KHANDU PANDURANG GANGURDEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

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        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
              CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

       CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 1644 OF 2026

Khandu Pandurang Gangurde.
Age 62 years, an Indian, residing at
Vijay Chowk, Munjababa chowk, Phule
Nagar, peth Road, Panchavati, Nashik.        …    Petitioner.

         V/s.

1. The State of Maharashtra,
   Through the Secretary, Home
   Department (Special),
   Mantralaya, Mumbai-400 032.

2. The Commissioner of Police,
   Nashik City. Nashik.

3. The Superintendent of Nashik
   Road Central Prison, Nashik.              …    Respondents

                              __________
Ms.Aisha Ansari for the Petitioner.
Ms.M.M.Deshmukh, Addl.PP for the Respondent- State.
                               _________

                CORAM : SARANG V. KOTWAL &
                        RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, JJ.

                DATE    : 11th September 2026.

JUDGMENT:       (Per Sarang V. Kotwal, J.)


1.     The Petitioner has challenged the detention of his son Rohit
Gangurde, who was detained in pursuance of the order dated 9 th
December 2025 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Nashik City-
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Respondent No.2. The order was passed under Maharashtra
Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 (“MPDA Act” for short).


2.        By a separate committal order dated 9th December 2025, he
was directed to be detained at the Central Prison, Nashik Road,
Nashik.


3.        The State Government approved the detention order passed
by Respondent No.2 on 18th December 2025. A reference was made
to the Advisory Board under section 10 of the MPDA Act, on 18 th
December 2025.       The Advisory Board gave its opinion dated 27 th
January 2026.     It was received by the Government on 27 th January
2026 and the order of detention was confirmed by the State
Government on 11th February 2026.


4.        Heard Ms. Ansari, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Ms.
Deshmukh, learned Addl.PP for the Respondent- State.


5.        The Petitioner was served with the grounds of detention
dated 9th December 2025 along with the detention order. The
grounds of detention run into 14 paragraphs. The relevant averments
contained in the grounds of detention are referred to in the following
paragraphs at appropriate places.


6.        Paragraph-1 records that Respondent No.2 was intimating
the detenu of the basic points mentioned in paragraphs- 4A, 4A(i),
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4A(ii) and 5(i) and 5(ii) based on which the detention order under
section 3(2) of the MPDA Act was issued. Paragraphs 4A(i) and
4A(ii) refer to two registered offences and paragraph 5(i) and 5(ii)
refer to two in-camera statements.


7.      Paragraph-2 of the grounds of detention mentions that the
criminal record of the detenu shows that as per section 2(b-1) of the
MPDA Act, the detenu was a dangerous person. The public order in
the areas of Pethroad, Navnath Nagar, Phule Nagar, Shani Mandir,
Macchi Market, Dindori Naka, Sharad Pawar Market Yard,
Bhaktidham and the areas nearby and adjacent were in danger.


8.      Paragraph-3 specifically mentions that there were various
offences registered against the detenu, those offences indicated his
past criminal background and that Respondent No.2 has considered
them only to understand his criminal background as well as his
mentality, nature and method. It was specifically further mentioned
that they are only referred rather than relying on it, but he was
definitely relying on two offences mentioned in paragraphs- 4A,
4A(i) and 4A(ii) and two confidential statements mentioned in
paragraphs- 5(i) and 5(ii).


9.      Paragraph- 3A gives the list of seven offences. Six of those
offences were registered at Panchavati Police Station and the seventh
offence was registered at Mhasrul Police Station.         They were
registered between the years 2017 to 2023. Paragraph-3B mentions
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Chapter Case No.51/2021 under section 129 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS” for short) dated 20 th August 2025
initiated at the instance of Panchavati Police Station. In that case, a
bond was taken on 22nd August 2025. There is another order passed
under section 56(1)(a)(b) of the Maharashtra Police Act dated 3 rd
August 2023 externing the detenu for a period of two years from the
jurisdiction of Nashik City and Nashik Rural.   Apart from these two
actions, there is a reference to the earlier Detention Order dated 8 th
September 2021 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Nashik City
bearing No.D.O./2021/MPDA/DET-09/CB-17 pursuant to which he
was detained for one year. He was released from the Central Prison,
Nashik Road on 8th September 2022 after completion of twelve
months detention.


10.     Paragrpah- 4 of the grounds of detention refers to two
cognizable offences. Paragraph-4A(i) gives the details of CR
No.363/2025 registered at Panchavati Police Station on 23 rd July
2025 under section 194(2), 189(2), 191(1), 191(2) and 190 of the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS” for short) read with section 7
of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 read with section 142 of the
Maharashtra Police Act. The incident was dated 23 rd July 2025. The
incident involved a quarrel between two groups. Firing took place
during the incident. Stones and bottles were thrown at each other.
The detenu reached the spot. A scuffle went on between two groups.
The police prevented further acceleration of the offence but they kept
fighting amongst themselves. The Crime Investigation Team Officer
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identified the accused. The detenu was one of them and, hence an
offence was registered against him.       He was issued a notice under
section 35(3) of BNSS.


11.    Paragraph-4A(ii) refers to CR No.452/2025 registered at
Panchavati Police Station on 26th September 2025 under sections
109, 126(2), 352, 351(2), 351(3), 329(4) and 3(5) of BNS read with
section 4/25 of the Arms Act.         The offence was in respect of an
incident dated 25th September 2025 which took place at 8.30 pm.
The detenu pointed a sharp weapon on the complainant’s neck and
threatened him and the crowd near him. In that connection the
detenu was arrested on 26th September 2025. He was granted bail
on 4th November 2025.


12.    Paragraph-5(i) of the grounds of detention refers to the in-
camera statement of witness-A recorded on 18th November 2025 in
respect of the incident that took place in third week of August 2025.
The detenu in the evening time took out a chopper and threatened
the witness and forcibly removed Rs.1,100/-. He threatened the
crowd that had gathered there.


13.    Paragraph-5(ii) refers to the in-camera statement of witness-
B recorded on 18th November 2025 in respect of incident that took
place in the first week of September 2025. It was a similar incident
involving the issuance of threats at the knife point and forcible
removal of Rs.800/-. The crowd was also threatened.
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14.    Paragraph-6 of the grounds of detention mentions that
Respondent No.2 had minutely considered the offences of the recent
past mentioned in paragraphs- 4A(i) and 4A(ii) and the confidential
statements mentioned in paragraphs- 5(i) and 5(ii) which were
submitted before him. It is further mentioned that the detenu had
proved himself to be a dangerous person within the meaning of
section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act.


15.    Paragraph- 8 of the grounds of detention further mentions
that the detaining Authority, on       careful examination of all the
documents submitted before him, reached to the conclusion that the
detenu's criminal activities were adversely affecting public order and
further satisfaction was recorded that it was necessary to detain him
under the MPDA Act.


16.    Paragraph- 14 further emphasizes that Respondent No.2 had
intimated to the detenu about the offences registered against him
and mentioned in paragraph-3(A) showing his previous criminal
background and that those were used only for reference and the said
background neither inferred his mind to pass the detention order
nor was he relying upon them to pass the detention order.


17.    The learned counsel         for the Petitioner submitted that
Respondent No.2 had taken into consideration the past history. On
the previous occasion, the detention order was passed based on the
same past history of the same registered offences and, therefore,
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Respondent No.2 on this occasion could not have passed the
detention order based on the same registered offences.      She invited
our attention to the grounds furnished to the detenu on the earlier
occasion, i.e. in connection with the detention order dated 8 th
September 2021.     Those grounds of detention dated 8 th September
2021 make a reference to CR No.830/2019, CR No.394/2020, CR
No.48/2021, and CR No.117/2021.            All these offences were
registered at Panchavati Police Station and all of these offences were
mentioned in paragraph-3(A) of the grounds of detention of the
present detention order under challenge.    She, therefore, submitted
that this course was not open to the detaining Authority.


18.     Learned counsel relied on ground (iv) taken in the Petition
which reads as follows:
       "(iv) The Petitioner says and submits that in the grounds
       of detention the detaining authority has kept reliance on
       7 pending cases against the detenu. It is to be noted out
       of which four CRS have already considered by the than
       detaining authority when he has issued the impugned
       Order of detention dated 08.09.2021 against the detenu.

               The Petitioner states that again the detaining
       authority has relied the said stale ground which has been
       already considered by the detaining authority while
       issuing detention order against the detenu dated
       08.09.2021. The petitioner states that in the ground of
       detention the detaining authority stated that to show that
       the detenu is a habitual offender by listing 7 crimes. The
       detenu has undergone a whole one year of imprisonment
       and thus it come to finality. The Petitioner states that
       against considering the same offence shows non-
       application of mind on the part of detaining authority.
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        This shows non application of mind on the part of
        detaining authority which makes subjective satisfaction of
        the detaining authority as sham and unreal. The
        Impugned Order of detention based on such satisfaction
        is malafide null and void."


19.     In support of her contention, she relied on the following
three judgments:
(i)     Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar v. N.L.Kalna and others reported
in (1989) 2 SCC 318;
(ii)    Jahangirkhan Fazalkhan Pathan           v.   Police Commissioner,
Ahmadabad and another reported in (1989) 3 SCC 590; and
(iii)   Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana and others reported
in (2023) 9 SCC 587.


20.     Learned A.P.P, on the other hand, relied on the affidavit-in-
reply filed by Respondent No.2. The response to ground (iv) of the
Petition is mentioned in paragraph-15 of the affidavit-in-reply of
Respondent No.2, which reads thus:
        "15.     With reference to Ground No.5(iv) of the Petition, it is
        denied that again considering the same offence shows non
        application of mind on the part of detaining authority which
        makes subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as sham
        and unreal. It is further denied that the Order of detention
        based on such satisfaction is malafide null and void.

                It is further submitted that the satisfaction arrived at by
        the detaining authority is based on relevant and good
        conscience grounds.

                 It is further submitted that, the offences registered
        against the detenu, indicate detenu's past criminal background
        and the detaining authority have considered it only to
        understand the criminal inclination as well as detenu's
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       mentality, nature and method. The actions being done by the
       detenu and its impact on the society were closely observed and
       understood. However, it is only referred rather than relying on
       it. The detaining authority has definitely relied on two offences
       mentioned and two confidential statements in the grounds.

                It is submitted that from the above facts and
       circumstances the detaining authority had reached to a clear
       and certain inference that petitioner is a hardened criminal,
       who creates fear and terror in the areas and for whom,
       established penal code of law and preventive actions have failed
       to stop from committing unlawful activities. From the series of
       past offences, it is learnt that whenever detenu committed an
       offence, he after getting released on bail, he repeatedly
       committed offences thereby disturbing the public tempo.
       Therefore, in light of the circumstances and incidents the
       detaining authority was constrained to reach conclusion that no
       other option is left other than detaining the petitioner under
       Section 3(2) of MPDA Act 1981 to maintain the public order.

               The detention order is based on good legal conscience
       and cogent and material evidence.”


21.    We have considered these submissions. In case of Chhagan
Bhagwan Kahar (supra), the relevant observations are made in
paragraphs 12, 13 and 15, which read thus:
       “12.     It emerges from the above authoritative judicial
       pronouncements that even if the order of detention comes to
       an end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of
       detention there must be fresh facts for passing a subsequent
       order. A fortiori when a detention order is quashed by the
       court issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas corpus or
       certiorari the grounds of the said order should not be taken
       into consideration either as a whole or in part even along
       with the fresh grounds of detention for drawing the requisite
       subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh order because once the
       court strikes down an earlier order by issuing rule it nullifies
       the entire order.”

       “13.     In the present case, no doubt, the order of detention
SKN                          10 of 21                  314-WP-1644.26


      contains fresh facts. In addition to that the detaining
      authority has referred to the earlier detention order and the
      judgment of the High Court quashing it, presumably for the
      purpose of showing that the detenu in spite of earlier
      detention order was continuing his bootlegging activities.
      But what the detaining authority says clearly in para 9 of his
      affidavit in reply is that he took into consideration the
      previous grounds of detention also for his conclusion that the
      detenu “was engaged in bootlegging activities since long”. In
      other words the detaining authority has taken into
      consideration the earlier grounds of detention which grounds
      had been nullified by the High Court in Special Criminal
      Application No. 46 of 1987 by issuing a prerogative writ of
      habeas corpus.”

      “15.     Mr Poti has sought to explain the statement of the
      detaining authority made in his counter saying that the
      earlier proceeding was considered only for limited purpose
      of taking note of the detenu's continued involvement of
      bootlegging activities; but the entire grounds of earlier
      detention as they were, were not considered. We are unable
      to accept this explanation because the detaining authority, in
      the counter, in clear terms had expressed that he considered
      the earlier grounds of detention also. Incidentally, it was
      brought to our notice that a copy of the earlier grounds of
      detention was also one of the documents furnished to the
      detenu in the present case which confirms the fact that the
      detaining authority has considered the earlier grounds of
      detention along with other documents for drawing his
      requisite subjective satisfaction for passing this impugned
      order. In other words, the earlier grounds of detention dated
      2-1-1987, quashed by the High Court was one of the material
      documents considered by the detaining authority in drawing
      his subjective satisfaction. Therefore, we hold that this order
      of detention is vitiated on the ground that the detaining
      authority has taken into consideration the grounds of earlier
      detention order along with other materials for passing this
      impugned order. Hence, the order is liable to be set aside.
      Accordingly, we quash the detention order on this ground
      and direct that the detenu be set at liberty forthwith if his
      detention is not required for any other case.”
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        There is a major difference in the case before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and the present case. In the case before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the earlier detention order was quashed by the High
Court and hence it was observed that once the Court strikes down an
earlier order by issuing rule, it nullifies the entire order. Further it
was also noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the reply of the
detaining   Authority     clearly    mentioned       that    he     took     into
consideration the previous grounds of detention also for reaching his
conclusion in passing the fresh detention order. Such is not the case
in the facts of the present case.         First of all, the earlier detention
order was not set aside by the High Court and, more importantly,
Respondent No.2 is very specific in his grounds as well as in his reply
that he has not taken into consideration the past history of the
detenu for passing the present detention order but he has only
referred to that history.   The Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed
in paragraph-15 that the detaining Authority, in clear terms had
expressed that he had considered the earlier grounds of detention
also. In the present case, the detaining Authority has specifically
stated that he has not considered the previous offences which were
subject matter of the earlier detention order.


22.     Similarly, even the observations in Jahangirkhan Fazalkhan
Pathan (supra) does not help the detenu in the present case. The
relevant observations in the said case are mentioned in paragraphs-5
and 7, which read thus:
        “5.     The most important question that posed itself for
        consideration in this case is whether the detaining authority
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      while considering the fresh facts disclosed in the grounds of
      detention has taken into consideration the earlier two
      detention orders — one of 1985 under the National Security
      Act and the other of 1986 under the PASA Act in forming his
      subjective satisfaction that the detenu in spite of the passing
      of the earlier two detention orders has been persistently
      indulging in his anti-social activities and as such in
      preventing such criminal activities which posed a threat to
      the maintenance of public order the impugned order of
      detention has been made by him. It is now well settled by the
      decisions of this Court while considering the scope of Section
      15 of PASA Act that the modification and revocation of
      detention order by the State Government shall not bar
      making of another detention order on fresh facts when the
      period of detention has come to an end either by revocation
      or by expiry of the period of detention”

      “7.       In the present case, admittedly in the grounds of
      detention specific reference has been made to the earlier two
      orders of detention made in 1985 and 1986 against the
      petitioner. It is also evident that in the schedule of documents
      annexed to the grounds of detention not only the copies of
      the order of detention but also of the grounds of detention in
      the earlier detention cases have been given to the petitioner.
      It also appears from the statements made in the grounds of
      detention that the detaining authority took into consideration
      the previous grounds of detention as well as the orders made
      therein even though the same were nullified by the High
      Court as well as by the Advisory Body, presumably, for the
      purpose of showing that the detenu in spite of those earlier
      orders of detention was continuing in his bootlegging
      activities. It has been tried to be contended on behalf of the
      detaining authority that though the earlier two detention
      orders have been mentioned in the grounds of detention and
      the copy of the orders passed in the previous detention cases
      as well as the grounds of detention were supplied to the
      detenu yet these were not at all considered by him in forming
      subjective satisfaction for clamping the order of detention.
      This submission cannot be sustained in view of the
      statements made in the grounds of detention.”
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       It was observed that         from the statements made in the
grounds of detention it appeared that that the detaining Authority
took into consideration the previous grounds of detention as well as
the orders made therein even though the same were nullified by the
High Court as well as by the Advisory Board. Again, the facts in this
case and the statement of the detaining Authority in the case before
us are entirely different. Therefore, even this judgment does not
help the detenu.


23.    The learned counsel then relied on the case of Ameena
Begum (supra). In this context, paragraphs 49, 50, 53, 55 and 56
are important, which are as follows:
       “49.     Now, we proceed with the second issue as to whether
       there was proper application of mind to all relevant
       circumstances or whether consideration of extraneous factors
       has vitiated the detention order.”

       “50.      Considering past criminal history, which is
       proximate, by itself would not render an order illegal. The
       Commissioner in the detention order made pointed reference
       to the detenu being a habitual offender by listing 10 (ten)
       criminal proceedings in which the detenu was involved
       during the years 2019-2020, consequent to which the detenu
       was preventively detained under the Act vide order of
       detention dated 4-3-2021, since quashed by the High Court
       by its order dated 16-8-2021 [Hakeem Khan v. State of
       Telangana, 2021 SCC OnLine TS 3663] . It is then stated
       therein that the detenu had committed 9 (nine) offences in
       the years 2022-2023, and these offences are again listed out
       in detail. However, the Commissioner states that the present
       order of detention is based only on 5 (five) out of these 9
       (nine) crimes, which are alleged to show that the detenu's
       activities are “prejudicial to the maintenance of public order,
       apart from disturbing peace and tranquillity in the area”.”
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      “53.       Although the Commissioner sought to project that he
      ordered detention based on the said 5 (five) FIRs, indication
      of the past offences allegedly committed by the detenu in the
      detention order having influenced his thought process is
      clear. With the quashing of the order of detention dated 4-3-
      2021 by the High Court and such direction having attained
      finality, it defies logic why the Commissioner embarked on an
      elaborate narration of past offences, which are not relevant to
      the grounds of the present order of detention. This is exactly
      what this Court in Khaja Bilal Ahmed [Khaja Bilal
      Ahmed v. State of Telangana, (2020) 13 SCC 632: (2020) 4
      SCC (Cri) 629] deprecated. Also, as noted above, this Court
      in Shibban Lal Saksena [Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of U.P.,
      (1953) 2 SCC 617: AIR 1954 SC 179] held that such an order
      would be a bad order, the reason being that it could not be
      said in what manner and to what extent the valid and invalid
      grounds operated on the mind of the authority concerned
      and contributed to his subjective satisfaction forming the
      basis of the order.”

      “55.    Since the aforesaid order of the High Court went
      unchallenged and is, thus, binding upon the parties, it was
      not open to the Commissioner to refer to the very same
      antecedent offences again in the detention order under
      challenge. There was no direct nexus or link with the
      immediate need to order detention and we hold extraneous
      considerations having found their way into the detention
      order.”

      “56.      The other aspect requiring some guidance for
      detaining authorities and on which we wish to comment is
      that there is no requirement in law of orders of detention
      being expressed in language that would normally be
      considered elegant or artistic. An order of detention, which is
      capable of comprehension, has to precisely set forth the
      grounds of detention without any vagueness. The substance of
      the order and how it is understood by the detenu determines
      its nature. An order in plain and simple language providing
      clarity of how the subjective satisfaction was formed is what a
      detenu would look for, since the detenu has a right to
      represent against the order of detention and claim that such
      order should not have been made at all. If the detenu fails to
      comprehend the grounds of detention, the very purpose of
SKN                             15 of 21                  314-WP-1644.26


        affording him the opportunity to make a representation could
        be defeated. At the same time, the detaining authority ought
        to ensure that the order does not manifest consideration of
        extraneous factors. The detaining authority must be cautious
        and circumspect that no extra or additional word or sentence
        finds place in the order of detention, which evinces the
        human factor — his mindset of either acting with personal
        predilection by invoking the stringent preventive detention
        laws to avoid or oust judicial scrutiny, given the restrictions of
        judicial review in such cases, or as an authority charged with
        the notion of overreaching the courts, chagrined and
        frustrated by orders granting bail to the detenu despite stiff
        opposition raised by the State and thereby failing in the
        attempt to keep the detenu behind bars.”

        The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph-50
that the past criminal history, which is proximate, by itself would not
render the order illegal. In that case also, the previous detention
order dated 4th March 2021 was quashed by the High Court.                  The
detention order under consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court   mentioned that the detenu therein had committed nine
offences in the years 2022-2023. The detaining Authority had stated
that the order of detention was based only on five out of nine
offences. In paragraph- 53, it was observed that once the earlier
detention order was quashed by the High Court, it defies logic as to
why the Commissioner embarked on an elaborate narration of past
offences.   In paragraph-55, it was observed that once the earlier
detention order was quashed, it was not open to the Commissioner
to refer to the very same antecedents again in the detention order
under challenge.        There was no direct nexus or link with the
immediate need to order detention and hence it was extraneous
consideration for passing the detention order. More importantly, the
SKN                             16 of 21                  314-WP-1644.26


Hon’ble Supreme Court had reproduced the specific averments made
by the detaining Authority in the detention order under challenge.
Those averments reproduced in paragraph-57 are as follows:
        "        As seen from his past criminal history, background
        and antecedents and also his habitual nature of committing
        crimes one after the other and his efforts to come out of the
        prison, I strongly believe that if such a habitual criminal is set
        free, his activities would not be safe to the society and there
        is an imminent possibility of his committing similar offences
        by violating the bail conditions in one of the cases, which
        would be detrimental to public order, unless he is
        preventively detained from doing so by an appropriate order
        of detention."


        Thus, in the said case under consideration before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the Commissioner had referred to the detenu’s
criminal history, background and antecedents as well as the habitual
nature of committing crimes.               Based on these factors, the
Commissioner had recorded his belief that unless he was
preventively detained there was imminent possibility of his
committing similar offences.          In the present case before us, the
Respondent No.2 has not recorded any such satisfaction or belief
based on the detenu’s criminal history, background and antecedents.
On the contrary, Respondent No.2 is very specific in restricting basis
of his satisfaction only on two registered offences and two in-camera
statements mentioned in paragraphs- 4 and 5.            In the facts of the
case of Ameena Begum (supra), it can be seen that the earlier
detention order was quashed by the High Court.               Therefore, the
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were in the context of
those facts.
SKN                           17 of 21                 314-WP-1644.26




24.     In this background, it is necessary to reproduce, emphasize
and refer to the averments made by Respondent No.2 in the grounds
of detention, even at the cost of repetition. They are as follows:
(i)     "…..I, hereby intimate you basic points mentioned in the
        following paragraph nos. 4(A), 4(A)(i), 4(A)(ii) and 5 (i) &
        (ii) whereby detention order under 3(2) of the said Act is
        issued…..”        -- (Para-1)

(ii)    "In times gone by, following offences are registered against
        you. They indicate your past criminal background and I have
        considered it only to understand criminal background as well
        as your mentality, nature and method. The actions being done
        by you and its impact on the society were closely observed
        and understood. However, it is only referred rather than
        relying on it. I am definitely relying on two offences
        mentioned in paragraph nos. 4(A), 4(A)(i) 4(A)(ii) and two
        confidential statements mentioned in paragraph nos. 5(i) and
        (ii)." -- (Para-3)


After mentioning this, the list of seven registered offences is given.


(iii)   "......The said detention order has been issued by me, the
        detaining authority, basically relying on the following two
        offences mentioned in paragraph no. 4(A), 4(A)(i) 4(A)(ii)
        and two confidential statements mentioned in paragraph
        nos.5(i) and 5 (ii)." -- (Para-4)

(iv)    "I have minutely considered the offences of recent past
        mentioned in paragraph 4(A), 4(A)(i) 4(A)(ii) and
        confidential statements mentioned in paragraph nos. 5(i) and
        5(ii) which were submitted before me….."

        "Thus, you have proved yourself to be a 'dangerous person' as
        per the meaning provided under Section 2(b-1) of
        "Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
        Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons,
        Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons engaged in Black-
SKN                             18 of 21                 314-WP-1644.26


         marketing of Essential Commodities, Illegal Gambling, Illegal
         Lottery and Human Traffickers Act, 1981" (No. LV of 1981)
         (Amendment 1996, 2009, 2015 and 2025)." -- (Para-6)

(v)      "On careful examination of the documents submitted before
         me, I have reached the conclusion that your criminal
         activities are adversely affecting public order….." -- (Para-8)

(vi)     "You are hereby intimated that the offences registered against
         you and mentioned in paragraph No.3(A) shows your
         previous criminal background and those are used only for
         reference and this background neither inferred my mind to
         make the detention order, nor am I relied upon them to pass
         the detention order."

         "You are also hereby intimated that at the time of issuing
         detention order, all the documents mentioned in Paragraph
         nos. 4(A), 4(A)(i), 4(A)(ii) & 5(i) and 5(ii) are considered
         and are hereby attached….." -- (Para-14)



25.      Thus, it can be seen that Respondent No.2 has been very
categorical in repeatedly emphasizing the fact that he has considered
only the grounds mentioned in paragraphs- 4 and 5 of the grounds of
detention and he had not taken antecedents and earlier offences into
consideration. They were only referred to as past history and the
subjective satisfaction was not based on those grounds. This has
been made more than clear by Respondent No.2.                   The earlier
detention order was not set aside and the detenu was released only
after completing the entire period of detention under the said earlier
order.   Therefore, the facts before us are materially different. The
subjective satisfaction of Respondent No.2 demonstrates that he had
applied his mind and that after considering all the factors had passed
the detention order. We do not find any fault with this approach and
SKN                           19 of 21               314-WP-1644.26


the subjective satisfaction recorded by him. It was based only on
fresh incidents which were not part of the earlier detention order.


26.     Apart from the above submissions, the learned counsel for
the Petitioner also made further submissions. She relied on ground
(vi) of the Petition. Ground (vi) refers to the fact that Respondent
No.2 had put his signature on the in-camera statements of witness-A
and witness-B on 8th December 2025 and the detention order was
passed on 9th December 2025. Learned counsel submitted that it was
impossible to consider the entire material and pass the order
immediately within one day.
        To this submission, learned A.P.P. invited our attention to
paragraph-17 of the affidavit-in-reply of Respondent No.2.            It is
mentioned that ACP (Crime) received the proposal on 4 th December
2025 and forwarded it to DCP (Crime) on the same day who
forwarded it to Respondent No.2 on 6 th December 2025.                The
Respondent No.2 after thoroughly perusing the proposal for three
days i.e. from 6th December 2025 to 8th December 2025, issued the
detention order on 9th December 2025.
        The learned A.P.P, therefore, submitted that the detaining
Authority had applied its mind for over three days and only then the
detention order was passed along with the grounds of detention.
The grounds of detention are of 21 pages. Signatures on the in-
camera statements note that he has put his signature on 8 th
December 2025 and after giving his thoughtful consideration to the
material before him, he passed the detention order on 9th December
2025.
SKN                          20 of 21               314-WP-1644.26


        We do not find force in the submission of learned counsel for
the Petitioner. The detaining Authority had considered the material
before it including the in-camera statements for three days and had
passed the detention order on 9th December 2025.      He had put his
signatures on the previous date as endorsement of having seen the
documents.    We do not find either the delay or non-application of
mind   on his part.     We do not find that it was impossible for
Respondent No.2 to have passed the           detention order on 9 th
December 2025.        We, therefore, do not find any force in that
submission as well.


27.     Learned counsel for the Petitioner thereafter submitted that
paragraph-4A(i) of the grounds of detention refers to CR
No.363/2025 registered at Panchavati Police Station.           The FIR
mentions enmity between two groups. She submitted that there
was nothing to substantiate the allegation in the FIR that there were
two groups. According to the learned counsel, it was necessary for
the detaining Authority to have considered and supplied the
documents showing enmity between two groups.
        We do not find any substance in this submission. The FIR
merely narrates what had occurred at the spot. The detenu was seen
at the spot and had indulged in the offence. The FIR merely notes
this fact. We do not think there was any vital document which was
not considered by Respondent No.2 in this connection and that it was
necessary to have been supplied to the detenu in this case.
SKN                          21 of 21                314-WP-1644.26


28.     The learned counsel for the Petitioner then submitted that
the detention order passed by Respondent No.2 was not immediately
communicated to the State Government. There was a window of 12
days in which the detention order passed by Respondent No.2 could
be approved    by the State Government but it was necessary for
Respondent No.2 to have sent that order immediately to the State
Government. In this context, the learned A.P.P. invited our attention
to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the State of Maharashtra.
In that affidavit it is mentioned that the report under section 3(3) of
the MPDA Act was received by the State Government                     from
Respondent No.2 on 12th December 2025 and the order was
approved on 18th December 2025. The detention order was passed
on 9th December 2025.
        We do not see any delay in Respondent No.2 sending the
order to the State Government and the State Government approving
it on 18th December 2025.     All this was done within the stipulated
period and there was no delay in that procedure. Therefore, we are
not impressed by the said argument of the learned counsel for the
Petitioner.


29.     In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this
Petition. The Petition is accordingly dismissed.


(RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, J.)           (SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.)