25 of
Schedule I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. It was held that
the nature of the Agreements executed in the year 2012 and the
Supplementary Agreements executed in the year 2003 was
different. The Appellate Authority held that the property was
included in the Annual Statement of Rates under the Bombay
Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules,
1995, and that its market value was Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. Since the
market value was higher than the consideration mentioned in the



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documents, it was held that stamp duty at the rate of 5% was
payable.

8.    Mr. Girish Godbole, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
the Petitioner, invited my attention to the impugned orders and
submitted that both the Authorities have proceeded on a clear
misunderstanding of the law. According to him, the Authorities
have misdirected by proceeding on the basis that stamp duty is
payable only by looking separately at each instrument and not by
considering the real nature of the entire transaction. He submitted
that the instruments dated 9 June 1995, 31 December 1999, 4
September 2003 and 19 March 2012 were all connected with one
and the same transaction. According to him, this was one
continuous transaction by which the owner of the land, namely
Pashankar, conveyed the land to the Petitioner. He submitted that,
once the documents are viewed in their proper sequence and in
the background of the entire transaction, Section 4 of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act was applicable. According to him, stamp
duty on the full market value of the property had been paid under
the earlier instruments. Therefore, when the Deed of Conveyance
dated 19 March 2012 was executed, no stamp duty was payable on
the same transaction. He submitted that the instrument dated 19
March 2012 was entitled to the benefit available under Section 4
and, therefore, the Authorities were not justified in demanding any
or deficit stamp duty.

9.    Mr. Godbole submitted that merely because a document is
given a particular name, its real character does not get decided
only by such name. According to him, the instrument dated 9 June



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1995 was described as an Agreement and the instrument dated 31
December 1999 was described as a Development Agreement.
However, what is important is the actual substance and effect of
the documents. He submitted that under these Agreements, the
entire right, title, and interest in the property were agreed to be
conveyed and given to the Petitioner. The Petitioner was given the
right to construct tenements and flats, sell them to purchasers and
thereafter convey the building as well as the land to the occupiers
or to their society. He submitted that actual physical possession of
the property was handed over to the Petitioner under these
Agreements. According to him, once possession was handed over
and the Agreements in substance provided for transfer of rights in
the land, the Agreements were required to be treated as deemed
conveyances. Therefore, the description of the document as a
“Development Agreement” was not conclusive. He submitted that
the documents were in substance instruments relating to sale and
transfer of the land. Since stamp duty on the full market value had
been paid in respect of those instruments, the Respondents were
bound to give credit and benefit of such stamp duty under Section
4 while considering the instrument dated 19 March 2012.
According to him, no deficit stamp duty could therefore have been
declared payable.

10.   Mr. Godbole then referred to Section 2(na) of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, which defines “market value” in
relation to any property forming the subject matter of an
instrument. He submitted that the definition means the price
which such property would have fetched if it had been sold in the



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open market on the date of execution of the instrument or the
consideration stated in the instrument, whichever is higher. He
submitted that, in the present case, the consideration mentioned in
the Agreements dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999 was
higher than the market value of the property on the respective
dates of execution of those Agreements and the subsequent
Confirmation Deeds. According to him, therefore, for the purpose
of calculation of stamp duty, the consideration mentioned in the
relevant documents, being higher than the market value as
determined on the relevant date, was required to be taken into
account. He submitted that the Authorities could not ignore the
market value and consideration prevailing on the date of execution
of the earlier instruments and determine the liability by applying
the market value prevailing at a later point of time.

11.   Mr. Godbole relied upon the judgment of this Court in
Jitendra Manohardas Thakker and Anr. vs. The Deputy Inspector
General of Registration and Deputy Controller of Stamps and
Others, Writ Petition No. 2370 of 2024, decided on 16 February
2026. He relied upon the decisions in Suhas Damodar Sathe vs.
State of Maharashtra and Another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
Bom 576, and Thakkar Investment and Finance Company vs. Chief
Controlling   Revenue    Authority    and   Inspector    General       of
Registration and Controller of Stamps and Others , reported in
2026 SCC OnLine Bom 4685.

12.   Ms. Sulbha Chipade, learned AGP, on the other hand,
supported the impugned orders. She invited my attention to
Paragraph 5(g-a) of Schedule I and submitted that stamp duty is



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payable under Article 25 in respect of an Agreement and the
records or memorandum relating to such Agreement. According to
her, the different documents involved in the present case are
separate instruments and are different in nature. She submitted
that, for this reason, the stamp duty paid on a document described
as a Development Agreement cannot be deducted against the
stamp duty payable on an Agreement for Sale. According to her,
since the nature and character of the documents are different, the
benefit claimed by the Petitioner by way of deduction of stamp
duty paid on the Development Agreement cannot be granted.

13.   Ms. Chipade submitted that Documents Nos. 7689 and 7690
of the year 2003 are Development Agreements, whereas Document
No. 2414 of the year 2012 is an Agreement for Sale. According to
her, both these documents are different and independent
documents. Therefore, stamp duty is required to be determined on
the market value of the property covered by the respective
documents in accordance with Article 25 of Schedule I to the
Maharashtra Stamp Act. She submitted that the decision of this
Court in Writ Petition No. 9923 of 2014, M/s Prasun Developers
vs. Government of Maharashtra & Ors., decided on 30 January
2015, is applicable to the facts of the present case and supports the
action taken by the Authorities.

14.   Ms. Chipade submitted that, under the Maharashtra Stamp
(Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995, the
property in question falls in the category of Department No.
20/354.1. According to her, after taking into consideration Notice
No. 16 B, the applicable rate for the property was Rs. 16,800/- per



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square metre. On that basis, the total market value of the property
was determined at Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. She submitted that this
market value was required to be considered in accordance with
Section 2(na) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act. Since the property
was situated within the limits of a Municipal Corporation, stamp
duty at the rate of 5% was payable under Article 25(B)(i) of
Schedule I. According to her, on the market value so determined,
the total stamp duty payable came to Rs. 3,05,49,475/-. She
submitted that, after giving credit for the amount of Rs.
45,00,000/- paid by the Petitioner, the balance amount of Rs.
2,60,49,475/- remained payable. According to her, the said
amount was therefore liable to be recovered from the Petitioner.
She submitted that the Petitioner was liable to pay the maximum
penalty, namely twice the amount of the deficient stamp duty,
together with penalty at the rate of 2% per month from 19 March
2012, as provided under Section 32A(4) of the said Act.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

15.   I have considered the rival submissions made by both the
parties. I have gone through the Agreements dated 9 June 1995
and 31 December 1999, the translated order placed on record, the
impugned orders and the relevant provisions of law to which my
attention has been invited by the learned counsel. In my view, the
real question is about the actual legal nature of the rights which
were created under these documents. It is necessary to see
whether all these instruments were used for completing one
transaction and, if that is so, whether the Deed of Conveyance
dated 19 March 2012 could again be subjected to stamp duty by



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taking the market value prevailing in the year 2012.

16.   The learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Petitioner
submitted that the documents dated 9 June 1995, 31 December
1999, 4 September 2003, and 19 March 2012 were all part and
different steps of one transaction. According to him, the
transaction had started when the owners agreed to transfer their
rights in the land in favour of the Petitioner and possession was
handed over. The later documents were only steps for completing
and recording the same transaction. On the other hand, the
learned AGP supported the orders passed by the Authorities.
According to her, the earlier documents were Development
Agreements, whereas the document of the year 2012 was an
Agreement for Sale or Conveyance. Therefore, these were different
instruments and separate stamp duty liability was attracted on
each of them.

17.   Before going into these rival submissions, it is necessary to
see the documents. The document dated 9 June 1995 is described
as an “AGREEMENT”. The clause regarding possession records that
“The direct open and vacated possession of the said property is to
be given by the Giver in Writing to the Taker in Writing by taking
Govt. measurement of the said property.” The same document
gives substantial rights to the Petitioner in respect of development
of the property. It states that “You will have full rights and
authority to commence construction development on the said
property by entering the said property for carrying out
development and to complete the same by carrying out
construction of building.” It is recorded that the rights and licence



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for development would continue until the full ownership rights
were changed in favour of the purchasers, societies or nominees.

18.   The Agreement dated 31 December 1999 shows that
substantial rights were given to the Petitioner. The document
records that “Entire rights and authority have been given to you to
commence Construction development on the Said property by
entering the Said property for Carrying out development and to
complete the Same by carrying out construction Of building.” It
records that “open and actual possession of the property described
in the above para 1 has been given today by us to you for
development work”. However, the same clause connects such
possession with the future documents of transfer and with
ownership of the property being transferred in the name of the
Petitioner or its nominees. Therefore, this document cannot be
understood only as an ordinary permission for doing development
work. At the same time, the document says that possession was
given “for development work” and refers to the right and licence
continuing till the ownership rights were changed. Thus, the
submission of the Petitioner that the nomenclature of the
documents is not conclusive deserves to be accepted. A document
may be called an Agreement, Development Agreement or
Supplementary Agreement. Only the name given to the document
cannot decide the liability towards stamp duty. The contents of the
document, the rights created under it, the nature of possession and
the legal effect of the document are required to be seen. Even the
translated material placed on record shows the contention of the
Petitioner that “The registered instruments are agreements of sale



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and not development agreements” and that actual possession had
been handed over. The same material shows that merely because
the registering authority treated a document as a development
agreement, the real nature of that instrument was still required to
be decided from its substance.

19.   However, this by does not mean that the whole contention of
the Petitioner has to be accepted as it is. The documents of the
years 1995 and 1999 contain provisions relating to transfer of
property, development rights and possession. Therefore, whether
these documents are called agreements for sale, development
agreements or documents having some mixed character, the
important question in the present matter is whether they formed
part of the same transaction which was completed by the
Conveyance Deed dated 19 March 2012.

20.   In this background, Section 4 becomes important. The
relevant provision reads as follows:

      “Section 4. Several instruments used in single transaction
      of development agreement, sale, lease, mortgage or
      settlement.—
      (1) Where, in the case of any development agreement,
      sale, lease, mortgage or settlement, several instruments are
      employed for completing the transaction, the principal
      instrument only shall be chargeable with the duty prescribed
      in Schedule I for the conveyance, development agreement,
      lease, mortgage or settlement, and each of the other
      instruments shall be chargeable with a duty of five hundred
      rupees instead of the duty (if any) prescribed for it in that
      Schedule.”




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21.   The Section 4 applies where “several instruments are
employed for completing the transaction”. Therefore, the enquiry
is not limited only to finding whether all documents have the same
title or whether they were executed on the same date. What is
required to be seen is whether several instruments were in fact
used for completing one transaction of sale, development
agreement, lease, mortgage, or settlement.

22.   Sub-section (2) provides that the parties may decide which
one of the instruments is to be treated as the principal instrument.
Sub-section (3) provides that if the parties do not determine the
principal instrument, the Officer before whom the document is
produced may determine the same. The proviso states:

      “Provided that the duty chargeable on the instrument so
      determined shall be the highest duty which would be
      chargeable in respect of any of the said instruments
      employed.”
23.   Therefore, Section 4 cannot be understood to mean that
stamp duty can be avoided. The provision protects the revenue
because the principal instrument is required to bear the highest
stamp duty which would be chargeable amongst the several
instruments used for completing the transaction. At the same time,
the provision does not permit the same transaction to be treated as
separate transactions only because more than one instrument was
executed for completing the same.

24.   In the present matter, the record shows a continuous
connection between the earlier transactions and the Conveyance
Deed dated 19 March 2012. The translated order records that the



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parties had executed the Agreements dated 9 June 1995 and 31
December 1999. These were registered as Documents Nos.
7689/2003 and 7690/2003. Thereafter, the Conveyance was
registered on 19 March 2012 as Document No. 2414/2012. The
material on record shows that the Conveyance related to the
property which was the subject matter of the earlier documents. At
the time of registering the Conveyance in the year 2012, the
Authorities treated the earlier documents as having connection
with the Conveyance. The aggregate consideration under the
earlier transactions was taken as Rs. 5,00,00,000/-. On that basis,
duty at the rate of 10% was calculated at Rs. 50,00,000/-. After
giving credit of Rs. 5,00,000/-, which was paid on the earlier
documents, the Petitioner paid the balance amount of Rs.
45,00,000/- at the time of the Conveyance. This factual position is
recorded in the material available on record.

25.   For the purpose of registration of the Conveyance in 2012,
the Authorities treated the earlier transactions as connected with
the Conveyance and gave credit for the stamp duty paid.
Thereafter, for making a demand, the Authorities proceeded as if
the earlier transactions and the Conveyance were unrelated
transactions. In my view, these two positions do not go together.

26.   The learned AGP has submitted that Documents Nos. 7689
and 7690 of the year 2003 were Development Agreements,
whereas Document No. 2414 of the year 2012 was an Agreement
for Sale or Conveyance. It is submitted that the nature of these
documents is different, and the stamp duty paid on the earlier
Development    Agreements     cannot   be   adjusted    against     the



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subsequent instrument.

27.   I am unable to accept this submission in the manner in
which it is made. Section 4 applies where several instruments are
employed for completing a single transaction of, amongst other
things, “development agreement” or “sale”. Therefore, merely
because one document may have the character of a development
agreement and the final document is a conveyance, that fact by
cannot take the matter outside the scope of Section 4. The entire
transaction is required to be examined. In the present case, the
earlier documents gave extensive rights in respect of the property
to the Petitioner and the question of possession was dealt with
therein. The subsequent Supplementary Agreements recorded that
possession had been handed over. The final Conveyance does not
appear to have started a new transaction. It was executed for
completing the transfer of rights which was the subject matter of
the earlier arrangements. The record shows that the area conveyed
was less than the area mentioned in the earlier documents because
part of the land had been acquired for road widening. This
circumstance shows that the final Conveyance was concerning the
same original land transaction, though the area available for final
conveyance had changed during the period in between. Merely
because the final document covered the remaining available area,
it does not create a new transaction separate from the earlier
agreements.

28.   The Authorities have relied upon the conduct of the
Petitioner. According to them, the Petitioner adopted different
descriptions of the documents at different stages according to its



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convenience. The translated order records that the parties
described the documents differently before different authorities
and, according to the Authority, this resulted in avoiding stamp
duty on the market value prevailing at the relevant time.

29.   There is some substance in the criticism that the Petitioner's
stand regarding the exact character of the earlier instruments has
not remained consistent. The record shows that stamp duty at the
rate of 1% was paid on the earlier documents under Article 5(g-a).
The appellate order records that the Petitioner relied upon the
documents being agreements for sale with possession, whereas at
an earlier stage they were treated as development agreements for
payment of stamp duty. However, inconsistency in the description
given by a party cannot authorise the Authorities to levy stamp
duty contrary to the statutory scheme. Stamp duty is required to
be determined according to the real nature and legal effect of the
instrument. The liability cannot be decided only on the basis of
estoppel when the document and the provisions of law require
examination of its real substance.

30.   The appellate Authority has observed that because the
Petitioner paid stamp duty under Article 5(g-a), it was not open for
the Petitioner to later contend that the documents were
agreements for sale. The Authority has relied upon what is
described as the “Principle of Estopel”. In my view, this reasoning
by is not sufficient for deciding the legal nature of the instrument.
If, on proper reading, an earlier instrument attracted a particular
provision of the Stamp Act, its stamp duty liability was required to
be determined according to law. The description accepted earlier



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by the Authority or adopted by the party cannot change the
character of the document.

31.   Article 5(g-a), relied upon by the Respondents, relates to an
Agreement “if relating to giving authority or power to a promoter
or a developer, by whatever name called, for construction on,
development of or, sale or transfer (in any manner whatsoever) of,
any immovable property.” The duty prescribed is “The same duty
as is leviable on a Conveyance under clause (b), [or (c)], as the
case may be, of Article 25, on the market value of the property”.
Therefore, Article 5(g-a) does not support an approach that a
document called a Development Agreement can be separated from
the final transfer without examining the rights created under that
document. The provision deals with an agreement giving authority
for development, sale or transfer of immovable property.
Therefore, the real substance of the document remain important.

32.   The next important question concerns the market value
applicable to the transaction. Section 2(na) provides:

      “Section 2 (na) “market value” in relation to any property
      which is the subject matter of an instrument, means the price
      which such property would have fetched if sold in open
      market on the date of execution of such instrument or the
      consideration stated in the instrument, whichever is higher;”
33.   The statutory definition makes the date of execution of “such
instrument” relevant. Therefore, where a particular instrument is
independently liable for ad valorem stamp duty, its market value
has to be considered with reference to the date on which that
instrument was executed, subject to the consideration stated in it




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being higher. The Authorities have proceeded on the basis that the
market value of the property on 19 March 2012 was Rs.
61,09,89,500/- and, therefore, stamp duty at the rate of 5% was
payable on that value. After deducting Rs. 45,00,000/- paid by the
Petitioner, deficit stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/- has been
demanded. Such a conclusion could have been possible if the
Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 was to be treated as a
independent instrument involving a new transfer, with no
relevance of the earlier documents under Section 4. However, that
is not the factual position which comes from the record. The
calculation made at the time of registration of the Conveyance
shows that the earlier instruments and the consideration of Rs. 5
crore were treated as relevant for the final Conveyance and credit
was given for the stamp duty paid. The first order records that the
earlier documents were used as the basis for calculating stamp
duty at the time of registration of the Conveyance in 2012. It
records that the aggregate consideration in the earlier documents
was Rs. 5 crore, the duty calculated on that amount was Rs. 50
lakh and, after adjusting the earlier payment of Rs. 5 lakh, an
amount of Rs. 45 lakh was collected.

34.   Once this factual position is accepted, the question is
whether, after registration of the Conveyance and acceptance of
stamp duty on that basis, the Authorities could again treat the
document of 2012 as a fresh and independent transaction and
calculate duty on the market value of Rs. 61,09,89,500/-. In my
view, the answer has to be in the negative, considering the
applicability of Section 4 to the facts of the present case. The



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purpose of Section 4 is not that no stamp duty is payable on the
transaction. The purpose is that where several instruments are
used for completing the same transaction, full duty is payable on
the principal instrument, while the other instruments do not
attract repeated ad valorem duty in respect of the same
transaction. In the present matter, the Authorities proceeded on
the basis of the aggregate transaction value of Rs. 5 crore and
collected the balance duty after giving credit for the amount paid.

35.   The submission of the Petitioner that the market value or
consideration prevailing under the earlier instruments must be
accepted cannot be accepted only because the Petitioner relies
upon certificates issued under Section 269UL of the Income Tax
Act. Such certificates issued by the Appropriate Authority do not
determine the market value for the purpose of the Maharashtra
Stamp Act. The first order correctly records that such certificates
only show no objection to the proposed transfer for the apparent
consideration and do not fix the market value for stamp duty
purposes. Therefore, the Petitioner's reliance upon the Income Tax
certificates for determining the market value is rejected to that
extent. However, this does not decide the controversy against the
Petitioner. The case of the Petitioner succeeds on a different basis,
namely that the instruments formed part of one transaction and
were required to be considered under Section 4.

36.   The Respondents have relied upon the Annual Statement of
Rates and the rate of Rs. 16,800/- per square metre. On that basis,
the market value of Rs. 61,09,89,500/- was arrived at. This
calculation is based upon the assumption that the market value



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prevailing on 19 March 2012 was relevant for imposing full ad
valorem stamp duty on the Conveyance. There is no material
placed before this Court to show that the mathematical calculation
based upon the applicable Annual Statement of Rates was, by,
incorrect. The case of the Petitioner does not require this Court to
hold that the market value of the property in 2012 was not Rs.
61,09,89,500/-. That question loses its importance once it is held
that the instrument of 2012 was one amongst several instruments
employed for completing the earlier transaction and was required
to be considered under Section 4.

37.   The impugned orders have proceeded on the basis that
because the earlier documents and the final Conveyance were
described differently, Section 4 could not apply. This approach does
not consider the statutory requirement whether the several
instruments were “employed for completing the transaction”. The
Authorities have concentrated on the separate names and
descriptions of the documents. The continuous nature of the
transaction and the fact that the final Conveyance completed the
transfer contemplated under the earlier arrangements has not been
given proper effect. The first Authority has observed that
possession under the earlier documents was only for development
and was in the nature of a licence, whereas possession after
execution of the Conveyance was different. It is true that the
earlier documents use words concerning development rights and
licence. However, the documents give substantial authority to the
Petitioner to enter the property, carry out construction and
development and continue such rights until the ownership rights



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were transferred. The document of 1999 records actual and open
possession. Therefore, even if the possession under the earlier
instruments was described as being for development, that fact by
does not establish that the subsequent Conveyance was a separate
transaction having no connection with those instruments. The later
Conveyance was for completing the transfer contemplated under
the earlier arrangements. Section 4 deals with such a situation
where more than one instrument is used for completing one
transaction.

38.   The appellate Authority has referred to the failure of the
Petitioner to register the earlier documents within the prescribed
period and has treated such delay as a circumstance against the
Petitioner. The material shows that the earlier agreements were
executed in 1995 and 1999, whereas the Supplementary
Agreements were registered in 2003. The record shows that the
Authority considered the provisions of the Registration Act
concerning delayed presentation. Such circumstance may have
consequences under the Registration Act or in relation to the
manner in which the earlier documents were dealt with. However,
delay in registration cannot convert a transaction which otherwise
appears to be one continuous transaction into several independent
transactions for the purpose of Section 4. The question under
Section 4 still remains whether the several instruments were
employed for completing one transaction. That question has to be
answered by considering the documents and the whole transaction
together.




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39.   The Authorities have referred to a notice dated 23 December
1997. According to the record, the Petitioner was informed that
the earlier document was liable to stamp duty under Article 25 as
an Agreement for Sale or deemed conveyance. The appellate order
records that despite this notice, the Petitioner did not pay stamp
duty at that stage and paid duty at the rate of 1%. This
circumstance does show that the conduct of the Petitioner in
relation to payment of stamp duty cannot be said to be free from
doubt. It shows that the Revenue had, at an earlier stage,
considered the document from another legal angle. However, the
present proceeding is concerned with the legality of the demand of
Rs. 2,60,49,475/- on the Conveyance dated 19 March 2012. The
conduct of the Petitioner, by, cannot justify a demand which
otherwise is not consistent with Section 4. It is necessary to note
that the final order directs payment of the alleged deficit stamp
duty together with penalty at the rate of 2% per month from the
date of execution. The appellate Authority has referred to
maximum fine and recovery as arrears of land revenue. The
translated order records the conclusion that the document of 2012
was under stamped by Rs. 2,60,49,475/- and directs recovery
together with 2% monthly penalty. The foundation of the entire
demand is the conclusion that the Conveyance dated 19 March
2012 was liable for stamp duty on the market value prevailing in
the year 2012. Once this conclusion cannot be sustained because
of the application of Section 4, the consequential demand of deficit
stamp duty and the penalty based upon such alleged deficit cannot
survive.




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40.   I am, therefore, of the view that this is not a case where the
Petitioner can contend that no stamp duty at all was payable on
the transaction. It is not possible to accept the Petitioner's
submission that the Income Tax certificates fixed the market value
for stamp duty purposes. These submissions are rejected to that
extent. At the same time, the submission of the Respondents that
the   earlier   Development   Agreements    and    the      subsequent
Conveyance were separate transactions cannot be accepted. The
material on record does not support such a conclusion. The
documents show a continuous transaction concerning the same
property, the same owners and the Petitioner. Under these
documents, rights were created from time to time, possession was
dealt with, and the transaction was completed by execution of the
Conveyance.

41.   On overall consideration of the material, I hold that the
Agreements dated 9 June 1995 and 31 December 1999, the
subsequent instruments and the Conveyance dated 19 March 2012
were several instruments employed for completing one transaction
within the meaning of Section 4 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act,
1958. Merely because different names were given to the
documents, that by cannot change this conclusion. Consequently,
the benefit of Section 4 could not have been refused only because
the earlier documents were described as Development Agreements
and the later instrument was described as a Conveyance or
Agreement for Sale. The Authorities were required to consider the
transaction as a whole and determine the principal instrument for
the purpose of charging the highest duty as contemplated by



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Section 4. In the present case, the manner in which stamp duty
was accepted by taking the aggregate consideration of Rs. 5 crore
and by giving credit for the amount paid shows that the
instruments were treated as connected parts of the same
transaction. The later demand based upon the market value of the
property as on 19 March 2012, after ignoring the earlier connected
instruments for the purpose of Section 4, amounts to treating the
same transaction as if a fresh and independent transfer had taken
place in the year 2012. Such an approach is not in accordance with
the scheme of Section 4.

42.   For these reasons, the finding of the Authorities that the
Petitioner was liable to pay deficit stamp duty of Rs. 2,60,49,475/-
on the basis of market value of Rs. 61,09,89,500/- cannot be
sustained. The consequential direction for payment of penalty at
the rate of 2% per month and other recovery based upon the said
alleged deficit cannot survive. The impugned Judgment and Order
dated 19 July 2014 passed by the Collector of Stamps and the
Order dated 16 March 2015 passed by the Deputy Inspector
General of Registration and Deputy Controller of Stamps are,
therefore, required to be set aside.

43.   In view of the above discussion, the following order is
passed:

      (i)    The Writ Petition is allowed;

      (ii)   The Judgment and Order dated 19 July 2014 passed by
      Respondent No. 4, the Collector of Stamps, and the Order
      dated 16 March 2015 passed by Respondent No. 3, the



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Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Deputy
Controller of Stamps, are quashed and set aside;

(iii) The demand for alleged deficit stamp duty of Rs.
2,60,49,475/- in respect of the Deed of Conveyance dated 19
March 2012, together with the consequential penalty and
other charges, stands quashed and set aside;

(iv) It is declared that, in the facts of the present case, the
instruments forming part of the transaction are required to
be considered in accordance with Section 4 of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, and the Respondents could
not treat the Deed of Conveyance dated 19 March 2012 as a
wholly independent transaction for levying fresh stamp duty
on the market value determined as on the date of execution
of the said Deed;

(v)   Rule is made absolute in the above terms.

(vi) There shall be no order as to costs.

                                       (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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